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Summary
For the past few decades, the losses caused by natural catastrophes have risen
continuously. Though changing hazard frequencies may explain some of this, it
cannot be neglected that human and social drivers play a role too; hence, the
importance of effective management strategies. A problem in this regard concerns
that it is often difficult to get decision-makers to prioritize preparedness planning
and risk management measures in times of calm, meaning that it is often not until
disaster has already hit that necessary reforms are being implemented.
In theory, the possibility to simulate the likely outcomes of one or more natural
hazard scenarios represents a promising prospect for change in this respect. By
showing the consequences of being hit while there is still time to act, simulations
– so it is proposed – will motivate decision-makers to take relevant steps and
measures in foresight rather than in hindsight. At the same time, all models are
simplifications of reality, meaning that all output will be associated with intrinsic
uncertainties and predictive limitations. In this regard, it is often pointed to as a
risk factor that actors in policy and practice without specific expertise in the field
of modeling and simulation (so called ‘non-experts’) may nevertheless expect these
to deliver certain research results in line with what has been achieved in relation
to invariant natural phenomena in the hypothetico-deductive science tradition.
Based on the analysis of available social science literature, a misconception about
the epistemological nature of simulation is proposed to be associated with two
types of dangers. First, it can lead intended users to take an ‘over-critical’ approach
to simulation results, meaning that unrealistic expectations about science’s ability
to deliver certain knowledge translates into low confidence in output associated
with natural levels of uncertainty. The effect of this may be non-use, in which case
potentially valuable insights will go unheeded. Second, a misconception about
simulation’s epistemological nature can lead intended users to take an ‘under-
critical’ approach to simulation research. In practice, for example, public officials
in government and administration sometimes satisfy with limited or nonexistent
expressions of uncertainty and model and data assumptions, although this can lead
to blind spots. Because graphical representations of findings look convincing, so
the reasoning goes, and because non-experts often lack experience in working with
this type of research, they may accept these as ‘the truth’ without much critical
reflection. As demonstrated by concrete empirical examples, the consequences of
this can be suboptimal decision-making, either in the sense of not accounting for
the implications of uncertainty or in the sense of – unintentionally – relying on
research of questionable quality. Both possibilities concern a form of ‘misuse’ of
available knowledge, and both can be extremely costly in their consequences.
In light of this analysis, it is relevant to explore how simulation-based informa-
tion about the likely consequences of natural hazard scenarios are responded to
and used by non-experts responsible for directing and managing the communal re-
sponse to this threat. On the one hand, hazard maps and other forms of simulation-
based hazard assessments can allow for better planning and decision-making in re-
lation to technical protection, emergency management, non-structural alleviation
and risk communication. On the other hand, there is also the risk of them not
being used or – perhaps even worse – of them being misused.
The research questions that have guided this study concern how and why (or why
not) graphical scenario simulation results are used in relation to risk management
of natural hazards, and with what benefits and problems this is associated. As
case study, the introduction of flood hazard maps to municipalities in the Ger-
man state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg was selected. Qualitative data was collected
through interviews with, on the one hand, local-level risk managers (mayors and
civil servants) and, on the other hand, external experts (e.g. modelers, engineers
and higher-level public officials) with insight into the state’s mapping project and
its implementation.
In a second step, following the realization that the interviewees in Baden-Wu¨rttem-
berg did not regard uncritical acceptance of flood simulation results as a great
cause for concern, a small excursion was made into the field of alpine hazard
simulation in Austria. Here, a small number of additional interviews were carried
out to see whether this finding would hold true for other simulation products
and user groups as well. Together, the results are used to develop a theoretical
argument as to how it can be that under-critical acceptance of simulation output
does not always constitute a cause for concern.
Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahrzehnten sind die Verluste, welche durch Naturkatastrophen
verursacht werden, kontinuierlich gestiegen. Zwar kann eine ho¨here Frequenz
solcher Ereignisse einen Teil dieses Anstiegs erkla¨ren, es darf aber nicht u¨bersehen
werden, dass menschliche und soziale Einflussfaktoren ebenfalls eine Rolle spie-
len. Dabei ist es problematisch, dass es oft schwer ist, Entscheidungstra¨ger dazu
zu bewegen, Bereitschaftsplanung und Risikomanagementmaßnahmen in Zeiten
der Ruhe zu priorisieren, was bedeutet, dass die notwendigen Reformen oft erst
umgesetzt werden, wenn die Katastrophe bereits eingetroffen ist.
In der Theorie stellt die Mo¨glichkeit, die voraussichtlichen Effekte von einem oder
mehreren Naturgefahrenszenarien zu simulieren eine viel versprechende Perspek-
tive fu¨r einen Wandel dar. Durch das Aufzeigen der zu erwarteten Konsequen-
zen wa¨hrend es noch Zeit zu handeln gibt, ko¨nnen Simulationen – so die Theo-
rie – Entscheidungstra¨ger motivieren, pra¨ventiv anstatt im Nachhinein relevante
Schritte und Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. Zugleich sind alle Modelle Vereinfachun-
gen der Realita¨t und somit alle Ergebnisse von Simulationen mit eigenen Un-
sicherheiten und Einschra¨nkungen verbunden. In diesem Zusammenhang wird
als Risikofaktor oft genannt, dass Akteure in Politik und Praxis ohne Fachwis-
sen bezu¨glich Modellierung und Simulation (sogenannte ‘Nicht-Experten’) trotz-
dem erwarten, dass simulationsbasierte Forschungsergebnisse sichere Voraussagen
darstellen, so wie sie der Forschung in der hypothetisch-deduktiven Wissenschaft-
stradition gelungen sind.
Laut der Analyse der vorhandenen sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur ko¨nnen falsche
Vorstellungen bezu¨glich des epistemologischen Statuses von Simulationen auf zwei
Arten negativ sein. Zuna¨chst ko¨nnen sie bei vorgesehenen Anwendern dazu fu¨hren,
eine “u¨berkritische” Haltung zu simulationsbasierten Forschungsergebnissen ein-
zunehmen, was bedeutet, dass unrealistische Erwartungen bezu¨glich wissenschaft-
licher Mo¨glichkeiten, bestimmte Erkenntnisse zu liefern zu geringem Vertrauen in
‘normal’ unsichere Ergebnisse fu¨hrt. In der Folge werden verfu¨gbare Ergebnisse
nicht verwendet und mo¨glicherweise wertvolle Erkenntnisse bleiben unbeachtet.
Zweitens ko¨nnen solche falschen Vorstellungen vorgesehene Anwender dazu brin-
gen, eine “unterkritische” Haltung zu simulationsbasierter Forschung einzunehmen.
Zum Beispiel zeigt empirische Forschung, dass Beamte in Regierung und Ver-
waltung trotz geringer oder nicht vorhandener Darstellung der Unsicherheit und
der Modell- und Datenannahmen zufrieden sind, obwohl dies zu blinden Flecken
fu¨hren kann. Weil grafische Darstellungen die Ergebnisse u¨berzeugend aussehen
lassen und weil es Nicht-Experten oft an Erfahrung im Umgang mit dieser Art
von Forschungsergebnissen fehlt, besteht die Gefahr, dass sie unkritisch Simu-
lationsergebnisse akzeptieren und diese als sicherer behandeln, als sie wirklich
sind. Wie durch konkrete empirische Beispiele gezeigt worden ist, kann das zu
suboptimaler Entscheidungsfindung fu¨hren, entweder weil die Auswirkungen von
Forschungsunsicherheit u¨bersehen werden oder weil man sich unwissentlich auf
Erkenntnisse verla¨sst, deren Qualita¨t Akteure mit mehr Wissen in Frage stellen
wu¨rden. Beides stellt eine Art von Fehlanwendung dar und beides kann sehr teuer
werden.
Angesichts dieses Problempotenzials ist es relevant zu erforschen, wie auf simula-
tionsbasierte Informationen u¨ber die wahrscheinlichen Folgen von Naturgefahren-
szenarien reagiert wird und wie sie durch Nicht-Experten fu¨r die Leitung und
Organisation der Reaktion einer Gemeinschaft auf diese Art von Bedrohung ve-
rantwortlich eingesetzt werden. Einerseits ko¨nnen Gefahrenkarten und andere
grafische Darstellungen vorhergesagter Ergebnisse zu besser informierter Planung
und Entscheidungsfindung in Bezug auf technischen Hochwasserschutz, Katastro-
phenschutz, nicht-strukturelle Vorbeugung und Risikokommunikation fu¨hren. An-
dererseits gibt es auch das Risiko der Nichtbenutzung und – vielleicht schlimmer
noch – der Fehlanwendung.
Die Forschungsfragen, die diese Studie geleitet haben sind wie und warum (oder
warum nicht) visualisierte Simulationsergebnisse von Gefahrenszenarien in der
Praxis eingesetzt werden und mit welchem Nutzen und welchen Problemen das ver-
bunden ist. Als Fallstudie wurde die Einfu¨hrung von Hochwassergefahrenkarten
als Instrument fu¨r lokales Risikomanagement im deutschen Bundesland Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg ausgewa¨hlt. Qualitatives Datenmaterial wurde durch Interviews
mit, einerseits, kommunalen Risikomanagern (Bu¨rgermeistern und Verwaltungs-
bediensteten) und, anderseits, externen Experten (Modellierern, Ingenieuren und
u¨bergeordneten Beamten) mit Einsicht in das Gefahrenkartierungsprojekt gener-
iert.
Nach der Erkenntnis, dass die Experten in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg unkritische Akzep-
tanz nicht als allzu großen Anlass zur Sorge betrachten, wurde in einem zweiten
Schritt ein kleiner Exkurs in den Bereich der alpinen Gefahrensimulation in O¨ster-
reich gemacht. Hier wurde eine kleine Anzahl weiterer Interviews gefu¨hrt, um
zu sehen, ob diese Aussage auch fu¨r andere Simulationsprodukte und Anwender
zutreffend ist. Zusammen werden die Ergebnisse genutzt, um ein theoretisches
Argument dafu¨r zu entwickeln, wieso unterkritische Anerkennung von Simulation-
sergebnissen nicht immer einen Grund zur Sorge darstellt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Misuse of predictions can lead to greater costs than if no prediction
were provided. (Pielke, 1999, pp. 98)
In April 1997, communities along the Red River of the North, USA, experienced
extreme flooding. Most of the 1-2 billion USD worth of damage occurred in the two
towns Grand Forks (North Dakota) and East Grand Forks (Minnesota), located at
opposite sides of the river. Almost immediately after the flood, residents and policy
makers in Grand Forks and East Grand Forks began to blame the disaster on the
river stage forecast issued by the National Weather Service (NWS) (Pielke, 1999).
This was based on a hydrological modeling system, which was used to produce
values for two different scenarios. Under the assumption of average temperature
and no subsequent precipitation, the river was predicted to crest at 14,5 meter (47,5
feet). Under the scenario of average temperature and continued precipitation, on
the other hand, a river stage of 15,1 meter (49 feet) was forecasted. On April 22,
after the protective dikes had already given way, the Red River finally crested at
16,6 m (54 feet), leading local, state and national officials to point to inaccurate
flood forecasting as the cause of the disaster. Had the final flood crest been known
in advance, so it was argued, Grand Forks could have been protected to almost
any elevation (Pielke, 1999; Pielke and Conant, 2003, pp. 1351).
Yet, an analysis of the outlooks issued between 1982 and 1997 finds little support
for the argument that the flood forecast was “inaccurate”:
1
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Placing the 1997 outlook into historical context, indicates that the 1997
prediction was worse than average in terms of feet, but perhaps more
importantly, better than average in terms of percentage. The forecast
error was neither unique or unusual, and in fact, because it was a
forecast of a record event, arguably better than those issued in more
typical years. (Pielke, 1999, pp. 89)
Though the NWS did not escape criticism, the main problem was not the quality of
the forecast but rather its design and how it was interpreted. Interviews carried out
with local leaders show that different people interpreted the flood stage outlooks
in different ways, some of which were demonstrably incorrect:
Some viewed the two numbers as a range: that the maximum flood
stage would be between 47.5-49 feet. Others viewed the higher num-
ber as a maximum: a value that would not be exceeded. [. . . ] Others
viewed the flood outlook as exact, that is, “the crest will be 49 feet.”
Still others viewed the 49 foot outlook as somewhat uncertain; ex-
amples of the uncertainty ascribed to the outlook by various decision
makers ranged from 1 to 6 feet. (Pielke, 1999, pp. 88)
Whereas the message that the NWS had intended to send was to expect un-
precedented flooding, an ex-post resident survey in Grand Forks showed that 79,6
percent of the respondents had taken the forecasts to mean that no flood insurance
was necessary (Pielke, 1999).
Regarding the forecast’s content and design, Pielke (1999) finds it problematic
that no sensitivity analysis was performed and that no quantitative uncertainty
information was provided. Instead, a qualitative disclaimer was appended to the
bottom of the flood stage prediction. This did not only make it difficult to assess
the forecast’s reliability but also implicitly placed the responsibility for deciding
which river stage to prepare for with the forecasting agency rather than with
the decision-makers in charge of crisis management. A more appropriate solution
would have been to provide probabilities of different levels of inundation together
with uncertainty information. But this is not what decision-makers wanted. What
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they desired was “an accurate forecast that the NWS will stand behind.” (Pielke,
1999, pp. 94, emphasis added). Hence, Pielke concludes:
Responsibility for the apparent misuse of the outlooks is shared. The
NWS failed to communicate effectively the uncertainty of the predic-
tions, and some local decision makers failed to appreciate the uncer-
tain nature of flood forecasting. The result was that actions were taken
based on a misinterpretation of what could have been useful informa-
tion. (Pielke, 1999, pp. 89)
Though much has changed since 1997 in terms of how forecasts are issued, the Red
River flooding is a good illustration of the problems associated with non-experts’
use of predictive information as input to real-world decision-making. Particularly,
it highlights the ‘dilemma’ of simulation: that it can imply a great advantage to be
able to act in foresight rather than hindsight at the same time as the complexity of
simulation research makes it difficult for unpracticed users to interpret the output
in a way that accounts for the presence of uncertainty. As Pielke and Conant
(2003, pp. 1355) put it, “[p]rediction products are difficult to evaluate and easy to
misuse”. Hence, although we tend to think of access to information as something
good, whether access to predictive information is beneficial or not will not only
depend on whether but also on how it is used.
If computer models are treated as ‘answer machines’ or ‘truth generators’, implic-
itly legitimated by the success of prediction in traditional reductionist science, it
can lead to forms of application “that miss the true value of models and distort
their outputs in damaging ways.” (Wagner et al., 2010, pp. 330). For example,
public officials in government and administration are noted to satisfy with limited
or nonexistent expressions of simulation uncertainty and model and data assump-
tions although this can lead to blind spots (Wagner et al., 2010). Moreover, there
is the risk of unrealistic expectations in models’ predictive capacity keeping peo-
ple from acting upon information in the present as they are holding out for more
certain information to reduce political risk (Pielke and Conant, 2003).
Thus, the potential benefit of ‘foresight’ does not only depend on the quality of
simulation research but also on users’ approach to and application of this. If
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treated as a technique for illuminating dynamic and uncertain relationships in
natural settings, simulation-based information can be highly valuable (cf. Wagner
et al., 2010). But, in practice, other forms of use are common, too. Hence, the
benefit of access to simulation technology and ability to generate predictions about
complex natural phenomena cannot be taken for granted, but should be subject
to empirical analysis.
1.1 Outlining the research interest
Statistics by Swiss Re for the period between 1970 and 2013 show that, with
few exceptions, each year, natural catastrophes claimed more victims (dead or
missing persons) and resulted in higher insured losses than man-made disasters.
Both in terms of insured and uninsured losses, the costs associated with natural
catastrophes and man-made disasters have risen continuously over the same period,
with 2011 being a record year (Swiss Re, 2014).1 While some of this can be
attributed to an increase in hazard frequency, human and social drivers (such as
population growth, land-use and settlement patterns, and the development and
use of sensitive technology) play a large role, too (Haque and Burton, 2005).
In an article called “Knowing better and losing even more”, White et al. (2001)
contemplate how come the past decades’ growth in research and knowledge on
disaster prevention and drivers of risk has not been able to curb the trend of rising
losses from natural hazards. According to their analysis, available knowledge is
often ineffectively used, e.g. due to conflicting interests and lack of political will
to resolve the same. As long as the losses are largely attributed to growing wealth
and can be absorbed by an economically rich society, they write, the motivation
to undertake actions is likely to be weak. Although one might think that the
potential impact of a crisis would be sufficient to motivate political leaders and
risk managers to devote considerable resources to prevention and preparedness
1Although the number of reported natural disasters in 2011 was below the average for 2001-
2010, the number of people killed, injured, homeless or requiring immediate assistance during
a period of emergency was the largest since 2003, while the estimated economic losses (USD
366.1 billion in 2011) were the highest ever registered, surpassing the last record year of 2005
(Guha-Sapir et al., 2012, pp. 23). According to the OECD (2003, pp. 30), it is especially the
impacts of floods, storms and droughts which have risen steeply since the early 1960s.
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planning, such optimism has to work against forces and circumstances of inertia;
often, it is only once disaster occurs that a ‘window of opportunity’ for reform
opens (cf. McConnell and Drennan, 2006). At the same time, Weichselgartner
and Sendzimir (2004) note that the concurrent increases in losses and research
raise doubt about the approaches and tools hitherto used for hazard assessment
and disaster management.
In this perspective, simulation technology represents a promising prospect for
change. Already, forecasts of floods, hurricanes and seasonal precipitation patterns
have frequently contributed to save lives and reduce physical damage (Sarewitz
and Pielke, 1999, pp. 127). Thanks to rapid technological development, new forms
of applications are being developed as well. One such novelty is the simulation of
one or more scenarios to explore the likely effects of being hit by a natural hazard
(i.e. a kind of ‘what if – what then’ prediction).2 This type of information can,
for example, help public authorities identify hazard hotspots where a high risk of
exposure coincides with high levels of vulnerability or valuable structures or activ-
ities. In contrast to forecasts of oncoming threats, simulation of hazard scenarios
– for which we do not know when they will materialize or whether they will come
exactly as assumed in the model – allow for more long-term planning of how to
mitigate and adapt to risk; enabling people to act in the present to avoid damage
later. The output is often displayed on a map or against a digital background
resembling an aerial photo, providing the end-user with a visual representation
of which areas the simulation model predicts to be at risk. In comparison to the
manual documentation of a single historic disaster, simulation allows for the ex-
ploration of a range of different scenarios based on the current state of topography.
As such, it allows for a more up-to-date hazard assessment and the exploration of
scenarios which surpasses local memory. In a nutshell, it represents the possibility
of ‘seeing’ what it would mean to be hit by a natural hazard without actually
having to experience this, thereby offering a chance to act in foresight rather than
hindsight.
At the same time, all models used to simulate hazard scenarios are simplifica-
tions of reality, meaning that the output generated by such models will always be
2Other novelties include agent-based modeling. This has, e.g., been used by Lewis (2010)
to simulate traffic behavior to support evacuation planning. These will not be the focus of this
study, however.
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associated with intrinsic uncertainties and limitations. Writing about modeling
and mapping software used to characterize the nature and extent of flood, wind
and coastal hazards, Pine (2009, pp. 54) notes that it is highly important for
users of environmental hazard models to understand how assumptions and vari-
ations in input data can affect output results, as errors in this regard “can lead
to distortions [. . . ] so that the hazard zone outputs do not reflect the real danger
in the simulated hazard.” Likewise, commenting on flood hazard mapping in the
European Union, van Alphen et al. (2009, pp. 291) write:
Flood mapping is not an exact science, but includes uncertainties re-
garding the natural phenomena and those associated with the data
and modelling. [...] These uncertainties dictate the accuracy of the
mapping products and need to be understood in order to know how
closely the mapping represents what the users would see as an accurate
representation.
In other words, information about limitations, assumptions and uncertainties, re-
spectively the implication of these for the completeness and reliability of simulation-
based predictions, needs to be communicated to end-users to avoid that mistaken
conclusions are drawn about which areas should count as ‘safe’. Yet, a research
report by Meyer et al. (2009) claims that the uncertainty and imprecision asso-
ciated with flood simulation used for risk assessments is often not communicated
to decision makers. Instead, a non-existent precision of estimation is pretended,
which “might facilitate the decision for the decision maker but reduces the scope
of decision and could lead to a solution which is not optimal.” (pp. 18). In short,
this implies a theoretical risk of misguided decision-making if the uncertainty asso-
ciated with scenario simulation of natural hazards is not properly communicated
to or understood by end-users in risk management.
Hence, the interest of this study concerns the introduction of graphical scenario
simulation results to support risk management of natural hazards in practice.
On the one hand, a graphical representation of the likely outcome of a natural
hazard can help public officials improve crisis preparedness and risk management
while there is still time. On the other hand, people without expertise in the field
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of modeling and simulation are suggested to have difficulties when it comes to
interpreting predictive information, in the worst case leading to misuse of what
could have been valuable insights. Consequently, the research interest motivating
this study is what benefits and problems the introduction of such tools are actually
associated with. So far, there have not been any reports of misuse of, e.g., hazard
maps similar to the descriptions offered for forecasts (i.e. Pielke, 1999) and other
simulation products (e.g. Wagner et al., 2010). But is there still a risk to be
cautious of? What are the perspectives of those working with these products in
practice?
1.1.1 Research questions and study design
To guide the exploration of risk managers’ use of visualized scenario simulation
results (e.g. in the form of lines on a map), the following research questions were
formulated:
- How are risk managers in the public sphere using simulation-based scenario
information about the predicted outcome of a natural hazard – if they use it
at all?
- What affects whether or not predictive information is used?
- What benefits and/or problems are associated with the introduction of predic-
tive information to an audience that lacks expertise in the field of modeling
and simulation?
In this respect, ‘risk management’ refers to all efforts to decreasing the probability
for and/or potential consequences of being exposed to an unwanted event, focusing
on both the risk agent and the potential target. According to Renn (2008, pp. 7),
it refers to “the creation and evaluation of options for initiating or changing human
activities or (natural and artificial) structures with the objective of increasing the
net benefit to human society and of preventing harm to humans and what they
value”. The term ‘risk manager’ covers both elected decision-makers and employed
administrators and practitioners carrying some kind of responsibility for or having
being tasked with risk management activities.
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To make the exploration of the research interest practically manageable, the study
will focus on a single context and example of the phenomenon of interest, namely
risk management in the German state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and the introduction
of simulation-based hazard maps depicting the predicted outcome of riverine flood
scenarios. According to Yin (see 2009), a single case study design is motivated
when a research area is relatively new and there is limited knowledge about relevant
concepts and linkages, as it allows for in-depth study of the phenomenon of interest
while drawing on data from different units of analysis. In principle, it reflects the
belief that exploratory research is well-served by an approach that seeks to identify
systematic components in one context before an effort is made to see if these are
replicated also under other circumstances (cf. Esaiasson et al., 2005, pp. 186).
Below, the choice of case study is enlightened in more detail.
1.1.2 The choice of flood maps in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
Beginning with why flood hazard maps are a product of interest, it can be noted
that simulation technology is currently used to predict the outcome of a wide
range of hazards, including different forms of flooding, avalanches, debris flow
and torrents. Because the underlying physical processes of riverine and coastal
flooding are relatively well understood, these are amongst the hazards for which
simulation-based hazard mapping has been pursued the longest. In Canada, the
portrayal of hydrotechnical information on topographical maps, including from
simulation of design flood profiles, begun already in the 1970s (Burrell and Keefe,
1989). Yet, it is really only since a couple of decades that simulation of flood
scenarios is possible from a computational perspective (de Moel et al., 2009, pp.
298). Early European examples include simulation efforts in Norway, England
and Wales, and the German state of Bavaria during the second half of the 1990s
(Petrow et al., 2006; Wagner, 2006).3 What really sets modeling of flooding apart
from that of other natural hazards is that it is only in respect to flooding that the
production of hazard maps has been regulated at supra-national level. Through
3In Norway, severe flooding prompted a flood mapping project to be initiated in 1995, and
in England and Wales maps documenting the flood lines of previous inundation episodes were
complemented with simulation of a 100-year flood scenario in 1996 (Petrow et al., 2006). For
as long, floodplain mapping based on 1D- and 2D-modeling of 100-year flood events has been
pursued in Bavaria (Wagner, 2006).
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the introduction in 2007 of the EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC), all EU member
states were required to produce and publish hazard and risk maps based on “the
best available technologies” until the end of 2013. Resting on the three pillars of
information, cooperation and planning, the directive calls for hazard maps showing
the predicted extent, depth and – if appropriate – velocity of inundation associated
with a frequent, mid-frequent and rare flood event.4
According to academic literature, the introduction of flood hazard maps as a
EU policy tool reflects how the approach to the risk of flooding has changed in
Europe and elsewhere in recent years (e.g. Meyer et al., 2009; Wagner, 2008). Not
only are they seen as suitable tools for lessening exposed communities’ reliance on
structural protection measures (Petrow et al., 2006; Handmer, 1980), they are also
thought to support a ‘risk’-based rather than ‘safety’-based management approach
(Bu¨chele et al., 2006; Wagner, 2008; de Moel et al., 2009, pp. 290). At the same
time, reflecting that information provision to private individuals is not only about
empowerment but also a way of transferring responsibility from a ‘hollowed-out’
state to active citizens (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006, pp. 16), the requirement
for hazard and risk maps to be made publicly available is sometimes interpreted
as a strategy for shifting some of the responsibility for flood protection and risk
preparedness onto those at risk (Hagemeier-Klose and Wagner, 2009; Steinfu¨hrer
et al., 2009).
For the study at hand, this means that flood hazard maps are an example of
a mandated risk management instrument. Even if there is no requirement to
produce these with simulation technology, this is often the solution in practice. In
effect, this means that all member states have to invest intellectual and financial
resources in the production of this type of information, whether they want to
or not. Considering how common this makes flood hazard maps, an empirical
analysis of benefits and eventual problems is certainly called for.
4These are to be complemented by risk maps, specifying the expected adverse consequences,
including the number of people and economic activities affected, sources of environmental pollu-
tion, etc. According to Wagner (2008, pp. 777), however, risk maps are generally a less relevant
tool for most activities and users. Until the end of 2017, flood risk management plans covering
all management measures and being developed for each river basin and coastal zone area (as
opposed to for each state, region or municipality) are to follow. Each of these documents are to
be updated every 6 years.
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That the choice fell on Baden-Wu¨rttemberg as the contextual setting in which to
study non-experts’ use of predictive information is, in contrast, primarily a result
of pragmatism. Apart from geographical proximity facilitating data collection,
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is also amongst the German states with the longest tradition
of flood hazard mapping, with early attempts dating back to the end of the 1990s.
Hence, it is a suitable setting for studying hitherto experiences of introducing
scenario simulation as a policy tool for risk management. Additionally, it is an
interesting circumstance that Baden-Wu¨rttemberg chose to develop this kind of
instrument prior to it becoming mandatory to do so through EU legislation, and
that considerable efforts and financial resources have gone into its production and
design. As will be discussed in chapter 3, pre-existing interest and involvement by
actors in policy and practice are generally seen as favorable conditions for research
use. At the same time, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is also one of the few cases in which
some of the simulated hazard lines are given legal status after their publication,
meaning that the introduction of predictive information is at the same time an
imposition of strict land-use regulations. In that sense, there are not only favorable
conditions in place but also a high potential for conflict.
Flood hazard maps are described as useful instrument for a wide range of actors,
from private households to insurance companies. In this study, the focus is placed
on local-level risk managers’ use of flood hazard maps. This decision reflects both
that the hazard maps in this state depict individual communities and that risk
management is normally a municipal responsibility.
1.2 Previous literature on flood hazard maps
Academic writing on flood hazard maps can be divided into four different cate-
gories. First, a large body of literature is of a technical nature. To this count
both descriptive overviews of methods and map designs currently applied across
Europe (e.g. de Moel et al., 2009; van Alphen et al., 2009), and papers outlining
methods not yet subject to standard use. To this latter category belong, e.g.,
Bu¨chele et al.’s (2006) proposal of a methods for extreme flood events, Falconer
et al.’s (2009) study of less well-understood sources of flooding, and Zerger’s (2002)
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method for including and visualizing model uncertainty directly in hazard maps.
This category is altogether of little interest to the study at hand.
The three remaining categories concern (a) analytical or empirical evaluations
of map designs and design requirements, (b) studies of the knowledge production
process associated with hazard mapping, and (c) studies concerned with the impact
of flood hazard maps, focusing on land-use planning and communication.
a) Analytical or empirical evaluations of map designs or design require-
ments
Beginning with the first category, these studies often depart from the assump-
tion that current map designs are suboptimal and that this explains why “maps
often fail to attain their potential to fulfill the needs of different users, to raise
awareness and provide a clear and understandable source of information for plan-
ning.” (Meyer et al., 2012, pp. 1702). For example, Dransch et al. (2010) point
out that, although one of the main uses of hazard and risk maps is as tools for
risk communication, most maps have been designed for scientists and experts, not
for laypeople. Likewise, empirical evaluations of current European practices find
that several maps and online mapping tools are either too simple or too complex
(Hagemeier-Klose and Wagner, 2009), and that their content fails to meet the re-
quirements both of residents at risk and public officials (Meyer et al., 2012; Pardoe
et al., 2011).
Independently of whether these evaluations concern an existing design or a sug-
gestion for an alternative (e.g. Spachinger et al., 2008), what they have in common
is that they point to different user groups having different needs and capacities,
often paying particular attention to the general public. From this perspective, it
is problematic when end-users are simply assumed to be willing and able users of
hazard maps. Instead, representatives of different user groups should be invited to
participate in the mapping and design development process. Such direct involve-
ment does not only expand the knowledge on which the maps are based, but also
fills the function of improving the usability and acceptance of maps among users.5
Furthermore, different needs of different target groups mean that different designs
5As noted above, this is something where the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg scores relatively
high.
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should be considered. For laypeople, it is suggested to be important that a map’s
message can be identified at the first glance. (In effect, this implies a low need
for this group to consider simulation uncertainty. Yet it is not explained why this
is of limited relevancy.) Professional risk managers, on the other hand, can often
handle more complex tools and may also require functions that allow for further
data processing.
More concretely, the recommendations found in this literature include:
- to avoid technical terminology;
- to include gauge level information so that people can compare the mapped
water levels with past flood events;
- to include information (e.g. photos) from past flood events; and
- to use colors that people naturally associate with water, such as different
shades of blue.
b) Studies of the knowledge production process associated with hazard
mapping
The second category concerns studies, which – following in the footsteps of Sci-
ence and Technology Studies (STS) – are interested in the processes through which
knowledge is produced, negotiated and stabilized. Two examples of this are Land-
stro¨m et al. (2011) and Lane et al. (2011), both of which focus on the flood hazard
maps commissioned by the Environment Agency of England and Wales. Accord-
ing to Landstro¨m et al. (2011), technical consultants’ computer simulation of local
flood hazard is best understood as a form of virtual engineering, since the work is
geared towards solving a client’s problem by articulating risks and possibilities in
the digital space of the computer.
Based on ethnographic observation and in-depth interviews with actors in engi-
neering consultancy firms, as well as with scientists at universities and national
research centers, a detailed account of the practice of flood hazard mapping is
presented. The result shows that, although the simulation is undertaken by pri-
vate businesses, the work is shaped by the demands and protocols of the client,
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e.g. through the establishment of long-term contractual agreements and by re-
quiring the consultants to use particular software packages. The latter point is
of particular interest since it implies that part of the agency’s trust in simula-
tion output is linked to its level of standardization, rather than to its predictive
skill: “Information produced in this practice can be trusted by clients because of
the stamp of approval given to the software, not because specific knowledge claims
have demonstrated their ability to withstand challenges from competing modelling
approaches.” (Landstro¨m et al., 2011, pp. 19). To some of the engineers, the re-
quirement to use particular software packages implies a restriction in terms of what
can be simulated; limiting their ability to produce truly useful output (Lane et al.,
2011). Moreover, as virtual engineering becomes the way in which input to flood
risk management is generated, it starts defining what society needs to know about
flooding; unless numerically compatible with model requirements, other forms of
evidence, such as local knowledge, will not be recognized (Landstro¨m et al., 2011).
What made several of the interviewed engineering consultants critical of current
mapping practices was (a) the amount and quality of available data (e.g. in the
form of historic flood records) since this is critical for calculating return periods;
(b) that the mapping only considered inundation caused by water coming out of
a river, although another common flood cause is rainwater flowing towards a wa-
terway; and (c) that historical records were used to ‘force’ empirical adequacy, i.e.
that the parameters were adjusted until the simulation output fitted the empirical
data, even when a model contained poorly known processes and parameters (Lane
et al., 2011). Finally, a paradox was perceived in the sense that a certain percent-
age had to be added to the calculated river flow to account for climate change,
while it was excluded to take future changes in urban development into account.
This was felt to imply that only some sources of instability were accounted for,
meaning that flood hazard maps construct flood risk in particular ways; closing
the analysis down rather than opening it up. In this respect, the occurrence of
actual flood events was perceived to play an important role, unsettling some of the
critically seen practices by “drawing attention to elements of flood risk excluded
from or overlooked by a particular analysis.” (Lane et al., 2011, pp. 1803). Rep-
resenting a more general form of criticism, especially scientists at universities and
national research centers considered the reviewed simulation practice to “rely on
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over-simplifying model structures and to lack critical perspectives on the param-
eterisations in the proprietary software packages.” (Landstro¨m et al., 2011, pp.
18).
This shows that there is both internal and external critique against some of the
hazard mapping practices currently in use in Europe. In Lane et al.’s (2011, pp.
804-805) view...
what separates flood risk estimation from astrology has less to do with
the separation of risk assessment and management than with the bur-
den of social accountability attached to the risk management regimes
of which the calculation of risk is inextricably a part. Such account-
ability requires an openness about the scientific and policy procedures
that make flood risk estimations more (or less) reliable to those we en-
trust to produce and act upon them such that, unlike astrology, they
can be put to the test of public interrogation, not least by those who
have to live with their consequences.
Put differently, this suggests that what creates a demand for flood scenario simu-
lation is not necessarily how good it is but that it makes things traceable; enabling
others to scrutinize the basis of a hazard assessment; allowing for accountability
both on behalf of those producing predictions and behalf of those using them for
decision-making.6
c) Studies concerned with the impact of hazard maps on land-use plan-
ning and communication
Finally, the last category, which is also the one of most direct interest to the study
at hand, concerns the use of hazard maps for risk management purposes and
concrete impacts in the areas of land-use development and risk communication.
Many studies concerned with land-use impacts come from Canada, where an agree-
ment for mapping and floodplain zoning and for the distribution of these maps
to the public was signed by the governments of Canada and Quebec already in
6A similar perspective is found in Jamieson (2000), in which simulation is described as the
latest successor in a long tradition of oracles, through which decision-makers try to reduce
uncertainty and dictate ‘rational’ policy paths.
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1976.7 Referring to maps of the Greater Montreal region from the period 1978-
1996, for example, Robert et al. (2003) study whether mapping and designation
of floodplains helped reduce increases in flood damage potential in four selected
municipalities. Flood mapping and designation, it is argued, should basically
have led occupancy and economic value in floodplains to cease to grow, whereas
no-flood-risk zones near water bodies should have seen a marked increase in the
same values. In reality, however, a long list of automatically exempted undertak-
ings together with withdrawal clauses included in the mapping agreement enabled
municipalities to permit increased floodplain occupancy even after mapping and
designation, with the result that...
...the pace of home construction is the same (or greater) in flood-risk
zones as it is in no-flood-risk zones. The same is true for property
values [. . . ]. This means a considerably increased exposure to potential
flood damage – contrary to the principle underlying the activities of
designation, mapping and dyking. (pp. 382)
Another study from the Quebec area confirms this picture. Having looked at the
construction development in floodplains in six municipalities along the Chaudie`re
River for the period 1979-1997, Roy et al. (2003) find that, in spite of the desig-
nation carried out in 1979, total property value in floodplains increased in each
study area over the selected time period. The ratio of new property values to total
value in the floodplain ranged between 4,5 to 14,3 percent for most areas, but in
one municipality property value increased with 64,3 percent due to a commercial
sector being built in the flood-risk zone. Moreover, the study found that new
buildings had been legally erected in the high-risk zone (i.e. the zone likely to be
affected by a flood with a return period between 0 and 20 years), despite of the
fact that construction in this area was officially prohibited (Roy et al., 2003, pp.
399). Referring to a report by Christin (1997) showing that 23 out of 25 munici-
palities in the Quebec area asked about the region’s flood-risk mapping program
7It should be noted that, since hazard mapping based on scenario simulation is a relatively
new phenomenon, especially the maps discussed in studies of Canada are sometimes based on
a somewhat different methodology. For a description of one of the methods used to produce
flood hazard maps in Canada in the 1970-80s, see Burrell and Keefe’s (1989) article on flood risk
mapping in the New Brunswick region.
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had allowed for further development in floodplain areas, Robert et al. (2003, pp.
384) conclude that. . .
. . . in the Greater Montre´al region as in other regions of Canada, flood
damage reduction measures based on designation and mapping of flood-
plains had no impact on occupancy, have failed to reduce flood dam-
ages, and have not even halted increases in such damages.
In 2000, Shrubsole reported that Environment Canada is not renewing the 10-
year agreements of which the mapping and designation projects were part and
that there has not been any effective action by provinces and municipalities to
update existing maps and extend the present coverage.
While similar studies are lacking in Europe, Wisner et al. (2004, pp. 204-205) note
that, in the United Kingdom, “awareness of the significance of the flood plain does
not mean that pressure for use of its ‘cheap’ flat land has diminished”. On the
contrary, severe housing shortage in some regions, coupled with a reduction in the
planning powers of local authorities, has led to an increase in use of floodplains
for housing developments, and an accompanying steep increase in insured flood
losses following flood events. Hence, it seems somewhat uncertain what role it
has played that flooded areas in England and Wales have been subject to hazard
mapping since 1973 (see Petrow et al., 2006, pp. 719).
When it comes to Germany, studies of early mapping efforts criticize that there
are no standards in place for considering flood hazard zones in land-use regulation.
Instead, land-use regulation is largely left to municipalities, for which trade taxes
is a main source of income. Since this implies that municipalities have much to
gain from attracting businesses and enterprises to their areas, the result is an
intrinsic conflict between the aims of reducing increases in flood damage potential
and encouraging local economic development (Thieken et al., 2005). Data from
Bavaria support this by showing that municipalities there resisted the changes
made to the federal Water Resource Act (WHG) in 2005 out of fear for restrictions
of their planning capacities (Wagner, 2009). Finally, a study by Petrow et al.
(2006) of the lessons learned from the catastrophic Elbe flooding of 2002 warns
that a too strong focus in hazard maps on the area at risk in case of a 100-year
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flood event can cause people to ignore the residual risk of more extreme events.
By concentrating on a 100-year flood, the assessment of flood hazard is reduced to
a question of whether an element is located ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the 100-year flood
line. Hence, flood mapping can potentially have the effect of increasing damage
potential just outside the floodplain line, in a sort of ‘land-use’-equivalent to the
escalator effect.8
When it comes to the use of hazard maps as a tool for public authorities to raise
public awareness about the risk of flooding, John Handmer (1980) used qualitative
and quantitative methods to investigate the effect of access to hazard maps on local
residents’ risk perception in Canada. In Handmer’s view, the use of flood maps for
public information purposes relies on the implicit assumption that “maps are read
and understood by the target audiences, and that they have the effect of improving
their flood awareness and acceptance of government flood related programs.” (pp.
84). His own empirical analysis, however, suggests that there is little substantive
foundation for such an assumption.
More precisely, Handmer’s findings show that direct distribution of flood maps to
households was ineffective in increasing the recipients’ flood risk perception.9 In
one of the case study areas, there was almost total ignorance of the flood maps’
existence six months after local newspapers had covered and even reprinted parts
of them. In another case study area, an interest group formed against local risk
management efforts: “These people, and others in the flood plain, did not regard
the maps as a source of information. Instead they saw them solely as part of a
program to expropriate their property and as a waste of resources: ‘the money
would be better spent on building a dyke’.” (Handmer, 1980, pp. 97). Amongst
the interviewed officials, furthermore, there was uncertainty about what to do with
flood maps, and a feeling of unhappiness about a tool that seemed to condemn
half of the town to being flooded.
8For avalanches, such an effect is reported for regions in Austria and Switzerland, where
damage potential increased the most just outside the designated risk zones prohibited from
further development (Wagner, 2008, pp. 776).
9Although quantitative surveys could establish a difference in the respondents’ flood risk
expectations before and after the maps were distributed, there was no significant difference
between the group to which maps had been distributed and the control group. Hence, the
change in perception was attributed to the intense media campaign surrounding the release of
flood maps rather than to the maps themselves.
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That the results of mapping efforts will not always be welcomed or accepted is
also shown by Burningham et al. (2008), who analyzed quantitative and qual-
itative data related to two projects intended to contribute to a more detailed
understanding of flood awareness in England and Wales. In 2004, the Environ-
ment Agency, which is responsible for flood risk management activities (ranging
from building flood walls to raising public awareness), collaborated with insurers
to produce flood hazard maps using hydrological modeling. The maps pinpoint
risky areas and households defined as being ‘at risk’ and target these by campaigns
intended to raise people’s risk awareness, as well as awareness of warning systems
and appropriate behavior in case of flooding.
Results from the qualitative part of the study, however, found that people would
often reject the maps’ findings and/or the conclusion that they should be at risk.
While some suggested that the maps were simply wrong, others pointed to the
location of their property (e.g. on a hill) as putting them beyond flood risk. Yet
others told of different actors drawing different conclusion on the basis of the same
findings, making some inclined to see the whole effort to designate floodplains as a
conspiracy between the Environment Agency and the insurance industry. On the
whole, the awareness campaigns adopted a deficit model of public understanding
of risk, assuming that the simple act of providing information about flood hazard
would ‘correct’ people’s low risk perception and lead to behavioral changes. In
reality, though, people were often unwilling to accept the message provided to
them, e.g. due to economical and psychological reasons or because the responsible
authority enjoyed little credibility (Burningham et al., 2008).
When it comes to Germany, Wagner (2006) has studied the floodplain designation
process in Tiroler Achen, in Bavaria, where his results show that floodplain maps
were unsuccessful as public information tools. Based on documents, newspaper
articles, interviews and observation, Wagner found that the designation process
was accompanied by conflicts both between the two responsible authorities and
between these authorities and the affected property owners. Due to insufficient,
late and partially contradictory information, the authorities missed the chance to
affect the public’s conception of what a floodplain is or why it should be designated.
As a result, people did not only fail to understand the purpose of the mapping
process but also felt it to go against their values and interests, e.g. in terms of
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the right to free disposal of one’s own property and in terms of reduced property
values. To make the situation worse, local residents did not always find the maps
credible. This was, for example, the case when areas depicted as inundated in the
maps were noticeably larger or smaller than the areas that people remembered,
and where it was not sufficiently clarified that such discrepancies can be natural,
e.g. due to changes in the local terrain and due to the fact that not all sources
of flooding are accounted for in hazard mapping. Where the conflict between the
public authorities and those perceiving themselves to be affected by “arbitrary
and excessive planning” stood in the foreground it overshadowed the message of
certain areas being at risk to the extent that the mapping process could not be
used to contribute to awareness raising (pp. 231). At the same time, Wagner
doubts that the success was much greater in other areas. Out of 20 responsible
authorities, only one provided material indicating active public relations work and,
in interviews, active communication efforts were regarded with skepticism; it could
lead to “overreactions” or it was best to “let sleeping dogs lie” (2006, pp. 239-240).
Based on the study of 60 communication practices across Europe, Ho¨ppner et al.
(2012) suggest that promising tools for risk communication such as hazard and risk
maps are rarely embedded in a more comprehensive and long-term communication
strategy. For example, risk maps and forecasting systems are “not necessarily well
advertised amongst the public through additional information materials or events.”
(pp. 1767). Finally, a quantitative study from Switzerland showed that 75 percent
of the respondents did not know or did not think that flood maps were available
for their area although these existed since several years (Siegrist et al., 2004, pp.
19).
Comments on the basis of the literature review
On the basis of this literature review, it may be suggested that:
- Lack of stakeholder involvement leading to unsuitable design is one of the
explanations proposed for low levels of application of flood hazard maps;
- The role of simulation uncertainty for how risk managers respond to flood
hazard maps, respectively for whether and how they use these, has not been
focused on previously;
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- Prior empirical work questions the effectiveness of flood hazard maps as tools
for risk management and public risk communication;
- Although hazard maps are often described as promising information products
in theory, there is little empirically-based understanding of what benefit this
type of tool is actually associated with in practice;
- There has not been any prior focus on whether the problems noted in liter-
ature on other simulation products are also present for flood hazard maps;
- Beyond the technical literature and some studies of map-design, research on
flood hazard maps has not focused on the case of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
This means that there is potential for the study at hand to generate new and/or
complementary insights in relation both to flood hazard maps and simulation usage
more generally.
1.3 Purpose and disposition
The empirical study of municipal-level use of simulation-based flood hazard maps
in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg has two aims. The theoretical aim is to explore the role
of uncertainty for whether and how simulation-based hazard assessments are used
by non-experts to guide practical planning and management decisions. While
academic literature often points to usage of simulation results by non-experts as
something complicated and potentially ‘risky’, there is not enough literature on
this phenomenon to be able to determine under which circumstances this is so
and whether or when exceptions are possible. Furthermore, since the literature on
flood hazard maps has so far focused on other aspects, we cannot know whether
or in which ways the problems reported in literature on simulation in general
also pertain to maps showing the results of hazard scenario simulation. Hence,
it is the aim of this study to close this gap and to try to further our theoretical
understanding of when and why simulation usage by non-experts requires caution.
In more practical terms, the study represents a chance to do research in a German
region so far not very well-represented in the academic literature on flood hazard
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maps. In this regard, the aim is to formulate concrete recommendations, based
on empirical analysis, for how to motivate use (as oppose to misuse or non-use) of
this type of foresight information.
In the next chapter, it will be explained what simulation is, why it is sometimes
understood as a controversial assessment method, what problems, more exactly,
have been observed in regard to non-experts’ dealings with simulation output,
and what suggestions have so far been developed for how to respond to these
difficulties. In chapter 3, focus will be shifted towards the science-policy nexus
more generally. The questions raised in this section concern what research ‘use’ is,
how it differs from misuse and non-use, and how this can be studied empirically.
Moreover, theory and literature as to what affects whether research is used or not
used will be reviewed to provide an idea of what to look for in respect to the
second research question.
Before the method and material are described in chapter 5, chapter 4 will provide a
more detailed overview of and information on the case of flood scenario simulation
in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and the context of local-level risk management. In chap-
ters 6-8, the results of the empirical analysis will be presented. The presentation
of the results is divided into three chapters corresponding to each of the three re-
search questions. Because the outcome of the analysis was somewhat unexpected
in the sense that what has been described as problematic in academic literature
on non-experts’ use of simulation results was not found to be problematic for risk
managers’ use of flood hazard maps in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, an effort was made to
assess whether this situation also applies to other instances of scenario simulation.
Hence, chapter 10 presents the results of a small excursion into the world of alpine
hazard simulation in Austria. Finally, the conclusion takes us back to the study’s
practical and theoretical purpose.
Chapter 2
Simulation beyond the science
sphere
2.1 Definition and characteristics
Simulation is sometimes described as a third path to knowledge next to theory (or
logical thinking) and experiment (e.g. Ku¨ppers et al., 2006, pp. 5). As a research
method, its advantage does not only lie in that it enables us to study systems
which are beyond our physical reach, or which it would be dangerous or immoral
to experiment with, but also that the time and cost requirements are often lower
compared to other methods of investigation. Furthermore...
...there is no limit to their complexity. When a complicated system
defies mathematical analysis or when the inclusion of random variables
with nonstandard distribution makes a statistical formula difficult to
find, a simulation models may still be constructed. (Bobillier et al.,
1976, pp. 7)
Apart from constituting an academic research method, simulations are run by
corporations and public agencies and institutions. In these instances, computer
models are, inter alia, run for the purpose of:
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- Gaining insights into the operation or dynamics of a system;
- Informing strategies or decisions to improve system performance;
- Testing and optimizing new concepts before implementation;
- Supporting pedagogical activities or purposes (Hartmann, 2005; Chung, 2004,
pp. 3).
In relation to environmental regulatory issues,1 Wagner et al. (2010) describe sim-
ulations as providing a means for assessing, measuring and predicting exposure
or harm, thereby generating insights which may trigger heightened or reduced
regulatory activity. Simulation can also be used outside of rulemaking activities,
however, e.g. for assessing problems, setting priorities, or evaluating existing rules.
In American environment and health policy, models have become so entailed that
if the use of computer models would be abandoned, regulation would be set back
to pre-1970 levels (Wagner et al., 2010, pp. 297).
The aim of the following section is to provide a basic understanding of what
‘simulation’ is, why it is thought to have a distinct epistemology and why its use
as input to policy and decision-making is subject to discussion.2 In this respect,
all simulations will be treated as if they are the same although there are really
many different types and areas of applications.
2.1.1 What is simulation?
Though there is no scientific consensus about what the term ‘simulation’ really
refers to, it is nowadays generally associated with science and technology, and
with computation carried out on a digital computer (Thompson, 2000, pp. xi). In
its widest sense, it can be understood to mean the imitation of a system, though
1E.g. water quality, air toxics, pesticides, toxic chemicals, hazardous waste facilities, forest
planning and ecosystem management.
2Here and in the following, ‘simulation’ means theoretical computer simulation, implying that
the target system of interest is mathematically simulated on a computer for the purpose of study
and analysis. This can be compared to real-world or physical simulation, where a real physical
or biological model is used to imitate a real physical or biological process (see Hartmann, 2005,
pp. 2), or training simulation, where the aim is to develop or practice certain skills (see Chung,
2004, pp. 1-3).
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a variety of more precise definitions can be found as well. To offer a sample,
Robinson defines computer-based dynamic simulation used in private and pub-
lic sector organizations as “[e]xperimentation with a simplified imitation (on a
computer) of an operations system as it progresses through time, for the purpose
of better understanding and/or improving that system.” (2004, pp. 2), whereas
Chung describes “simulationmodeling” of manufacturing, service and transporta-
tion systems as “the process of creating and experimenting with a computerized
mathematical model of a physical system.” (2004, pp. 1). Others have defined
simulation without specifying the area of use as “the generation of pseudodata on
the basis of a model, a database, or the use of a model in the light of a database.”
(Thompson, 2000, pp. xi), or as “the technique of constructing and running a
model of a real system in order to study the behavior of that system, without
disrupting the environment of the real system.” (Bobillier et al., 1976, pp. 6). Fi-
nally, the definition offered by the Oxford English Dictionary (Murry et al., 1989)
is broad enough to include both training simulation and physical models as well
as theoretical computer simulations:
The technique of imitating the behaviour of some situation or process
(whether economic, military, mechanical, etc.) by means of a suitably
analogous situation or apparatus, esp. for the purpose of study or
personnel training.
While each of these definitions is slightly different, they all describe simulation as
something that involves a model or the imitation of a target system. Hence, we
shall take a closer look at these terms, too.
Beginning with the term system, this can be quite easily defined as “a collection
of parts organized for some purpose” (Robinson, 2004, pp. 2) or as “a set of parts
organized functionally to form a connected whole.” (Bobillier et al., 1976, pp. 4).
Robinson (2004, pp. 2) differentiates between four classes of systems:
- Natural systems, like an atom or the weather.
- Designed physical systems, like a house or a car.
- Designed abstracts systems, like mathematics or literature.
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- Human activity systems, like a family, city or political system.
Though simulation is used to imitate systems within each of the four categories
above, in this study, it is the simulation of natural systems that is of interest.
What a model refers to is less clear-cut. Having reviewed a number of different
definitions of models, Spath (2009, pp. 50) suggests that:
Ein Modell kann zwei verschiedene Dinge bedeuten, zum einen die
Wiedergabe eines Sachverhaltes, in Form einer Abbildung [...], zum an-
deren eine Aussage u¨ber die Beziehung und Wechselwirkungen mehrerer
Objekte untereinander (was sie mit den Theorien verwandt macht).
[. . . ] Die abstrakten Modelle bilden die Basis von Annahmen, auf der
eine Simulation aufbaut. Eine Simulation stellt also die konkrete Um-
setzung eines solchen Modells dar.
This can be compared with Thompson’s (2000, pp. xii) definition of a model as “a
mathematical summary of our best guess as to what is going on in a part of the
real world”, whereas Hartmann (2005, pp. 4) describes it as “a set of assumptions
about some system”, where “[s]ome of these assumptions may be suggested by a
general theory (such as symmetry principles), others serve merely as (idealized)
descriptions of a special object or system.”
Thus, both Hartmann and Spath see a model as a set of assumptions about a
system. If the purpose of the model is to study the behavior of a target sys-
tem, the model must not only specify static properties of that system, but also
assumptions about its time evolution (Hartmann, 2005). When the simulation
is of a theoretical nature, these assumptions will be expressed in mathematical
form – as suggested by Thompson’s definition. For a model to be run on a com-
puter, furthermore, these mathematical expressions must be made into numerical
expressions. A computer model (or numerical model) can therefore be said to
refer to the algorithms and equations used to capture the main characteristics of
the target system. Sometimes, an abstract model of this kind that is stored in
and manipulated by a computer will also be referred to as a computer program
(Bobillier et al., 1976, pp. 7).
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A last aspect to note, finally, is that, although a model allows us to study a
system (i.e. by comparing observations of how the model reacts to changes in
input data with observations from the empirical world), it is rarely possible, or
even desirable, to imitate a system in all its detail. Hence, a model will commonly
offer a simplified, approximate description of the target system.
Based on these elaborations, the term simulation, as it will be used in this study,
can be understood as the technique of imitating a system (on a computer) by means
of a mathematical model, thereby allowing for the study of the target system’s
behavior without having to interrupt the environment of the real system. This is
also in line with how the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms
defines the main feature of simulation technology:
The essential characteristic of simulation is the use of models for study
and experimentation rather than the actual system modeled. In prac-
tice, it has come to mean the use of computer models because modern
electronic computers are so much superior for most kinds of simulation
that computer modeling dominates the field. (Parker, 2003, pp. 1480)
In practice, this means that existing theoretical knowledge of the behavior of
underlying components (e.g. solid particles or parcels of fluid) are used to create
a computer model with which to simulate a phenomenon of interest (e.g. complex
natural phenomena like storms or flow of water) to help scientists investigate the
interactions and influences involved (cf. Winsberg, 1999).
2.1.2 What makes simulation ‘special’?
In the next two sections, the focus is on features that are often discussed as
setting simulation technology apart from more traditional methods of inquiry.
These concern (a) the epistemological character of computer models, and (b) that
simulation results tend to come in the format of graphic images.
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2.1.2.1 The epistemology of simulation
The questions of what represents reliable knowledge, respectively how this can be
established, has long been a subject of discussion within the field of philosophy of
science. The term epistemology (or ‘the theory of knowledge’) can be said to refer
to the means by which we sanction belief in a specific outcome. What makes sim-
ulation special is that the traditional means by which we sanction belief in natural
science theories and predictions based on deductive logic cannot be transferred to
computer models and simulation output. As Winsberg (2001, pp. 447) puts it,
the techniques used to justify simulation-based claims “are unlike anything that
usually passes for epistemology in the philosophy of science literature.”
To understand this statement, we must look at how empirical data is traditionally
used to assess the credibility of reductionist natural science theory. A first thing
to notice, in this regard, is that no amount of empirical evidence can ever verify
a theory. This is because, no matter how much data we have, there is always
the possibility that more than one theory can explain the same observations or
that data contradicting the theory exists even if we have not found it. What
empirical evidence can do is to help disprove or refute a theory (i.e. to falsify it),
since a lack of correspondence between a theory’s logical prediction and empirical
evidence means that the theory was faulty. Because of this prospect, a match
between prediction and evidence is thought to confirm the underlying theory even
if it cannot prove it.
When it comes to simulation, modelers sometimes claim that a computer model
has been “verified” when the simulation output reproduces empirical data. When
a model is calibrated,3 for example, one is satisfied when the model’s output data
matches empirical observations beyond those which were used to calibrate it. Yet,
this does not mean that the model has been verified (Oreskes et al., 1994). First,
it is not only a hypothetical possibility but a common situation that more than
one model construct can produce the same simulation results. During the 2008
3When a model is calibrated, the independent variables are manipulated to obtain a match
between the observed and the simulated distribution of the dependent variable. The aim is to
‘tune’ the model until it reproduces available data. Commonly, one part of available data is used
for tuning, while the rest is saved to serve as a basis for comparison; if the calibrated model
replicates the second part of the observational data, it supports the model’s quality.
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workshop A new look at the interaction of scientific model and policymaking at
the University of Oxford, Pasky Pascual used the term ‘model identifiability’ to
refer to the fact that different sets of model structures and parameters are often
able to explain available data with reasonably similar descriptive accuracy (PFP,
2008, pp. 6). Second, the use of auxiliary hypotheses (i.e. additional assumptions,
inferences and input parameters serving to make the model work) implies that
there is always a risk that two or more errors in auxiliary hypotheses cancel each
other out, in which case a faulty model may appear to be correct (Oreskes et al.,
1994).4
Likewise, even if some modelers argue that a model can be “verified” by comparing
a numerical solution with an analytical solution to demonstrate that the two match
over a particular range of conditions, once the model is applied beyond the initial
range of conditions – and this is mostly the very point of modeling – the numerical
code would no longer be verified (Oreskes et al., 1994, pp. 642).5
More serious from an epistemological viewpoint, though, is that a lack of corre-
spondence between simulation output and empirical data cannot be used to falsify
a computer model. The reason for this is that, even though simulation modeling
begins with theory, theoretical knowledge is just one of several ingredients that
modelers use to produce simulation results:
[I]f the model is derived from a set of approximations to a well-corroborated
theory, then the simulation tests both the theory and the approxima-
tions in conjunction. When the results in simulation go against the
underlying hypothesis but we have reason to believe those results, then
we cannot be certain immediately what has been falsified, the theory
or the approximation. (Weissert, 1997, pp. 110)
4The concept of auxiliary hypotheses can be compared with Winsberg (1999)’s view that
modelers use ‘tricks of the trade’ to make models computationally tractable. A similar point to
the one made here is found in (Bobillier et al., 1976, pp. 14), who argue that if the programming
is consistent with the rules of the simulation language, then errors stemming from invalid data or
incorrect logic will not prevent the model from working and thereby producing spurious results.
5Whereas an analytical solution (or closed form solution), refers to the exact solution of a set
of equations by means of mathematical analysis, e.g. using calculus or trigonometry, a numerical
solution uses algorithms (i.e. a step-by-step procedure for calculation) to produce an approximate
solution, often with the help of a computer. Such a solution can be accurate to a certain digit
of precision and is often as good as an exact solution for many applications.
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These models are a complex amalgam of theoretical or phenomenolog-
ical laws (and the governing equations and algorithms that represent
them), empirical input parameters, and a model conceptualization.
When a computer model generates a prediction, of what precisely is
the prediction a test? The laws? The input data? The conceptualiza-
tion? Any part (or several parts) of the model might be in error, and
there is no simple way to determine which one it is. (Oreskes, 2000,
pp. 36)
This inability to use empirical data to falsify a model implies that the means by
which we sanction belief in theory cannot be transferred to the case of simulation
models. In extension, this also means that the high level of trust accorded to logical
predictions based on ‘confirmed’ theory is not transferable to predictions stemming
from simulation. Winsberg has explained this by arguing that, although simulation
is a practice of applying theory, model output cannot be equated with deductive
inferences since the inferences that take place in simulation modeling have neither
the inevitability nor the epistemic certainty associated with deduction:
[D]eductive inferences, by definition, confer certainty on their conclu-
sions (provided that the premises are true!). The inferences that take
place in simulation modeling confer no such thing. At their best, they
confer reasonable warrant for believing the conclusions reached, and
this only when painstaking steps are taken to ensure success. (Wins-
berg, 2001, pp. S448)
Without entering into a discussion about epistemology, Sarewitz and Pielke (1999)
and Pielke (2003) make a similar point. In their view, it is sufficient to think of the
difference between a closed and an open system to understand why more caution
is required in relation to some forms of research. As Sarewitz and Pielke (1999)
clarify, predictions made in traditional reductionist science in the fields of physics,
chemistry and astronomy pertain to stationary systems. The behavior of these
systems can be predicted with a high level of accuracy because it follows certain
laws; the processes involved in producing a certain behavior or outcome are of an
invariable character. In open systems, this is not the case; the processes involved
Chapter 2. Simulation beyond the science sphere 30
are not stationary.6 Even if one can, in principle, reduce epistemic uncertainty by
learning more about the processes involved in an open system, the level of uncer-
tainty can never be known with absolute certainty. Hence, there is an inherent
limit to the predictability of an open system, which not even the application of
simulation technology can change.
Even when a computer model recreates historical or present-time data with a high
level of accuracy, this does not necessarily mean that it will be able to predict
the future. The most intuitive reason for this is that in open systems, there is
no guarantee against surprises; one debris clogged bridge can cause a flood to rise
far above its predicted crest, and a huge volcano can negate a decades-long global
warming trend (Sarewitz et al., 2000).7 Besides, small errors in the input data,
which do not impact the fit of the model to available data under the investigated
time frame, can still result in deviations when extrapolated over a longer time
horizon (Oreskes et al., 1994, pp. 643). Finally, Winsberg (1999, 2001) point out
that simulation is often used precisely when data is scarce, meaning that even if a
model recreates available empirical data, this does not necessarily mean anything.
The consequence of these aspects is that academics commonly portray it as a
mistake to treat predictions generated by a computer model with the same kind
of respect that the hypothetico-deductive research model accords to logical pre-
dictions in natural science disciplines (e.g. Oreskes, 2000; van der Sluijs, 2005).8
The question is, if the normal rules for assessing whether or not to sanction belief
in research-based predictions do not apply to simulations, what are we to apply
instead?
In Petersen (2006)’s view, the difficulty of establishing the accuracy of simulation
results means that we should focus on assessing a simulation’s methodological
6Making a comparison with a deck of cards, Pielke (2003) compares the uncertainty associated
with a closed system to the probability of drawing a particular card, and the uncertainty asso-
ciated with an open system to the same exercise when the deck is handled by a less-than-honest
dealer. The more open a system is, the harder it is to predict its behavior.
7Indeed, as long as we do not know whether future environmental conditions will be similar
or different, we also do not know whether available historic and present-time data is suitable for
evaluating model output extending into the future (PFP, 2008, pp. 3).
8Or, as Sarewitz and Pielke (1999) put it: to conflate the role of prediction in traditional
reductionist science (where it serves the role of validating hypotheses about invariant natural
phenomena) and the role of prediction as input to societal decision-making (where it is used to
foretell the behavior of complex non-stationary environmental phenomena).
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rigor, so that methodological quality rather than accuracy becomes the criterion
of importance. ‘Quality’ in this sense does not only depend on how adequately
the theoretical understanding of a phenomena is reflected in the model structure,
but also on the quality of the initial and boundary conditions used as input data
to the model, the numerical algorithms, the procedures used for implementing
the model in software, the statistical analysis of the output data, etc. In effect,
this means that a simulation’s methodological quality can be assessed according
to criteria such as (1) theoretical basis, (2) empirical basis, (3) comparison with
other simulations and (4) acceptance/support within and outside the direct peer
community (Petersen, 2006, pp. 57-62).
Representing a similar position, Winsberg (2001) writes that, even though mod-
eling begins with theory, a simulation also includes techniques of mathematical
transformation, choosing parameters, initial conditions and boundary conditions,
application of ad hoc modeling, a computer and a computer algorithm, a graph-
ics system and the final interpretation of the numerical and graphical output.
Therefore, all of these elements and their influences need to be considered when
justifying the results, including the facts we know about our computers and graph-
ical techniques, our confidence in the various ad hoc models used, the ability of
calibrating models against empirical results, and, finally, “the confidence we have
in the tacit observing abilities [. . . ] of simulationists to make judgments about the
degrees of resemblance between different classes of images.” (Winsberg, 2001, pp.
450).
Ultimately, this suggests that the means at our disposal for sanctioning belief in
simulation results consist of assessing the various elements involved in producing
those results, ranging from the quality of the input data to the skills and experience
of the simulationist him- or herself. As expressed by Bruce Beck at the workshop
A new look at the interaction of scientific model and policymaking, this essentially
means that quality is in the eye of the beholder (PFP, 2008, pp. 2-3). Whereas
one can argue that this is not a unique feature for simulation, since most research
will ultimately be judged by recipients in the peer community and beyond, the
problem with simulation is that, in comparison to other – more intuitive, well-
known or less complex – methods of inquiry, very few non-peers are able to make
an informed assessment. Instead, many users outside the science sphere must trust
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in someone else’s assessment. As Ivanovic´ and Freer (2009, pp. 2551) put it, “[t]he
underlying science of models may be opaque to non-specialists, who then rely on
honest communication of the implications of model predictions [. . . ]”. Likewise,
Petersen (2006, pp. 67) note that policy makers become dependent on scientific
policy advisers, since they are “usually not themselves able to judge the uncertainty
of scientific simulation-model outcomes [...]”.
From a philosophical point of view, this corresponds to a high level of uncertainty
of reliance (see Hansson, 2002, pp. 45), as the less decision-makers know and
understand about a topic, the more they must trust in and rely on what the experts
tell them, although history clearly shows that experts are sometimes wrong. In
theory, moreover, it is not impossible that difficulties in assessing research quality
means that other aspects, such as a piece of research’s strategic usefulness, become
more important instead (see chapter 3).
2.1.2.2 Visualization of results: Seeing is believing?
A second characteristic that makes simulation special is that its output often
comes in the format of digital images. Though other formats are also possible,
graphical representation has significantly contributed to make simulation one of
the formative research technologies of the 20th and 21st centuries (Spath, 2009,
pp. 55). By constructing images, Ku¨ppers et al. (2006, pp. 8) note, simulation
translate non-visual events into visual media:
Whereas telescopes and microscopes render phenomena visible by af-
fecting the scale of ‘tangible’ entities through optical processes of reso-
lution, simulation renders ‘visible’ the effects of parameters and forces
such as time, dynamic interactions, and so forth that are not dealt with
by optics-related transformations. Thus, simulation, by constructing
images, may translate absolutely nonvisual events into a visual media!
In literature, the visualization capacity of simulation is associated with two types
of consequences. First, it means that the output is delivered in a format that
makes it easily accessible, thereby increasing its chances of being used. Second, it
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is associated with the effect of ‘hiding’ uncertainties, allowing simulation results
to appear more certain than they might actually be. Scheer (2010, pp. 7) has
referred to this latter effect as the certainty-uncertainty paradox of simulation,
noting that simulation may impart certainty due to the format of its results rather
than due to quality criteria.
In relation to the first point, research shows that graphics attract and hold people’s
attention more effectively than numerical representations. By condensing and
clarifying data and complex information, graphics can reveal data patterns that
may otherwise go undetected. Furthermore, graphics allow the observers to process
information more effectively than numbers alone, and they make messages more
memorable (Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Lipkus and Hollands, 1999, pp. 149). In risk
research, graphical representations were found to increase risk aversion to a greater
extent than numerical representations (possibly because vision is our dominant
sense), implying that visual representations are capable of eliciting a stronger
affective response (Bostrom et al., 2008, pp. 31).9 Moreover, interviews with
policy makers and scientists have shown both groups to find visual representations
of simulation results to be more attractive than traditional formats of scientific
publication, as simple and colorful maps, graphs and tables make the content
“understandable for anyone” (Kowalczewska and Turnhout, 2012, pp. 97).
Though generally thought to constitute an advantage, this ‘immediateness’ of
graphical images can also represent a risk. Findings by Messaris (1993) show that
people can recognize the content of images without being familiar with the applied
representational conventions and that an image’s lack of fidelity to visual reality
will not impede interpretation even by an inexperienced viewer. Put differently,
this means that graphical representations make it easy for people to recognize con-
tent and draw inferences as to what they see even if they actually lack the technical
skill that it would require to make a ‘correct’ interpretation. Following the notion
of the philosopher Sven Ove Hansson (2002, pp. 39) that data “must be cognitively
assimilable in order to qualify as information, and cognitively assimilated in order
to qualify as knowledge”, one might end up assimilating a mistaken understanding
of what there is to know.
9According to Bostrom et al. (2008), these findings should, in principle, be transferable to
cartographic representations.
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In relation to the second point, academics in the field of Science and Technology
Studies (STS) have traditionally criticized numerical representations for hiding the
uncertain nature of certain types of research findings. Numbers, so the reasoning
goes, convey an impression of objectivity and certainty by ‘hiding’ the value judg-
ments and assumptions used to produce them. While language leaves room for
discussion, mathematical methods leave little room for personal judgment, and,
hence, also a minimum of opportunity for others to doubt the analysis, making
numbers difficult to contradict (Porter, 1995; Heintz, 2007, pp. 72). This has, e.g.
led to critique of quantitative risk assessments on the ground of numerical risk
representation creating a false impression of certainty, in which case assessments
may be used by regulators without them paying proper regard to the imperfections
of the underlying science (see Jasanoff, 1986, pp. 27).
That the same kind of critique is applicable to graphical images is apparent, as
these, too, fail to represent the true true complexity of the underlying research
process. As commented by Yearley (1999, pp. 846), “simulation and sophisti-
cated models commonly exert a compelling persuasiveness; they are designed to
look ‘real’– particularly to those beyond the model-constructing community [...].”
Since it is rarely possible to compare simulated images with real-world originals,
the result is that it becomes difficult to tell whether simulations are equipping
“virtual worlds with visual and other qualities that do not mirror those of real-
world processes.” (Ku¨ppers et al., 2006, pp. 8). Though some techniques exist for
illustrating certain sources of simulation uncertainty (see e.g. Pang, 2008), these
are seldom applied in practice (Zerger, 2002). Thus, a graphical representation of
simulation results will rarely show the model and data uncertainty involved. While
such information is normally provided in a supplementary document, there is no
guarantee that this type of fine print will be read in time to affect the audience’s
interpretation of the more easily accessible visual image.
Together, the lack of visual cues as to the uncertain nature of simulation results
and the fact that the immediateness of graphical representations means that one
might think that one understands what is being conveyed, although this might not
actually be the case, implies a high risk of misinterpretation. Specifically, it implies
a risk of anything beyond what is included in the graphical representation being
overlooked, including information about limitations, assumptions and sources of
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uncertainty necessary for understanding the sensitivity and range of imprecision
of simulation results. Essentially, this means that the visualization capacity of
simulation represent both a strength in terms of enabling easy communication of
complex scientific messages to non-experts and, at the same time, something of
a risk in terms of increasing the likeliness of too intuitive and, hence, incomplete
interpretations. As a result, end-users may not appreciate the uncertain nature of
the predictive information presented to them as input to decision-making.
2.2 The simulation-policy/practice interface
To begin with a clarification, the fact that predictions based on simulation tech-
nology will always be associated with some form of uncertainty is not in itself a
problem. Inherently uncertain research results are used to guide societal decision-
making on a daily basis, including in economic, financial, social and educational
issues. What concerns academic writers is not the presence of uncertainty, but the
observation that there is insufficient awareness and consideration of this on behalf
of audiences beyond the science sphere.
As individuals, most of us intuitively understand uncertainty in minor
matters. We don’t expect weather forecasts to be perfect, and we know
that friends are often late. But, ironically, we may fail to extend our
intuitive skepticism to truly important matters. As a society, we seem
to have an increasing expectation of accurate predictions about major
social and environmental issues, like global warming and the time and
place of the next major hurricane. (Oreskes, 2000, pp. 36)
Even if people understand, intellectually, that a certain research result or piece
of information is associated with uncertainty, it is quite another to be able to
understand the implications of this or to account for it in decision-making:
Every prediction contains an element of irreducible uncertainty. This
fundamental fact is not disputed by scientists or by those who use
their predictions to inform decisions. However, important implications
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of irreducible uncertainty are rarely discussed and generally not appre-
ciated. (Stewart, 2000, pp. 41).
The question is, what might the consequences be of not appreciating the uncertain
nature of simulation or of failing to account for this in decision-making?
2.2.1 Perceived risks
In principle, one can distinguish between (1) the risk of negative implications
for the science community and (2) the risk of negative consequences for decision-
making when simulation output enters the policy and practice sphere. In regard
to the first aspect, promising too much or failing to meet the – perhaps too high –
expectations of the intended audience can lead to disappointment and, in the worst
case, a lasting loss of trust in simulation technology as a whole. In this respect, it
is highly problematic when model and simulation uncertainties are insufficiently
documented and communicated, as this may lead end-users to understand the
output as more certain than it actually is. According to Ivanovic´ and Freer (2009,
pp. 2551), end-users’ confidence in model predictions has inter alia been under-
mined by “misrepresentation (or miscommunication) of model performance (where
model limitations may have been understated and inadequately explained) leading
to a false representation of results, which may later become evident.” Providing
a concrete example, van der Sluijs (2002) recounts how, in 1999, the Netherlands
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment was accused of ‘lies and
deceit’, e.g. for not clarifying the uncertainties associated with the results of what
some perceived as “poorly validated computer models” (pp. 133). Ultimately, it
was not only singular findings which were questioned but the monopoly position
of the institute itself as main provider of environmental statistics and forecasts.
As illustrated by this and other examples (see e.g. Pielke and Conant, 2003, pp.
1356), it may not be enough that the methodological quality is sufficient in view of
its function. The documentation, management and communication of uncertain-
ties must also live up to a high standard, as it can be serious enough to pretend a
non-existent precision of estimation to trigger a credibility crisis.
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When it comes to the second aspect, two forms of potential problems are commonly
identified in academic literature concerned with simulation as decision input. Both
of these are linked to end-users’ misconception of simulation models as answer ma-
chines or truth generators (see Wagner et al., 2010). First, mistaken expectations
or an unclear understanding of simulations’ ability to deliver ‘certain’ answers can
lead users in the policy and practice community to confuse the presence of uncer-
tainty with an obstacle to decision-making, so that potentially useful evidence go
unheeded, in the worst case meaning that the chance at acting in foresight is lost.
Second, the same type of misconception can lead non-experts to uncritically accept
research results of low quality or without paying attention to limitations, assump-
tions and uncertainties, treating the output as more certain than warranted. As
a consequence, decisions and policies may be based on mistaken assessments or
on an incomplete understanding of available evidence, in the worst case leading to
suboptimal or unintended outcomes.
Borrowing from terminology used by Collingridge and Reeve (1986) to describe
experts’ role in politics, the first of these problems can be described as resulting
from an ‘over-critical’ approach to simulation uncertainty, whereas the later is
rather a result of an ‘under-critical’ attitude. Below, these two problems and
examples of their potential consequences will be reviewed in more detail.
2.2.1.1 The ‘over-critical’ approach
Beginning with the risk that potentially valuable insights will go unheeded, a
commonly referred to problem is that misconception about simulation’s ability to
deliver ‘certain’ answers will reduce leaders’ willingness to act on available data
in the present. Under the assumption that science will sooner or later be able to
deliver more precise guidance, uncertainty becomes an obstacle towards decision-
making. Instead of focusing on what can be done here and now, necessary and
feasible action is deferred in anticipation of more certain evidence although this
may not be forthcoming within a realistic time frame. Instead of considering
hedging strategies and going for measures which would increase overall resilience,
a mistaken expectation in science’s predictive capacity deflects a focus on decision-
making in favor of a focus on more research (Wagner et al., 2010; Sarewitz and
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Pielke, 1999). According to Dessai et al. (2009), this is inter alia to observe in
regard to how global leaders responded to climate change in many cases.
Alternatively, uncertainty as to the reliability of simulation results can make
decision-makers and managers prefer to keep to familiar procedures and estab-
lished sources of information rather than to rely on unfamiliar computer models.
In the European water management sector, significant investments have been made
in the development of models to support policy implementation. Yet, research by
Brugnach et al. (e.g. 2007, pp. 1088) show that simulation models did not play
a dominant role in the investigated practices. On the contrary, a number of the
management organizations’ cupboards had turned into “graveyards for unused, un-
maintained academic models” (Borowski and Hare, 2007, pp. 1062). According
to Brugnach et al. (2007, pp. 1076),
part of the difficulties of incorporating computer models as a tool for
policy formulation is rooted in the lack of confidence policy makers
have in model information. Generally speaking, policy makers consider
computer models as potentially unreliable tools. Being the ultimate
responsible parties for the decisions, they fear that the incorporation of
model information could mislead or bias the decision making process.
Rather than recognizing uncertainty as a natural and to some extent irreducible
part of simulation research, ‘over-critical’ audiences view lack of certainty as an
obstacle towards use, requiring predictive information of a more accurate and
precise character than the science community is able or willing to supply. Although
the water managers included in Brugnach et al.’s study stressed that they knew
and accepted that models are only representations of real-world target systems,
they still wanted models to represent reality in exact terms when the effects of
different measures were considered. Similarly, policy makers tended to see the
presence of uncertainty as a critical constraint to decision making, leading them
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to avoid solutions which would require them to deal with uncertain information
(Brugnach et al., 2007, pp. 1080, 1086).10
In terms of empirical examples of what consequences it can have when available
evidence is disregarded as a consequence of low uncertainty tolerance, Pielke and
Conant (2003, pp. 1352) recounts how regulatory decision-makers in the USA,
e.g. due to inexperience and lack of trust in ecological forecasts, failed to act on
simulation results regarding the spread of zebra mussels into the Great Lakes – a
problem which, 20 years later, cost 20-100 million USD annually in clean-up and
environmental mitigation.
2.2.1.2 The ‘under-critical’ approach
Regarding the risk that non-experts will use simulation-results without sufficient
recognition for the limitations, assumptions and uncertainties involved, the ac-
count of the 1997 Red River flooding (see above) is probably the most illustrative
example of why this may be problematic. Whereas the Red River catastrophe was
partially a consequence of too little uncertainty information, part of the problem
was also decision-makers’ lack of interest, leading them to treat forecasting models
as truth-machines.
According to Brugnach et al.’s (2007) study of the European water management
sector, national-level policy makers, especially, show little interest in understand-
ing the uncertainties associated with modeling and simulation, preferring to rely
on experts to translate model output into readily usable policy conclusions:
Generally speaking, policy makers were not familiar with the modelling
process; commonly they did not know what models do and what type
10At the same time, low levels of application can be linked to other factors, too. Apart
from intended users’ lack confidence in computer models, including in some of the own in-house
models, Borowski and Hare (2007) showed non-use of simulation models in the European water
management sector to be linked to structural differences and mutual misunderstandings between
the science and policy communities. For one thing, academics’ main focus was not the generation
of ‘directly applicable’ products but the deeper exploration of their own field of interests, and
they were rarely able to deliver the kind of documentation and maintenance support that public
management authorities require. On the other hand, intended users in water management offices
were subject to a number of constraints, having little time to invest in models in terms of being
guided on their use or involved in their development. Moreover, some authorities lacked resources
to provide for wider access to available models or were limited by copyright regulation.
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of questions models could answer. Many policy makers used models
as if they were a black box, i.e., a device that, operating in a way
that is completely ignored, provides the desired output result. Under
these circumstances the participation of policy makers in the modelling
process was not encouraged and misinterpretations of modelling results
were likely. (Brugnach et al., 2007, pp. 1077)
Policy makers ignored model uncertainty and predictive limitations, and used
model results “without taking into account modelling assumptions, and without
examining how robust model conclusions were with respect to variations in these
assumptions” (Brugnach et al., 2007, pp. 1080).
Apart from increasing the risk of misinformed decision-making as users in policy
and practice act on the basis of what they think is the meaning of simulation
output without having this interpretation confirmed, ‘under-critical’ acceptance
also increases the risk of people relying on predictive information of questionable
quality. An empirical example in this regard concerns the use of simulation results
by public authorities in the United Kingdom, in 2001, to bring the spread of foot
and mouth disease in livestock under control. Although several, e.g., veterinar-
ian experts publicly questioned the assumptions underlying models of contagion
constructed by epidemiologists, it was the results of one of these controversial mod-
els that responsible decision-makers chose to rely on; ignoring available criticism.
As a results, a stricter cull policy than necessary was adopted, resulting in the
slaughtering of over 6 million animals at a cost to the public and private sector
of 8 billion GBP – an outcome that some referred to as ‘carnage by computer’
(Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004). Due to the novelty of model-based analysis to
the responsible decision-makers and the nature of the model outputs “to appear
more certain than perhaps they are” (pp. 407), simulation was used as a substitute
for poor information and it was overlooked that poor information will also affect
the quality and reliability of modeling output. Moreover, pressure to secure the
livestock export market and for public authorities to show that they had learned
from the criticized BSE crisis a few years prior, led to a preference for a model
which would deliver rapid and seemingly unambiguous results, and allow for quick
and decisive action. Hence, there was little interest in looking at other models or
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in examining the sensitivity of the output to changes in the criticized assumptions
(Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004).
All in all, this matches well with the assessment by Sarewitz and Pielke (1999, pp.
130) that predictive information is sensitive to misuse “because the limitations
and uncertainties associated with predictive models are often not readily apparent
to non-experts, and because the models are often applied in a climate of political
controversy and/or high economic stakes [...]”. Apart from the risk of doing too
little as a consequence of not having understood the uncertain nature of predictive
information, the example above shows that under-critical acceptance can also lead
to the opposite outcome: doing too much and waisting scarce resources. The
methodological dilemma, of course, is that it is only if the misinterpretation of
good or reliance on bad predictive evidence have negative implications that misuse
following under-critical acceptance will be discovered or framed as problematic.
To understand this statements, one can imagine what would have happened if the
forecast issued for the Red River in 1997 had been too high instead of too low;
most likely no one would ever have bothered looking into how this information was
interpreted and used. Even if under-critical acceptance is problematic in principle,
then, it will not always be of consequence in practice.
2.2.2 Solution suggestions
It is worth considering what lies behind the problems noted above. According to
Scheer (2013, pp. 86), two strains of explanations can be identified in the research
literature as to the ‘deficient’ (i.e. too low or erroneous) effect of simulation in
decision-making processes: those that refer to characteristics of the simulations
themselves and those that refer to contextual factors.
In simulationsbezogenen Defizitanalysen werden vornehmlich Aspekte
der Modelle selbst als Erkla¨rungsfaktoren fu¨r eine geringe und/oder
falsche Wirkung herangezogen. Diese Studien bescha¨ftigen sich mit
der Thematik von Unsicherheiten und Limitierungen von Modellen und
der daraus resultierenden ungenu¨genden Reliabilita¨t ihrer Ergebnisse.
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Als einen weiteren Erkla¨rungsfaktor wird die Komplexita¨t und Un-
durchsichtigkeit von Modellen angefu¨hrt, so dass Entscheidungstra¨ger
das Zustandekommen der Ergebnisse nicht verstehen und entsprechend
fehlinterpretieren. Bei kontextbezogenen Defizitanalysen werden dage-
gen Modelle in den gesellschaftlich-politischen Raum gestellt. Der
Blick liegt dann weniger auf den Limitierungen der Simulationsinstru-
mente als auf Akteuren und Institutionen, die sie erstellen (lassen),
kommunizieren oder nutzen. (Scheer, 2013, pp. 86)
Often, though, empirical analyses draw on reasons pertaining to both of these
categories when explaining non-use and black-box use. In relation to the Euro-
pean water management sector, for example, workshops and interviews with both
modelers, policy-makers and practitioners have helped Brugnach et al. (2007) and
Borowski and Hare (2007) identify a number of perceived or observed problems
leading to difficulties in relation to non-experts’ dealings with models and sim-
ulation results. Though the overriding issue found in Brugnach et. al.’s study
was “the need for a more explicit and comprehensive statement of a model’s as-
sumptions and limitations and better information provided on the sensitivity and
uncertainty inherent in the model outputs.” (2007, pp. 1080), users’ confidence in
and use of simulations was also thought to be affected by lack of understanding of
models; lack of certainty or validation of models; restrictions in models; modelers’
behavior; lack of integration of policy-makers and modelers; and lack of stakeholder
involvement in the modeling process. Here, then, we see that both characteristics
of the model (i.e. restrictions, lack of certainty, complexity) and factors pertain-
ing to the actors and the research and communication processes (i.e. modelers’
behavior, users’ lack of understanding and the insufficient exchange between the
two groups) are pointed out as responsible.
In contrast, Borowski and Hare (2007) choose to focus more on structural and
attitudinal differences between the science and policy communities, arguing that
there is “a mutual misunderstanding about the resources (time and funding) avail-
able to each community to develop and use model-based tools [. . . ]” (pp. 1070).
The result of this is that it may not be sufficient to invest in more and better un-
certainty analyses; what water managers want is not for uncertainty to be better
represented, but for it to be significantly reduced. In other words, the problem
Chapter 2. Simulation beyond the science sphere 43
does not lie in the representation of uncertainty but in the user community’s at-
titude towards simulation uncertainty: “water managers are requiring a level of
model validity and of a lack of ambiguity in results that modelers are increasingly
disinclined to provide.” (Borowski and Hare, 2007, pp. 1066).
So what can be done? Apart from calls for more explicit information on models’
assumptions and limitations, and on the uncertainty and sensitivity of output data
and predictions, a common recommendation is for more communication, interac-
tion and exchange between users and producers of models and simulation results.
First of all, this is thought to be able to affect attitudinal changes, i.e., so that
researchers become better at articulating and understanding the policy-relevancy
of uncertainty, while decision-makers become better at recognizing and dealing
with it. Second, closer cooperation is thought to be able to lead to models that
are better suited to the user’s needs. According to Wagner et al. (2010), for exam-
ple, it is a problem that policy makers and regulators see themselves as detached
consumers of simulation output. Continuous interaction could not only help ad-
dress misconceptions about the capabilities of computer models but also ensure
model constructs that answer the right types of questions and rely on appropriate
assumptions.
The implications of Borowski and Hare’s analysis, however, is that structural
and attitudinal differences can make interaction and model co-production diffi-
cult. In practice, managers often lack both time for and interest in such activities
(Borowski and Hare, 2007), whereas policy makers feel that decision-making is
complex enough in its own right, failing to see a need to complicate it further
(Brugnach et al., 2007).
In a similar way, some see problems with the idea of offering more and better
uncertainty information, arguing that there is a trade-off between offering complete
information and keeping it comprehensible:
Although tempting to provide more complete information in order to
assist decision makers, in two experimental studies, we demonstrate
that more complete information can lead to decreased comprehension
and quality of choices, particularly for individuals with lower skills
[. . . ]” (Peters, 2008, pp. 297).
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In practice, a different appraoch is noticeable. As noted by Borowski and Hare
(2007), researchers are increasingly preferring to produce predictive information
on a range of possible outcomes rather than a single future trajectory, referring
to computer models as ‘ideas generators’, ‘epistemological devices’, or tools for
awareness raising and exploration. At the same time, the authors note, this does
not change that users of model-based tools still need concrete reason to trust that
the simulated scenarios are ‘good enough’ to consider as serious possible futures,
meaning that the problem of too high expectations on the predictive capacity of
computer models largely remains.
For their part, Pielke et al. (2000) and Dessai et al. (2009) specify a number of
factors supporting beneficial use of simulation in the policy sphere, including, e.g.,
that the predictive skill is known, that the user has experience with understanding
and using predictions, and that the time frame of the predicted event is short
(to allow for evaluation). Furthermore, recommendations for how to counteract
problems stemming from over- and under-critical use of simulation concern for
policy makers to hedge their bets, consider alternatives to prediction, and to focus
on good (i.e. resilient) decisions rather than on good (i.e. certain) prediction
(Pielke et al., 2000).
In principle, then, there are different recommendations and strategies for how to
come to terms with problems related to a misconception of simulation technology.
Central in this regard are those focusing on (a) more and better uncertainty in-
formation, (b) more interaction, (c) strategies for making simulation output less
vulnerable to misuse, and (d) strategies for how to make decisions in spite of
predictive limitations.
Having seen that non-use and misuse are two problems associated with the in-
troduction of simulation results into the policy and practice sphere, but also that
there can be different reasons for such outcomes, the next chapter will focus on
research use in more general terms. After all, what constitutes sound and legiti-
mate use of research and how this can be achieved or encouraged are issues that
have preoccupied academics in the field of Knowledge Utilization (KU) for many
years.
Chapter 3
The science-policy nexus and
research utilization
3.1 Science in the policy sphere
Although the relation between science and politics has been subject to discussion
much longer,1 the idea that it is “critical that governmental decision-makers ben-
efit from the best possible information they can get, relevant to the actions they
contemplate”, dates back more than 200 years (Chelimsky, 1991, pp. 226), to the
time of the industrial and political revolutions (cf. Elzinga and Jamison, 1995, pp.
580). To mention but a few of the benefits that science can bring to policy and
practice, research can be used to:
- offer evidence, ideas and concepts;
- clarify respectively reduce areas of uncertainty or lack of knowledge;
- confirm knowledge of tacit, local and indigenous character;
- identify issues requiring public policy or management attention;
1According to Weiss (2002, pp. 376), the discussion of the proper role of expert advice can
be traced back to the era of classical Greece, during which Plato wished to install a form of
technocrat-rule while Aristotle argued that the role of the technocrat was to advise but not to
decide.
45
Chapter 3. The science-policy nexus and research utilization 46
- identify and assess options for policy and practice;
- help exclude alternatives for action that contradict basic scientific principles;
- guide and legitimize decision-making;
- evaluate policy and account for the reasons for success or failure;
- constitute a language for communication (Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980; As-
cher, 2004; Weingart, 1983).
Yet, it is not always that research evidence is heeded or scientists’ warnings taken
seriously. An oft cited example in this regard concerns the 2005 flooding of New
Orleans by Hurricane Katrina. Not only was it known that the levee system had
been inadequately maintained, but researchers had continuously warned against
draining the surrounding wetlands on the basis of this aggravating the risk of
inundation. Hence, the disaster that followed was not so much a consequence of
insufficient knowledge or research as of the policy community’s unwillingness or
incapacity to respond to available evidence (Egner, 2008, pp. 422).
Indeed, the relationship between science and policy can be tricky. According
to Hoppe (2005, pp. 206) it often takes the form of an ‘argumentative pin-ball
machine’:
Scientists keep accusing politicians of asking the wrong questions and
under-using their precious insights. Vice versa, politicians and policy-
makers keep telling scientists that they produce usable knowledge too
little and too late.
Likewise, Vogel et al. (2007, pp. 350) write that...
policy-makers and managers often indicate that they do not receive the
information they need, scientists are frustrated when their information
is not being used, and ultimately, communities remain vulnerable in
the face of extreme events and environmental changes.
Chapter 3. The science-policy nexus and research utilization 47
While scientists tend to see themselves as ‘speaking truth to power’, policy-makers
tend to prefer the metaphor of politics ‘on top’ and science ‘on tap’, signaling that
it is for them to decide when scientific advice is called for (Knagg˚ard, 2009, pp. 67-
69). Hence, research use is all but straightforward although one would rationally
expect it to be otherwise.
This chapter will first review what is meant by research use, and how it differs
from misuse and non-use. Thereafter, it will be reviewed what is hitherto known
about the factors affecting whether research is used or not used in the policy and
practice sphere.
3.2 What is research use?
3.2.1 Typologies of research utilization
The issue of how to define and measure research use has traditionally been dealt
with in studies of Knowledge Utilization (KU), and normally focused on the ap-
plication and influence of social science findings (e.g., in the fields of health care,
education and other forms of social service provision). In KU literature, it has
long been subject to debate what should suffice for someone to say that research
has indeed been used. Should it be equated with information being received, read,
understood, appreciated, made the basis of a decision, leading to action, or having
an effect (see Machlup, 1993, pp. 449-450)? Empirically, academics in the field of
KU studies often look at whether or not research is read, referred to or having any
kind of direct effect, focusing either on objective criteria and observable indica-
tors (such as number of citations or actual policy change) or on decision-makers’
and practitioners’ own subjective assessments of whether and how research is used
(Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 67).
In more theoretical terms, research is thought to be usable in different ways.
Hence, there is no one exact definition, but rather typologies and categorizations
of different forms of research use. An early and oft cited example in this regard is
the typology developed by Carol Weiss (1979). In Weiss’s view, one can distinguish
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between seven different forms of research use, pertaining to both natural and social
science products:
- The knowledge-driven model, implying that research leads policy; once knowl-
edge (or technology) exists, it will eventually become used.
- The problem-solving model, suggesting that research follows policy, being
sought out or commissioned when there is a particular problem in need of a
solution.
- The interactive model, in which research findings are used in a non-linear
process of decision-making along with experience, political insight, social
pressure, etc.
- The enlightenment model, implying that research knowledge will percolate
through (or diffuse in) society, shaping decision-makers’ general thinking
about issues, although they might not actively pursue scientific information.
- The political model, implying that research is used selectively to support,
defend and/or legitimize a previously adopted position.
- The tactical model, in which the fact that research is being undertaken
or commissioned is used, e.g. to enhance decision-makers’ credibility or to
defend non-action.
- A seventh model casts research as part of the intellectual enterprise of society.
That is, as a dependent variable rather than an independent.
While indeed covering many of the roles played by science in policy and practice,
the many different categories – all of which are not mutually excluding – also makes
this framework somewhat cumbersome as a basis for empirical analysis. A simpler
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but still related typology is a framework that differentiates between instrumen-
tal, conceptual and strategic (sometimes referred to as symbolic or legitimative)
research use. From now on, this will be referred to as the ICS-framework.2
Instrumental use is the type of usage that has traditionally been aimed for under
the assumption that research today means decision-help tomorrow (Hoppe, 2005,
pp. 203). It involves direct application of research to decision-making in politics
and practice, and can largely be said to correspond to Weiss’s knowledge-driven
and problem-solving models (Ginsburg and Gorostiaga, 2001). According to Nut-
ley et al. (2007, pp. 34-5), instrumental use can mean somewhat different things
in different settings. At macro policy level, it can mean that research is used to
develop and choose between policy options. For practitioners, it can mean that
research is used to define the most appropriate course of action, leading to new
processes and activities on the ground. And for local policy makers, it can mean
that research is applied in deciding on local priorities or for defining a strategic di-
rection. In either case, use is explicit and direct, meaning that it is possible to tell
whether research has been instrumentally used or not by looking at whether or not
a specific piece of research has influenced decision-making or been instrumental in
defining a solution to a problem (Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 36).
Conceptual use refers to more indirect and subtle ways of using research. Rather
than direct application to a situation needing a solution, conceptual use means that
research findings are assimilated into the user’s belief system (potentially together
with other forms of information), giving rise to new knowledge or confirming or
revising existing one. Research can serve to raise consciousness, shape people’s
understanding, attitudes and ways of thinking, alert people to new issues, provoke
societal debate, etc. Policy makers often state that research ‘informs’ rather than
‘determines’ policy, whereas practitioners emphasize how research enhances their
understanding of key issues, provides new ideas and perspective, promote discus-
sion, etc. (Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 36-7). According to Ginsburg and Gorostiaga
2Sometimes, process use is presented as a fourth category of the ICS-framework (see Nutley
et al., 2007, pp. 38). Process use refers to changes in thinking or behavior stemming from
learning arising during involvement in the research process, e.g. as a result of enhanced commu-
nication or interaction between the science and policy spheres or between different organizational
departments. A different way to see this would be that both the results and the process of re-
search can give rise to new knowledge or influence practical decision or routines. In this way,
focus is kept on whether and how research is used, rather than mixing in what causes these
effects.
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(2001), conceptual research use largely corresponds to Weiss’s enlightenment and
interaction models. Compared to instrumental use, this means that conceptual
research use is more difficult to identify since their influence is more abstract and
less direct. At the same time, Nutley et al. (2007, pp. 36) write that “research is
much more likely to be used in conceptual than instrumental ways”.
Strategic use, finally, refers to when research is commissioned as an alternative
to having to take action or when it is selectively deployed to advocate for, push
through, or legitimize a predetermined position. In this sense, it corresponds to
Weiss’s political and tactical models of research use, but is also described to cover
the somewhat different category of promotional use, in which research is applied
to promote the implementation of a policy to individuals who were not involved
in the decision-making process (Ginsburg and Gorostiaga, 2001, pp. 175-6). Rep-
resenting a more critical perspective, the ‘research as ammunition’-tradition ar-
gues that strategic usage involves the manipulation of knowledge to attain specific
power or profit goals (Huberman, 1987, pp. 590).3 Taking a different view, Nutley
et al. (2007, pp. 37) describe strategic use as being when policy makers find that
research provides credibility and weight to their agencies and policies, or when
practitioners mention that research helps them validate what they do personally
and publicly. Compared to conceptual and instrumental uses, strategic research
use does not imply an effect on the user’s knowledge level, decisions or behavior,
but on his or her confidence and/or capacity to pursue a certain agenda. Indeed,
strategic research use is often about affecting how others think and feel, thereby
paving the way for a favorable context for policy and practice change. In this
sense, strategic research use is partially related to the concept of ‘framing’ and
activities in the field of public relations and political communication.
An alternative framework, which some feel reflects the complexity of the field
better, is the conceptualization of research use as a linear and cumulative process
of stages. In the model proposed by Landry et al. (2001), for example, research use
is described as a ladder with six steps ranging from transmission to application via
cognition, reference, effort and influence. While there are many different ‘stages
models’ (see Blake and Ottoson, 2009), the critique against them is generally the
3Whereas some would refer to this as misuse of research, Weiss (1979) argues that research-
as-ammunition is valid as long as all participants in the policy process have access to all evidence.
Invalid use is instead when research is willfully distorted or deliberately misinterpreted.
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same, pertaining to (a) the fact that they ignore strategic forms of research use,
and (b) the way they depict instrumental use as the ultimate goal for all research
evidence (Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 47-51). As Young et al. (2002) put it: considering
that the policy processes is not rational enough to live up to the ideals associated
with ‘evidence-based’ policy making, conceptual research use is often preferable.
In principle, this means that there is no general definition of what research use
is, only more or less complex categorization systems and typologies. A common
point of critique against these is that it can be misleading to think of research
use as a one-off event to be classified according to a pre-defined schemata. For
instance, Nutley et al. (2007, pp. 43-5, 58) argue that research use is better por-
trayed as a dynamic process that moves through different models and changes
character over time, thus allowing for different types of usage to occur simultane-
ously respectively to interact in multiple and overlapping ways. So far, though,
no model has been developed that captures this dynamic element. The closest try
is to depict conceptual and instrumental research use as located in either end of a
continuum; ranging from awareness of research findings to direct changes in policy
and practice (Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 51). While such a conceptualization has
the advantage of not requiring a sharp line to be drawn between conceptual and
instrumental forms of influences, it has the drawback of not covering any strategic
kinds of application.
3.2.2 Use, misuse and non-use of research
Regardless of which typology or way of thinking about research utilization one
prefers, the fact is that not all research is ‘used’. J. Bradley Cousins (2004) is one of
the few authors who offers a conceptual framework covering both use, non-use and
misuse of research.4 In his view, research is either used or not used, respectively
either handled in an appropriate and justified manner or not. Furthermore, he
distinguishes between the use of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ research (the latter being a result,
e.g., of unforeseen circumstances leading to design degradation, or of incompetence
4Though Cousins taxonomy concerns legitimate and illegitimate (non-)use of social science
evaluation, nothing speaks against applying it to other forms of research as well.
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or mischief on behalf of the researcher). Following these assumptions, Cousins
arrives at a four-part taxonomy of research use (see Figure 3.1).
The first of these categories concerns cases of appropriate use of ‘good’ research.
Cousins view instrumental, conceptual and strategic use as three different forms
of legitimate research use, meaning that these become sub-categories of what he
refers to as ideal use.
The second category contains two different types of misuse. First, there is the case
of mischievous use of ‘good’ research, meaning that the recipient acts to “distort,
fudge or otherwise misrepresent the findings” (Cousins, 2004, pp. 393). Second,
there is the case of mistaken use of ‘bad’ research. If a user is too uncritical, for
example, and fails to reflect on the quality of research, he or she might end up
accepting and using results for which there is little real support.
The third category refers to illegitimate non-use. This is when ‘good’ research (i.e.
valid findings) are intentionally swept under the rug for self-serving purposes. In
Cousin’s framework, such inappropriate suppression of findings is referred to as
abuse of research.
Finally, the fourth category refers to legitimate non-use, of which there is two
kinds. Rational non-use is something that can emerge as a consequence of a
conscious decision not to transmit or use ‘bad’ research, or as a consequence of
untimely reporting, poor communication, findings being irrelevant, etc. Political
non-use, on the other hand, is when defensible findings go unused “in light of
competing information, changes in the decision or policy context, and a host of
other factors” (Cousins, 2004, pp. 393).
While Cousins’s framework is comprehensive in terms of differentiating between
both use and misuse, and use and non-use, the question remains how to opera-
tionalize and separate these categories from each other in practice. As already
hinted to at the beginning of this chapter, what is seen as legitimate or illegit-
imate when it comes to research use will often be a matter of perspective. To
give an example, Hoppe (2005, pp. 203) write that social scientists often discover
that influence in the policy sphere comes at the cost of hard-worked findings be-
ing “severed from their nuances and qualifications and re-shaped as un-scientific,
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Figure 3.1: Use, misuse and non-use of research. Adapted from Cousins (2004,
pp. 392).
over-generalized, and popularized stories.” But is this ‘misuse’ or still within the
boundaries of what is legitimate? Likewise, Ascher (2004) find that government
officials in natural resource politics will, inter alia, interpret the implications of
scientific information in ways that ignore the complexity of the situation; dismiss
scientific input as biased; reach self-serving conclusions regarding the reasons for
past successes or failures; over-simplify models to make the own agency’s policies
seem less prone to uncertainty; and exaggerate and exploit scientific uncertainty in
order to justify inaction. But is this willful manipulation and abuse of unwelcome
findings or simply what strategic research use looks like in practice? To provide
a contrast, Knagg˚ard (2009, pp. 280) does not portray it as problematic that
scientific uncertainty associated with climate change research ‘disappears’ more
and more as the policy process progresses, but describes this as a consequence
of how knowledge brokers translate and reformulate evidence to match end-users’
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knowledge background and to make ‘science’ understandable to non-experts.
According to modern learning theory, it is natural for audiences of different back-
grounds and interests to focus on somewhat different things and understand find-
ings in somewhat different ways. People are not a tabula rasa onto which new
knowledge can be inscribed and the human brain is not a sponge that will simply
‘soak up’ new findings. Instead, people will interpret new information in light of
their pre-existing knowledge, values and experiences (cf. NCDDR, 1996). While
this does not make all interpretations equally valid, it does suggest a difficulty
in terms of separating willful manipulation from ‘innocent’ instances of selective
perception.
Ultimately, this implies a possibility of the science and policy community having
different views as to what constitutes legitimate or illegitimate use and non-use.
Moreover, there is some support for the notion raised in chapter 2 that what some
perceive as ‘misuse’ will not necessarily be the act of intentional manipulation or
distortion of findings, but can also be the unfortunate result of insufficient under-
standing or erroneous reading of the same. As long as there are no obvious negative
consequences giving raise to questions, though, decision-makers may never even
learn of their interpretation and application of research being ‘misinformed’.
3.3 Explaining research use
Traditionally, the role of science in policy and practice is often portrayed as mak-
ing these more rational and evidence based, reflecting a view of decision-making
as a linear and logic process of defining goals, analyzing options, and acting on
the basis of what research and analysis suggest is best (Becker and Bryman, 2004;
Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 92-4). Descriptive theories of later date, however, tend to
distance themselves from such a rational understanding of policy making and the
science-policy nexus.5 If societal decision-making is understood as something that
5In the incremental model by Charles Lindblom (1959), for example, political administration
is not a question of doing what research suggests is ‘best’, but about what is possible; goals
and the means to achieve the same will be selected simultaneously and policy will be made
and re-made in a process of successive approximation towards aims which may themselves be
changing. Likewise, the policy streams model by John Kingdon (2003) depicts policy change as
something that happens when three streams of recognizing problems, generating policy proposals
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involves ambiguous goals, inconclusive information, public opinion, struggle over
legitimacy, framing and agenda setting (cf. Becker and Bryman, 2004), it becomes
understandable why influence over policy and practice is not simply a question
of producing valid findings. Indeed, “information may be complicating and in-
convenient, obscuring the clarity of choices most easily made under conditions of
relative ignorance.” (Young et al., 2002, pp. 218). To this comes the ‘two commu-
nities theory’, indicating that research use is prevented by a cultural gap between
the science and policy communities, taking the expression of different incentives,
interests and internal rules (Caplan, 1979, pp. 459).
While helpful for enlightening why research use is not straightforward, descriptive
theory of this kind is not very helpful when it comes to understanding specific
instances of (non-)use. Though the academic field of KU studies has focused on
the issue of research use for quite some time, the fact of the matter is that there has
been little theory building within this discipline, implying an general absence of
explanatory models of what determines research influence (cf. Landry et al., 2001;
NCDDR, 1996, pp. 7). What there is, instead, is an extensive amount of empirical
work, sometimes referred to as the ‘factors affecting’-literature.6 Traditionally, this
work has focused on knowledge utilization of social science research, but, recently,
studies of the use of hazard and environmental assessments and vulnerability,
resilience and risk reduction research have become more common, too (see e.g.
Morss et al., 2005; Weichselgartner and Kasperson, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2006b;
Kolkman et al., 2005). Whereas studies of social science usage have tended to
rely primarily on quantitative methods, often ending up pointing towards the
importance of factors related to personal characteristics of researchers and users,
the nature of research, linkages between research(ers) and users, and the overall
context of research use (Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 67-8),7 studies focusing on the
use of environmental assessments have often relied on qualitative case studies to
and engaging in political activities come together, e.g. as an external event opens up a ‘window
of opportunity’ for action. Even if research identifies a serious problem or a rationally superior
solution, it is unlikely to be of much influence unless someone lobbies for it or turns to the science
community for input.
6In all of this literature, focus is placed on what affects research use, not on whether or
not these reasons are legitimate or illegitimate or on whether the outcome should really be
characterized as misuse.
7Though a research review by the NCDDR (1996) instead highlights the importance of factors
related to the source, user, content and medium, these are largely different labels for the same
relationships.
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identify relevant ‘factors affecting’. What these have been shown to indicate is that
research use is largely dependent on the intended audience’s perception of research
(e.g. Mitchell et al., 2006a; Cash et al., 2003). As Cash et al. (2003, pp. 8086)
put it, “scientific information is likely to be effective in influencing the evolution
of social responses to public issues to the extent that the information is perceived
by relevant stakeholders to be not only credible, but also salient and legitimate.”
In terms of what affects how research is perceived, this appears to depend both on
the characteristics of research, users’ needs and user-producer interaction, hence
indicating clear similarities with more traditional KU findings.
Because simulation research on natural hazards has more in common with envi-
ronmental assessments than with social policy analysis, the next section will begin
with a review of the concepts of credibility, saliency and legitimacy, drawing both
on the findings reported in Mitchell et al. (2006a) and Cash et al. (2003), and on
insights stemming from KU studies. Thereafter, the categories of personal charac-
teristics, research characteristics, science-policy linkage and context will be briefly
enlightened to provide a complementary image to this picture. Finally, as neither
of these strains of literature deal explicitly with the role of scientific uncertainty
for research use, a short review of what Science and Technology Studies (STS) has
to say on this topic will be provided at the end of the chapter.
3.3.1 Credibility, saliency and legitimacy
Credibility
Beginning with credibility, this involves the user’s assessment of the scientific ad-
equacy of the technical evidence and arguments provided by a piece of research
(Cash et al., 2003, pp. 8086). As Mitchell et al. (2006a, pp. 317) puts it, the influ-
ence of research will partly depend on whether actors can be convinced “that the
facts, theories, ideas, models, causal beliefs, and options contained in an assess-
ment are ‘true’, or at least a better guide to how the world works than competing
information.” In this respect, it does not go unnoticed that non-experts may be
hampered in their ability to independently judge the information claims made in
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research. According to Mitchell et al. (2006a, pp. 318-9), this means that credibil-
ity will sometimes be assessed through some form of proxy related to the source’s
credentials, or alternative sources of information will be sought out for compari-
son. Furthermore, close contacts between researchers and intended users before,
during and after a scientific inquiry or project can help build trust and confidence
both in the source and in end-results (e.g. by providing insight into how the latter
were achieved).
Supporting these findings, KU studies tend to point to research quality as one of
the factors likely to affect uptake of new findings, as doubts about research quality
is found to be a key reason for non-use (Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 68). At the same
time, audiences in policy and practice are noted to judge research quality differ-
ently from academic peers. For example, decision-makers will sometimes place
more emphasis on a piece of research’s ability to withstand political critique than
on formal criteria of validity. In other instances, the trustworthiness of the source
has been found to be more important than the credibility of the research itself
(NCDDR, 1996, pp. 15). According to a quantitative study by Weiss and Bucu-
valas (1980), furthermore, decision-makers judged the ‘truthfulness’ of incoming
social science research on the basis of (a) its technical merit and the degree to
which it adhered to basic scientific rules, and (b) “the extent to which research
outcomes agree with their firsthand experience and professional judgment” (pp.
308), drawing on everything from direct observation to routine statistics (i.e. there
are two components of what they refer to as the ‘truth test’). Indeed, the better
the fit with previous knowledge, the less important became the criteria of research
quality. If, on the other hand, research diverged from the known, research quality
suddenly became crucial for whether people would accept the findings or not (pp.
309).
Hence, it is not only the methodological quality of research that matters for
whether or not an audience will perceive findings as credible but also whether
there is other evidence supporting them; whether there is a fit between formal re-
search results and professional knowledge and practice wisdom; whether the source
is trusted; etc.
Saliency
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Regarding relevancy, Cash et al. (2003, pp. 8086) write that saliency refers to the
fit of assessments to decision-makers’ needs. For information to be perceived as
relevant, it helps if it is produced with an eye towards the decisions that are likely
to be affected; if it is responsive to local needs and concerns; if it is timely, coming
before – but not too long before – relevant decisions; if it links to issues on which
decision-makers focus (and over which they have control); and if it identifies actions
that can be taken to mitigate or adapt to a problem (Mitchell et al., 2006a, pp.
314). Hence, close ties between researchers and intended audiences can increase
the chances of research being perceived as relevant. First, this is because this will
allow the researcher to learn about decision-makers’ constraints and the issues
currently on the agenda, thereby allowing him or her to better respond to users’
needs and concerns. Second, Mitchell et al. (2006a, pp. 327) note that it can take
considerable effort to help decision makers understand the relevance of scientific
findings to their decisions. In this respect, involving users in the research process
can fill the function of strengthening the audience’s interest in and capacity to
make use of scientific evidence.
KU studies largely support these findings. According to Nutley et al. (2007, pp.
68-71), relevancy is largely a question of matching decision-makers’ day-to-day
needs, and of being timely and action-orientated. In terms of which research is
likely to be seen as salient, both commissioned research and research which has
been conducted locally, within the context of its future use, are more likely to
be seen as relevant. Moreover, user-influence is something that is thought to
increasing the chances of application by making sure that the ‘right’ questions
are posed and that local needs and concerns are accounted for. Focusing on the
saliency of research over which users have not had any influence, on the other hand,
Weiss and Bucuvalas (1980) find that decision-makers will first of all assess whether
the content of a study is relevant to their sphere of responsibility. Thereafter, a
‘utility test’ will be applied (together with the above-described ‘truth test’). One
part of this test consists of assessing “the extent to which a study provides explicit
and practical direction on matters that they can do something about”, suggesting
that research will be influential if it is sensitive to established constraints and
proposes solutions that fit with current practices (pp. 308). Alternatively, a
study can pass the utility test if it challenges the status quo, drawing attention to
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problems associated with current practices, and suggesting new perspectives and
orientations. In effect, then, saliency is only partially about producing results that
fit with current practices. It can also be about questioning those practices or in
some other way sound the alarm as to emerging problems.
Ultimately, this means that a number of different factors and circumstances may
affect whether a piece of research is found to be relevant or not. In terms of the
research itself, its content should preferably correspond to the intended audience’s
needs, concerns and current agenda. Furthermore, the results should either provide
practical direction by identifying concrete options for action or they should bring
hitherto unknown problems to light, thereby challenging the status quo. At the
same time, saliency will also be a question of what is currently going on at a
contextual level and of an institution’s organizational constraints. Though user-
producer interaction may help achieve a match between an audience’s needs and
research content and contribute to build interest in findings, there will also be
cases in which no interaction is possible or in which this must be limited to selected
representatives.
Legitimacy
According to Cash et al. (2003, pp. 8086), “[l]egitimacy reflects the perception that
the production of information and technology has been respectful of stakeholders’
divergent values and beliefs, unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of
opposing views and interests.” Likewise, Mitchell et al. (2006a, pp. 320) speak of
legitimacy as involving the perception of an audience of the assessment process as
‘fair’; having considered the audience’s values, concerns and perspectives: “Audi-
ences judge legitimacy based on who participated and who did not, the processes
for making choices, and how information was produced, vetted, and disseminated.”
(pp. 321). In this respect, pre-existing mistrust on behalf of the target group, e.g.
for historical reasons, is something that can affect the chances of research being
perceived as legitimate. For example, audiences in the southern hemisphere have
been found to be skeptical of global environmental assessments produced by re-
searchers in the north, whereas people in the former eastern block will sometimes
reject findings stemming from the west (Mitchell et al., 2006a, pp. 322). As be-
fore, this means that close ties between users and producers are important since
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this can help bridge historical gaps and serve to build a common understanding
of why and how a study should be made:
The effectiveness of assessment processes depends on a process of co-
production of knowledge between assessment producers and potential
assessment user groups in which the boundaries among these groups
are bridged so that they can develop reciprocal understandings of what
salient, credible, and legitimate mean to the others involved. (Mitchell
et al., 2006a, pp. 324)
In KU studies, there is no particular focus on legitimacy. Moreover, in a quanti-
tative study by Weichselgartner and Kasperson (2010) to test the importance of
users’ perception of credibility, saliency and legitimacy for their use of vulnerabil-
ity and resilience research, what the authors found was that, if a decision-maker
did not consider an assessment to be legitimate, he or she would – in most cases
– also not regard it as credible. Hence, it was between the variables of legitimacy
and credibility perception that there was a significant relationship, rather than
between legitimacy and research use. Essentially, then, the concept of legitimacy
may be valuable for highlighting the possibility of research being rejected due to
historical schisms, respectively for underlining the importance of user-producer
cooperation to overcome pre-existing skepticism and hostility, but not necessarily
for explaining research (non-)use.
3.3.2 Further affecting factors
This section reviews factors that KU studies emphasize as important in terms of
affecting research utilization, and which have not yet been exhaustively discussed
above.
Personal characteristics
Though attempts have been made to identify individual characteristics that shape
the use of research, Nutley et al. (2007, pp. 73) conclude that this search has gen-
erally born limited fruit. In principle, there are some evidence that people with
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higher levels of education or qualification are more likely to use research, reflecting,
e.g., differences in values and/or skills. Likewise, some researchers are more tal-
ented than others when it comes to interacting with users and/or marketing their
results. In the end, though, what the findings come down to is often that some
people are more willing than others to make changes to current practices or to
experiment with new ideas (both in the policy/practice sphere and in the science
community), without it being possible to identify any common characteristics to
explain these differences.
Research characteristics
In relation to research characteristics, many of the findings discussed in KU studies,
e.g. concerning quality and relevancy, have already been discussed above. Apart
from the factors contributing to whether or not research is perceived as credible
and salient, though, there are also factors that are observed to affect whether or not
research reports are read in the first place. Specifically, these factors concern the
results’ format and comprehensibility in the sense that reports that are difficult
to understand or which it takes too much effort to decode are less likely to be
influential. In effect, this means that, for research to be used, it should preferably
come in the shape of concise, simple, clear and repeated messages, well-packaged in
an attractive, user-friendly and visually appealing format that makes them easily
accessible (NCDDR, 1996; Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 68-72).
Linkages
When it comes to user-producer contacts (including the medium of research dis-
semination), studies show that utilization is enhanced when contact is sustained
throughout the course of a study, when it takes the form of a two-way dialog and
when it involves face-to-face interaction. Such exchange does not only increase
the likeliness of research addressing relevant issues but is also pointed out to help
establish relationships of trust, increase the audience’s sense of ownership of the
findings and address user-incapacity problems. Alternatively, a knowledge broker
(i.e., an actor playing an intermediary role between potential users and evidence
producers) can fill a similar function. Effectively, this suggests that some form
of supportive institution or actors helping intended users understand research re-
sults and how these may be used is something that can facilitate research uptake
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(NCDDR, 1996; Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 73-5). In contrast to the literature fo-
cusing on environmental assessments and natural hazards and disaster prevention
(e.g. Mitchell et al., 2006a; Weichselgartner and Kasperson, 2010), though, KU
studies seldom call for outright ‘co-production’. On the contrary, a certain dis-
tance between users and producers is sometimes depicted as necessary for the sake
of integrety.
Context
Context, finally, refers to the climate and incentive structures characterizing the
current policy and practice environment. For example, research use is facilitated
when an organization is characterized by ‘readiness to change’ (NCDDR, 1996,
pp. 23-4), senior-level openness towards science usage or the presence of someone
actively championing research use or lobbying for specific findings (Nutley et al.,
2007, pp. 70, 74).
When it comes to policy processes, the concept of ‘context’ involves the interests
of those involved in policy making, the ideology and institutions within which they
act (characterized by certain belief systems, histories, cultures and constraints),
and the extent to which alternative sources of information crowd for attention.
Studies show that research is more likely to be used when findings are aligned and
compatible with the current ideological environment, with personal values, and
with individual and agency interests, but also in times of political crisis (Nutley
et al., 2007, pp. 75-8). For practitioners, context has more to do with organiza-
tional characteristics; whether there is time, autonomy or authority to instigate
change. Among heavy workloads, competing pressures and continual demand for
change, research use sometimes takes a low priority and the requirement to engage
with research can even be seen as a burden (Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 79-80).
In relation to risk managers, this assessment is supported by a study by (Morss
et al., 2005), in which the intended audience’s low interest in more precise flood
risk information was explained with reference to their pressured work situation
leaving little space for them to consider new research findings (including more
precise uncertainty information):
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[P]ractitioners are constrained by time, money, and other resources,
particularly given their multiple responsibilities. They also use many
types of information that evolve and thus compete with scientific in-
formation to be updated. Under such constraints, familiarity with
existing processes often reduces practitioners’ motivation to invest in
learning to use new scientific methods and information. (Morss et al.,
2005, pp. 1595)
In effect, this means that there are similarities between the aspects that KU litera-
ture refers to as the ‘context’ of research use and some of the descriptions of what
affects whether research will be perceived as relevant or not, specifically in the
emphasis of an organization’s interests and the importance of research matching
eventual constraints and current needs. Ultimately, though, as with the cate-
gory of personal characteristics, it appears difficult to pinpoint what determines
whether or not an organization is characterized by readiness to change or openness
to science use.
To conclude, what the ‘factors-affecting’-literature shows is that there is no sim-
ple one-way relationship between any one factor and research use. According to
Nutley et al. (2007, pp. 84-5), this realization has altogether curbed the enthu-
siasm amongst KU scholars for quantitative efforts to isolate main determinants
of influence. Instead, more case study analyses are increasingly being called for
to map out the complex relationship of interacting factors involved in knowledge
utilization.
3.3.3 The role of uncertainty
Since the presence of uncertainty was identified in chapter 2 as something that can
affect whether and how simulation results are used, this section will take a closer
look at what STS literature says about the role of scientific uncertainty.
According to Knagg˚ard (2009), scientific uncertainty is what we know that we
do not know, rather than what we are unaware of not knowing. For empirical
investigations, it can be identified either as the absence of certainty or as the lack
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of accord within the scientific community. For their part, Walker et al. (2003, pp.
8) have defined uncertainty in broad terms as “any departure from the unachiev-
able ideal of complete determinism”, noting that one can distinguish between
the location of uncertainty, its level, and its nature, where ‘nature’ refers to the
distinction between aleatory (i.e. stemming from variability in populations) and
epistemic uncertainty (i.e. arising from a basic lack of knowledge). Since aleatory
and epistemic uncertainty can – to some extent – be reduced by increasing the
sample size or by doing more research, though, Renn (2008, pp. 70-1, 76) also
refers to a category of ‘genuine’ uncertainty pertaining, e.g., to variation of effects
due to random events or indeterminacy, and which cannot be completely resolved.
Regarding the role of uncertainty, high levels of uncertainty will not necessarily
prevent a study from being perceived as credible. It may, however, affect a user’s
assessment of the results as relevant in the sense that, the higher the level of
uncertainty, the less guidance the findings are perceived to offer. According to
Shackley and Wynne (1996), this means that scientists must succeed with a dual
interpretation of uncertainty. On the one hand, it is there and should not be
ignored, and, at the same time, it should not be taken to undermine the authority
of science or be seen as a threat to its usefulness for policy-making. Put differently,
it should neither be seen as a scientific failure nor become an alibi for decision-
makers to ignore available evidence.
To succeed with this dual interpretation, scientists are found to adopt different
strategies, including to place the responsibility for uncertainty on someone else,
to frame it as under control, to consciously or unconsciously condense it to one
category, to reduce it, or to say when it will be reduced. Moreover, scientists
in advisory functions will often represent uncertainty in conformity with policy
makers’ assumptions about its implication for decision-making and management
(Shackley and Wynne, 1996).
When it comes to the policy process, (Knagg˚ard, 2009, pp. 281) argues that
there are three logical ways of responding to scientific uncertainty: (a) to ignore
it, implying that decisions will be made as if available information was actually
certain, (b) to perceive and/or to frame it as too large, in which case decision-
making becomes difficult, or (c) to perceive and/or to frame it as manageable, in
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which case the focus will shift towards what is known and what can be done on the
basis of this (including hedging strategies or efforts to increase overall resilience).
In practice, this means that the role of uncertainty does not only depend on its size
but also on how a user chooses to frame it (such as when uncertainty is exploited
to avoid having to act).
In Knagg˚ard’s (2009, pp. 2071) view, uncertainty reinforces the incremental char-
acter of the policy process. Based on an empirical study of the role of uncertainty
in Swedish climate change politics, scientific uncertainty was found to be handled
in four different ways depending on (a) whether the uncertainty was seen as man-
ageable or not, and (b) whether it was framed as the responsibility of the science
or the policy community. The only case in which policy making was prevented
was when uncertainty was seen as too large and as falling under the responsibility
of the science community, in which case more research would be called for. In the
other cases, large uncertainty would lead decision-makers to focus on what might
be done from a political perspective rather than on scientific evidence, whereas
manageable uncertainty would either lead them to trust in scientists’ assessment
or to focus on tactics such as the ‘precautionary principle’ (pp. 283-289). More
specifically, uncertainty was not found to affect the political agenda setting, but
rather to exercise an influence over the selection and design of policy alternatives,
respectively over the timing of decision-making.
An additional thing that Knagg˚ard notes is that the whole issue of scientific un-
certainty became more and more invisible the closer it drew to policy making (pp.
268-9). This point is in accordance with Shackley and Wynne (1996)’s observation
that research users are known to account for uncertainties to a lesser degree than
research producers. Yet, actors in the policy sphere can come to appreciate the
fragility of scientific knowledge. According to the authors, “[s]uch appreciation of
uncertainty increases when the users are motivated to explore critically the basis of
the knowledge claims that have an important bearing on their or their opponents’
policy actions.” (pp. 278).
All in all, this means that STS literature confirms (a) that scientific uncertainty
is something that can be perceived or framed as an obstacle towards decision-
making, (b) that this can present scientists with something of a dilemma (or at
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least a challenge) in terms of safeguarding political relevancy while ensuring a
truthful representation of uncertainty, and (c) that research users tend to account
for uncertainty to a lesser degree than producers. In contrast to the non-technical
simulation literature, though, there is little focus on the risks associated with
this. Moreover, there are few clues as to what affects whether uncertainty will be
ignored, perceived/framed as too large, or perceived/framed as manageable.
3.4 Implications for the empirical study
What this chapter has shown can be summarized as follows:
(1) There is no accepted definition of research ‘use’, only more or less criticized
typologies and models differentiating between different ways of using research. A
common point of critique is that it is rarely recognized that research use can mean
different things or take different shapes over time, respectively interact in dynamic
ways. Empirically, some academics rely on objective criteria and observable indi-
cators for investigating research use. Such methods are limited in their ability to
capture more conceptual and strategic forms of research use, however. Often, it
can be preferable to depart from the target audience’s own subjective accounts of
how research is applied and profited from.
(2) Though one can distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of use
and non-use in theory, it remains unclear how to recognize and separate these
categories from each other empirically, as it will often be situational or a matter
of perspective what constitutes misuse, ideal use, abuse or legitimate non-use.
(3) Though misuse is commonly defined as intentional manipulation or distortion
of findings, there are also at least two ways in which research can be unintentionally
misused. First, users may unknowingly be drawing on the results of low-quality
research, and, second, there is a risk of them misinterpreting the findings of high-
quality research so that they end up relying on a misguided understanding of
this. In either case, misuse is often difficult to detect other than ex-post undesir-
able events revealing mistaken or mischievous interpretations, or, for that matter,
scientific errors.
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(4) In the ‘factors affecting’ literature, focus is exclusively placed on identifying
factors increasing the chances of research use, including options of interaction,
attractive presentation, etc. That there can be rational reasons for non-use is not
explicitly recognized. Instead, research is implicitly assumed to be ‘good’, so that
cases of non-use become something to ‘fix’. In this respect, a number of factors
supporting or obstructing research uptake have been identified. Key amongst
these is the notion that users must find research results credible and salient. At
the same time, what makes people see research as trustworthy or relevant is not
limited to its quality or content but will partially depend on other factors as well;
some people or organizations may simply be keener on consulting science, certain
issues will or will not be on the political agenda, some audiences trust in a source
that others distrust, etc. Moreover, though scientific uncertainty can be perceived
to constitute an obstacle towards use, whether or not this will be the case is not
necessarily tied to the size of uncertainty. Sometimes, it may simply be convenient
to frame things in one or the other way.
(5) Having shown research use to be dependent on a broad range of factors rather
than a single variable, KU studies have partially begun to turn away from quan-
titative searches for significance, calling instead for qualitative case study designs
to allow for in-depth studies of complex relationships and interaction effects.
For the study at hand, this implies a number of challenges in terms of how to
explore research (non-)use. For example, it seems impractical to use fixed criteria
for identifying and distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms of
use and non-use. If one relies on the target audience’s own subjective assessment,
though, will not all cases of non-use appear rational? And how would that account
for the possibility of users being unaware of conducting ‘misuse’?
In response to these challenges, four conclusions have been drawn from the theory
and literature reviewed above. First, the study should draw on intended users’
subjective accounts to be able to capture the full variety of different forms of ap-
plications, but not only on these. It should also seek to include material from
actors in the science community and/or with a more aggregate perspective. More-
over, the study should not focus on identifying cases of legitimate and illegitimate
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research (non-)use in absolute terms, but instead explore whether there are in-
stances of application that are perceived to constitute examples of these different
categories.
Second, though not escaping criticism, ‘use’ of research will be understood along
the lines of the ICS-framework. This is because this is the simplest of the reviewed
models, providing a relatively straightforward point of orientation. Hence, research
use will be understood as something that can involve, e.g., direct influence over
decisions and behavior (instrumental use), knowledge effects and changes in the
audience’s way of thinking (conceptual use), and efforts to influence the policy
context, e.g. by silencing calls for action, legitimizing pre-defined proposals or
increasing one’s own credibility (strategic use).
Third, decision-making will be understood as a non-linear, non-rational process,
meaning that there is no guarantee for research to be used even if it is of high
quality and corresponding to a user’s area of responsibility. To gain as full of
a picture as possible of reasons for use and non-use, this question, too, should
be investigated by exploring different actors’ experiences and observations, rather
than relying solely on the accounts of the user group. In light of the lack of
explanatory theory in this regard, the analysis of this material should proceed in
an inductive way while keeping the above reviewed factors in mind as potentially
relevant aspects affecting application outcomes.
Finally, in light of the effects of research use being an under-studied topic (cf.
James and Jorgensen, 2009), the benefits of introducing a new information product
should also be explored inductively. The same applies to eventual problems as it
cannot be excluded that other problems than non-use and misuse are possible as
well (unintended effects, insufficiency of available information, etc.).
Chapter 4
Flood hazard maps in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
4.1 Simulating flood hazard
To reduce the negative impacts of flooding, people have long sought to predict the
time and place of the next flood through forecasting. More recently, interest has
also grown in predicting the outcome of various flood scenarios to allow for a better
overview of what consequences inundation would be associated with and what
might be done to prevent it or to reduce the risk of damage. For this type of hazard
assessment research,1 hydrological and hydraulic modeling are central elements.
In comparison to efforts to map flood lines by hand, ex-post inundation, scenario
simulation has the advantage of being able to account for changes in boundary
conditions (streambed, land cover, etc.) having occurred since the last larger
flood event, thus providing a more up-to-date hazard assessment. The outcome is
mostly a graphical image of the predicted extent and depth of inundation, though
other parameters such as flow velocity, flood duration, the rate at which the water
rises, etc., can also be simulated (de Moel et al., 2009, pp. 291).
1Departing from an understanding of ‘research’ as not being limited to activities of academic
researchers in academic settings, but as a form of evidence that pertains to any investigation
towards increasing the sum of knowledge based on planned and systematic inquiry (see e.g.
Nutley et al., 2007, pp. 21-23), commissioned flood scenario simulation falls under what counts
as research.
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Offering predictive information on more than one flood scenario, corresponding ei-
ther to different statistical return periods or to assumed gauge level values, modern
flood hazard maps are examples of the trend to simulate a range of likely outcomes
to break with the understanding of computer models as answer machines. (In re-
lation to other natural hazards, though, it still happens that only one pre-defined
scenario is simulated.)
This chapter will first take a closer look at how flood simulation is done and
what sources of uncertainty it is associated with. Thereafter, the case of Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg will be looked at, both in terms of what flood risk management
looks like and what role flood hazard maps are hoped to play in this regard.
4.1.1 The how of flood scenario simulation
The calculations needed for producing flood hazard maps can be performed using
methods of varying complexity depending, e.g., on the amount of data and time
available. Independently of which method is chosen, the different steps involved
tend to concern (1) estimation of the discharge associated with a specific scenario
such as a return period, (2) a translation of this discharge into a water level, and
(3) the combination of this water level with some sort of digital elevation model
to obtain output data on the expected extent and depth of inundation (de Moel
et al., 2009). Hence, one needs both hydrological input data and data required for
hydraulic calculations.
Hydrological data refers to water discharge (i.e. the volume rate of water flow,
e.g. m3/s) at certain locations along the water body associated with a flood that
– statistically speaking – occurs once in X years. In German and sometimes also
English language publications (see e.g. Prinos et al., 2008), such scenarios are com-
monly denoted by the letters HQ followed by the number of years of the statistical
return period (i.e. HQ100 for a flood with a recurrence period of once in 100 years).
Gauge level data and corresponding discharges are published at state level in Ger-
many. If a statistical method is used to produce the hydrological input data, these
records can be used to calculate the estimated discharge at ungauged locations by
applying a regionalisation approach. Alternatively, a rainfall run-off model can be
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used to generate hydrological input data.2 Such models require spatially explicit
meteorological data (e.g. temperature, precipitation and evaporation) and data
on soil and land cover, and solves the water balance for each geographical unit
(e.g. grid-cell) for each time step and route of the runoff downstream, yielding
discharges throughout the entire catchment.
Hydraulic calculations are based on topological data. This is commonly provided
by building a Digital Terrain Model (DTM) based on laser scan and geographical
survey data. Laser scan data is collected by having a plane fitted with a rotating
laser fly over an area, scanning the land at right angles to the direction of flight.
This is normally done in winter when vegetation is sparse. This data is then
processed to eliminate vegetation and man-made objects (using interpolation to
fill in any resulting gaps), arriving at a dot grid, commonly with a grid spacing of
something between one and five meters. Since laser scan data only reveals terrain
characteristics above the water level, though, other survey methods are necessary
for obtaining a sub-surface terrain model. Furthermore, manual on-site survey is
used to increase the accuracy of the laser scan data with respect to buildings and
terrain structures near water bodies. Based on laser scanning and geographical
surveying, cross section data along the water bodies is produced. This can be
imagined as a profile of what the ground looks like if cut vertically in two halves,
with a line showing where the ground meets sky or water (see Prinos et al., 2008,
pp. 5 for illustrations).
Based on hydrological data and the cross sections derived from the digital terrain
model, hydraulic calculations are made. There are a number of flood inundation
models available for these calculations. According to Prinos et al. (2008), many
models have a similar primary function, making it somewhat difficult, sometime,
to determine the most appropriate modeling solution. Basically, one can differen-
tiate between empirical (or statistical) models which do not attempt to simulate
physical processes but which relate observations or measurements of inputs (e.g.
wave conditions and water levels) directly to outcomes (e.g. overtopping rates),
and models which explicitly simulate the physical processes involved. This latter
2In Germany, conceptual rainfall run-off models are most common. These models seek to
describe the hydrology of a drainage basin from rainfall to stream discharge as a sequence
of interlinked processes and storages, but without solving the underlying physical equations
explicitly (Prinos et al., 2008).
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kind are referred to as first, second or third generation mechanistic models de-
pending on how advanced they are and the amount of simplifying assumptions
involved. Additionally, one can distinguish between the spatial aspect of the field
characteristics and equations used. One-dimensional (1D) models can be applied
to assess water levels along the axis of a water body. Some water bodies, however,
do not satisfy the boundary conditions of a 1D model, e.g. due to irregular flow or
flow in more than one direction. For flat or estuary areas or areas affected by tide,
for example, two-dimensional (2D) models are often preferable (LAWA, 2010, pp.
13). A 2D model can be used to assess extensive hydraulic dimensions such as
flow depth and speed of current in both directions along the axis of a water body.
Three dimensional (3D) models are more accurate but also more complicated and
demanding, and either not commonly used or confined to the study of smaller
areas. Examples of first generation models (essentially 1D models) used to calcu-
late the water level in each flood cell at given steps are Infoworks RS, Infoworks
CS and ISIS, which use a DTM, time series and overflow discharges as input and
produce data on flood depth, flood extent and flood duration as output. Second
generation models (1D/2D hybrids or pure 2D models) use similar or somewhat
different input data and produce similar or somewhat more detailed sets of out-
put data. Examples of software include HYDROF, LOSFLOOD-FP, Mike 21 and
TELEMAC 2D, to mention but a few (see Prinos et al., 2008, pp. 34 for a more
extensive discussion of different models).
The result of a hydraulic calculation shows the different water levels along the
length of a water body. Based on this, the flood outline can be calculated and
maps created which show the extent and water depths associated with different
flood scenarios (HQ10, HQ50, etc.). Many software packages include a graphical
user interface (or a post-process directly linked to a GIS environment), allowing
the user to visualize the results against a graphical background.
4.1.2 Sources of simulation uncertainty
When it comes to simulation results to be used for practical decision-making and
management, it is normally the uncertainty associated with the output data that
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is of interest. This refers to the uncertainty that has been accumulated through-
out the simulation process, stemming from the identification of the boundaries
of the system to be modeled, the model design, the input, and the parameters
(Walker et al., 2003). In relation to flood hazard maps, each element of the chain
involved in creating flooding (hydrological load, flood routing, potential failure
of flood protection structures, etc.) gives raise to uncertainty of one sort or an-
other. According to Prinos et al. (2008), one can distinguish between three main
categories of uncertainty affecting simulation output: (1) data uncertainty, (2)
model uncertainty, and (3) parameter uncertainty. When it comes to calculations
of annual discharge and water stages, data uncertainty arises from short or un-
available flood records, measurements error, sediment transport and bed forms,
debris accumulation, and ice effects. In respect to model uncertainty, the authors
mention, e.g., uncertainties related to rainfall run-off modeling, wave modeling,
the selection of a distributing function with respect to annual discharge, model
selection, and the use of frictional resistance equations with respect to the water
stage variable. Parameter uncertainty, finally, involves such aspects as channel
roughness and the geometry of calculating the water stage. If a dike breach is
to be simulated, furthermore, this will also involve elements of data, model and
parameter uncertainty (Prinos et al., 2008, pp. 42).
In de Moel et al. (2009)’s view, some of the main difficulties involved in flood
hazard mapping concern the statistical determination of extreme events from rel-
atively short time series of empirical data, the spatial extrapolation of data, and
the presence and/or possible failure of structural protection works. Moreover,
Bu¨chele et al. (2006) note that the quality of output data is stongly dependent on
the quality and spatial resolution of the DTM. This will namely assume the same
elevation value throughout each grid cell, ignoring eventual differences in elevation
within. Plus, there is the risk of confusing viaducts or other line structures in a
DTM with flood barriers, although these will not actually be holding any water
back (de Moel et al., 2009; Pine, 2009, pp. 71).
A further form of challenge in relation to hydrological data is the fact that pro-
tection works, channelization and other forms of anthropogenic interferences in
river systems have contributed to increase the frequency by which unusual flood-
ing occurs (Berlamont, 1995). This system instability is projected to continue, as
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global warming is likely to result in shifts in frequency, intensity and duration of
extreme precipitation events, resulting in higher peak river discharges for Europe
(see IPCC, 2014). Hence, time series of past flood events may no longer constitute
a perfect basis for the statistical calculation of future scenarios. In general, the
estimate of what constitutes a HQ100 scenario will often be somewhat uncertain,
as the statistical basis on which this scenario is calculated changes every time a
new flood episode arrives.
Together, these factors make flood scenario simulation a challenging task. Accord-
ing to Bu¨chele et al. (2006, pp. 501),
flood hazard and risk assessment is still associated with large uncer-
tainties, even in areas where a rather good data and model base is
available (as for example given at the Neckar river by means of the
flood information system with relatively well-known hydraulic condi-
tions and substantial spatial data).
Though a model can sometimes be evaluated against empirical data, such data is
rarely available when it comes to flood hazard maps, for which uncertainty assess-
ments must often be based on Monte Carlo or error propagation methods, instead.
According to Prinos et al. (2008, pp. 47), this means that flood hazard maps
should always be provided with a disclaimer with remarks as to the confidence,
accuracy and estimated uncertainty of the displayed predictions. Preferably, this
should involve a visualization representation to make the presence of uncertainty
unmistakable. Failure in this regard can not only lead to unnecessary fear but also
to a false sense of security (cf. Pine, 2009).
4.2 The case of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
4.2.1 Flood risk management and its challenges
Risk management of natural hazards is sometimes divided into four phases: (1)
prevention/mitigation in periods of calm, (2) preparedness when a threat seems
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likely, (3) response during an event, and (4) recovery, including lesson drawing and
analysis of how to improve as a new cycle of phases follows (McLoughlin, 1985).
Flood hazard maps may be useful in relation to the first two of these phases. In
terms of concrete strategies and options for action, one can differentiate between
four different pillars of flood risk management measures:
- Technical flood protection, including structural defenses like dams, dikes,
retention basins, flood gates, etc., constructed to keep the water away from
areas with high damage potential.
- Non-structural flood alleviation, including land-use management, develop-
ment planning, the use of risk sensitive building techniques, retro-fitting,
and measures to conserve and reclaim natural flood retention space. These
measures either aim at adaptation to the risk of flooding (e.g. by increasing
resilience or practicing avoidance) or at decreasing the risk of rivers over-
flowing in the first place.
- Emergency management, including preparations in the form of installation
of flood warning systems, preparedness and evacuation planning, drill exer-
cises, investment in mobile flood defenses, etc., to be able to respond to an
oncoming threat.
- Risk communication to seek to lower a community’s vulnerability to flooding,
e.g. by encouraging private flood insurance, private retro-fitting and building
precaution, ensuring sensible conduct in case of a flood emergency, etc.
In principle, all strategies of flood risk management are associated with some
form of difficulty. Due to the (false) sense of security that they convey, technical
protection and structural defenses have been shown to be associated with growth
in development in protected areas, thereby contributing to increase the damage
potential in case of overtopping or failure (Parker, 1995). Moreover, such installa-
tions can aggravate the risk of unusual flooding for downstream communities by
increasing a river’s flood stage and velocity (Berlamont, 1995, pp. 343).
When it comes to emergency management, on the other hand, the idea of investing
in crisis preparedness is often met with lack of interest or even outright opposi-
tion (McEntire and Myers, 2004, pp. 142). Whereas investments in day-to-day
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activities are certain to pay off, investments in preparedness planning, emergency
equipment and drill exercises risk appearing like sunk costs as long as nothing
happens. To this comes that no amount of planning or training can guarantee
that a hazardous event does not result in disaster, and that there is generally
little praise to be harvested if a crisis is handled well, only criticism if it is not.
Together, these aspects make it into something of a ‘mission impossible’ to uphold
the motivation for emergency preparedness (McConnell and Drennan, 2006). As
a result, preparedness will often exist in the form of a paper plan but not in terms
of actual readiness and response capacity (McEntire and Myers, 2004, pp. 142).
Traditionally, non-structural alleviation measures like hazard zoning and land-use
regulations have often been avoided due a preference for structural protection and
technical fixes, respectively for reactionary end-of-the-pipeline responses of emer-
gency management and ex-post disaster assistance (Weichselgartner and Ober-
steiner, 2002; Thomalla et al., 2006, pp. 45). In light of growing economic losses,
though, the perception of floods – and natural hazards in general – is increasingly
changing from that of that of an engineering challenge to something that requires
human adjustment and healthy ecosystems (Pielke, 1999; Jaeger et al., 2001, pp.
96-101). ‘Safety’ through flood control, it is recognized, may not be attainable to
an affordable price. Hence, rather than aiming for a certain safety level irrespec-
tively of the costs, ‘risk-based’ management approaches and strategies of avoidance
are growing in importance. Part of this is the identification of cost-effective miti-
gation measures to “reduce the maximum magnitude of an effective risk at a lowest
possible price to an individually and socially acceptable level.” (Plattner et al.,
2006, pp. 471). To help determine what is acceptable, public participation and
stakeholder consultation is being advocated (e.g. Gamper and Turcanu, 2009).3
In general, residents at risk are increasingly expected to take a larger share of re-
sponsibility for their own safety and damage potential through self-protection and
private preparatory measures. Findings cited by Grothmann and Reusswig (2006),
for example, suggest that precautionary adaptation by households and firms could
reduce monetary damage from flooding by as much as 80 percent. At the same
time, this process of individualization of risk is not only regarded as something
3This is not least apparent in the concept of ‘risk governance’ (as oppose to risk management),
in which risk is seen as something that concerns representatives of civil society and economic
actors as well as science and politics (Walker et al., 2010; Renn, 2008).
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positive, but also with a shift in responsibility from the public to the private that
weaker members of society may have difficulties coping with (Steinfu¨hrer et al.,
2009; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006, pp. 15-16).
Moreover, non-structural alleviation and risk communication to encourage behav-
ioral change are associated with challenges, too. With regard to land-use and
development planning, interest groups of land owners, developers and builders are
known to resist regulation and legislation (McEntire, 2009, pp. 76), while local
populations desiring safety will sometimes prefer a solution based on technical
protection (e.g. Walker et al., 2010, pp. 42). Furthermore, cities in economical de-
cline will often welcome development almost anywhere, making voluntary schemes
difficult (cf. Parker, 1995, pp. 343).
In regard to risk communication, the idea of this is generally to counteract the fact
that lay-people are known to underestimate the risk of natural hazards and there-
fore do less than necessary to lessen the risk of death and damage.4 Commonly it
aims to affect people’s risk perception to increase their motivation to act, and, yet,
this may not suffice. For one thing, lack of trust in experts and public authorities
can make people doubt the content of information aimed at awareness raising, at
the same time as too much trust is linked to lower levels of risk perception (see
e.g. Wachinger et al., 2012). For another thing, the fact that risk perception tends
to decrease over time, means that behavioral change will often require continuous
transmission of the same information also after awareness has been reached (Renn,
2008, pp. 239). Moreover, it may not suffice for people to learn of the presence
of a risk, as non-protective responses such as denial, wishful thinking and fatal-
ism constitute viable options as well (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006; Harries,
2008). Hence, protective motivation is unlikely to depend only on the assessment
of a threat but will also require a positive coping appraisal (including the belief
that protective actions will be effective; that one is capable of performing them;
and that the cost are manageable). Hence, risk communication should not focus
solely on awareness raising and information dissemination to ‘correct’ mistaken
4Known findings in this regard concern that certain risk characteristics (e.g. catastrophic
potential or naturalness) and contextual variables (e.g. personal control or familiarity) can bias
people’s risk judgments (see ‘the psychometric model’ in Slovic, 1992), whereas the heuristics
(i.e. judgmental rules) that people use to reduce difficult mental tasks to simpler ones will often
lead them to over- or underestimate the prospect of gains and losses (Tversky and Kahneman,
1979).
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risk perceptions, but must also address barriers to self-protection by underlining
the limits of public flood protection and by providing information on the possibil-
ities, effectiveness and costs of private precautionary measures (Grothmann and
Reusswig, 2006). According to Ho¨ppner et al. (2012), this should preferably in-
volve integrated longer term communication campaigns, multiple tools, and both
one-way and two-way communication strategies.
The case of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
In Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, the municipal administrations play a central role in the
implementation of each of the four defined management pillars. In regard to
technical flood protection, municipalities are responsible for measures pertinent
to all water bodies of the second order (though they can apply to the state level
for financial support). In this respect, it is becoming increasingly common for
municipalities to join forces to obtain catchment-wide protection, delegating the
task of planning, building and maintaining large protection works to so called
‘flood associations’ (‘Zweckverband’ in German) with their own legal status. For
waterways of the first order (e.g. parts of the Neckar, Rhine, Elsenz, Leimbach),
the State is responsible for technical protection issues, though coordination with
local authorities is required.
In terms of non-structural alleviation, the municipal level is responsible for local
development planning and for administrating private building permit applications.
In this respect, two types of plans are prepared, both of which are to contain
floodplain information:
- Preparatory land-use plans (‘Fla¨chennutzungsplan’in German) cover the whole
municipality but do not contain any legally binding provisions. These plans
have to show areas that are to be kept free in the interest of flood pro-
tection and regulation of water discharge, and areas where special building
requirements have to be fulfilled.
- Legally binding development plans (‘Bebauungspla¨ne’ in German) are devel-
oped from the preparatory land-use plans and are limited to specific parts
of the municipality. They govern whether and in what way a plot of land
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may be developed. These plans have to assign areas for flood protection and
regulation of discharge.
Local development planning is partially informed and/or restricted by regional-
level plans.5 Since these plans are not subject to frequent updates, however, it
may be a few years before regional plans introduce new restrictions even if new
evidence emerges in the meantime.
In regard to emergency management, municipalities are obliged to draw up alarm
and response plans to prepare for their involvement in a disaster management
operation. Each municipality must evaluate and plan which measures will be
required under different potential scenarios. The mayor or the mayor’s represen-
tatives carry the overall responsibility for making sure that the municipality’s plan
covers all measures within the own area of responsibility, and that it is coordinated
with the next higher administrative level. On the ground, it is mostly the nearest
fire brigade that carries out the practical measures and activities required, as fire
brigades are required to offer assistance in case of imminent emergency. Therefore,
they often play an active role in the preparedness planning even if they do not
carry any formal responsibility in this regard. Depending on the type of waterway
affected and how serious the flood is, furthermore, responsibility for coordinating
the response work can sometimes shift to a higher administrative level.
Turning to the topic of risk communication, finally, §76 of the federal Water Re-
source Act (WHG, 2009) states that there is a legal obligation to inform the public
of the location of floodplains and of measures for avoiding detrimental flood con-
sequences. Though this act does not specify who is formally responsible for this
task, the expert opinion is that, due to their closeness to the potentially affected,
5These define so called priority areas and reserve areas for flood protection. Priority areas
refer to areas where flooding poses a threat to life and limb, or where flood control structures
would be unduly costly (LAWA, 2006, pp. 8-9). These areas are to be kept free of further
development for residential and commercial purposes to prevent increases in damage potential
and to safeguard retention, and are not open to further consideration by subordinate planning
authorities (Safer, 2008, pp. 30). In contrast, reserve areas are not subject to legal restrictions
but refer to areas where the risk of flooding should be taken into consideration in planning
and construction activities and/or where it would be desirable for flood control measures to be
defined (LAWA, 2006, pp. 8-9). However, existing settlement areas and areas already covered
by legally binding development plans – even if construction has not yet begin – are normally
exempt from the definition of priority and reserve areas (Moser and Zeisler, 2003, pp. 9).
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decision-makers at the local level are best suited to handle flood risk communica-
tion (see Greiving et al., 2006, pp. 748). According to Renn (2008, pp. 203), one
can distinguish between four main functions of risk communication: (1) education
and enlightenment, (2) risk training and inducement of behavioral change, (3)
creation of confidence in institutions responsible for risk assessment and manage-
ment, and (4) involvement in risk-related decisions and conflict resolution. How
these functions or aims are to be reached in respect to flood risk is not formally
specified in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
4.2.2 Flood hazard mapping in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
Already towards the end of the 1990s, different flood mapping projects were ini-
tiated to cover the large rivers running through Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. For the
Neckar, the State government commissioned a hydrodynamic-numerical flow model
to be developed by the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, resulting in hazard maps
depicting areas at risk of inundation at different water levels at the closest gauge
station. For the Danube valley, laser-scanning enabled hazard analysis within the
framework of the Integrated Danube Program, managed by the Regional Adminis-
trative Authority Tu¨bingen in cooperation with the Regional Administrative Au-
thority Freiburg (‘Regierungspra¨sidium’ in German). These hazard maps specify
both gauge levels and return periods associated with different inundation scenar-
ios. Additionally, special ‘fact sheets’ (‘Steckbriefe’ in German) showed the water
depths to be expected from a 100-year flood. For the Rhine, finally, a project com-
missioned by the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (IKSR)
and the German Federal Institute of Hydrology (BfG) resulted in the publication
of the Rhine Atlas 2001, which depicts both the expected extent of inundation and
the values at risk associated with floods of different return periods (HQ10, HQ100
and HQextreme) (see IKSR, 2001).
In March 2003 (i.e. shortly after the 2002 flood catastrophe along the Elbe), the
need for state-wide flood hazard maps was recognized in a publication published
by three of the state ministries (Moser and Zeisler, 2003). The same year, the EU-
funded project “Safer” was initiated with the Regional Administrative Authority
Stuttgart as lead partner. Between 2003 and 2008, this project served to map flood
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extent and water depths associated with different return periods both along the
Neckar and in areas of Scotland and Ireland (Safer, 2008). The method and design
currently used for mapping around 11000 km of waterways in Baden-Wu¨ttemberg
was developed within this project. Since early 2005, the production of flood hazard
maps is required by law, as formulated by the state’s Water Act (WG, 2005).
Though each Regional Administrative Authority is responsible for the mapping
within its area, the Regional Administrative Authority Stuttgart has retained a
leading role in the project (Moser et al., 2011, pp. 9).
The hazard maps currently produced consist of two types of documents at a scale of
1:2.500.6 Both types are produced for all water bodies with a catchment area larger
than 10 km2. The first type of map offers information on the inundation depth, in
50 cm increments, for the HQ10, HQ100 and HQextreme scenarios (see example
in Figure 4.1). The second type provides information about the expected extent of
inundation for the HQ10, HQ50, HQ100 and HQextreme scenarios (see Figure 4.2).
All map types show a topographical basemap for orientation, and depict mobile
and static flood defenses. Areas protected by an installation designed to withstand
a 100-year flood or more (after subtraction of freeboard) are shown as hatched,
but are still colored blue to indicate the risk of flooding in case of a larger flood
event or dam break. A further item included in the maps is color-coded markings
at bridges to indicate whether these are likely to be free or under water in case of
a 100-year flood (Reich et al., 2014; Moser et al., 2011, pp. 14). To make flood
hazard maps publicly available, a state-wide online map service has been set up
(see ‘InteraktiveGefahrenkarte’ under http://www.um.baden-wuerttemberg.de/
servlet/is/71525/).
The hydrological data and the DTM are both centrally produced. The hydrologi-
cal data is mostly calculated through a rationalization approach, except for cases
where retention basins play a significant role, for which the runoff model Larsim
is applied instead. The DTM comes in a format of a 1x1m grid, and is based on
laser-scanning (carried out between 2000 and 2004) supplemented with empirical
terrain surveys (see Moser et al., 2011, for more detail). The hydraulic simulation
is outsourced to private engineering bureaus. However, in contrast to the hazard
6The recommended map scale for local planning purposes, defined by LAWA (2006, pp. 10)
is 1:1,000 to 1:25,000.
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Detailkarte der Überschwemmungsgebiete und derHochwassergefährdeten Gebiete (HQ100) nach §§ 77und 80 Wassergesetz.
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Figure 4.1: Example flood hazard map depicting inundation depth for the
HQ100-scenario: “U¨berflutungstiefen fu¨r HQ100” (LUBW, 007a)
7
2
1
1
3
1
1
9
357
86
4
2
5
6 48186
3
3
1
15
2414
33
14
16
18
20
13171950
46
36
12
40
42
48
21 15
22
38
1/2 1/1
114
108
106
115
113
112
13/1
48/1
112/1
Grund
Bürgle
Murrweg
Dornhau
Maubach
Sandmurr
Hofäcker
Burgholz
Alter Berg
Attichäcker
Lange Äcker
NEUSCHÖNTAL
Spitzwiesen
Klöpferwald
Krumme Steigäcker
Am Erbstetter Weg
GVGV
K 189
7
K 1897
K 1831
K 1831
K 1831
K 1897
Weiherhau
Stadtrain
Lindaue
r  Straß
e
Alte B
ackna
nger S
traße
E r b s t e t t e n
B a c k n a n g
Murr
Maubach
Klö
pfer
bac
h
2207
500
410
599
434
377
380
2540
554
585
450
400
388
1604/2
378
2210/12
596
603
2134
385
456
1900
630
448
598
444
660
2360
458
581
1727
554
/1
1659
504
2296
248
9
490
477
443
233
3
2567
1776/4
176
6
592
255
0
2
369
1682
2330
2116
1508
590
1481
2537
389
2103
2206
2250
232
0
2211
2297/2
2396
580
534
2397
252
1
460
574
2475/3
2105
1776/1
1496
2413
1489
488
600
2415
517/4
421
174
5
1662
520
254
5
2569/1
2311
1764
1697
517/3
174
8
523
211
0
232
3/1
1493
1775
248
9/1
227
0
1492
664
254
2
1776
1679
1746
254
1
572
1510
591
518/9
1756
2216
2227
1503
226
4
2/1
1674/1
2343
2208
1696
1823
236
1
254
8
2348
1709
255
8/2
2073
1706
2243
1712
177
1
251
6/1
174
9
2235
231
6/2
212
9
518/8
1700
246
2
2538
2458 1813
367
1557
251
1472
1509
255
9
517/2
233
5
2512
177
4
521
219
6
1670
517
/1
130/2
2346
2141
1665
2349
248
9/2
1752
232
2
2231
216
9
2326
207
8
234
7
16451827
168
7
516
600/2
453
2303
1704
226
0
174
0
173
2
1486
567/1
2301/2
2428
515
252
4
202
0
173
6
2551
1483
225
8
561/2
362
1500
2019
1702
2247
1551
2305
1487
1501
162
9
2224
246
0
2358
2412
1758
224
8
1651
174
3
2211/1
254
3
2355
2018
1499
2365
218
9
2071
2435/1
172
9
2401
2423/1
2394
1488
1620
2299/2
173
4
668
1512
2135
172
8
1513
1506
1484
667
233
6
669
/1
2341
531
173
0
2225
1564
2427/1
233
8
2421
254
7
1511
2298/2
1494
202
2
1565
508
2435/3
2539/1
2198
2186
1637
2578
2539/2
173
1
2084
244
1
1699
224
9
2151
2154
1818
1769
662
231
8
2402
1635
1714
2233
2429
2113
560/3
1597
1507
1650
1567
2385
2245
205
2
1562
601
2314
1495
1474
2484
2552/8
232
4/1
2252
218
8
1473
602
2558/1
1677
2159
1560
518/11
243
5/2
2230
246
1
2130
226
1
236
3
1505
518/10
1816
663
2424
2126
254
4
1713
2267
2381
518/7
2423
2301/1
512
2431
252
2/2
226
2
1766/1
480
2463
2471
1775/1
359
1477
2312
2237
2148
1776/2
226
5
665/1
2408/1
1826
1716
2480/2
158
6
1648
665/2
173
9
360
1516
168
9
666
2127
2519
2426
1821
173
8
2139
589
2517 252
2/1
518/6
2119
2553
2367
1559
1485/2
364
2368
1572
2370
173
7
180
1/1
2266
256
0
518/5
1708
1710
370/1
1745/2
2527
1705
2376
2353
246
8/2
2354
1719/1
1485/1
174
1
363
1568
1675
1790
1761
1639
174
2
154
9
217
7
510
1671
2530
2197
245
2
2217
1800
2222
168
6
1760
168
5
2140/2
370/3
2209
2137/1
2422
2406/1
2529
1742/2
2120
2404
2557
1803
1698
252
3
2101
2204
225
6
1802
1623/1
245
3
239
1
1720
245
4
254
9/3
208
0
2372
217
5
1490
2192
2408
245
1
2203
1514
1839
1641
2100
245
5
2089
254
9/1
2374
1644
1763
2109
1780
1772
1694
225
7
224
2/5
217
8
251
4
180
1/2
1783
1809
2446/1
172
6
219
5
1676
2373
518/13
2409
2375
233
9
1808
1633
224
2/1
218
3 2554
240
5
370/2
172
5
172
3
225
5
2123
518/12
178
2
172
4
1841
172
2
1570
1711/2
1721
155
6
254
9/2
1838
566
2351
565
2570/2
219
4
1693/1
1711/1
2099
1837
208
2
1840
1843
208
1
1643
155
5
368
2072
377
/1
511
2108
2142/1
1834
2144
2193
2092
2467
1479
1478
2570/1
209
1
1819
1626
2403
2324/2
2077
1827/1
600/1
1553
1642
1502
1820
513
556
2199/1
2533
361
2534
251
6/2
2090
1781
1656/2
2352
2477/2
2483
/1
2532
2152
1785
2191
2106/2
236
2
2535
2199/2
2111
252
6
2161
2172/2
1668
2310
2316/1
2395
/1
2555
1667
1475
1646
1779
2106/1
1498
2160/2
393
1804/2
2218
2228
225
4/3
1625
1821/1
2143
2515
2179
1764/1
2190
168
4
2200
2131
225
4/5
2133
2395
/2
1754
630/1
2124
2102
1623/2
2505
174
4
567/2
2132
1628
442
1515/1
2145
1482
2518/1
1766/2
1806
1627
1604
/4
2180
593
1743/1
224
2/3
2407
366
1622
2142
241
0
1574
1718
1789
175
1
2223
1681/1
2229
202
3
217
2/1
2012/
5
2364
2531
1833
209
7
224
2/2
1815
1778
509
/1
560
/4
2201
2160/1
2380
509
/2
2122
1824
2406/2
252
5
1681/2
560/6
2153
2098
248
2/1
2577
2442/2
2253/1
1830/1
2085
1742/1
2185/1
1673
560
/5
1621
1830
2185/2
1630
514/1
605
2241
1636
1814
224
2/4
2086
2387
2489/3
2076
2389
2378
1646/1
1811/1
169
0
514/2
371
2528
1632
1759
1755
155
4
1672
2492
1831
2388
1631
1753
1653
1811/2
1634
243
5/4
1649/1
1652
216
8
1604/
5
1777
1649/2
169
1
2121
2420
1640
1810/2
2470/4
224
0/2 23
92
2472/1
592
/1
1810/1
2418
2234
256
1
1768
2469/2
1835
1812
2406/4
1624
567/4
1836
2509
1832/1
2149
1757
2579/1
1569
158
6/1
2470/3
2419
2457/1
2345
225
4/4
2457/2
1928
250
1
2407/1
1927
209
6/1
2182
1825
2190
/1
1791
1550/2
1666
1807
177
1/2
1550/1
1590
1930
2430/1
1591
250
2
2510
1776
/5
218
1
1778/1
365
2189
/1
1831/1
2430
1804/3
1744/1
2513
202
8
1804/1
2478/2
2500
518/2
2221
2555/1
2191
/1
518/3
2424/3
217
0/1
2411
535/1
1846/1
2556
1719/2
217
1/1
2187
/1
1656/
1
2088
470
1577
180/2
2147
2220
2297/4
182
8
2219
1826/1
1772/1
1799
216
6
2479/2
2087
2556/
1
567/3
2146
1805
2554/1
2241/
1
1586/26
1654/
2
217
6
1743/2
1831/2
1784
1833/1
217
1/2
158
6/4
2
1762
231
1586/21586
/41
1596
2297/1
2442/1
158
6/21
208
3/1
2551/1
1579
378
/5
158
6/1
8
217
0/2
1778/2
208
3/2
2434/2
636
2518/2
2218/1
1548
1771/1
158
6/2
0
2220/1
1834/1
1586/34
2499/1
1578
183
2204
8
1692/3
1784/1
2557/1
158
6/1
9
2219/1
218
4/1
1747
2150/1
2192/1
1798
158
6/5
3
158
6/5
6
1547
202
7
1832/4
2012
/6
2298/1
1586/40
2069
1788/1
1837/1
1586/3
1797
2299/1
1838/1
180
1750
2295
604
2417
2316/3
386
1604/7
501
2379
555
2493
1783/1
473
2275
2275/1
2138
555/2
1770/1
1845
2297/3
524
1809/1
1601
1827/2
1535
358
1602/1
1931
525
1518
1794
3842300/1
1580
1839/1
1586/171586/351604/3 2576
1847/1
1693/2
1793
1586/16 1613
3528,4
3528,4
3528,5
3528,5
3528,6
3528,6
3528,7
3528,7
3528,8
3528,8
3528,9
3528,9
3529,0
3529,0
3529,1
3529,1
3529,2
3529,2
3529,3
3529,3
3529,4
3529,4
3529,5
3529,5
3529,6
3529,6
3529,7
3529,7
3529,8
3529,8
3529,9
3529,9
3530,0
3530,0
5421,4 5421,4
5421,5 5421,5
5421,6 5421,6
5421,7 5421,7
5421,8 5421,8
5421,9 5421,9
5422,0 5422,0
5422,1 5422,1
5422,2 5422,2
5422,3 5422,3
5422,4 5422,4
5422,5 5422,5
5422,6 5422,6
Überflutungsflächen für HQEXTREM, 100, 50, 10
Geobasisdaten: ATKIS-DLM, ALK, DTK25© Landesvermessungsamt Baden-Württemberg, Az.: 2851.9-1/19
Hochwassergefahrenkarte (HWGK)Baden-Württemberg, Typ 2Detailkarte
  
!
!
!
!
Tübingen
Freiburg
Stuttgart
Karlsruhe
 
 
Detailkarte der Überschwemmungsgebiete und derHochwassergefährdeten Gebiete (HQ100) sowie derÜberschwemmungskernbereiche (HQ10) nach §§ 77und 80 Wassergesetz.
Backnang
Burgstetten
M025 083089
M025 084089
M025 082089
M025 084090
M025 082090
M025 083088
M025 084088
M025 083090
M025 082088
§
Blattübersicht
This Project has receivedEuropean RegionalDevelopment Fundingthrough the INTERREG III BCommunity Initiative Neckar unserLebensraum
 m
Maßstab 1:2.500
0 100 20050
Überflutungsflächen für HQEXT, 100, 50, 10
Flächenausbreitungfür HQx:
HQ100
GeschützterBereich(bezogen auf ein HQ100)
Historische Hoch-wassermarke
MobileSchutzwandJ J
Damm
Gewässer
Staatsgrenze! ! !
Landesgrenze
Kreisgrenze
Gemeindegrenze
Gemarkungs-grenze
Sonstiges:
Ortslage
Flurstück34/6
Nebengebäude
Hauptgebäude
öffentl. Gebäude
passierbareBrücken
Verdolung
AnschlaglinieHQEXT
HQ10
HQ50
HQextrem
AnschlaglinieHQ100
Karte erstellt am: 09.05.2007
M025 UF 083089
! ! ! !
Gewässer: Murr ohne Neckaranschluss
Gemeinde:
Kartenblatt:Stadt-/Landkreis:
Figure 4.2: Example flood hazard map depicting inundation extent for differ-
ent HQ-scenarios: “U¨berflutungsfla¨chen fu¨r HQEXTREM, 100, 50, 10” (LUBW,
007b)
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mapping reviewed in Landstro¨m et al. (2011) and Lane et al. (2011), where the re-
sponsible environment agency specified which simulation software should be used,
the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg leaves it to the respective engineering bureau to
choose which model and software program they prefer to work with. To still ensure
a standardized, uniform end-product, detailed instructions are provided, specify-
ing which tasks and obligations the responsible bureau has to fulfill. Mostly, 1D
models are sufficient for the hydraulic calculations, though 2D models are required
in areas with complex flow patterns. On the basis of the simulation results, hazard
maps are finally centrally produced by the Regional Office for Environment, Mea-
surements and Nature Protection (LUBW) in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (Moser et al.,
2011).
When it comes to simulation uncertainty, the flood hazard maps and map legends
in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg do not provide any information in respect to limitations
or uncertainties associated with scenario simulation. Such information is instead
found in other documents. In a handbook published in 2005, for example, one can
read that only flooding due to overflowing water bodies is simulated. Flooding
resulting from flash floods (i.e. sudden extreme precipitation over a limited area),
slope water, rising groundwater, sewer backwater, and flooding due to ice or other
objects obstructing the normal discharge profile are not depicted in the hazard
maps (Zeisler, 2005, pp. 2). Furthermore, the final report on the Safer project
offers a qualitative disclaimer: “The reliability of the maps is limited by the input
data. The information provided is indicative only and is subject to the normal
uncertainties associated with ground level and modelling accuracies as well as to
the causes of flooding.” (Safer, 2008, pp. 14). To learn more, one must consult
a special method paper published in 2011, offering technical information on the
data, models and procedures involved in hazard mapping.
In relation to the DTM, this paper tells us that:
- The accuracy of the DTM is estimated to lie within a range of ±0,3m.7
- Changes to the landscape undertaken since 2004 will not be reflected in the
DTM.
7In Zeisler (2005: 27) it is specified that “[t]he position accuracy of the aerial laser scanning-
derived DTM is around +/- 50 cm and the elevation accuracy is +/- 20–30 cm.”
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- Small-scale structures like walls, dikes and embankments are difficult to
model in a way that reflects their actual extent and height in spite of the
use of a 1x1 m grid.
- Steeply inclining terrain is only approximately modeled, while values related
to flat areas without vegetation are highly reliable.
- The manual processing of the terrain data included in the DTM shows a low
error rate.
- In areas with dense vegetation or a high concentration of buildings, the DTM
is partially inexact. (Moser et al., 2011, pp. 17).
Furthermore, we can read that the hydrological data is one of the most sensitive
aspects of the mapping project, representing an important input source but also
one where the values can diverge greatly depending on the calculation method
(Moser et al., 2011, pp. 21). Particularly for small catchments, it is difficult to
produce reliable hydrological input data:
Je kleiner die Einzugsgebiete sind, desto schwieriger ist die Bereitstel-
lung der hydrologischen Grundlagendaten. In einzelnen Fa¨llen kann
die Neuerstellung der Hydrologie fu¨r kleine Einzugsgebiete erforderlich
werden. Allerdings gibt es in der Regel jedoch insbesondere in kleinen
Einzugsgebieten keine Aufzeichnungen u¨ber abgelaufene Hochwasser-
ereignisse, sodass sich die hydrologische Datenlage auch durch die Er-
stellung von Niederschlags-Abfluss-Modellen (N-A-Modell) – mangels
Kalibrierungsdaten – nicht signifikant verbessern la¨sst. (Moser et al.,
2011, pp. 23)
The calibrations are normally done on the basis of high water marks or documented
flood lines associated with known discharge levels. Parameter values following from
such calibrations are assumed to be applicable to other river stretches of similar
size and structure, too. For areas to which these values cannot be transferred,
parameter values are assumed based on the water and terrain structure. To ensure
transparency, such assumptions are part of what engineering bureaus must provide
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information on (Moser et al., 2011, pp. 20). Other forms of difficulties concern
the simulation of areas where rivers merge, the effect of retention basins and other
forms of defense structures, the possibility of failure of such structures, etc. (Moser
et al., 2011).
Though it is clear from the method paper that several steps of quality control of the
input data and calculation steps are built into the mapping process, it is also clear
that such precaution can never completely eliminate the presence of uncertainty.
Considering that the maps are intended to guide both public and private risk
management, explicitly targeting audiences without experience of modeling and
simulation, this is something that should be unmistakably conveyed directly in
the maps. Presently, this is not the case. In principle, this implies a risk in the
sense of missing that areas displayed as ‘safe’ may still be inundated from other
sources of flooding, due to the occurrence of unexpected events, or as a result
of model and data imprecision. Though this type of information is included in
the handbook and method papers, respectively documented and supplied together
with the hazard maps, the separation of uncertainty information from the mapped
flood lines makes it questionable to what extent it will be recognized.
4.2.3 Special features: legal status and linkage
Two things make the flood hazard maps produced in Baden-Wu¨ttemberg special
in relation to many other mapping efforts in Germany and beyond.
The first is that, following a period of mandatory public display at city hall and
at the Administrative District Office (‘Landratsamt’ in German), the area shown
in the flood hazard maps to be at risk of inundation from a HQ100 scenario will
automatically gain legal status as floodplain; no further designation process or
legal ordinance is necessary. Originally, the state Water Act of 2005 (WG, §77)
specified that this automatism only applied to so called external zones or outlying
areas, meaning that it was only in non-built-up areas that raising or lowering the
earth’s surface, or constructing, demolishing or significantly modifying buildings
or other facilities required official consent. Since the introduction of the federal
Water Resource Act in 2009, however, a discrepancy emerged, since the federal
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law did not make a distinction between outlying and built-up areas (WHG, 2009,
Ch. 6). Thus, a new state Water Act was introduced, entering into force on
January 1, 2015 (WG, 2013). Since then, areas shown in the maps as likely to
become inundated in case of HQ100 scenario automatically count as floodplain
independently of whether they are located in outlying or built-up areas (Reich
et al., 2014, pp. 7). In these areas, firm land-use restrictions apply, making it
prohibited to designate new construction zones, to erect or modify buildings, to
turn meadows into farm-land, to store substances hazardous to water, etc., with
exceptions being permissible only under particular circumstances (see WHG, 2009,
§78 for a complete list of both bans and exceptions). Furthermore, in so called
core flooding areas, corresponding to the areas predicted to be inundated in case
of a HQ10 scenario, such consent is also required for planting or removing trees
or bushes (see Zeisler, 2005, pp. 34-35). This makes Baden-Wu¨rttemberg special,
since most other German states still designate floodplains in separate processes.
The second aspect setting the mapping project in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg apart, is
that it has accounted for and followed many of the recommendations specified in
KU studies for how to increase the chances of research use. Such recommendations
include the involvement of intended users throughout the research process, and
the setting up of institutions or support structures to motivate and enable target
audiences to use available evidence (Nutley et al., 2007, Ch. 5).
In Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, the hazard maps’ design reflect a conscious effort to in-
quire about different target groups’ needs and requirements, realized by involving
stakeholder representatives in the Safer project (Safer, 2008, pp. 16). Further-
more, the latest mapping project has offered the municipalities several chances
at direct involvement. First, prior to the mapping, local authorities were able
to specify additional catchments (i.e. smaller than 10 km2) that they wanted to
have mapped (Zeisler, 2005, pp. 3). Second, once the mapping of a municipality
started, the administration would be requested to help the responsible engineering
bureau with information. Third, all municipalities are asked to review and give
feedback on the first map drafts produced (a so called ‘plausibilization’ process).
In this way, local knowledge and experience is safeguarded and the risk of errors
is reduced (Reich et al., 2014, pp. 6). In literature, both stakeholder involvement
and repeated contact with intended users are described as tactics for increasing
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the chances of research being perceived as credible, relevant and legitimate (e.g.
Mitchell et al., 2006a).
Moreover, in terms of institutional arrangements to support research use, a train-
ing association (the ‘WBW Fortbildungsgemeinschaft’) has been set up to support
the formation of voluntary catchment-based flood partnerships, where municipal
decision-makers and administrators can meet and discuss different aspects of risk
management (Zeisler, 2005, pp. 7). Apart from increasing awareness, enabling
exchange of information and know how, and inspiring more non-structural pro-
tection measures, one of the main aims of these partnerships is to support the
municipalities in making use of flood hazard maps. To encourage attendance, ac-
tive efforts are made, e.g. by choosing well-respected actors to chair the meetings
(Safer, 2008, pp. 38). Furthermore, the municipal level is suggested to have ex-
plicit ownership of the mapping process through the fact that they co-finance the
production of the maps together with the State through the committee in which
all the municipalities in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg are represented (Reich et al., 2014,
pp. 1).
4.2.4 Intended areas of application
In official publications concerning flood risk management, mostly published by the
Ministry of the Environment and Transport, the Ministry of Commerce and the
Ministry of the Interior, one finds descriptions of the flood hazard maps’ intended
effects. Similar descriptions can be found in reports of the Safer project. One
such report states that the introduction of flood hazard maps particularly aims to
support local-level risk management.8 By allowing local administrations to make
better informed judgments and decisions, foresight should enable them to take
a more proactive approach to flood risk management (Safer, 2008). In general,
hazard maps are thought to be useful tools for each of the four pillars of flood risk
management:
[F]lood hazard maps are an ideal instrument to create awareness of the
diverse stakeholders. With the help of flood hazard maps owners of
8Other actors that flood hazard maps may be used by include regional administrations, in-
surers, businesses and households (Zeisler, 2005).
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properties as well as stakeholders in responsible authorities and politi-
cians are able to see if they are in danger and if precaution activities are
necessary. Detailed hazard maps are essential to implement efficient
technical flood protection and a sustainable land use management. In
addition they are necessary to initiate self help activities and to prepare
an emergency management. Not least hazard maps clearly highlight
areas where further development should be avoided to protect natural
floodplains and safeguard original retention capabilities. (Safer, 2008,
pp. 70)
More specifically, flood hazard maps are expected to be useful in the following
ways:
Technical protection: In relation to the planning, construction and maintenance
of technical and infrastructural measures aimed at flood control, hazard maps can
help authorities identify (a) hot-spot areas, where hazard or vulnerability are
particularly large, and (b) gaps in the existing flood defenses. They may also help
local administrations determine the expected damage potential associated with
different flood scenarios, thus supporting cost benefit analyses of possible defense
options (Safer, 2008, pp. 31). Furthermore, hazard maps can help determine
the need for targeted physical protection, e.g. of sites likely to contain materials
hazardous to water, such as fuel or heating oil (Moser and Zeisler, 2003, pp. 11).
Non-structural alleviation: In relation to local land-use management, some use
is more or less unavoidable as a result of the legal status awarded the HQ100 and
HQ10 scenarios. In other areas, flood hazard maps constitute an important tool
for enabling risk-sensitive development planning, helping “local authorities and
others to understand flood risk when considering where new homes, businesses
and other developments should be built.” (Safer, 2008, pp. 29). Other ways in
which the flood hazard maps are expected to enable risk reduction is by allowing
municipalities to specify particular building requirements (e.g. a minimum floor
height), pursue re-naturalization, and taking measures to ensure free discharge of
flood water.
Emergency management: In the field of emergency management, flood hazard
maps offer input for creating and revising the alarm and response plans that each
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municipality is required to develop according to §2 of the Civil Protection Act
(LKatSG, 1999). The maps can help emergency managers plan what equipment
and assignments will be necessary, which roads to take, where to evacuate people
to, what to focus on and prioritize. Moreover, information about flood depth can
help them analyze beforehand what types of vehicles will be functional for reaching
different areas and districts (Safer, 2008, pp. 32-34). In general, predictive infor-
mation as to the extent and depth of inundation is expected to make emergency
management planning more purposeful and precise (see Moser and Zeisler, 2003,
pp. 10).
Risk communication: Official accounts show that flood hazard maps are seen
as suitable tools for fighting the unawareness and complacency that is known to
set in when enough time has passed without a hazardous event. Flood hazard
maps are “an ideal instrument to create awareness”, helping stakeholders “see if
they are in danger and if precaution activities are necessary” (Safer, 2008, pp. 70).
Flood hazard maps, so the reasoning goes, “will help people to be aware of the
hazard and prepare for it.” (Safer, 2008, pp. 31). By consulting the information
in the maps, members of the general public can identify whether or not they live
in an area at risk of flooding, and use this insight to assess whether and what form
of precautionary action is required:
The publication of the FHM allows everyone to be informed about the
level of threat of flooding to one’s home. Flood prevention measures
such as installing door guards, putting up demountable flood defence,
moving valuable goods upstairs if taken in sufficient time can signifi-
cantly reduce the loss and damage caused by floods. (Safer, 2008, pp.
33-34)
Also businesses and enterprises are expected to benefit from the publication of
hazard maps. Predictive information as to inundation risk is, e.g., relevant in
relation to water-hazardous substances, for analyzing the need for retrofitting or
re-location, and for developing emergency and business contingency plans (Safer,
2008, pp. 33-34). Hence, one of the purposes of flood hazard maps is to encourage
people to take more own protection measures; becoming more responsible for their
own risk situation.
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What is not mentioned anywhere is how citizens and businesses are to learn of flood
hazard maps being available or of options and costs for protective measures. There
are no guidelines or recommendations in place for what flood risk communication
should look like. On the contrary, official documents appear to assume that it will
suffice to make hazard information publicly available for people’s awareness and
behavior to change. Even at EU-level, this is sometimes the view as illustrated by
the notion that “[p]roducing flood risk maps will mean the public is better informed
about flood risks” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, pp. 23).
Though, the Safer report (2008) recognizes that supplementary information about
how to prepare one’s house or business facility for flooding should be provided
along with the hazard maps, it remains up to each local administration to decide
upon whether and how flood hazard maps should be used for risk communication
purposes.
Ultimately, this implies official expectations of flood hazard maps being both con-
ceptually and instrumentally used, whereas there is no mentioning of strategic
application. In terms of obstacles and challenges, only the Safer report touches
upon this topic, noting that low levels of risk awareness, the presence of compet-
ing interests, and lack of manpower in small communities constitute challenges for
local-level map use (Safer, 2008, pp. 47-48). Regarding benefits and problems,
available reports do not allow for any conclusions to be drawn about what local
administrations or other actors associate with any of the hazard maps hitherto
published.
Chapter 5
Method and material
5.1 The study interest and research questions
As previously noted, this study takes an interest in computer simulation as a tech-
nology for identifying and visualizing areas predicted to become affected under
different natural hazard scenarios. More specifically, it takes an interest in what
happens when public decision-makers and practitioners are presented with the re-
sults of such simulation runs, considering (a) that these are the actors that are the
most directly responsible for a community’s level of vulnerability, preparedness
and protection, and (b) that they are often non-experts when it comes to simu-
lation technology. Academic literature on non-experts’ use of simulation results
warns that insufficient understanding of the inherent uncertainty associated with
computer modeling can jeopardize the benefit of ‘foresight’, leading to non-use
or misuse of what could have been valuable insight for decision-making and reg-
ulatory activities. So far, though, this literature has not focused specifically on
natural hazards or hazard maps.
Hazard maps constitutes an interesting type of product because it is a common
format for displaying scenario simulation results and an increasingly emphasized
kind of policy tool, expected to allow risk managers to plan and act in foresight
rather than hindsight. In this respect, actors in policy and practice are not pro-
vided with simulation output in its original form but with a processed product,
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showing lines or colored fields in a cartographic representation of the area in ques-
tion. This type of product will rarely give any hint as to the uncertain nature of
the mapped assessment results although technical literature often emphasizes the
importance of this.
What underlies this study is primarily curiosity about whether the problems and
risks identified in relation to non-experts’ dealings with simulation technology and
simulation output in other areas are also aﬄicting simulation-based scenario maps
introduced to support risk management of natural hazards. So far, there is nothing
that allows us to expect that they should not be. Yet, we cannot know since the
question has not been made the focus of empirical study. For the same reason, it
remains unknown what benefits are actually experienced in practice compared to
what is suggested in theory.
To allow for an open and unprejudiced exploration of risk managers’ use of visu-
alized scenario simulation results and what benefits and problems this entails, the
following three research questions were formulated:
- How are risk managers in the public sphere using simulation-based scenario
information about the predicted outcome of a natural hazard – if they use it
at all?
- What affects whether or not predictive information is used?
- What benefits and/or problems are associated with the introduction of predic-
tive information to an audience that lacks expertise in the field of modeling
and simulation?
The selected product and context in regard to which these research questions
are approached are simulation-based flood hazard maps and the German state of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
5.2 Research design: Exploratory case study
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
in depth and within its real-life context (Yin, 2009, pp. 18). Though a case
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study must not be limited to a single case or draw on any particular form of
data, the design is often associated with the practice of in-depth study of one
or a few examples of the phenomenon of interest with the help of qualitative
methods. According to Yin (2009, pp. 47-49), a case study, even of a single
case, is motivated when a researcher is provided with the opportunity to observe
and analyze a phenomenon that has not yet been explored or that was previously
inaccessible to social science inquiry. At the same time, one should also be aware
that a case study comes with a trade off between depth and generalizability. That
is, even if the possibility to dig deep is a plus in terms of allowing for detailed
descriptions and the construction of plausible within-case explanations, there is
also a minus in the form of afterwards not knowing whether these are useful for
or applicable to other cases as well. Without reviewing a larger number of cases,
we cannot know whether we are dealing with a ‘typical’ example or an ‘outlier’
(King et al., 1994, pp. 56). In principle, though, it is not always that this type
of critique is significant. For example, some cases are important in themselves or
even ‘unique’. Furthermore, when available knowledge about a phenomenon and
its different components and causes and effects is scarce, theory development may
be well-served by an approach that seeks to identify systematic components of a
phenomenon in one context, before these are tested and/or developed for a more
diverse range of cases (Stebbins, 2001; Esaiasson et al., 2005, pp. 186).
Nevertheless, a few criteria are often set up for a single-case or small-n study to
be of scientific relevancy. For example, Esaiasson et al. (2005, pp. 172-173) note
that it must (a) relate to or draw on previous research and/or existing theoretical
thinking (i.e. to fulfill the requirements of cumulative research instead of inventing
the wheel anew), and (b) that it is clear and explicit what the investigated case
is a case of ; what type of general, recurrent phenomenon the empirical study
is concerned with. In this respect, it may be pointed out that the overarching
phenomenon of interest is the introduction of simulation output in graphical format
to non-experts in policy and practice, while the category of cases focused on is
simulation-based hazard maps as public risk management tools. In this respect,
the single case selected for empirical investigation is flood hazard maps in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, introduced to support local-level risk management (see Chapter 1
for details as to the background of this choice).
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For his part, Yin (2009) is careful to point out the value of studying more than
one case, of including more than one unit of analysis per case, of drawing on more
than one source or form of data, and of seeking to repeat initial findings (either
for further cases or in a new context)1 – everything to get as full of a picture
as possible of the phenomenon of interest. In this respect, the study has drawn
on more than one source of data and more than one unit of analysis per data
source. Furthermore, as will be explained in chapter 10, a small excursion was
eventually made into the field of scenario simulation of alpine hazards in Austria
to see whether or not the material collected there would corroborate what the case
of flood hazard maps in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg showed. As this was not part of the
original study design, however, the rest of this chapter will continue to focus on
how the first, and main, part of the study was carried out.
Departing from a view of social science as something that is not only preoccupied
with discovering regularities and correlations but also with understanding people’s
reasons and motives for how they act and behave, it becomes interesting to access
and interpret relevant actors’ own experiences and ways of thinking. At the same
time, it can also make sense to collect data from different perspectives, to get
a fuller and more complete understanding of the phenomenon of interest. To
handle the possibility of human memory being biased and keen on finding ex-
post rationalizations and idealizations (sometimes without the research subject
even being aware of it), for example, Boyatzis (1998, pp. 56-59) recommends the
technique of ‘bracketing’; to interview people on the outside of the target group
to generate comparative information, thereby generating a conceptual context or
‘bracket’ for the event or phenomenon under study.
For the study at hand, this means that qualitative interviews were conducted to
gain access to local risk managers’ subjective descriptions of whether, how and
why they use flood hazard maps or not. Additionally, a number of interviews were
held with other actors, located outside the world of municipal administrations.
Drawing on the writing of Meuser and Nagel (1991), one can refer to this second
1This last point can be compared with the logic of repetition adhered to in grounded theory.
For example, Glaser and Strauss (1967, pp. 23-26) argue that the collection of comparative
data, whether collected from a different unit of analysis or a different case, is advantageous for
allowing the analyst to discover what the core aspects of a phenomenon of interest are by seeing
which emerging generalizations are replicated and which not.
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group as a form of ‘external’ experts, possessing knowledge about the contexts
and conditions under which the target group acts:
[D]ie ExpertInnen [repra¨sentieren] eine zur Zielgruppe komplementa¨re
Handlungseinheit, und die Interviews haben die Aufgabe, Informa-
tionen u¨ber die Kontextbedingungen des Handelns der Zielgruppe zu
liefern. [. . . ] Die ExpertInneninterviews bilden eine Datenquelle neben
anderen, sie stehen z.B. neben Interviews mit der Zielgruppe, teil-
nehmender Beobachtung, Dokumenten- und Aktenanalyse. (Meuser
and Nagel, 1991, pp. 445-446)
Apart from gaining access to contextual knowledge, method literature often em-
phasizes the advantage of drawing on a second source of data as a way of corrobo-
rating what is being told by the first data source, thereby strengthening a study’s
internal validity (e.g. Yin, 2009). Hence, interviews with external experts can be
useful in more than one way.
Regarding the issue of who to interview, the fact that it was not known beforehand
who uses or refrains from using flood hazard maps made it impossible to make this
into a sampling criteria. Instead, it was decided to go for a sampling logic aiming
at maximum variation. The aim of such a strategy is to achieve a sample that
reflects the extent of variation and difference that is naturally present in the field.
By selecting few but as different cases as possible, one is able to cover the same
phenomenon from many different angles, elucidating many different perspectives
and experiences (Witt, 2001; Flick, 1995, pp. 87-88). According to Esaiasson
et al. (2005, pp. 286-287), the fact that qualitative studies seldom make more
discoveries when based on 30 interviews than when based on 15 shows that a
limited number of interviews can suffice for discovering and describing the main
aspects of relevancy in relation to a social phenomenon.
5.2.1 Sampling
When it came to the risk managers, information from the state’s statistical au-
thority shows that there are around 1100 municipalities in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
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and that the number of inhabitants in these communities range from less than a
hundred to over half a million. Through the state’s official hazard map website,
it was possible to identify municipalities for which hazard maps could already be
accessed online.2 In the beginning of 2011, these amounted to about 30 communi-
ties of somewhat varying size. Six months later, this number had already doubled.
In the meantime, internet searches and preparatory interviews (e.g. conducted to
achieve a better understanding of local flood risk management and flood hazard
maps) provided information about specific cases with recent flood experience re-
spectively one or two communities thought to represent (or to have represented)
a more or less active stance towards flood risk. Other forms of information gen-
erated during this time concerned in which parts of the state that other forms
of flood hazard maps had been produced, some catchments for which flood asso-
ciations had been formed to implementing a joint technical protection concept,
respectively a not-too-detailed overview over where flood partnerships had so far
been formed.
Based on these different pieces of information, it was decided to include interview
partners working in different positions in different local administrations to try
to catch as broad of a sample of experiences and perspectives regarding the role
of foresight information for different forms of risk management tasks as possible.
In this respect, it was decided to focus both on mayors, for carrying the overall
responsibility for a community’s safety, and administrators and practitioners re-
sponsible for management, planning or the carrying out of practical activities in
the fields of technical protection, non-structural alleviation and emergency man-
agement. Based on the experiences made during a test interview with an actor
responsible for a local administration’s public relations and communication work,
it was decided not to include this type of actor, as the discovered lack of autonomy
in terms of deciding whether, what or in which format to communicate suggested
it to be questionable whether a person in this position can really be described
as a risk manager. Instead, it was decided that usage of hazard maps for com-
munication purposes would be covered through the sampling of mayors and by
2Special progress maps showing where the mapping process was only just being initialized,
where first versions of the maps were currently subject to local review, and where this had
already been finished were also available and consulted.
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raising the issue of hazard maps as a communication tool as a sub-topic in the
other interviews.
In terms of municipal characteristics, it was decided to interview actors in both
small and large communities along both small and large waterways, covering both
more recent and more distant histories of being flooded respectively both members
and non-members of flood associations and partnerships. Furthermore, the infor-
mation gained through test interviews about areas being (or having been) more or
less active in regard to flood risk management was used to include one case each or
these ‘extremes’. To corroborate that a municipality selected on the basis of being
thought to fulfill certain criteria did indeed fit the profile, a one-page questionnaire
was supplied at the end of each interview. In this way, it was, e.g., possible to learn
whether an interviewee had personal experience of flood partnership meetings or
whether the municipality’s membership in this was of little personal importance.
Rather than filling in a strict pre-defined schedule of which mixes of characteris-
tics were sought, though, these aspects worked as general guidelines to help decide
where to look for the next interview partner and whom to contact with a formal
request.
The very first interview was the result of a contact established during the test-
interview phase. After that, communities and actors were sought which would
complement the characteristics and experiences already covered. This would nor-
mally begin with a look into the state’s online map service to see along which
waterways that had not already been covered there were finished simulation re-
sults. Once one or more municipalities of suitable optical size had been identified,
an effort would be made to research the population size, local flood history and
eventual membership details. Once a municipality with complementary charac-
teristics to those already covered had been identified, the local organigram would
be studied and a candidate judged as likely to work with risk management in a
field not yet covered in this particular constellation would be sought. That many
requests for interviews (first sent with e-mail and then followed up on with a tele-
phone call) were rejected meant that these steps were sometimes repeated a few
times before an interview was actually scheduled. It also happened that the per-
son originally contacted would reject but refer to a colleague thought to be better
suited or have more time. In these cases, the suggestion was always accepted even
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Figure 5.1: Overview of interviewed risk managers
if it led to slight changes in terms of whom was approached where. The table in
Figure 5.1 shows the variation achieved in the sample of risk managers interviewed.
Though the numbering does not necessarily represent the chronological order in
which the interviews were held, the following particularities may be noted: inter-
view numbers 01 covers a municipality not thought to have paid much attention to
risk management in the past (though since then hit by a severe flood episode); the
municipality in interview 02 was contacted for having been described as very ac-
tive since a few years back and was then discovered to have – on its own initiative,
inspired by large flood events in the 1990s – made an active effort to engage with
simulation-based hazard assessment prior to the state’s general mapping initia-
tive; interview 05 covers an area for which the final map was not yet available but
where the interviewee had been directly involved in the plausibilization process;
interview 06 covers a risk manager responsible for coordinating the technical pro-
tection across a larger number of settlements; and interview 10 covers a different
form of hazard map (depicting gauge level scenarios instead of statistical return
periods). Sometimes, the inclusion of these particularities in the sample was the
result of having planned it that way, but it also happened that it was only during
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an interview that this type of information came to light. In other instances, what
had been planned did not really pan out as imagined. For example, the sample
does not really cover a community openly giving risk management low priority (in
the community covered by interview 01, for example, flooding had become a pri-
ority since the last inundation episode, and in other areas requests for interviews
were turned down). In light of the exploratory research purpose and of enough
material having been collected to indicate that it might be more relevant to extent
the study with an excursion than to dig any deeper into the case at hand, inter-
views which should perhaps have been replaced to ensure better methodological
stringency were eventually kept and no replacements were sought.
In terms of how potential interview partners were contacted, an effort was made
not to reveal too much about the specific research interest in order not to repel
actors not appreciating or using flood hazard maps. Instead, the study was always
described in broad terms as concerning the preconditions, practices and challenges
associated with local-level flood risk management. Nevertheless, there were some
instances were telephone calls to follow up on unanswered requests for interviews
would be met with the statement that no interview could be given since flood risk
management was not a prioritized question locally. In principle, this implies a risk
for slight bias in the sample of risk managers in the sense of actors feeling that
they could defend the local risk management work possibly being more keen on
accepting an interview request. Ultimately, though, the data covers a wide range
of experiences in terms of whether and why hazard maps are used or not. And
through the effort to tap into aggregate-level observations as well, there is at least
indirect access to voices of a more critical nature.
In regard to the experts, it was decided to cover interview partners working in
engineering bureaus having produced simulation results for hazard mapping and
actors working in public offices and institutions responsible for coordinating, im-
plementing or advising others in relation to the most recent forms of hazard maps.
Additionally, some interview partners were approached for the purpose of provid-
ing particular contextual knowledge, e.g. in relation to hydrological and hydraulic
modeling and the state’s legal framework pertinent to the hazard maps. In this
sense, the experts were partially contacted for different purposes (i.e. insight as
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Figure 5.2: Overview of interviewed experts
to the municipal-level response to and use of flood hazard maps respectively con-
textual knowledge pertinent to simulation and its use). The table in Figure 5.2
offers an overview of the experts interviewed.
Two interviews came about through previously established contacts. The rest of
the interview partners were recruited per e-mail after considering who represents
key players in relation to the state’s hazard mapping project.3 In contrast to the
risk managers, the experts were either told that the research interest concerned
simulation technology in the field of hydrology/hydraulics or that it concerned
flood hazard maps explicitly. This was done in order to make sure that only
interview partners would accept who would also have something relevant to say in
relation to these topics. All of the interview requests resulted in a meeting, albeit
sometimes with a colleague or subordinate to the actor originally contacted.
For the sake of anonymity, when a risk manager or expert is referred to in the
results chapters, the personal pronom ‘he’ is used independently of whether the
3Some ‘key’ players had already been interviewed during the study’s very early phase. Hence,
there are one or two cases of central institutions whose experience is not covered by the expert
interviews but whose insights instead contributed to help focus the study and identify relevant
interview topics. The impression from these interviews is largely similar to that which was left
by the ‘official’ talks.
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person in question is male or female.
5.2.2 Interviews
All interviews were done at the interview partner’s office. Most of them took
around an hour, but in the case of two of the experts the interview lasted for more
than two hours. In both these instances, the interview partner was explicitly asked
whether it was ok to continue the interview.
The interviews were semi-structured, in the sense that an interview guide had been
prepared ahead of each meeting to provide general structure while still allowing
for flexibility in terms of order, follow-up questions, and whether or not to pursue
additional topics or side-tracks. The purpose of the interview guide was primarily
to ensure that all topics identified as relevant would be covered. Though it is often
desirable to aim for comparability between the content of the different interviews
(e.g. Schnell et al., 1999, pp. 355), some variability in terms of the content and
focus of each interview was unavoidable in this case, considering the large number
of different experiences, institutions and types of actors covered. Additionally,
it may be raised as a point of critique that the interview guide still underwent
optimization and adjustments after the test-interview phase was over and the
‘real’ interviewing had begun. This was partially related to language difficulties
associated with carrying out interviews in a non-native language4 as all interviews
were held in German.
The topics pursued in the interviews with the risk managers included an initial
focus on the challenges involved in flood risk management, how these are coun-
tered, and the role of research information. This question block was intended as
warm-up, as well as a way of exploring whether the problems and challenges ex-
perienced in this field could be related to lack of (reliable) knowledge. The topic
of flood hazard maps was introduced through a general question about whether or
4Around 15 research-/test-interviews were conducted. Some of these were as brief as 15
minutes on the phone whereas others took a whole hour of face-to-face time. These talks were
used to (a) corroborate and complement the understanding of simulation technology provided in
academic sources, and (b) to identify flood hazard maps as a potential topic for a case study and
learn of the main actors to target for data collection. Though some interviews were held with
local-level risk managers respectively external experts during this phase, these were not enough
to arrive at a final version of the interview guide.
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not the interviewee was familiar with this type of tool and what he or she thought
about it. This was followed by questions about how the maps were used, and what
advantages or problems the interviewees associated with the introduction of flood
hazard maps. Often, this question block also included inquiries about other forms
of uses made of the hazard maps within a municipality, e.g. in order to cover the
topic of dissemination and communication, but also to use each risk manager as an
informant as well as a respondent. To allow for an exploration of the role of simu-
lation uncertainty for whether and how hazard maps are used, each risk manager
was asked about how trustworthy he or she felt the maps to be, respectively about
the basis for this assessment. Sometimes, this would result in further questions
on simulation technology and uncertainty more generally. Before the interview
ended, the topic of the hazard maps’ usefulness or problems for risk management
was raised again in the form of an indirect control question about whether the
interviewee would recommend the hazard maps as a risk management tool to a
third party. The aim of this question was to allow the risk manager to reflect on
this new tool in a more general and abstract way, without having to be concerned
about how this might reflect on their own municipality or job performance. In
this sense, this question was partially a strategy to facilitate for people to voice
potential criticism.
When it came to the external experts, it was difficult to define an interview guide
that would work for engineers and modeler as well as for civil servants in higher
offices. Emphasis was mostly placed on eliciting the experts’ viewpoints of the
maps as a risk management tool, their knowledge about how this tool is received
and/or used at the local level, and the benefits and problems that this is perceived
to bring with it. Beyond that, specific questions were asked to the area of exper-
tise of each interview partner. This could concern details regarding the mapping
process, the pros and cons associated with simulation technology, etc.
In terms of data quality, some difficulties were experienced as a consequence of
lacking experience in the ‘art’ of interviewing, as well as of having to work in a
non-native language. Some interview mistakes are therefore present. Most of these
are of a less serious nature, such as posing a yes/no-question when a more open
formulation would have been more suitable. But there are also some instances in
which a question was misunderstood or in which an ‘easily formulated’ follow-up
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question was posed instead of a more relevant one. In some cases, this led to less
material than desirable being collected on a certain topic or perspective. While
this was occasionally a source of frustration during the analysis phase, the fact
that different aspects were affected means that the error is not of a systematic
nature.
5.2.3 Data analysis
The data analysis followed along two paths. The first and initial path was in-
spired by a method developed by Meuser and Nagel (1991) for analyzing expert
interviews. The aim of this approach is to compare the texts with the aim of dis-
covering what is representative in relation to different topics, as well as the areas
of difference. The ‘topics’ can have theoretical origins, stem from the interview
guide, or concern areas for which detailed description is desired.
In its original form, the analysis strategy consists of different steps Meuser and
Nagel (1991, pp. 455-464). First, the interviews are transcribed. In this respect,
little weight is placed on tone of voice and/or non-verbal elements. Thereafter,
the transcripts are paraphrased, whereby the chronology of each interview is still
respected. Following this, the paraphrased passages in an interview are given one
or more headlines (here it is recommended to stay true to the interviewee’s own
terminology). The original sequence of the interview is broken, so that passages
referring to the same or similar topic are grouped together. These headlines should
then be reviewed and revised, and overarching categories formulated to reflect
the topics raised across the interviews. Eventually, the different transcripts are
brought together and compared, and theoretical concepts and terminology are
used to formulate categories of a more analytical character.
While this description of how to analyze interview data served as a guide, the
process had to be adjusted to accommodate the limitations associated with work-
ing in a non-native language. This means that the interviews were recorded and
subsequently transcribed by a German native speaker hired for this purpose. In
the following step, the transcripts were read-through and made anonymous, and,
in some of the longer interviews, monologues not directly referring to the research
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topic were paraphrased to save space. In the following steps, rather than para-
phrasing (and thereby taking the risk of introducing language errors), the interview
texts were condensed by deleting repetitions and (half-)sentences disrupting the
main narrative. (All places where text was deleted were marked with three dots
in square brackets.) The resulting – shorter and clearer – transcripts still reflected
both the full range of topics and the interviewees’ own terminology.
In the subsequent phase, each reduced transcript was dissected so that passages
dealing with flood hazard maps were grouped together, whereas material deal-
ing with other topics were put under other headlines (such as ‘risk management’,
‘simulation technology generally’, etc.).5 This provided a first rough sorting of
the material. Eventually, further sorting, revision and harmonization of categories
between interviews resulted in a set of categories and sub-categories under which
passages from different interviews could be brought together. Generally, though,
these steps only served the purpose of bringing overview in terms of what the
interviews covered and in which direction this pointed. It was useful for provid-
ing a concrete strategy for sorting through the material and thereby developing
a preliminary category system. This category system was then transformed into
a ‘code schedule’ in MaxQDA, with which the anonymous transcripts were then
coded. The advantage with this was that the original text remained intact, facili-
tating going back to check the context of a statement, while text segments tagged
with the same code could also be retrieved together to allow for direct comparison
in regard to what different interviewees have to say about the same topic. This
facilitated both the analysis and the writing process.
In the results chapters, shorter citations, included directly in the text, have been
translated into English to make for easy reading. Longer and freestanding quotes
have been kept in German to stay true to the original. A translation of these
can be found in Appendix A. Parenthesis are used to mark passages where the
transcription is uncertain. Square brackets are used when a word has been added
to make for grammatically correct sentences or when a editor’s note has been
introduced (marked ‘- Ed.’).
5In contrast to Meuser and Nagel (1991)’s recommendations, the headlines were rarely formu-
lated in line with the interviewees’ own terminology, as the material covered too many different
categories of topics to make this practical.
Chapter 6
Utilization of flood hazard maps
6.1 (Non-)Usage per management field
This chapter will present the results pertaining to whether and how flood hazard
maps are used by local-level risk managers in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. It will also
present what external experts have observed in respect to map usage. To structure
the presentation, each management field will be reviewed separately, followed by
observations of a more general character. At the beginning of each section, it will
be noted whether this particular management field is central or more peripheral
in terms of what the interviewees see scenario prediction as relevant for. In this
way, one does not only get an idea of how hazard maps are used but also of the
how important such usage is regarded as.
6.1.1 Technical protection
When risk managers and experts are asked whether they know and what they
think of flood hazard maps, technical flood protection is rarely amongst the first
or even second target areas mentioned. Indeed, some of the experts are of the
viewpoint that the purpose of foresight simulation is to reduce the municipalities’
focus on infrastructural protection and control measures by supporting other areas
of application. When technical protection is mentioned, on the other hand, what
is emphasized is primarily the possibility to discover and/or analyze weaknesses
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in existing defense structures. Indeed, in I02RMb’s view, this is the very point
of hazard mapping. Raising the topic spontaneously, he notes that the benefit of
scenario simulation is that it allows you to see where there is a risk of flooding
and thereby also whether or not more technical protection is required:
Fru¨her hat man es nicht gewusst. Da hat man die Mo¨glichkeiten nicht
gehabt solche hydrodynamischen, numerischen Modelle zu erstellen.
Da hat irgendeiner erza¨hlt: “Ja ganz fru¨her, da stand da mal Wasser
oder da.” Es war nicht aufgezeichnet richtig. Und heute weiß man
es einfach. Durch die Hochwassergefahrenkarten sieht man es und
dann weiß man auch, dass man einen technischen Hochwasserschutz
herstellen muss, wenn es nicht ausreichend ist, was da ist. (I02RMb,
00:32:59-3)
Similarly, I04RM see flood hazard maps as additional helpful information for recon-
sidering the current state of a community’s structural protection concept, whereas
I14E claims that one of the effects of hazard mapping will be that municipalities
take action to repair and extend their existing flood defenses. Nevertheless, it is
clear that technical protection is relatively peripheral in terms of what most of the
interviewees see flood hazard maps as relevant for.
Moving on to the issue of actual use, only the mayors and the risk managers work-
ing explicitly with technical protection had anything to say about flood hazard
maps’ role for this type of management work. In the other cases, technical protec-
tion was not part of the interviewee’s area of responsibility or altogether low on
the municipal agenda.
Beginning with interview 02, one of the first things that happened in this area was
that the result of flood scenario simulation1 gave rise to a new understanding of the
local hazard situation, as several of the town’s defense structures were found to be
1It should be noted that the interviewees partially discussed scenario simulation findings
resulting from their involvement in a pilot mapping project interchangeably with the latest
flood hazard maps produced by the state. Since all comments pertain to the role and use of
visualized simulation results depicting the predicted outcome of scenarios based on statistical
return periods, it has not been judged to be of great consequence for the study’s purpose or
validity that it cannot always be clearly marked when which set of scenario simulation results
are meant.
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too low or too run down to offer effective protection, resulting in larger areas than
expected to depicted as being at risk of inundation. Having looked up photos of
past flood events in the city archive and thereby confirmed that inundation of this
magnitude could indeed be realistic, what happened then was that the responsible
department decided to carry out a detailed survey of the state of the existing
defenses to assess their stability and protective capacity:
Nachdem wir jetzt quasi wussten durch die Hochwassergefahrenkarten,
wo kann sich oder wo breitet sich das Wasser aus oder... wo sind die
geschu¨tzten Bereiche, haben wir jetzt die Hochwasserschutzanlagen,
die vorhandenen, untersucht und haben eine U¨berpru¨fung der Stand-
sicherheit der Hochwasserschutzanlagen durchgefu¨hrt. Und da hat
sich ergeben, dass nicht alle Anlagen standsicher sind, sondern dass
sie ertu¨chtig werden mu¨ssen beziehungsweise vielleicht sogar erneuert.
Und in manchen Bereichen hat sich herausgestellt, dass die Anlagen
nicht hoch genug sind. Und das war der zweite Schritt dann. Zuerst
gucken wo ist die Gefahr und dann das, was da ist, ist das ausre-
ichend? Ist das standsicher? Und natu¨rlich erga¨nzend, wo fehlt noch
was. (I02RMb, 01:31:07-4)
Hence, the first step was to see where there is a hazard, and the second step
to analyze what defenses there are and whether these are sufficient and stable
or need to be complemented. Together, these assessments gave the responsible
department an overview both of the state of the existing flood protection and of
the areas, objects and activities at risk if something would happen. Together, the
dug-up photos, flood hazard maps and the new defense assessment were presented
to the municipal council, which responded by ordering a plan for how to improve
the current situation:
[W]ie gesagt zum Einen wurde der Gemeinderat informiert und dann
wurde der Beschluss gefasst, dass die Verwaltung, also wir, beauftragt
worden sind... auf der Grundlage dieses Berichts, einen Maßnahmen-
plan und ein Finanzierungskonzept zu erarbeiten. (I02RMa, 00:42:23-
9)
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In the end, it was not only decided to repair existing defenses but also to reinforce
and extend these to achieve a higher and even level of protection along the main
river.2 As I02RMa explains, this was done because the areas likely to become
inundated were industrial zones, implying a very high damage potential:
I02RMa: [. . . ] Das war dann auch noch ein weiteres Thema. Also wir
hatten bisher eine Sicherheit, die je nach Einrichtung unterschiedlich
war. Also es war nicht ein einheitliches Schutzziel gegeben. Und die
Stadt hat sich dann entschlossen durch einen Gemeinderatsbeschluss
entlang des Hauptflusses einen Hochwasserschutz fu¨r ein gro¨ßeres Hoch-
wasser herzustellen. Also nicht wie an den kleinen Gewa¨ssern fu¨r ein
100 ja¨hrliches Hochwasser, sondern aufgrund des wesentlich ho¨heren
Schadenspotenzials... Sie mu¨ssen sich vorstellen, diese Bereiche, die
hier so scho¨n blau sind, das ist alles, das ist das Industriegebiet. Wenn
das unter Wasser steht... entstehen riesige Scha¨den. Und deswegen hat
man sich entschieden einfach einen ho¨heren Schutzgrad zu realisieren.
00:28:55-4
In terms of the maps’ role, I02RMb notes that a simulation (or rather the visual
representation that is the result of simulation) is something that can be well pre-
sented to the municipal council since it is more impressive than an oral account
and therefore also more convincing:
I02RMb: Und dann konnten wir das natu¨rlich auch gut im Gemein-
derat pra¨sentieren, weil so eine Simulation ist viel beeindruckender,
wie wenn man irgendjemand erza¨hlt: “Hier wird alles blau sein” und
die sagen... -Ist halt schwierig. Aber ich denke durch diese Visual-
isierung... ist die Akzeptanz einfach anders. 00:36:25-9
Ultimately, then, predictive flood scenario information was used in several different
ways. First, simulation results filled an alarm function by alerting the responsible
2Currently, the trend in risk management is otherwise to move away from uniform protection
standards, in order to adjust the level of protection according to the vulnerability and/or value
of the area at risk.
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department to the possibility of the municipality not being as well protected as
hitherto assumed, corresponding to conceptual use in the sense of affecting the
audience’s knowledge and understanding of the local risk situation. This, in turn,
pushed the issue of flood risk onto the administration’s agenda, motivating the
interviewees to undertake a more detailed review of the current flood defenses.
Hence, predictive information was instrumentally used to define the most appro-
priate course of action, leading to the initiation of a new activity. Eventually,
available evidence, including hazard maps, photos of past flood events and the
current defense assessment were presented to the municipal council, which pro-
ceeded by ordering an action plan and make a formal decision to realize a higher
and more even level of protection. Even if flood hazard maps were not the only evi-
dence relied upon in this regard, constituting a case of direct application of specific
findings to decision-making, this is best described as a form of (knowledge-driven)
instrumental research use.
In contrast, the situation in interview 04 is that the the final version of the state’s
flood hazard maps has only just become available. Hence, usage has so far been
limited to involving the engineering bureau conducting the simulation work for the
hazard maps whenever new defense structures were being planned to ensure that
these would be made high enough to count against the maps’ provisions (i.e. a
form of ‘control use’ most similar to what is described as personal validation under
strategic research use). Now that the maps are finally finished, what they will be
used for, according to I04RM, is to reassess the local technical protection concept.
In contrast to interview 02, though, it was not the maps themselves that triggered
the realization that this kind of reassessment task is needed, but a survey sent out
by higher authorities to prepare for the development of risk management plans in
accordance with the EU Floods Directive:
Wir selber mu¨ssen natu¨rlich von Verwaltungsseite auch ein paar Hausauf-
gaben noch erledigen, was jetzt dieser Fragebogen gezeigt hat. Zum
Beispiel schauen, aufgrund der neuen Erkenntnisse, die man jetzt durch
die Hochwassergefahrenkarten hat, halt unser Konzept fu¨r den tech-
nischen Hochwasserschutz zu u¨berarbeiten. [. . . ] Die Schwachstellen
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genau zu analysieren und welche Maßnahmen man, also technische
Maßnahmen man in die Wege leiten kann. (I04RM, 00:07:35-3)
Hence, this cannot be classified as knowledge-driven research use, but may – once
use has actually followed – come to amount to a form of problem-solving appli-
cation if some form of practical activity or formal decision follows on the basis of
the new insights brought along by the hazard maps.
In comparison, the communities covered by interviews 03, 06 and 01 did not have
any full-fledged flood control systems in place that scenario simulation could ques-
tion the effectiveness of. Instead, plans for catchment-wide defenses were either
subject to negotiation or currently under implementation, at the time of the in-
terviews. Consequently, both the realization of being at risk and the phase of
analyzing and settling on a solution were already finished at the time of the haz-
ard maps’ arrival, leaving little space for any kind of conceptual knowledge effect
or need for input to decision-making:
SK: Verstehe ich es richtig, dass die Karten vielleicht nicht so eine
große Bedeutung fu¨r Ihre Arbeit gehabt haben? 00:39:59-1
I03RM: Das verstehen Sie richtig, ja. Weil der Wasserverband eigentlich
zum dem Zeitpunkt, da die Karten vero¨ffentlicht wurden, schon seine
Konzeption entwickelt hatte. [. . . ] 00:40:32-9
Also das hat bei uns nicht ausgelo¨st, dass man sagt: “Oh schau mal, wir
mu¨ssen hier was tun.” Sondern es war vorher schon klar, wir mu¨ssen
hier was tun. [. . . ] Das ist mo¨glicherweise an anderer Stelle, dann
ist [die] Hochwassergefahrenkarte Auslo¨ser dafu¨r, dass man u¨berhaupt
diesen Denkprozess beginnt. Das war bei uns nicht der Fall. (I03RM,
00:55:09-9)
Likewise, I06RM states:
Also wir habe schon vor der Hochwassergefahrenkarte diese ganzen
Berechnungen gemacht gehabt. Wo Hochwasserschutzanlagen gebaut
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werden mu¨ssen und wie groß die werden mu¨ssen, das stand schon
vorher alles fest. Und das hat sich auch nicht mehr vera¨ndert mit den
Berechnungen fu¨r die Hochwassergefahrenkarte. (I06RM, 00:17:53-2)
Yet, it is not completely true that there is no use at all. First, both the mayor in in-
terview 01 and the mayor in interview 03 have compared the predictions displayed
in the hazard maps to the input of the planned protection measures to confirm
that these “go in the right direction”, as I03RM puts it (00:29:01-1). Second, the
visual representation of the predicted extent and depth of inundation is something
that I03RM has been able to use to convince local skeptics of the need to accept
a structural solution to flood risk. Even if everyone cannot be convinced, this is
altogether a central part of what I03RM finds good about predictive information:
I03RM: [. . . ] Wenn man dann plo¨tzlich bei jemand im Garten steht,
der nur in der HQ100-Linie ist, der noch nie Hochwasser hatte [. . . ]
wenn sie dann kommen und sagen, sie mo¨chten da jetzt Hochwasser-
schutz machen und deswegen muss er mo¨glicherweise sein Gewa¨chshaus
abbauen, [. . . ] dann hat er zuna¨chst mal kein Versta¨ndnis. Wenn sie
ihm aber zeigen, letztes Mal war HQ50. Jetzt unterstellen wir, ir-
gendwann kommt HQ100 und dann steht das Wasser hier 20 cm hoch.
Und dann gehen wir einfach mal in sein Geba¨ude rein, was ist in den
20 cm dann betroffen. Dann wird er plo¨tzlich sehr aufgeschlossen fu¨r
Hochwasserschutzmaßnahmen. [. . . ] 00:34:36-6
SK: Und hatten Sie schon solche Beispiele, wo Sie die Karten mitgenom-
men hatten und (...)? 00:34:42-8
I03RM: Wir hatten dann eher hier, das Gespra¨ch. Und hatten dann,
konnten es dann visualisieren mit dem PC, dass man dann einfach
die U¨berschwemmungsho¨he dann darstellt. Da hatten wir zwei Fa¨lle,
ja, die bis heute, glaube ich, noch nicht 100% einsehen, dass sie das
brauchen. [. . . ] 00:35:15-0
Hence, a certain strategic use can still be identified, as hazard maps are used to
legitimize a predetermined management strategy and help risk managers validate
what they do personally and publicly.
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Turning, to the experts, none of the interviewees in this group has anything con-
crete to say on the topic of map usage in practice. Judging from I14E’s comments,
this can possibly be related to the fact that technical protection is quite an enor-
mous task, meaning that a certain delay between learning of a risk and acting
upon it can be natural. For his part, he is ‘curious’ to see how the municipal-
ities will react to the publication of hazard information, noting that some will
suddenly be depicted as being very much in risk, as existing defense structures
lack the necessary freeboard to count against the HQ100 scenario. Indeed, this is
something that he is somewhat critical of, noting that other states have chosen to
let such defenses installation count, using color coding to indicate the urgency of
addressing the freeboard issue.
To conclude, this suggests that there are cases of both use and non-use in the field
of technical protection, depending on what kind of use is looked at. Regarding
non-use, this is something that risk managers themselves portray as rational so
far, e.g. with reference to timing. Amongst the experts, usage is expected to occur
in areas where simulation results reveal weaknesses in current defense concepts,
but whether this is actually the case remains to be seen.
6.1.2 Emergency management
When it comes to hazard maps’ relevancy for emergency management, this is
primarily something that the experts emphasize. For example, I18E (00:25:39-
1) describe them as “quite centrally important”, both for alarm and emergency
operation planning and for evacuation planning, whereas I11Ea (00:17:48-6) see
them as a “quite essential basis”.
Wenn Sie sich jetzt so eine Karte anschauen, Sie sehen: Welche Gebi-
ete in meiner Kommune sind u¨berschwemmt? Wo muss ich eventuell
evakuieren? Wie muss ich evakuieren? Und dann gibt es verschiedene
Gefahrenpunkte: Krankenha¨user, Kla¨ranlage, wie auch immer. Was
sind Punkte, wo ich mir im Vorfeld u¨berlegen muss, wo ich agieren
muss, wie ich agieren muss, und dann auch die entsprechenden Alarm-
stellen festmachen. Das ist einfach mit den Hochwassergefahrenkarten
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sehr gut mo¨glich. Also Thema Rettungswege zum Beispiel. Und
Straßen: Welche Straßen sind u¨berschwemmt, welche Gebiete sind
nicht mehr erreichbar. Das kann man einfach anhand der Karten sehr
gut lesen. (I11Ea, 00:23:04-6)
Representing a somewhat more skeptical view, I16E notes that not all hazard
maps are equally useful. In his view, some maps are produced at a too coarse
scale to be directly applicable to preparedness planning. Furthermore, he finds
it questionable whether most municipalities do not already know what to expect
from a HQ25 or HQ100 scenario, other than if they completely lack own flood
experience. In his experience, there are other – more advanced – tools available
that provide more detail and are more useful for emergency management purposes.
Though a helpful basic tool where there is no information or experience present,
in most areas flood hazard maps are already a bit obsolete in I16E’s view:
I16E: Sie sind sinnvoll in den Bereichen, wo vorher keine Informationen
vorgelegen haben. [...] [D]ass dann auch die Kommunen sich u¨berlegen:
Was muss ich tun? Oder ich muss was tun. [...] [Aber] aus einer
einen Hochwassergefahrenkarte in dem Sinn von einem HQ100, ob da so
viele Erkenntnisse herauskommen, das mo¨chte ich bezweifeln. Weil im
Prinzip vielleicht die meisten damit schon Erfahrungen gehabt haben.
[...] Also ich meine, wenn ich jetzt, wenn ich jetzt hier eine Fluss
habe und ich habe hier ein 25 ja¨hrliches Hochwasser, dann wird die
Feuerwehr sagen: “Das habt ihr toll ausgerechnet. Das wissen wir
auch.” [...] Also Hochwasserrisikokarten, also Gefahrenkarten sind ja
auch mittlerweile, sozusagen das ist schon so ein bisschen obsolet. Man
spricht auch heutzutage nur noch von Hochwasserrisikokarten. [. . . ]
Und... das ist, meiner Meinung nach, das A und O, dass man halt
weiß, welche Objekte in dem Bereich vorhanden sind irgendwie. (I16E,
01:00:10-8)
While the experts can nevertheless be said to generally display a positive atti-
tude towards the relevancy of predictive information for emergency management
purposes, the picture amongst the risk managers is more neutral. Hardly any of
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the interviewed managers refer to preparedness planning when discussing hazard
maps, or some other area of application will be mentioned first. And there are
more mixed feelings, too, particularly on behalf of the chief fire fighter in inter-
view 07. Even if he recognizes the principal advantages of being able to explore
the hazard of rare flood events and generate a more precise estimate of expected
consequences, this is nothing that he thinks that his community has a need for:
Hier, wir ko¨nnen jetzt halt nach dem Gefu¨hl hier urteilen, aber mit so
einer Computersimulation kann ich halt durch das, dass ich heute halt
diese Hilfsmittel habe mit den Ho¨henpunkten, dass ich das einspielen
kann, da habe ich eigentlich einen genauen Wert nachher. Also ich
finde das nicht schlecht! Wie gesagt, fu¨r uns vor Ort zu groß. Zu weit.
(00:38:52-4)
Turning to the issue of how the results of such simulation exercises are used, we
see that, in spite of not having mentioned emergency management as one of the
primary areas of relevancy, several risk managers still proceed to refer to some kind
of use. Simultaneously, the interview material also contains a number of cases of
more or less confirmed non-use.
Beginning with the cases of use, it is, again, in respect to the community described
in interview 02 that the most influential role can be noted. According to the two
administrators responsible for flood risk management in this community, it was not
only in respect to the state of technical protection that scenario prediction led to
unwelcome discoveries but also in respect to the sufficiency of crisis preparedness.
Hence, in this management field, too, the arrival of flood hazard maps has filled
something of an alarm function, giving rise to a new reading of the sufficiency of
the current response capacity. The result was an intensification of preparedness
planning as the administration begun to work out detailed analyses of needs and
response options:
I02RMb: Genau. Wir sind etwas intensiver in die Einsatzplanung
eingestiegen. Haben festgestellt, dass wir viele Bereiche vorher gar
nicht beachtet haben. [. . . ] das ist viel intensiver geworden. Man
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hat das richtig ausgearbeitet, wo kommen jetzt zum Beispiel an einem
Straßenzug entlang des Bachs, wo ist mit U¨berflutungen zu rechnen?
Wo muss gesperrt werden? Das hat man ganz genau im Detail alles
angeguckt und hat das mit den Karten verglichen. Und das ist jetzt
richtig ausgearbeitet auch. Und das war vorher ein bisschen grob. Oder
gar nicht. 01:04:03-3
According to I02RMb, furthermore, it was only after the arrival of flood hazard
maps that a a special catastrophe plan was developed for how to respond to a
catastrophic flood scenario (e.g. in case of failure of the city’s technical protection
works). Having had a direct effect on the level of activity in this management
field, predictive scenario information has not only been conceptually but also in-
strumentally used. Yet, it is one thing to develop a new exemplary form of alarm
and response plan for a single district to be presented at a conference, and quite
another to maintain interest and engagement over a longer period of time. Due
to scarce resources in terms of time and personnel, it appears that the rest of the
city has been put on hold:
I02RMa: [. . . ] wenn hier entweder ein Versagen eintritt oder eben ein
Hochwasser eintritt, das gro¨ßer ist als das Bemessungshochwasser [. . . ]
haben wir mal beispielhaft fu¨r einen Ortsteil mal einen Alarm- und
Einsatzplan entwickelt. Was denn zu tun ist, wenn es versagt. Weil
die Menschen, die leben ja zuna¨chst mal im Bewusstsein: Wir sind
geschu¨tzt. Und jetzt ist der Schutz in Frage gestellt. [. . . ] Da ist
noch sehr viel zu tun. Eben auch jetzt in, fu¨r den Hauptfluss. Das
erfordert Zeit und... also personelle Ressourcen. [. . . ] Da muss einer
hinsitzen und einen Plan machen. Und da sind wir noch ganz am
Anfang. Wie gesagt, wir haben es mal fu¨r den Ortsteil mal fu¨r eine
Tagung aufbereitet. [. . . ] Und... Aber fu¨r das Stadtgebiet haben wir
das noch nicht... weil wir personell noch nicht in der Lage sind das
alles... zu... aufzuarbeiten. 01:23:25-8
Even if flood hazard maps have been used, then, there is something of a question
mark when it comes to their long-term effect.
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If interview 02 can be said to constitute a case of knowledge-driven research use,
the situation described in interview 08 is rather one of problem-solving. Here,
there was no emergency management plan in place since beforehand. Yet, it was
not the arrival of scenario simulation results that motivated I08RM to change this
fact, but the fact that this is something that state law requires:
[I]n der Zeit, wo ich jetzt hier bin hat es sich dann ergeben, dass dann
das Gesetz dementsprechend vorgab, dass man einen [Plan – Ed.] er-
stellen muss als Gemeinde. Es gab eine gesetzliche Vorgabe. Und es
hat dann aber doch noch eine gewisse Zeit gedauert bei uns, weil ein-
fach die Zeit nicht da ist. Wir sind fu¨r so viele Dinge verantwortlich in
so einem kleinen Rathaus [. . . ] Und ich habe sie mir jetzt genommen,
weil ich gesagt habe: “Wir mu¨ssen jetzt etwas tun.” Und habe mich
dann mal eine Woche aus allem anderen ausgeklinkt und habe dann
den Plan mal gemacht. (I08RM, 00:32:29-0)
Only after this decision had been taken for another reason than it being regarded as
necessary from a risk management perspective were the flood hazard maps sought
out and made use of. Though I08RM has fairly little to say about this, responding
to efforts to probe for details with saying that they were ‘helpful’, the fact that the
hazard maps have been included in the emergency plan in the form of an appendix
still qualifies it as a case of direct application and, hence, as instrumental research
use.
Proceeding with a case in which emergency management was already a priority
before the arrival of predictive information, this is how the administrator responsi-
ble for crisis management in interview 10 describes how flood hazard maps based
on gauge level scenarios have been used to update the emergency plans in his
community:
Zur Erstellung dieses Plans braucht man ja die Karten dazu, weil man
einfach sagen muss, man muss wissen, wenn ein Wasserstand, nehmen
wir ein Beispiel, von 5 m erreicht ist, was ist davon betroffen? [. . . ] Und
dann muss man ja sagen ko¨nnen, wenn der Bereich betroffen ist, welche
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Schutzmaßnahmen werden getroffen, um weitere Bereiche oder um an-
dere Bereiche abzusichern. Dafu¨r ist so eine Karte enorm wichtig. Das
ist ganz klar. Zusammen mit unserem Bauamt, mit unserem Bauhof
legen wir anhand dieser Karten und dieser Wassersta¨nde dann schon
fest, welche Maßnahmen wir veranlassen. [...] Sie haben einen Park-
platz direkt am Fluss unten und da stehen 150 Fahrzeuge. Sie wissen
ganz genau, wenn der Fluss 4,50 m kommt, mu¨ssen die Fahrzeuge dort
weg sein. Das sehen sie aber nur, wenn sie so eine Gefahrenkarte er-
stellt haben vorher, um zu sehen bei 4,50 m, welche Bereiche sind denn
betroffen. (00:33:43-4)
In spite of seeing flood hazard maps as an important tool for preparedness plan-
ning, though, other sources of information are required too, including professional
knowledge, experience, and lesson-drawing following each new flood episode. This
is how it has always been, according to I10RM, and this has not changed. After
all, the city keeps changing – and flood risk with it – while hazard maps remain
static between each new update:
Dieser Plan wurde von meinen Vorga¨ngern erstellt, urspru¨nglich. Ohne
Hochwassergefahrenkarten. [...] Die haben einen Plan erstellt, nach-
dem sie mehrere Hochwasser mitgemacht haben [...] Und anhand dieser
Erkenntnisse hat man dann festgelegt welche Maßnahmen man er-
greift. Das ist natu¨rlich ein sta¨ndiges fortschreiben, das geht heute
noch genauso. Wenn Sie heute ein neues Baugebiet erschließen, zum
Beispiel, dann hat das natu¨rlich Auswirkungen beim na¨chsten Hoch-
wasser. [. . . ] Wir kriegen das schon oft von Leuten mit, die dann
bei uns anrufen und sagen: “Wir haben jetzt auf einmal Wasser im
Keller.” [...] Und das wird von uns alles schriftlich festgehalten und
dann ko¨nnen wir beim na¨chsten Hochwasser sagen: “Stopp! 20 cm
vorher mu¨ssen wir die Leute anrufen. Trefft Maßnahmen, da kommt
etwas.” (I10RM, 00:35:30-1)
Though consulted for planning purposes, then, flood hazard maps are not what
made I10RM engage with preparedness planning in the first place; not the sole
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form of input relied on; and not associated with any direct kind of effect. On the
contrary, scenario simulation results appear to be one of the sources of information
which have been drawn upon and which can be said to have helped inform the
content of the emergency plan. In this sense, the most appropriate description
is conceptual use, i.e. in the form of a management version of the interactive
model, meaning that what ends up in internal planning documents for guiding
practical activities reflect inter alia the findings of predictive research, but also
what experience shows works, what local priorities dictate, what was already in
the plan since before, etc.
Turning to examples of less enthusiastic responses to predictive information for
emergency management planning, I03RM’s answer to the question of how flood
hazard maps have so far been used is: “Honestly, hardly at all.” (00:31:13-9).
And although flood hazard maps have been available for I07RM’s community for
well over a year already, he is still unaware of their existence, living under the
impression that this is something that will be produced for the larger waterways
first, not really seeing a need for his own community:
I07RM: [. . . ] Die sind aber, es hieß vor fu¨nf Jahren, dass auch wir so
was bekommen, aber ich glaube, dass diese Karten zuna¨chst mal fu¨r die
Anrainer von Neckar, Rheintal, zuna¨chst mal fu¨r die gro¨ßeren Flu¨sse,
dass sie die vorziehen und die zuna¨chst machen, dass wir es dann auch
vielleicht mal bekommen. Wie gesagt, die brauchen wir, wenn wir ein
hundertja¨hriges Hochwasser haben brauchen wir die, normal alle 100
Jahre (lacht). [. . . ] 00:28:35-8
Moreover, though not really up to him, I05RM says that he cannot imagine that
flood hazard maps will play a role for emergency management in the administration
where he works. In his view, there is no need for foresight information to support
local preparedness planning, as the risk of flooding is already well-known and
altogether quite low:
I05RM: Also wir wissen, wir hatten hier schon ein paar große Hochwa¨sser.
Insbesondere in dem Bereich, wo die Ba¨che zusammensto¨ßt. [. . . ]
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Also das ist eigentlich der Bereich bei uns, wo [. . . ] Scha¨den entste-
hen ko¨nnen. Und das ist bekannt. [...] Man hat auch in der Ver-
gangenheit dort das Gela¨nde angehoben, damit [...] die Gefahr der
U¨berschwemmung nicht mehr so hoch ist. Also die Bereiche sind
bekannt. Man weiß, wenn Hochwasser ist, ist das das Gebiet wo
es Probleme gibt. Aber die Probleme sind jetzt nicht so, dass man
Alarmpla¨ne machen wu¨rde. Das sind jetzt keine, was weiß ich, Heizo¨l-
lager oder irgendwas, wo man jetzt die Feuerwehr vorwarnen mu¨sste
oder irgendwelche O¨lsperren oder so was machen mu¨sste... 00:28:08-7
SK: Fu¨r das Emergency-Management wird die Karte also nicht so eine
große Rolle spielen, denken Sie? Dadurch dass sich- 00:28:17-9
I05RM: Also ich kann es mir nicht vorstellen. 00:28:21-1
Likewise, I09RM recounts how the colleagues responsible for coordinating respec-
tively carrying out crisis operations in his municipality cannot see what they should
need flood hazard maps for, as they already have everything they need to manage
the risk of flooding:
Ich habe mal hier im Haus eine Runde gemacht, als diese Hochwasserge-
fahrenkarten fu¨r die eine Bach dann verbindlich wurden, mit allen, wo
ich dachte die ko¨nnten damit zu tun haben. Also angefangen vom
Bauhof, der dann raus muss im Hochwasserfall und Bereiche absperren,
Sandsa¨cke auffu¨llen, was weiß ich, bis hin zu unserem Ordnungsamt,
das da organisatorisch die Federfu¨hrung hat in solchen Katastrophen-
fa¨llen. [. . . ] Und da war die erste Reaktion: “Hm? Wozu brauchen wir
diese Karten? Wir wissen ja genau was passiert, wenn das Hochwasser
kommt.” Wir haben ein Warnsystem. Es gibt ein Pegel [. . . ]. Und
[. . . ] einen entsprechenden Einsatzplan [. . . ]. (I09RM, 00:12:47-6)
Though neither of these reactions exclude the possibility of use by someone else
or at a later stage, they all point in the direction of non-use for now. According
to I06RM, even if a colleague of his has applied scenario simulation results to
preparedness planning in a very direct way and made good experiences with this,
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his general impression is that flood hazard maps are “too little” used in this way, as
local fire brigades lack the knowledge that it requires to appreciate them (00:35:20-
0). Hence, there are not only cases of use but also on non-use in this management
field.
Turning to the experts, it is only in interview 13 that any concrete experience
is present. Apart from the brief mentioning of an effort to show municipalities
how flood hazard maps can be used to assess the risk of flooding to critical in-
frastructure, what I13E’s account concerns is a pilot project initiated to help a
community develop an emergency management plan following the revelation that
a newly developed housing area was at high risk of inundation.
Das war auch durch die Gefahrenkarte ausgelo¨st. Die Gemeinde hat
gesehen, ihr Neubaugebiet von vor 20 Jahren steht unter Wasser schon
beim HQ10. [. . . ] Dann hat der [Bu¨rgermeister – Ed.] auf die Schiene
gesetzt, einen gescheiten Gefahrenabwehrplan zu machen. [. . . ] Dann
haben sie mal einfach anhand der Gefahrenkarten und anhand des
Ablaufes, mit externer Unterstu¨tzung, [. . . ] haben sie geschaut, was
passiert denn eigentlich tatsa¨chlich in der Ortschaft, wenn das Wasser
ankommt und wenn es anfa¨ngt zu steigen. (I13E, 00:27:08-3)
In spite of this analysis provenly having helped the community improve its pro-
tective capacity by showing the fire brigade’s suggested response strategy to be
inadequate for avoiding the undesirable scenario of parts of the city being cut off,
it was eventually discontinued at a premature stage. As in the case described
in interview 02, it appears to have been difficult to maintain interest over time,
suggesting predictive information to be something which may trigger a spike in
activity rather than provoking a lasting change in trend:
Ist dann aber auch irgendwo stecken geblieben, weil es halt doch viel
Aufwand ist und die Kommune knapp bei Kasse, wenig Personal.
Und dann hat man es geschoben. Oft ist es ja auch so, dass der
Bu¨rgermeister, der das angestoßen hat, vielleicht abgewa¨hlt wird. Und,
wenn dann eine neue da ist, geht es... Ach, da passiert nichts mehr...
(I13E, 00:27:08-3)
Chapter 6. Utilization of flood hazard maps 121
If an area of application is characterized by continuous activity rather than one-off
decision situations, instrumental research use may not even be the most desirable
thing (unless it comes in the format of lasting behavioral change). At least in the
cases reviewed here, the conceptual use described by I10RM may, all things con-
sidered, be a preferable form of application compared to the kind of discontinued
activity bursts described in interview 02 and 13 as it indicates a sustained interest
in local preparedness planning and in drawing on all forms of available evidence
for optimizing this.
In summary, the material contains cases of both use and non-use. While none
of the risk managers portray this non-use as problematic, it is too early to tell
whether there may also be other opinions in this regard.
6.1.3 Non-structural alleviation
In contrast to technical protection and emergency management, non-structural
alleviation occupies a central position in terms of what both interview groups see
flood hazard maps as relevant for. Amongst the experts, it is especially as input to
land-use and development planning that hazard maps are described as important.
In light of scenario simulation results, local planning documents should be changed
so that areas at risk from flooding are withdrawn from current building plans to
prevent further increases in damage potential. Moreover, flood-proof construction
techniques and risk sensitive building designs should follow, as well as a stronger
focus on ‘re-naturalization’ to preserve and increase the local landscape’s natural
retention capacity. Though I16E appears to regard risk zone maps accounting
for an area’s vulnerability as well as its hazard as a superior form of tool for
development planning, hazard maps are still acknowledged as a useful starting
point.
Amongst the risk managers, similar uses are mentioned. In contrast to the experts,
though, the risk managers’ accounts are much more concrete, defining specific tasks
and areas of application for which hazard maps are salient. Looking at the nature
conservationist in interview 05, for example, we see that, even if he did not have
access to a finished version of the hazard maps at the time of the interview, being
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familiar with this tool from the plausibilization process, he can already pinpoint
a number of management tasks for which this type of foresight tool will be useful,
including water body maintenance, land leasing, storage decisions, etc.:
I05RM: Im Bereich der Liegenschaften, der Landwirtschaft, also wenn
wir unsere Grundstu¨cke verpachten. Im Baurecht, ob man da das und
das bauen oder lagern darf. Sicher auch in der Gewa¨sserunterhaltung,
wie pflege ich den Bach (...). [. . . ] 00:25:51-5
And not only for the sake of human lives and property, but for the sake of local
nature, too:
I05RM: [. . . ] Wenn ich einen Auffu¨llungsantrag von einem Landwirt
kriege und ich sehe, dort ist U¨berschwemmungsgebiet, dann [. . . ] werde
ich in meiner Stellungnahme zu dieser Auffu¨llung sagen: “Nein, Mo-
ment. Das ist ein Bereich, der immer wieder u¨berschwemmt wird.
Also machen wir es nicht.” Wenn ich ein Grundstu¨ck verpachte, das
der Stadt geho¨rt dort, dann werde ich [. . . ] der Liegenschaftsverwal-
tung sagen: “Ho¨rt mal her. Da ist jetzt zwar Acker, aber versucht
doch das als Wiese zu verpachten, weil: wenn es als Acker verpachtet
wird habe ich den Dreck nachher im Bach.” In unserem Bach kom-
men seltene Fischarten vor, wie Stro¨mer und Groppe. Wenn da dann
noch Hochwasser, der Dreck eingespu¨lt wird, gehen die Lebensra¨ume
oder die Hohlra¨ume verloren, wo der Fisch seine Eier ablegt. [. . . ]
00:22:15-7
Hence, hazard maps’ relevancy is not something that risk managers ‘imagine’ but
something that they are convinced of. Indeed, when I09RM is asked what he
thinks of flood hazard maps, his response is not a theoretical but concrete descrip-
tion of how this new tool has already proven itself useful in terms of helping the
administration limit the damage potential associated with new building projects:
I09RM: Also fu¨r uns ist das auf jeden Fall sehr hilfreich, definitiv,
diesen U¨berblick zu haben. [...] Und wir haben Informationen zur
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U¨berflutungstiefe. Also das ist ganz wichtig, wenn jetzt, was hier noch
mo¨glich ist, Bauvorhaben beabsichtigt sind [. . . ] dann ko¨nnen wir dem
Architekten sagen: “Der Pegel bei dem 100 ja¨hrigen Hochwasser wa¨re
jetzt an dieser Stelle deines Grundstu¨cks 50 cm, an der Stelle 70 cm.
Richte da deine Planung darauf aus, damit eben das Schadenspoten-
zial minimiert wird.” [. . . ] Also ist fu¨r uns sehr, sehr hilfreich. [...]
00:41:42-1
Compared to the other management fields reviewed, then, the relevancy of flood
hazard maps for non-structural alleviation is not only mentioned more often but
also with more emphasis.
Regarding the actual issue of use, the field of non-structural alleviation is some-
what different from the other management fields as some of the predicted hazard
lines introduce binding land-use restrictions. In effect, this makes it close to im-
possible for local administrations to completely ignore available flood hazard in-
formation. As a result, the data material does not contain any first-hand examples
of admitted or evident non-use, only of usage being perceived to be insufficient or
more or less ‘forced’.
Beginning with the risk managers’ accounts, it is, again, in interview 02 that the
most direct influence of hazard maps is noted. For one thing, I02RMb feels that
access to flood hazard maps has increased the local administration’s ability to
account for the risk of flooding in relation to building permit applications and the
issue of whether or not to define particular construction requirements:
[D]ass wenn Menschen einen Bauantrag stellen, dass wir reinschreiben:
“Achtung Hochwasser! Hochwasserangepasst bauen.” Oder “hier ist
es nicht zula¨ssig.” Also solche Dinge. Die sind fru¨her auch nicht so
streng mit einem roten Faden verfolgt worden, weil man einfach diese
Karten nicht hatte und nicht wusste, wie weit geht jetzt die blaue
Fla¨che. Heute ko¨nnen wir mit den Karten uns genau angucken und
sagen: “Ok, da ist blau. [...]” (I02RMb, 00:55:02-8)
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For another thing, the local administration has proceeded to withdraw certain
areas from the local development plan, in spite of such measures not being popular
with the citizens owning land in these areas:
Und [. . . ] wir haben in Teilbereichen dann schon die Bebauungspla¨ne
a¨ndern mu¨ssen, u¨berarbeiten mu¨ssen, was dann eben oft bei betrof-
fenen Grundstu¨ckseigentu¨mern, die nach altem Planungsrecht einen
Bauplatz hatten und jetzt dann nur noch ein u¨berflutetes Grundstu¨ck,
planungsrechtlich, das ist kommunalpolitisch ein Problem. (I02RMa,
00:56:56-8)
Providing that it was indeed the hazard maps that inspired this decision, this
represents a case of instrumental research use. In contrast, the former kind of
application mentioned is more difficult to pinpoint, defying the view of research
use as a one-off event as hazard maps are consulted on a regular basis in relation
to routine administrative errands. Though likely to be instrumental in terms
of determining the outcome of these errands in some cases, there may be other
instances in which predictive information does not play any role at all. Indeed,
rather than using flood hazard maps on their own, these will often be integration
into a municipality’s Geographical Information System (GIS), where they can
be retrieved and overlayered with other pieces of relevant information, just like
previous forms of hazard estimates and floodplains before them:
Das ist im Alltag eine Riesenhilfe. Also dieses geographische Infor-
mationssystem u¨berhaupt. [...] Also ich sage immer, ich habe in der
einen Hand einen Telefonho¨rer, in der anderen Hand die Maus am
PC und kann, wenn mich jemand was fragt, eigentlich zu allen rel-
evanten Themen, die wir hier zu bearbeiten haben, eigentlich direkt
Auskunft geben. Ich kann diese Hochwasserthematik abrufen. Ich sehe,
wo Leitungen liegen. Ich sehe, welches Baurecht darauf ist, was der
Fla¨chennutzungsplan sagt, wo Schutzgebiete sind und so weiter. Und
da sind diese Informationen eben auch ein ganz wichtiger Baustein...
(I09RM, 00:41:42-1)
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Judging from these descriptions, simulation-based hazard information is one of
the pieces of information that risk managers will consult in relation to routine
management task. Actual areas of application concern where to designate building
or commercial zones, the location and design of public construction, and where
to survey the river banks for debris. What is eventually decided, though, will not
only depend on the predicted risk of flooding but on other factors, too. In this
sense, the influence of hazard maps is not given, but something that is likely to
change from case to case, not only depending on what level of hazard is indicated
but also on the cost-benefit balance of tolerating respectively not tolerating the
risk that this implies:
Sprich im Fall von dem Acker, der verpachtet wird [...]. Bevor jetzt die
Stadt das dann pflegen muss, also Wiese, wird das dann eben als Acker
verpachtet. Wie gesagt, es ist nicht so, dass das was dann nachher drin
steht die Bibel fu¨r alle ist. Aber es ist die Information, die eben mit
in die Entscheidung vor Ort einfließen muss. Wie die nachher ausfa¨llt,
das steht auf einem ganz anderen Blatt. (I05RM, 00:24:29-5)
Hence, predictive information is not described to have changed either what is done
or how this is done. Often, it is consulted in relation to issues and errands which
would have had to be decided upon anyhow and for which the risk of flooding is
only one aspect amongst others. In terms of their effect, risk sensitive land-use
planning was already a priority in I09RM’s administration, meaning that they did
not really need the arrival of scenario simulation results to begin to pay attention to
non-structural alleviation strategies (00:12:47-6). For his part, I05RM hopes, but
does not know, whether the arrival of flood hazard maps will make the responsible
decision-makers give more weight to the risk of flooding in local development
planning (00:22:15-7). And I08RM notes that, even if his administration uses
flood hazard maps to exclude the possibility of new building zones being located
in risk areas, the situation in other municipalities is different:
Man sieht, dass andere Gemeinden im Bereich von HQ100-Fla¨chen
durchaus Bauten, o¨ffentliche Bauten erstellt haben in der ju¨ngsten
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Vergangenheit. [. . . ] Letztendlich entscheidet die Politik ja nicht im-
mer rational, sondern man verfolgt Interessen. Und da muss man den
Hochwasserschutz gegen andere Interessen abwa¨gen. (I08RM, 00:20:37-
3)
Indeed, one of the problems identified with flood hazard maps in chapter 8 is their
lack of effect as local administrations continue to designate building zones in areas
known to be at risk of flooding:
I06RM: Ja ich finde sie sehr gut. Hochwassergefahrenkarten geben
schon Auskunft daru¨ber das theoretisch sich ergebende U¨berschwemm-
ungsgebiet. Aber man sieht schon, dass Gemeinden trotzdem noch in
diesen Fla¨chen, also gerade was den HQ extrem-Bereich betrifft, dass
sie dort versuchen immer noch Baugebiete auszuweisen. Und da sollte
es noch eine Handhabe geben das zu verhindern. [. . . ] 00:13:47-3
Turning to the experts, finally, these have little concrete insight as to the use of
flood hazard maps, but some as to the municipalities’ general reactions. In this
regard, the fact that flood hazard maps basically ‘force’ municipal administra-
tions to practice a management strategy of risk avoidance is noted to make them
somewhat unpopular amongst local political leaders:
Es gibt insofern Akzeptanzprobleme, dass natu¨rlich viele Kommunen
wollen diese Karten nicht. Weil sie dann Auflagen bekommen. Zum
Beispiel ein Industriegebiet, was sie neu ausweisen wollten, du¨rfen sie
nicht ausweisen. Oder ein Baugebiet. Sie wollen expandieren, jede
Kommune will expandieren [. . . ] Und die Gefahrenkarten, die stoppen
das in den Flussta¨lern. (I18E, 00:34:16-3).
[D]ie Gemeinden sind zwar in diesen... wie heißt das? In diesen kom-
munalen Verba¨nden an der Finanzierung mitbeteiligt. Und machen
das Spiel halt mit, notgedrungen. Weil es ist ja eine EU-Richtlinie,
die dann u¨ber Landesgesetze umgesetzt wird. Aber die Gemeinden
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sind nicht daru¨ber begeistert, weil ja dann Karten herauskommen,
wo bestimmte Fla¨chen u¨berflutet sind. Wo dann mo¨glicherweise ur-
spru¨nglich geplante Baugebiete gar nicht mehr realisiert werden ko¨nnen
oder nur viel schwieriger, weil man dann, wenn man das Baugebiet
dort baut, muss man auffu¨llen, verbraucht dann ein Volumen, ein Re-
duktionsvolumen, muss dieses Volumen an einem anderen Ort wieder-
herstellen. Das ist ja der ta¨gliche Kampf der Gemeinde, nicht nur
gegen das Hochwasser, sondern auch gegen die... diese Hochwasserge-
fahrenkarten. (I14E, 00:29:38-8)
Even if this does not say anything, per se, about how flood hazard maps are used,
it does show a lack of enthusiasm on behalf of some communities as to having to
prioritize local flood risk over other interests. Apparently, the chance at acting in
foresight is something that some actors could do without. Even if there are no
cases of admitted or evident non-use, then, there are some hints in the direction
of hazard maps being perceived to be under-used at the local level, not living up
to their full potential as useful for guiding local planning and decision-making.
6.1.4 Risk communication
Both amongst risk managers and experts, risk communication is the management
field mentioned the most often as an important field of application for flood hazard
maps. Particularly, the capacity to visualize the likely outcome of flooding is
perceived to make them practical for communication purposes. As I02RMb and
I18E explain, seeing the predicted consequences of a flood scenario makes the risk
of inundation ‘real’, and thereby harder to ignore:
Und das Land hat ja jetzt oder ist dabei die Hochwassergefahrenkarten
zu erstellen und dann sieht man es Blau auf Weiß: So sieht es aus. Und
das ist einfach dann real. Dann weiß man: Ok, das kommt irgendwann.
(I02RMb, 00:32:59-3)
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Also Simulation und Animation sind Mo¨glichkeiten, diese Hochwasserge-
fahr real werden zu lassen und damit die Menschen zu sensibilisieren.
(I18E, 00:25:39-1)
Amongst the experts, what exactly this is seen as useful for varies. To I15E, it
concerns the possibility to explain the options for public risk management and how
they would affect the local hazard situation. To I17E, it is about awareness raising
to increase people’s consciousness of the consequences of their actions. I18E and
I11Ea and -b do not specify why it is important to bring hazard information to
public knowledge, but to I13E and I12E it is about building societal acceptance for
a management strategy based on adaptation rather than technical flood control
and encouraging private precaution in addition to public protection:
[I]n diesen [geschu¨tzten – Ed.] Bereichen Vorsorge in irgendeiner Form
zu erwirken. Dass die Leute was tun, dass sie sagen: “Ja hoppla! Wir
ko¨nnen ja doch betroffen sein.” Und da sind halt gerade diese Karten
wichtig. Dass man da eben aufzeigen kann: da ist was! [. . . ] Genau
das sind die Punkte, wo wir heute was tun ko¨nnen in der Vorsorge.
Wo wir also Mo¨glichkeiten haben beim Bu¨rger was zu erreichen, dass
er selber was tut. Was ja ha¨ufig wichtig ist. Also ich meine, wir
ko¨nnen nicht sagen immer nur: “Baut Hochwasserschutz!” Der Bu¨rger
kann sehr viel selber tun in punkto Vorsorge. Dass er wenig Schaden
erleidet und damit ist es vielleicht wertvoller als das, das hundertste
Ru¨ckhaltebecken irgendwo an einem Gewa¨ssersystem zu bauen. Also,
dass kann durchaus sinnvoller sein, dass man da mit den Karten einfach
Vorsorge erzeugen kann. (I12E, 00:27:45-2)
In the case of I12E, there is outspoken hope that foresight information will make
private citizens take more own responsibility and rely less on the public authorities:
Dass die Bu¨rger selber anfangen Vorsorge zu betreiben, ganz wichtiger
Punkt. Dass sie also nicht sagen, wie eben schon gesagt, “der Staat
muss sich darum ku¨mmern” oder “die Gemeinde muss was tun”. Son-
dern jeder selber kann was tun indem man einfach nur sagt: “Gut, wie
Chapter 6. Utilization of flood hazard maps 129
nutze ich meinen Keller? [. . . ] Was kann ich tun, wenn ich neu baue?
[. . . ]” (I12E, 00:28:45-5)
When it comes to what the experts see flood hazard maps as relevant for, hence,
it is awareness raising for encouraging self-protection and a shift in focus from
technical protection to adaptation and a shared responsibility for risk management
that is mentioned the most often (as oppose to processes of public consultation or
stakeholder involvement, for example).
Amongst the risk managers, there is no mentioning of any expectation of citizens
becoming less inclined to rely on public authorities. What flood hazard maps are
appreciated for is simply the prospect of being able to enlighten the local hazard
situation, thereby enabling people to account for this when making decisions of
a private nature. In I06RM’s view, foresight information is a ‘blessing’ for risk
managers wanting to explain where there is a hazard and what can be done about
it (00:32:51-9), whereas I05RM explains how this is relevant for informing people:
Man kann dann der Bevo¨lkerung eben sagen oder zeigen: “Bis hi-
erher wird es gefa¨hrlich. Du kannst dich oberhalb auf der sicheren
Seite wa¨hnen.” Oder wenn er innerhalb von diesem HQ100-Hochwasser
ist eben sagen: “Bau entsprechend.” Oder wenn, was weiß ich, wenn
die Heizung umgebaut wird oder was auch immer, dass man sich
entsprechend darauf einrichten kann. (I05RM, 00:29:56-6)
In a couple of cases, this form of usefulness is not simply imagined but something
that has been experienced first hand. When I10RM, for instance, is asked whether
he knows and what he thinks about flood hazard maps, his answer is:
I10RM: Die sind natu¨rlich sehr wichtig, wenn es um irgendwelche Be-
bauungsdinge geht. Das heißt, wenn es um Bebauungspla¨ne geht oder
aufstellen von Bebauungspla¨nen. Oder wenn es darum geht, es kom-
men o¨fters mal Personen zu uns her, die wollen irgendwo in einem
gewissen Gebiet eine Wohnung anmieten, die Fragen dann nach: “Ab
wann haben wir denn dort das Hochwasser?” Dafu¨r sind die Karten
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natu¨rlich sehr wichtig, muss man ganz klar sagen. Oder es ist sehr
hilfreich, dass es sie gibt. [...] 00:25:16-2
Only in the case of the mayor in interview 03 is a different form of relevancy to be
found. Though acknowledging hazard maps as valuable tools for awareness raising,
what he sees this as important for is helping the local administration explain and
justify the need for structural protection measures (i.e. a form of strategic use):
Ich denke [die Gefahrenkarte – Ed.] ist nachher zum verdeutlichen fu¨r
die Anwohner ein wichtiges Instrument, um auch aufzuzeigen: “Passt
auf, auch wenn ihr bisher noch nie Hochwasser hattet oder nur ganz
selten, ihr wohnt in einem Hochwassergefa¨hrdeten Bereich.” Das ist
gerade fu¨r das, was wir eben angesprochen haben, die Vermittlung
der Maßnahmen, ganz wichtig. Weil wenn sie zu jemanden kommen
und sagen: “Wir bauen Ihnen jetzt eine Mauer in den Garten.” Und
wenn die nur 50 cm hoch ist, dann ist er zuna¨chst mal nicht begeistert.
Wenn man ihm aber sagt, man tut es, weil man diesen Anwohner
direkt schu¨tzen mo¨chte und man kann das auch belegen, weil es eine
Hochwassergefahrenkarte gibt, dann ist die Offenheit auch plo¨tzlich fu¨r
so eine Mauer da. Weil man sagt: “Ja bevor ich Wasser im Keller habe,
lieber so eine Mauer.” (I03RM, 00:29:01-1)
Turning to the issue of actual use beyond the hazard maps’ online presence and
mandatory period of public display, the fact that the concepts of instrumental
and conceptual research use as somewhat difficult to apply in this respect means
that this section will discuss the use of flood hazard maps in terms of the kind
of communication activity that they are applied to (e.g. two-way, face-to-face,
large- or small-scale). In this regard, it can be noted that the majority of the
risk managers’ comments pertain to face-to-face information provision to a single
individual or household. In the case of interview 02, this is partially something that
is described to occur when it comes to the administration’s attention that someone
wants to build in a high-risk area and persuasion is the only means available for
seeking to prevent an increase in local damage potential:
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Also es ist so, dass die, die bauen wollen und dort einen Bauplatz
haben – geschenkt bekommen, vererbt oder sonst was – die sind sehr
uneinsichtig. Weil sie sagen dann “da hat es noch nie Hochwasser
gegeben”, weil sie unbedingt auf dieser Fla¨che bauen wollen. Und
dann u¨berzeugen wir sie oft, wenn wir Fotos haben mit Fotos. Oder
eben mit diesen blauen Karten. [...] Und da ist schwierig oft, die zu
u¨berzeugen. (I02RMb, 00:55:58-5
In the rest of the cases, though, what is described are not active efforts at infor-
mation provision, but a form of ‘passive’ use in response to being approached with
a request for information from someone wanting to move, invest in construction
or buy new property:
Wenn Bu¨rger herkommen und fragen, [. . . ] sie mo¨chten Wohnungen
anmieten irgendwo oder ein Haus kaufen oder ja. Gibt vielleicht ir-
gendwo ein Grundstu¨ck, dass sie bebauen mo¨chten, da gibt es schon
mal den einen oder anderen, der nachfragt: “Liegt das im Hochwasserge-
biet?” [. . . ] Da es schon mal ab und zu die Nachfrage da und dann
greifen wir auf diese Karte zuru¨ck. (I10RM, 00:40:53-5)
Ich meine der einzelne Bauherr oder Architekt, der dann zu uns kommt
und sagt: “Wie ist denn das da?” Und ich kann ihm relativ schnell
sagen: “Beim 100 ja¨hrigen Ereignis, wo die Geba¨udeversicherung sich
darum ku¨mmert und wo es auch fu¨r das Baurecht gewisse Konsequen-
zen hat, ist der Pegel auf deinem Grundstu¨ck so und so.” Dann sind
die natu¨rlich auch sehr dankbar, wenn sie da schnell eine zuverla¨ssige
Information kriegen ko¨nnen. (I09RM, 01:02:12-4)
According to the risk managers in interview 02, it is a rather new development that
people are aware of the risk of flooding and choose to inquire about it. Rather than
linking this to the arrival of flood hazard maps, though, intense media coverage of
past flood catastrophes is what is thought to have sensitized people to this risk:
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I02RMa: Das stimmt, wenn, bei Grundstu¨cksgescha¨ften wird zwis-
chenzeitlich nachgefragt. 01:40:18-8
I02RMb: Genau. [...] [S]eit Oder und Elbe so durch die Fernseher
getingelt sind [. . . ] Und dann natu¨rlich auch Hochwasserereignisse in
La¨ndern, die sonst nie Hochwasserprobleme haben. [. . . ] [D]ie Men-
schen, die am Bach wohnen oder leben oder ein Haus kaufen wollen,
[sind] schon sensibilisierter. Sie kommen dann und fragen auch wie
sieht es da aus? [. . . ] Das war fru¨her nicht. Fru¨her hat keiner sich in-
teressiert. Weil das war einfach nicht in den Ko¨pfen drin, Hochwasser...
01:41:23-0
Judging from the experiences of I06RM and I08RM, furthermore, even if this devel-
opment is positive, it remains limited. Most people simply begin building without
making any form of inquiry (I06RM, 00:15:56-3), and it is only sporadically that
people come by city hall to view the displayed hazard maps (I08RM; 00:10:27-0).
When usage of hazard maps is not passive in the sense of provoked by someone
else’s active request or small-scale in the sense of targeting a single household,
what is described instead is some form of public meeting or information evening
to reach a larger audience. In theory, this type of meeting format can allow for
two-way communication, i.e. that the audience has a chance to ask questions and
voice concerns, instead of just being fed with information. In terms of practical
examples, I03RM describes having co-organized a series of information evenings
together with the other municipalities in the catchment area. Particularly after
the river last overflowed, he says, there was much interest in learning about local
flood risk:
I03RM: Also wir haben auch da Informationsveranstaltungen gemacht
und noch mal erkla¨rt wie funktionieren die Hochwassergefahrenkarten,
welche Informationen kann ich daraus ziehen. Und insbesondere nach
dem Hochwasser hat es natu¨rlich dann immer wieder die Anfrage gegeben:
“Ja wie ist das bei mir? [. . . ] Bin ich u¨berhaupt noch im gefa¨hrdeten
Bereich oder bin ich schon außerhalb?” [. . . ] [W]enn jetzt das Wasser
kommt, ist dann nur mein Kohlekeller nass oder ist dann auch mein
Wohnzimmer nass. [. . . ] 00:34:36-6
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Before the town was flooded, in contrast, interest was low, implying that risk
communication represents a difficult challenge in periods of calm. Apart from
offering information, I03RM notices, there is little you can do if people do not
want to listen.
In the case of the mayor in interview 01, what was organized in his community was
a public presentation and explanation of the flood hazard maps as these became
publicly available. As I01RM puts it, though, the whole affair was ‘rather short’
and ‘somewhat politically motivated’:
Und die Information, es war ja so, dass man sie auch o¨ffentlich pra¨sentiert
hat. Das war eine ziemlich kurze Angelegenheit. Das war ein bisschen
politisch motiviert. Man wollte eben nach außen zeigen, jetzt sind sie
da die Karten. Es wurde auch ein bisschen was erkla¨rt dazu. (I01RM,
00:43:59-5)
Even if what occurred at this event was information provision, then, the usage itself
appears somewhat tactical; an effort to enhance the public authorities’ standing in
an area recently hit by severe flooding by showing that something has been done
in response to this disaster. In terms of the audience, I01RM thinks that, truly,
some people came because they see the necessity of contributing to risk reduction.
Others, though, were rather there to look after their own interests; fearing the
imposition of restrictions that will limit what they can do: “they don’t want to be
restricted. This is their real estate, their plot of land, and they want to be able to
continue to act just as they have so far.” (I01RM, 00:58:49-1)
Representing a final example, I04RM tells that the local administration where
he works is planning to arrange an information evening during the time that the
state’s flood hazard maps are displayed at city hall, to proactively respond to the
questions that the arrival of this new tool is expected to trigger:
I04RM: Ja, haben wir jetzt besprochen. Die Verwaltungsspitze mo¨chte
auf jeden Fall einen Informationsabend machen. Hier in der Stadthalle,
also mit großem Publikum, mit Einladung vom Regierungspra¨sidium,
u¨ber die ja die Karten kommen und vom Landratsamt natu¨rlich. Und
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wir als Beteiligte wollen da also einen Informationsabend machen wa¨hrend
der o¨ffentlichen Auslegung. Weil da ist das Thema aktuell und da
tauchen auch die meisten Fragen auf. [. . . ] 00:06:14-1
All in all, then, there are some cases in which flood hazard maps are used for active,
large-scale communication efforts. Nevertheless, the main form of use is one-to-one
meetings of a ‘passive’ kind. As it turns out, not all administrations are willing to
make more active use of flood hazard maps for communication purposes. I08RM
states that his administration does not intend to use flood hazard maps for any
kind of active public relations work (00:10:57-3); I05RM admits that he does not
quite see the necessity of something like that (00:34:51-1); and I02RMb says that,
for the moment, they are doing less than they should (01:42:32-1). According to
I06RM, one of the problems with the hazard maps is that they there is no strategy
for how to convey these to the public: “There is no structure for bringing this to
people in a positive spirit... It [communication – Ed.] is left to depend on itself.”
(00:28:22-8).
Turning to the experts, concrete attempts to reach a larger audience were referred
to in interviews 11 and 13. The first of these concerns a best-practice example
of a joint municipal effort to arrange three information evenings targeting differ-
ent public and private groups of audiences. The second concerns how a mayor
responded to the discovery of a newly developed housing area being at high risk
of flooding by arranging a public meeting to explain this to the residents and offer
concrete guidance for self-protection:
Die Stadt [Name] hat das gemacht. Die hat die ganze Bevo¨lkerung
dieses Baugebietes eingeladen zu einer Informationsveranstaltung. Hat
gesagt: “So sieht es aus Leute. Da sind damals Fehler gemacht worden,
Okay. Jetzt ist es so, wenn wir ein Hochwasser bekommen, dann steht
das Wasser euch 1 Meter. Schaut, dass ihr genu¨gend im Material
habt, um euch zu schu¨tzen. Wir ko¨nnen das euch auch geben.” Haben
gezeigt, wie man so was macht, wie man auch mal ein Kellerfenster
dichtmacht, also die ganzen Objektschutzmaßnahmen macht. (I13E,
00:35:07-7)
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In the rest of the interviews, there are no references to concrete cases of map use.
In some instances, notably in interviews 12 and 18, it is specified how risk com-
munication and awareness raising could be pursued, including by displaying flood
hazard maps in prominent public locations, issuing press-releases about them,
linking to them on the municipality’s homepage or erecting pillars around town
to indicate predicted and historic flood depths. What is actually done, though,
is not familiar. In I12E’s (00:40:57-1) view, there will be little active map use
for enlightenment purposes amongst communities having escaped flooding for the
past 10-30 years. Even in 2002, at the time of the Elbe flood catastrophe as local
newspapers had parts of the Rhine Atlas reprinted in color, the municipalities
made no attempt to use this momentum to use available flood hazard maps to
talk about flood risk:
Also, Karten sind so in Farbe abgedruckt worden, in den Tageszeitun-
gen. Und es gab keinen Aufschrei. “Ach so sieht das aus, wenn das bei
uns kommt, das Hochwasser.” [. . . ] Es ist jetzt auch nicht irgendwo
politisch dann dazu genutzt worden, zu sagen: “So, ihr habt das jetzt
gesehen auf den Karten, auf dem Rhein-Atlas. Jetzt mu¨ssen wir was
tun! [. . . ]” (I12E, 00:34:59-3)
To summarize, this means that some map use follows more or less involuntarily,
as risk managers are faced with direct inquiries as to local flood hazard, whereas,
in other cases, individual households or a larger audience of citizens are actively
targeted. Though in a way constituting direct application, what the hazard maps
are applied to is neither decision-making nor definition of best-practice, but a
form of external enlightenment and/or persuasion attempt, making it difficult to
classify these as instrumental forms of research use. Possibly, it could qualify as a
form of knowledge-driven use if the decision to seek to raise widespread awareness
about flood risk would have been taken with direct reference to the predicted
outcome of the scenarios displayed in the flood hazard maps. Though the case
described by I13E might constitute such an application, the lack of access to a
first-hand account makes it difficult to know. In some of the other cases, usage
appears to be of a more strategic character, with hazard maps being applied to
raise or safeguard people’s confidence in the local authorities and to uphold good
Chapter 6. Utilization of flood hazard maps 136
public relations. What can be said for sure is that there are ways in which some
risk managers avoid using flood hazard maps, and that there are at least some
indications of flood hazard maps being perceived to be under-used as tools for risk
communication.
6.2 Complementary observations
One of the things that the above overview has shown is that, often, the experts
have little to say concretely about how flood hazard maps are used in practice
for local level risk management. Though it cannot be completely excluded that
this is a result of poor sampling, the fact is that some of the interviewees occupy
central positions in public offices; if they do not have more to say, it is hard to
imagine who would. The experts’ own explanations are that it is too early to tell.
When I11Eb is asked about the extent to which his expectations concerning flood
hazard maps have been realized or fallen short, his answer is that many of these
are still “dreams of the future”, suggesting that there is still hope (00:28:10-0).
Likewise, I13E states that, since it is in the flood risk management plans that
new and additional measures will be defined and committed to, it is not until the
next step of the EU Floods Directive has been completed that the influence of
simulation-based foresight will be recognizable.
Rather than concrete insights about use, what many of the experts have to offer,
instead, is a general impression of how flood hazard maps have so far been received
and responded to. For example, the experts in interview 11 suggest that there
have been fewer attempts to influence or manipulate the simulation process than
expected. I17E says that, from what he has heard, flood hazard maps have so far
been well received, adding that this may change when built-up areas in the HQ100-
zone are no longer exempt from land-use restrictions. Indicating a widespread
conceptual effect, furthermore, I13E suggests that flood hazard maps make a light
bulb go on in almost every administration even if this will not always result in a
full response program:
Also... da wird sich schon damit bescha¨ftigt. Und da geht auch, in,
ich wu¨rde mal sagen 90 Prozent der Fa¨lle, geht ein Aha-Effekt durch
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die Kommune, durch die Stadt, wo, wo man sich dann schon am Kopf
kratzt und sagt: “Da mu¨ssen wir aber mal etwas machen.” Also das
war bisher unsere Erfahrung. Also es ist wirklich so, dass die wenigsten
gar nicht reagieren, wenn sie das sehen. [. . . ] Natu¨rlich nach reiflichem
u¨berlegen [dass sie] mo¨glicherweise zum Schluss kommen, sie machen
A, B, statt A bis F. Das schon. (I13E, 01:14:40-2)
There are also reports of less positive reactions, though. Although I13E thinks that
the introduction has generally gone well, some areas have responded negatively;
doing everything they can to prevent the arrival of flood hazard maps:
Wobei wir hier auch zwei verschiedene Reaktionen von draußen haben.
[. . . ] Und wir haben Regionen, zum Beispiel die hier... Die sind ja fer-
tig schon, die dunkelgru¨nen. Das war problemlos. Die Kommunen, ja,
man hat ein bisschen diskutiert und aber in Ordnung. Hier in dem Ge-
biet, da unten, da, da werden sie gerade fertig gestellt. Da gab es also
massive Widersta¨nde: “Die Karte stimmt nicht. Es kann nicht sein,
dass wir Millionen ausgeben fu¨r Hochwasserru¨ckhaltebecken und un-
sere Siedlungs-, ku¨nftige Siedlungsfla¨che ist trotzdem u¨berschwemmt.”
[. . . ] “Es kann nicht sein. Die Karten sind falsch. Das Pra¨sidium
hat falsch gerechnet.” Und versuchten politisch mobil zu machen, dass
die Karte nicht hergestellt wird. Also so etwas gibt es auch... [. . . ]
[E]s gibt die ganze Bandbreite. [. . . ] Also ich habe ja schon geho¨rt, ihr
bringt uns das Hochwasser mit euren Karten zu uns. (I13E, 00:14:47-0)
Offering similar observations, I18E notes that some people will actively look for
mistakes and discrepancies to use as ammunition against hazard maps, whereas
I14E describes cases in which the relationship between the higher and lower au-
thorities is so infected that there is very little acceptance at all for things that are
introduced top-down. At the same time, I14E also knows of an enterprise where
the first reaction towards simulation results indicating a flood risk was denial and
protest, but where the end-result was that an own hazard assessment was under-
taken, indicating that a negative reaction can nevertheless lead to a constructive
response in some instances.
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Thus, even if the expert interviews contain relatively few concrete insights about
local map use, the data material still provides a general assessment of the local
level response to this new foresight tool. Judging from these descriptions, the lo-
cal reaction is mostly welcoming, though instances of opposition are encountered,
too. The next chapter will not only explore what leads to use or non-use but
also review what is thought to underlie these different forms of reactions. Be-
fore proceeding, however, a general comment as to what these findings show is
in place. In short, this could be summarized as cases both of use and of non-use
having been identified. In terms of how the maps have been applied, instances of
instrumental, conceptual and strategic research use have identified, but also some
forms of use which are difficult to fit into this framework (notably in the field of
risk communication). Moreover, some of the critique voiced against typologies of
research use for not capturing the ‘effect’ of knowledge utilization respectively for
not allowing for a view of research use as a long-term process rather than a one-off
event has been recognizable throughout the data material. In regard to the issue
of whether this use is legitimate or not, none of the stated or observed cases of ap-
plication are described to be questionable or to have had regrettable consequences.
Hence, there does not appear to be any concrete cases of misuse so far (at least
not any which have been discovered). For the instances or observations of non-use
reviewed, some are rationalized as legitimate whereas others are described as – if
not illegitimate then at least – unfortunate.
Chapter 7
Factors affecting application
7.1 Reasons for (non-)use per management field
The following chapter will explore the reasons for use and non-use of simulation-
based flood hazard maps. It will draw on both risk managers’ subjective expla-
nations and on the observations of experts representing a more aggregate form of
insight. It will begin with an overview of reasons for use and non-use within each
management field before observations of a more general character are presented.
7.1.1 Technical protection
When it comes to map usage in the field of technical and infrastructural risk
management, the previous chapter provided us with a few descriptions of both
conceptual-instrumental use (interview 02 and 04) and admitted non-use for any-
thing but internal confirmation and external legitimization of pre-formulated plans
(interview 03, 06 and 01). Beginning with interviews 02 and 04, these cover in-
stances in which the arrival of predictive scenario information revealed weakness
or confirmed a recent suspicion of deficiencies in the existing defenses. Hence,
both cases are characterized by flood hazard maps indicating a problem rather
than by confirming status quo. In comparison, the situation in interview 03, 06
and 01 is that the arrival of flood hazard maps is not described to have affected
either the local understanding of risk or the administration’s plans or activities
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in relation to technical protection. On the contrary, the risk of inundation was
already known and already part of the local political-administrative agenda. In
the case of interview 03, for example, a survey of the local hazard situation had
already been undertaken by an engineering bureau to inform the development of
a inter-municipal technical protection concept to guarantee catchment-wide flood
control. Hence, the reason why scenario simulation results could not bring much
new information to light is that comparable information was already available:
[U]nsere Flussgebietsuntersuchung lag ja zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon
vor. Das heißt, vieles was in der Hochwassergefahrenkarte jetzt als
Gefa¨hrdungsgebiet ausgewiesen ist war vorher bereits bekannt. Weil
man ja wusste, wie ist das Einzugsgebiet und wie wirkt sich das dann
auch von der Wasserspiegellage in den betroffenen Gemeinden aus.
(I03RM, 00:29:01-1)
Considering that the local flood hazard maps have largely been based on the
data from this survey, it becomes understandable why I03RM thinks that “they
have brought us few new insights” (00:29:01-1). Representing a similar situation,
I06RM’s work is focused on the realization of planned defense installations. In his
view, it is not for the work associated with the implementation of technical protec-
tion that scenario simulation results are useful, but for other types of management
tasks:
I06RM: Also fu¨r die ta¨gliche Arbeit nutzen wir sie nicht. Sie mu¨ssen
dann mehr von den Gemeinden selbst genutzt werden, wenn irgendwelche
Baugebiete zur Diskussion stehen und neue sich weiterentwickeln fu¨r
ku¨nftige Bebauungen oder so. Weil unsere Aufgabe ist es ja festgelegte
Hochwasserschutzanlagen, also Standorte fu¨r festgelegte Hochwasser-
schutzanlagen zu realisieren. [. . . ] 00:16:58-2
Finally, the situation in interview 01 is that, even if flood hazard maps are not
seen as completely irrelevant from an information perspective, the surrounding
circumstances appear to have made them so. A large part of this interview is
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namely spent explaining why there may not be any flood association or catchment-
wide protection concept after all. Not only is there no viable solution for how to
share the costs in sight (i.e. between municipalities of different size with different
means, facing different levels of risk and being expected to profit to different
degrees) but the political motivation is partially dwindling as the last catastrophic
flood is no longer fresh in memory. Whereas one might imagine flood hazard maps
to be just the right thing to make a change in this regard, reminding people of
the risk faced if nothing is done, no such application is described. Generally, the
interview material suggests joint technical protection to require relatively quick
action in the ‘window of opportunity’ that opens in the wake of a flood episode.
In any case, it is easier to get people to agree to investments after they have
experienced hazard than on the basis of a graphical representation of the same:
Es ist aber trotzdem, trotz allem immer leichter direkt nach einem
Hochwasserschaden Maßnahmen zu ergreifen und Unterstu¨tzung zu
bekommen, wie wenn man das aus jetzt, auf Grund der Hochwasserge-
fahrenkarte zum Beispiel (...). Da ist keine Gemeinde bereit, ohne jetzt
in großer Not zu stehen, Geld dafu¨r bereit, locker zu machen. (I06RM,
01:01:58-2)
Comparing these empirical insights to what was written about research use in
chapter 3, the situation in interview 02 and 04 is indeed one of flood hazard
maps being perceived as salient. To some extent, this appears to be connected to
the unexpected character of the displayed assessment indicating larger areas than
presumed to be at risk of inundation, ringing a bell of Weiss and Bucuvalas’s (1980)
finding that one of the things that can make research relevant is if it challenges the
status quo. At the same time, the community in interview 02 is also characterized
by having had its eyes towards the seriousness of flooding opened at an earlier
stage, meaning that some of the mapped scenario simulation results that they
have used have emerged as a result of the administration itself having taken an
interest in these issues. In this sense, there was also a pre-existing interest in
finding out about the local hazard situation in this case.
For their part, both interview 03 and 06 appear to be characterized by a low
perception of saliency due to the timing of the hazard maps in terms of coming
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after the hazard of flooding has already been assessed and a defense concept
defined. At the same time, this circumstance was beyond the control of those
commissioning or producing hazard maps, making it into something that has to be
attributed to the local context rather than indicating a failure to produce suitable
content. To the contextual situation can also be counted the existence of relatively
up-to-date information since before, which has also alleviated the need for further,
marginally different, assessment results. Besides, though I06RM admittedly think
of flood hazard maps as something of relevance to other management fields, I01RM
describe them as a “very important foundation” for risk management, including
protection planning, on account of changing hydrological patterns:
Weil [...] es sich u¨ber die Jahrzehnte hinweg vera¨ndert hat wie die
Hochwasserereignisse stattfinden. Heute kommt das Hochwasser an-
ders daher, als vielleicht noch vor 20, 30 Jahren. [...] Und wenn
man jetzt die Hochwassergefahrenkarten nimmt und vergleicht mit
alten Karten, fru¨heren Karten, dann allein schon dieses zeigt, wie
notwendig es war das ganz neu aufzulegen als Grundlage fu¨r Planungen
im Gewa¨sserbereich und im Bereich des Hochwasserschutzes. (I01RM,
00:39:55-7)
Whereas it is difficult to imagine that there would have been much space for apply-
ing flood hazard maps to technical protection planning considering that concrete
options for measures had already been defined, what I01RM focuses on is not that
the timing was bad or the content wrong, but that the current political situation
has put all plans in jeopardy. Lacking access to comparable information since
before, this decision-maker is not characterized by a view of flood hazard maps
as being of low relevancy. Instead, non-use of available hazard knowledge (inde-
pendently of origin or format) is attributed to general risk management challenges
related to resources, costs, cooperation difficulties, risk slipping into oblivion, etc.
Hence, (non-)use will not only depend on hazard maps being perceived as salient
but also on whether or not external circumstances presently create a need for or
interest in hazard information and risk management.
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7.1.2 Emergency management
The previous chapter showed there to be both cases of simulation-based flood haz-
ard maps being appreciated and used for preparedness planning and of this not
being the case. While one might have expected hazard maps to be of particular
relevancy to areas hitherto lacking alarm and response plans, what we see, instead,
is that usage is occurring both in areas with and without some form of pre-existing
emergency plan, respectively that usage is seen as unnecessary both in areas with
and without a tradition of preparedness planning. Hence, there is no obvious com-
mon denominator to point to for understanding these different outcomes, instead
this must be explored through the intended users’ subjective reasoning.
Beginning with the cases of use, these seem fairly straightforward. The munici-
pality in interview 02 is characterized by flood hazard maps having revealed an
unexpected level of risk; I08RM needed information to fulfill the legal obligation
of developing an alarm and response plan (previously having postponed this due
to lack of time and relevant know-how); and, in I10RM’s area, preparedness opti-
mization was already part of the local agenda since before, implying a pre-existing
interest in new hazard information. Particularly, I10RM holds hazard maps based
on gauge level scenarios for a relevant form of input for enabling direct translation
of flood warnings into a visual idea of which areas might be affected:1
[D]ann sieht man genau zu welchem Zeitpunkt welches, welcher Bere-
ich, welches Gebiet u¨berschwemmt wird. Also das hilft schon weiter.
Weil man dann ja auch genau weiß durch die Vorhersage, den und den
Wasserstand kriegen wir, also ko¨nnen wir vorher schon Schutzmaßnah-
men dort treffen. (I10RM, 00:25:16-2)
Hence, there is one case of flood hazard maps themselves having triggered a need
for planning input, one case of external circumstances (i.e. state law) having filled
1Though the state’s forecasting center does not only publish gauge level information but also
runoff data (m3/s) for most gauging stations, the comparison of runoff values with scenarios
based on statistical return periods is still less direct, requiring knowledge as to what runoff value
each return period is assumed to corresponds to. Hence, it cannot be excluded that this reason
for seeing simulation results as relevant is less applicable to hazard maps based on scenarios of
statistical return periods.
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this role, and one case characterized by general organizational openness towards
incorporating new evidence into existing planning. Moreover, even if they would
not have defined flood hazard maps as particularly salient for crisis management
beforehand, they all claim to have found them useful in retrospect.
Moving on to the instances in which no use was established or perceived as nec-
essary, the risk manager giving us the most detail as to the reasons for this is
the chief fire fighter in interview 07. All in all, four things are found to affect his
attitude towards predictive information. First, a low risk perception is something
that reduces I07RM’s need for information. As he puts it: “Yes, we have [...] the
flood too rarely. And then it’s like... If we have 10 basements, then that’s a lot,
which has been flooded here in the area.” (00:32:46-7). Not only in terms of hazard
frequency, then, but also in terms of damage potential, the risk associated with
flooding is thought to be low. Besides, it is a less serious form of risk compared
to fire: “No, a flood is not as problematic as a fire operation. [...] [T]he water
doesn’t come so quickly. [...] [E]everyone would have time to go to a higher story
or out of the house and perhaps to an acquaintance or so.” (I07RM, 00:02:07-6).
Second, what is already in place in terms of information resources is thought to
suffice. As I07RM sees it, the emergency services in his community have no urgent
need for an instrument like the state’s flood hazard maps since they already know
through experience and auxiliary means of documentation where which basements
will be standing under water:
Also (...) das ist nicht das Dringlichste bei uns. Weil wir wissen in so
einer Stadt, wir wissen schon. Wir wissen es kommt das Gebiet bei
dem und dem. Wir haben hier unten auch an der Bru¨cke so einfache
Hilfsmittel. Da haben wir, beim jedem großen Hochwasser machen wir
da mit Farbe nachher einen Strich hin und schreiben die Jahreszahl
hin und da wissen wir genau, wenn jetzt der Bach hier unten u¨ber die
Bo¨schung so und so hochkommt, dann wissen wir es la¨uft hier unten,
in der und der Bereich laufen der Keller voll. Also das ist so der Vorteil
von einer kleineren Stadt, dass wir uns da noch auskennen. (I07RM,
00:30:24-1)
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As I07RM explains, there is no expectation of any added value from hazard maps as
the response workers already have routines in place for assessing the anticipated
extent of inundation, respectively sufficient experience for knowing what to do
about it:
I07RM: Die bringen uns nicht viel, das ist-. Weil wir ko¨nnen dann
vielleicht die Schlauchsperre an eine Straße hinmachen, aber das wissen
wir auch von uns von alleine. [. . . ] [W]enn jetzt ein gro¨ßerer Regen
ist, dann fahre ich einfach, fahre ich mal raus an die erste Bru¨cke und
schaue mal wie hoch steht da das Wasser. Und dann weiß ich in zwei
Stunden habe ich in der Stadt die und die Ho¨he. Das sind einfach
Erfahrungen, die wir haben [. . . ] wo wir dann ta¨tig werden mu¨ssen
oder ko¨nnen. Wenn wir dann warnen mu¨ssen [...]. 00:34:24-8
While recognizing the principal relevancy of scenario simulation in terms of being
able to explore the consequences of an unprecedented flood, this is nothing that
his community is thought to have a need for, but possibly something that other
towns and cities may profit from.
Third, there is the fact that there is anyhow little that I07RM can do to prevent
flood damage. Essentially, his job is to wait until the water recedes enough for
the fire brigade to start pumping out basements and garages. While other munic-
ipalities may be equipped to prevent the flood water from causing damage, this
is not the case in his area: “we can prevent very little damage. [. . . ] When we
come, the damage is already there, really.” (I07RM, 00:21:56-6). Though more
or different emergency response equipment could potentially change this, this is
not something that the local administration is seriously expected to invest in: “It
wont, the city [...] will not build a dam here down the road and keep beams ready.
[...] They will never hold that ready for the case of, every 15 years, there being a
flood.” (I07RM, 00:32:46-7).
Fourth and finally, the source of inundation that is really causing I07RM concern
is not riverine flooding, but the risk of heavy precipitation over a limited geo-
graphical area leading to slope water. Since this source of flooding is not subject
to simulation, the state’s flood hazard maps are also of low relevancy:
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Aber das gro¨ßte Problem sind so kleine Flu¨sse, kleine Ba¨che, die im
Normalfall bloß so breit sind und vielleicht so tief [zeigt mit den Ha¨nden].
Und wenn sie gerade so ein punktuelles Hochwasser haben, dann kann
sein, das ist ein Fluss mit drei Meter Breite oder ja, und tief. Das
sind so, die Hauptprobleme. Aber das bekommen sie auch mit solchen
Karten nicht in den Griff. Weil das, da mu¨ssten sie ja jeden kleinen
Fluss, der irgendwo aus dem Wald her rauskommt, mu¨ssten sie berech-
nen. Und der kommt vielleicht alle 200 Jahre mal. [...] In 15 Jahren
ist es dort dru¨ben und in 20 Jahren ist es in der Richtung. Da ist der
Aufwand viel zu groß. Da finden sie die Pla¨ne schon gar nicht mehr
(lacht). (I07RM, 00:32:46-7)
Looking at the rest of the cases of non-use or not perceiving a need for hazard
maps, a low risk perception is also what characterizes I05RM’s interview response
when he says that the risk of flooding to his community is not of a nature that
requires an official preparedness plan (see quote in chapter 6). Additionally, it
would appear that he is unaware of the fact that state law requires municipalities
to possess this kind of document. In case of I09RM’s colleagues, in comparison,
it is not that the risk of flooding is thought to be low, but that the available
knowledge resources are thought to suffice. They already have an emergency
management plan, a gauging station and a warning system; they already know
what to expect in case of flooding, and have no expectation of hazard maps telling
them anything new. In contrast to I10RM, the fact that an alarm and response
plan already exists is, here, taken to speak against there being a need for flood
hazard maps. Finally, while not excluding that predictive information may become
interesting at some point of time, the situation as I03RM sees it for now is that
the administration already possesses an emergency plan that “more or less reflects
what the flood hazard map says” (I03RM, 00:31:13-9). Only once the planned
defense installations have been finished, and the flood hazard maps updated to
reflect this, might it become interesting to use these for preparedness planning.
Turning, finally, to the observations of the experts, I13E’s account of the discon-
tinued pilot project referred to in the previous chapter point to lack of resources
as an obstacle to a lasting effort of hazard information, while also pointing to
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the personal interest and agenda of whomever is mayor as a factor of importance.
Besides, not all municipalities are thought to be aware of the legal requirement for
preparedness planning, and it is overall perceived as something of a challenge to
get local administrations to understand why this is necessary:
I13E: Also was, wo wir natu¨rlich nach wie vor immer wieder auf Schwier-
igkeiten stoßen ist die Einsicht vor Ort, dass das notwendig ist. Dieses
oder jenes zu tun. Zum Beispiel einen Gefahrenabwehrplan aufzustellen
durch die Kommune. Dass das auch notwendig ist, wenn wir einen tech-
nischen Schutz haben durch einen Deich oder ein Hochwasserru¨ckhalte-
becken. Dass es trotzdem notwendig ist, weil es ein Ereignis kom-
men kann, das gro¨ßer ist als das, fu¨r das diese Becken oder dieser
Deich bemessen sind. Dann muss die Kommune trotzdem vorbere-
itet sein. Und das ist nach wie vor sehr schwierig an die Kommunen
heru¨berzubringen. [. . . ] 00:14:47-0
In summary, this suggests that the cases of use are all characterizes by some
form of circumstance creating a need for and/or interest in hazard information
in combination with these being found to offer helpful overview and guidance. In
contrast, the cases of non-use are characterized by one or more circumstance being
felt to alleviate the need for predictive hazard information. Only in one case are
hazard maps, as such, not thought to target the most relevant origin of flood risk.
From an observer’s perspective, finally, lack of resources, personal engagement of
local leaders and a general lack of interest in preparedness planning respectively
awareness of this being mandatory are factors perceived to affect application.
7.1.3 Non-structural alleviation
As noted in the previous chapter, complete non-use of flood hazard maps is basi-
cally impossible in the field of non-structural alleviation, as two of the displayed
scenarios introduce binding land-use restrictions. Nevertheless, we can explore
what supports application and what is thought to explain that not more use is
made of available foresight information.
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Beginning with the cases of used discussed in more detail before, the ones described
in interview 02 suggests two factors to affect map usage. First, even if not explicitly
stated, the explanation closest at hand for the decision to withdraw certain areas
from the local development plan would be that these had been revealed to be
associated with a previously unknown level of flood risk, in which case use would
again be related to findings having challenged the current status quo. Second,
there are reasons to believe that the application of flood hazard maps to the
administration of local building permit processes is something that has followed
more or less automatically. At least in the cases of interview 05 and 09, electronic
maps have been integrated into an established GIS-environment, just as other
forms of flood estimates before them. Yet, it is also clear that this is something
that scenario simulation is perceived as highly salient for, as a more precise hazard
estimate facilitates the process of assessing where which type of construction may
be permissible.
In the cases of I05RM and I09RM, available evidence as to the risk of flooding
was considered before, too, indicating a pre-existing interest in accounting for
available hazard information. Additionally, both cases are characterized by a
perception of flood hazard maps as offering salient information for non-structural
alleviation work and of GIS as a relevant program for retrieving and considering
this together with other relevant pieces of information. As I05RM explains, this
provides for better decision-making compared to when this kind of information
was only available in paper format:
Das [GIS – Ed.] ist im Prinzip wie eine Zwiebel, die verschiedene
Schalen hat, durch die ich nachher durchgucken kann. Dann sehe ich
eben an diesem Punkt, [...] es ist Naturdenkmal, es ist U¨berschwemm-
ungsgebiet, es ist Pipapo. [...] Wenn ich da dann eben diese Hochwasser-
gefahrenkarte auch habe und weiß an der Stelle, ich sehe es am Luftbild,
geht das soweit raus und kann dann pru¨fen, ist mein Vorhaben, dass ich
da jetzt habe mit betroffen? Oder ist es nicht betroffen? Dann kann
ich es halt viel besser entscheiden als fru¨her als man das als Karten-
material hatte. (I05RM, 00:15:36-1)
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Ultimately, then, it is not only that flood hazard maps are perceived to be salient
in relation to routine administrative errands but also that their compatibility with
an established information system makes them easy to use to this end. Indeed,
one of the main benefits of the state’s flood hazard maps, as I09RM sees it, is
that...
...man auch auf elektronischem Weg jetzt sehr schnell alles eruieren
kann, wie die Situation ist. Fru¨her mussten wir entweder, wie gesagt,
in Akten wu¨hlen oder wir hatten gar keine Daten. [. . . ] Und das ist fu¨r
uns schon wirklich wichtig die Informationen zur Verfu¨gung zu haben.
(I09RM, 00:43:46-1)
In the other interviews mentioning some form of use, either no particular reason
for application is mentioned or this is noted to be something that is more or less
coerced. For example, the mayor in interview 01 notes that his municipality has
not had much choice, as binding land-use restrictions had to be accounted for in
the last update of the preparatory land-use plan:2
Es gibt o¨rtlich die Fla¨chennutzungspla¨ne, die u¨ber die ganzen Gemarkun-
gen gehen. Und in einer aktuellen Fortschreibung, jedenfalls hier bei
uns vor Ort, musste das natu¨rlich beru¨cksichtigt werden. [...] Sie
ko¨nnen an mancher Stelle dann vielleicht keine Nutzung ausweisen.
Ob jetzt wohnen oder Gewerbe oder sonst etwas. Da war das schon
eine ganz konkrete Anwendungsmo¨glichkeit oder auch ein Zwang letz-
tendlich, das zu beru¨cksichtigen. (I01RM, 00:49:58-9)
Turning to the reasons for less positive reactions towards hazard maps, the only
risk manager openly indicating any kind of displeasure in this regard is the mayor
in interview 03. In his view, the land-use restrictions introduced for some of the
depicted hazard zones are overly strict and rigid. As he sees it, it is ‘unrealistic’ to
2That jurisdiction can be an effective way of guaranteeing knowledge utilization is also in-
dicated by I14E, who gives an example of how knowing that information of legal implication is
being produced can make private actors adjust to this even before it becomes mandatory to do
so.
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want to prohibit all forms of expansion in areas at risk since it is often indispens-
able for already established businesses to have space to grow. If the municipality
cannot make floodplains safe for development by investing in technical protection,
enterprises may choose to move and leave the municipality without one of their
main sources of income:
[O]ft ist es eben so, dass gerade gewerbliche Fla¨chen in den Bere-
ichen liegen. Und wenn die auf Dauer nicht mehr nutzbar sind und
nicht mehr vera¨nderbar sind, dann stellt das fu¨r das Gewerbe am Ort
und damit auch fu¨r die Gemeinde ein Problem dar. Denn wenn sich
ein Unternehmen nicht entwickeln kann, dann wird es sich [...] nicht
unbedingt auf einen anderen Standort im Ort vertro¨sten lassen, son-
dern es wird irgendwann die gesamte Standort [in]frage stellen und
mo¨glicherweise abwandern. Und das ist fu¨r eine Gemeinde sehr gefa¨hrlich
und auch teuer. Weil eine Gemeinde sich zu großen Teilen aus der
Gewerbesteuer finanziert. [...] Wenn wir gute Schutzmaßnahmen haben,
die verla¨sslich funktionieren, dann muss sich das dann auch [...] auswirken.
Momentan ist es sehr strikt gehandhabt, dass auch diese geschu¨tzten
Fla¨chen eigentlich nicht u¨berbaut werden du¨rfen. (I03RM, 00:39:11-4)
In general, avoidance and re-naturalization are management strategies that I03RM
thinks are nice in theory, but nothing that it makes sense to prioritize where flood
risk is high. In his community, the management strategies to be pursued in the
short- to mid-term are structural protection and emergency management planning.
While not telling us anything about what this means for the chances of use at the
subordinate administrative level, this confirms that there can be political resistance
towards having to forsake other interests on account of hazard evidence. Providing
a further observation in this regard, I06RM claims under-usage to be related to
local leaders’ preference for not knowing about flood risk in order to be able to
pursue other interests:
im Prinzip gibt es da Beru¨hrungsa¨ngste oder Widersta¨nde. Man will
das nicht wirklich wissen. Weil eine Gemeinde, wenn sie Firmen hat
im u¨berschwemmungsgefa¨hrdeten Gebieten oder so, dann will man die
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eher arbeiten lassen und Steuern bezahlen und so weiter und nicht
belasten und irgendwie-. Es wird so betrachtet, wie wenn man den
Leuten Schwierigkeiten machen wu¨rde, wenn man sagt: “Ihr lebt aber
im u¨berschwemmungsgefa¨hrdeten Gebiet.” Also es gibt viele Gemein-
den, die weiterhin bauen wollen in solchen Gebieten. (I06RM, 00:27:39-
3)
Supporting this view, I14E argues that scenario simulation results will be welcome
where they represent a solution to a problem, and less welcome where they con-
stitute a potential obstacle to the municipality’s plans of expansion and growth:
I14E: Ja, es ist immer die Frage, wenn eine Gemeinde vor allem ein
Problem hat und mo¨chte informiert werden und mo¨chte Ideen haben,
wie kann ich mich schu¨tzen, was kann ich tun, dann ist es ein Riesen-
vorteil. Wenn aber in der Gemeinde, sage ich mal, einen sehr engagierte
Bu¨rgermeister da sitzt, der seine Aufgabe vor allem sieht Gewerbe
anzusiedeln, Baugebiete auszuweisen, also quasi die Gemeinde zu en-
twickeln, und dann eben das Problem hat, dass er in einem engen Tal
sitzt und nur die Entwicklungsmo¨glichkeiten am Bach hat, fu¨r die ist
es ein Problem und die sehen es auch nicht immer ein. [. . . ] 01:35:16-3
Likewise, I17E notes that the reason why flood hazard maps are associated with
a high conflict potential is that many political actors still regard floodplains as
desirable land:
Und da muss man schon damit rechnen, dass die Kommunen, die
natu¨rlich – das sind ja interessante Grundstu¨cke entlang der Gewa¨sser,
solange die kein Hochwasser fu¨hren – dass die Kommune natu¨rlich
schon ein großes Interesse daran haben, auch diese Grundstu¨cksfla¨chen
zu sichern und zu nutzen fu¨r Bebauung, fu¨r sta¨dtische Entwicklung.
Und das wird, da steckt viel Konfliktpotenzial darin [. . . ] (I17E,
00:23:22-4)
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At least where hazard information is met with a lack of enthusiasm, then, this
is thought to be associated with non-structural alleviation generally being low on
the local political agenda (or at least lower than growth, expansion and trade
taxes). Apart from when knowledge use is linked to regulatory requirements,
things that are found to support map use are: if these indicate a hitherto unknown
risk of inundation; that their content is perceived as salient; and that their format
facilitates application by being compatible with current systems and routines.
7.1.4 Risk communication
While risk communication is central to what the interviewees see flood hazard
maps as relevant for, the type of use that is made of them is often small-scale
and passive in the sense of happening upon request. The question to explore in
this section, thus, is what separates administrations willing to use hazard maps as
communication tools at a larger scale (e.g. by organizing public meetings) from
those not wanting to do so.
In this respect, most – though not all – instances of large-scale use described in the
previous chapter appear to be characterized by the perception of communication
as something that is necessary to avoid problems and reduce the risk of protest.
Looking at I03RM, for example, his viewpoint is that it belongs to 21st century
policy making to take citizens’ concerns and viewpoints seriously. Independently
of whether those opinions are irrational, misinformed or well-founded, the best
way of responding to them is through open communication and dialog:
Also man kann nicht sagen: “Wir wissen es als einzige am besten und
so machen wir. Und Bu¨rger, du musst es so hinnehmen.” Sondern
man sollte den Bu¨rger sehr fru¨hzeitig miteinbeziehen [. . . ]. (I03RM,
00:15:50-8)
In I03RM’s view, communication is both a way of sounding out and responding
to people’s concerns and a chance at information provision to get them to see the
administration’s point of view. Even though there is no explicit statement as to
why a series of information meetings on local flood hazard has been arranged in
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this catchment area, the fact that a common structural protection concept is to be
pursued makes it appear at least somewhat likely that it has something to do with
the need to make people understand why such a solution is regarded as necessary.
In this sense, it is not only I03RM’s general openness towards communication with
the public that is a favorable circumstance but also timing in the sense of there
presently being a political message for which flood hazard maps lend support.
Turning to I04RM, he tells of a local administration wondering whether it will
have to face a storm of protest once flood hazard maps become public. There is
a clear concern that something will be triggered that local administrators do not
know where it will end, respectively that they will be overwhelmed with inquiries
in response to a mapping project that they have not themselves initiated:
[W]enn die Hochwassergefahrenkarten jetzt in na¨chster Zeit vero¨ffentlicht
werden, dann auch die Reaktion aus der Bevo¨lkerung, von den direkt
Betroffenen. Weil das ist noch ein großes Fragezeichen. Geht hier ein
Sturm der Entru¨stung, kommt da? Weil viele sehen: “Oh, ich liege
ja im U¨berschwemmungsbereich”, was denen vielleicht vorher nicht so
bewusst war. Und ob da was u¨ber uns herein bricht. Die Befu¨rchtung
hat jetzt mein Chef zum Beispiel. (I04RM, 00:02:47-9)
Aber wie gesagt, es wird jetzt gerade eher die Gefahr gesehen, dass hier
irgendwas losgetreten wird, wo man noch nicht weiß, was dabei unter
dem Strich herauskommt und viele Fragen auf die Kommunen dann
zukommen werden. (Dass) wir da u¨berha¨uft werden mit Anfragen und
wir als Kommune ja gar nicht der Veranlasser sind von dieser ganzen
Geschichte. Also das wird ein bisschen zwiespa¨ltig gesehen. (I04RM,
00:17:55-2)
Seeing the publication of flood hazard information as a source of potential public
unrest, it lies in the administration’s own interest to proactively reach out with
information to respond to people’s questions and concerns before these have a
chance to develop into protest. Similarly, the case described by I13E concerns a
mayor deciding to inform the residents of a newly build housing area about facing
Chapter 7. Factors affecting (non-)use of flood hazard maps 154
frequent flood risk. As noted in chapter 6, this can either be interpreted as a
response to the discovery of a hitherto unknown level of risk or as an effort to
forestall a negative public reaction to the publication of hazard maps. (Which
reading comes closest to the truth cannot be told without access to a first-hand
account.)
In comparison, the mayor in interview 01 is somewhat skeptical of the trend of
moderators, mediation and involving citizens in decision-making. As he sees it,
public protest is sometimes what puts a stop to projects designed to serve the
general good, meaning that it can actually be preferable for decisions of this kind to
be pushed through with a strong hand without too much regard for local skeptics.
Judging from the use of the third person pronoun when describing the wish to
organize a public presentation of scenario simulation results (see citation in chapter
6, 00:43:59-5), it was not I01RM himself who desired this but the higher authority
responsible for the mapping project.
Turning to the statements rejecting a more wide-reaching use of flood hazard
maps, many of these suggest that it would not bring much – or at least nothing
positive – to apply scenario simulation results to awareness raising purposes. This
is particularly clear in the case of I08RM. Not having the funds to invest in flood
control or technical management solutions, risk communication is something that
his administration prefers to avoid; it would be like revealing to people that they
are not perfectly protected and, generally, you only communicate positive news:
I08RM: Ja, es ist so, wenn wir jetzt unsere Becken erweitert haben
denke ich, dass wir das natu¨rlich bewerben. Weil positives kann man
natu¨rlich gut vermarkten. Aber aktuell fehlt uns das Geld, um jetzt
ganz konkret im Moment etwas auszubauen oder etwas Neues zu machen.
Und etwas Negatives vermarktet man natu¨rlich nicht... Man wu¨rde ja
die Leute auf die Idee bringen, dass sie vielleicht nicht perfekt geschu¨tzt
sind. Deshalb werden eigentlich nur – das hat politische Gru¨nde – nur
positive Nachrichten in dem Bereich auf unserer kleinen Ebene kom-
muniziert. (Pause) 00:11:41-6
Chapter 7. Factors affecting (non-)use of flood hazard maps 155
While some would argue that the very point of making flood hazard maps publicly
available is to enable people to learn about being at risk to allow them to take
appropriate precaution, the position in I08RM’s administration is instead that
potentially upsetting information is best kept under wraps so that people are not
unsettled. Similarly, the reasons given by I02RMb for why flood hazard maps
have not yet been used to the extent that the administration itself would like to
see do not just concern lack of personnel and a need to prioritize but also that
it might actually be preferable to wait with risk communication until planned
improvement of technical protection are underway. Then, one can inform people
in parallel about the existence of a flood risk and about what the administration
is doing about it. Only telling people about a risk, without being able to point to
concrete measures, would just scare them and lead to unwelcome political pressure:
Also fu¨r uns ist es momentan wichtiger den technischen Hochwasser-
schutz herzustellen, als die Zeit zu investieren Sachen aufzubereiten,
um die Bevo¨lkerung zu informieren und dann sagen zu mu¨ssen: “Wir
mu¨ssen jetzt das und das noch machen.” Es ist vielleicht sinnvoller erst
mal anzufangen und zu sagen: “Wir sind im Bau. Wir machen das.”
Und dann parallel zu informieren. Weil sonst hat das wieder so ein
bisschen die Wirkung, dass die Bu¨rger Angst haben, dass sie wieder
extrem Druck aufbauen. Und so ko¨nnen wir aber gleichzeitig sagen:
“Wir wissen es nicht nur, sondern wir arbeiten auch daran.” (I02RMb,
01:42:32-1)
Hence, while the current academic paradigm and official European policy see flood
risk as a shared responsibility that not only public authorities but also citizens
and local businesses must prepare for, the reality is that local administrations
sometimes hesitate to provide people with the information that such a joint ap-
proach requires. Still regarding the citizens’ safety as something that falls under
the responsibility of the public authorities, the presence of a flood risk becomes
synonymous with a risk of being perceived to have failed. Hence, scenario sim-
ulation results are not necessarily welcomed as a tool for awareness raising and
local capacity building, but may instead be interpreted as a political risk factor.
Variations on this theme concern that the risk of flooding is both too low and too
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well-known for there to be any need to cause panic, or that people are already so
aware of the risk of flooding that there is nothing to be had from presenting them
with hazard maps. In I05RM’s view, for example, there is no need to disseminate
scenario predictions since the affected parties have already experienced flooding
first hand:
I05RM: Also die Notwendigkeit sehe ich eigentlich nicht. Zumal bei
uns das im Prinzip auf ein paar wenige Wohnha¨user bezogen ist und
auf zwei Gescha¨ftsgeba¨ude oder eins vermutlich nur. Die wissen was
Sache ist, weil sie es schon erlebt haben. [. . . ] [D]as ist bei uns jetzt
nicht ein riesiges Gebiet, was u¨berschwemmt wird. Insofern gibt es
auch keine Veranlassung, da Panik zu machen. Die betroffen sind jetzt
direkt vom Hochwasser [. . . ], die wissen das... [. . . ] 00:34:51-1
Likewise, I09RM argues that the residents at risk in his community lack interest
in flood hazard maps since they already know what to expect. The only thing to
be had from information dissemination, in his view, is unwelcome discussion:3
SK: Und die Leute, die schon ein Haus haben nahe an dem Fluss?
01:02:55-3
I09RM: Fu¨r die a¨ndert sich nichts... 01:02:59-1
SK: Gibt es da kein Interesse hierherzukommen, die Karten anzuschauen
und zu gucken, wie hoch die- 01:03:04-1
I09RM: Die Ho¨he. Die wissen genau, wie hoch das in ihrem Keller war
zu jenem Zeitpunkt und diesem. Die fangen dann ho¨chstens noch an
zu diskutieren und sagen: “Das stimmt nicht.”
Low risk perception and/or not thinking there to be anything to gain from pur-
suing risk communication means that there is no perceived need for or interest in
applying flood hazard maps to this end.
3Essentially, both of these positions can be criticized for assuming that well-aware is synony-
mous with well-prepared, thus disregarding the possibility of people lacking belief in their own
protective capacity (see Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). Furthermore, it disregards research
showing that behavioral change can require continuous transmission of a message also after
reaching awareness (Renn, 2008, pp. 239), as well as the possibility of residential fluctuation.
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At a more aggregate level, furthermore, local-level risk managers are noted to lack
the skills required for effective communication whereas higher-level authorities are
thought to provide insufficient support and guidance. As I06RM notes, there is
no formal implementation strategy for how to bring people at risk to pursue more
private precaution. Instead, this is, unfortunately, left to the municipalities to
figure out on their own:
Also man braucht ja Spezialkenntnisse zum Hochwasserschutz, um das
auch den Bu¨rgern schmackhaft zu machen. Wo der positive Zweck,
der Zweck und der Sinn von der Hochwassergefahrenkarte liegt. Und
das wird dann auch von der Gemeinde, von der Kommune aus nicht
kommuniziert. Und das Personal ja auch nicht da ist und das Fach-
wissen nicht vorhanden ist. Und da ist es dann schade, dass man
so ein gutes Instrument sich zulegt, wie die Hochwassergefahrenkarte,
aber dass dann nicht mit mehreren Schritten die positiven Sinne an die
Bevo¨lkerung herantra¨gt... (I06RM, 00:30:31-4)
Although there is a long-term attempt to correct this situation by offering a forum
for best-practice exchange within the flood partnerships, I06RM notes that these
are voluntary, and the resonance at the local level low (though it may be noted
that this is contradicted elsewhere). A better solution, in his view, would be if a
designated group would take charge of presenting the published flood hazard maps
to local populations everywhere:
Das Land Baden-Wu¨rttemberg hat die Hochwassergefahrenkarte her-
ausgegeben, aber dann mu¨sste eigentlich eine Gruppe von Leuten sagen:
“wir stellen das jetzt in jeder Gemeinde vor und machen Beratungsge-
spra¨che und fu¨hren auch Gespra¨che mit einzelnen Betrieben, die von
Hochwasser bedroht sind.” Es gibt da keine Struktur, um das in pos-
itiven Sinne auch an die Leute heranzubringen... Das la¨sst man auf
sich selbst beruhen. (I06RM, 00:28:22-8)
Such an approach would cost money, however, and what costs money is difficult.
Hence the solution with the flood partnerships, as I06RM sees it.
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Moving on to the experts, several of these note it to be important to integrate
flood hazard maps in some kind of public relations strategy. Rather than defining
clear targets in this respect together with local-level representatives, though, I12E
thinks that the state has avoided discussion, settling for a program of the bare
minimum (00:36:55-3). Though some of the other interviews contain references
to plans for templates for information meetings and information materials, there
is (a) doubt about the extent to which local administrations would make use of
such materials, and (b) indications of higher-level authorities, too, struggling with
how best to explain flood hazard maps to lay-people. Considering that there is
no tradition at the local level of sharing hazard information with members of
the public, the absence of guidance and support in this direction is problematic.
Before it became mandatory to display flood hazard maps online and at city hall,
the results of the flood scenario simulations would rarely be published or made
officially available. Even now, I16E notes, decision-makers often prefer not to talk
about the risk of flooding (even when this is limited to the unlikely scenario of
over-topping or dam break), as this goes against the message of everything being
under control (00:23:34-1).
In general, municipalities with recent (within the last decade) flood experience
are thought to be more willing to present flood hazard maps to the public. In
contrast, mayors in areas with less recent flood experience are known to downplay
risk, preferring not to scare people respectively to invest in popular public services
rather than management measures:
Weil man ja eine Daseinsvorsorge hat als Bu¨rgermeister fu¨r seine Bu¨rger
und man mo¨chte denen ja keine Angst machen mit diesen Gefahrenkarten
und mit diesen Themen. Und da wird man unter Umsta¨nden auch
mal sagen: “Gut, ist ja bei uns kein Thema, Hochwasser. Von da-
her ku¨mmern wir uns da nicht weiter darum. Wir haben das [die
Hochwassergefahrenkarten – Ed.] da und wer das sehen mo¨chte kann
das sehen, aber wir machen uns nicht aktiv. Wir haben ja noch da
und da die Baustelle, und der Kindergarten soll ja noch gebaut werden
und das und das.” Und dann werden einfach die Ressourcen anders
gebunden. [. . . ] (I12E, 00:40:57-1)
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In contrast, I18E does not refer to flood experience but to the personal risk per-
ception of mayors and technical leaders. In his view, it is difficult to find any other
explanation for how different municipalities react towards scenario simulation re-
sults:
I18E: [. . . ] [E]s gibt Kommunen, die, aus meiner Sicht, sehr verant-
wortungsvoll damit umgehen und die Hochwassergefahr auch nie klein
reden, sondern immer sagen: “Es gibt die Gefa¨hrdung.” Die auch
kein Problem damit haben, dass wir u¨berfluteten Fla¨chen darstellen
von irgendwelchen Industriegebieten [. . . ] Die gehen sehr offensiv mit
diesem Thema um. Und es gibt andere Sta¨dte, die sagen: “Oh, was?
Hochwassergefahr? Nein das du¨rfen wir niemand sagen.” Weil dann
haben sie Angst, dass die Industrie wo anders hingeht, und sie zahlen
ja viele steuern. Und dass sie Angst davor haben, dass die Leute Panik
bekommen und vielleicht aus diesem Gebiet herausziehen. [. . . ] Also
da sieht man, es gibt viele, die wollen die Hochwassergefahr lieber
gar nicht groß erwa¨hnen und hoffen, dass wa¨hrend ihrer Amtszeit, als
Bu¨rgermeister zum Beispiel, hoffentlich nichts passiert. Und wenn,
dann war es ein ganz schlimmes Naturereignis. [...] 00:19:08-3
SK: Woran liegt das denken Sie, dass einige gut damit umgehen und
andere eher schlecht? 00:19:15-7
I18E: Also ich denke das ist zum einen wirklich eine reine perso¨nliche
Frage, welche Personen da sitzen. [. . . ] Also eigentlich muss es daran
liegen. Weil die beiden Sta¨dte, die ich gerade im Kopf habe, die
[...] sind wirtschaftlich sehr stabil, haben beide große Industriean-
lieger in ihren eingedeichten Gebieten, sind beide bei einer a¨hnlichen
Hochwassergefahr ausgesetzt, beide mit riesigen Schadenpotenzialen.
[. . . ] Aber sie gehen vo¨llig unterschiedlich damit um. [. . . ] [D]ie
kriegen Scha¨den erst ab Ereignissen Gro¨ße HQ100 oder HQ200. Das
ist ja sehr selten. Der eine sagt: “Ja trotzdem wichtig. Das kann
passieren, die Leute muss ich informieren.” Und der andere sagt: “HQ200.
Einmal in 200 Jahren. Ob mich das je trifft? Dann lieber jetzt gute
Politik, viele Gewerbesteuern einnehmen.” [...] 00:22:36-0
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Offering some support for this view, I11Eb notes that “When you have a committed
mayor, everything runs much easier than when you have one who does not engage
in it at all.” (00:45:08-9).
In effect, this means that experts observe flood experience, personal risk percep-
tion, political interests, low local competence, and lack of pressure and support
from higher levels to affect map use, whereas the reasons which can be derived
from the risk managers’ responses largely concern whether or not decision-makers
perceive there to be anything to gain or lose from communicating flood risk.
7.2 Complementary observations
As the expert interviews contain a number of observations that are not related to
any specific management field, a brief overview of comments of a complementary
character is necessary. In this respect, a main factor emphasized is the role of local
political interests and whether or not flood hazard information is perceived to be
associated with negative implications. As I14E puts it, municipalities “must have
an interest in knowing about their risk” for flood hazard maps to be used (00:29:38-
8). Often, it is suggested, other interests dominate, leading to a preference for
not giving too much weight to the risk of natural hazards. Instead of taking
it seriously, the municipalities “close down”, questioning when they will ever be
confronted with earthquakes or flooding (I13E, 00:51:49-2). As soon as scenario
results run counter to local planning and interests, I14E adds, there will be conflict
(00:29:38-8). This does not only pertain to public authorities, but to all actors,
public and private; as soon as a risk for negative implications is perceived, they
will question predictive results and/or not want to accept them:4
Ein Problem ist es immer, wenn es Konsequenzen gibt. Und wenn
dann plo¨tzlich eine Auflage kommt [. . . ] Dann sage ich: “Hm, vielleicht
stimmt das nicht. [...]” Dann gibt es immer Akzeptanzprobleme. Wenn
Menschen dadurch Nachteile sehen. (I18E, 00:38:02-0)
4In line with this argument, I17E associates what he perceives as a relatively high level of
acceptance of hazard maps with the fact that built-up areas were long exempt from the land-use
restrictions applying to outlying areas in the HQ100 zone, meaning that the interference with
local building and development planning was originally of a more limited character.
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That competing interests are perceived to make local administrations regard pre-
dictive flood information as a hassle rather than a help is also thought to have
implications for its ability to motivate more risk management activity. Though
the idea of flood hazard maps is that they should enable action in foresight rather
than hindsight, it still often takes the effect of experiencing flood hazard to get
local decision-makers to prioritize risk management in I11Ea’s experience:
Wenn wir unterwegs sind in den Hochwasserpartnerschaften, es wird ja
auch von vielen Maßnahmen, die durchgefu¨hrt wurden, berichtet. Aber
diese Maßnahmen werden meistens ergriffen auf Grund von Negativ-
Erfahrungen. Also weil Hochwasser-Ereignisse passiert sind. Und im
Vorfeld passiert sehr wenig. Ich muss zugeben ich habe keine sehr
großen Hoffnungen, dass wir viele Kommunen dazu bewegen, dass sie
im Vorfeld sich darum ku¨mmern. (I11Ea, 00:30:36-3)
Ultimately, this suggests that map usage will partially depend on local leaders’
willingness to carry out management measures and/or to advocate flood risk as
a political issue (I11Eb, 00:44:07-9). Additionally, a mayor’s authority, standing,
and capacity to push through his own priorities matter. As I13E notes, some may-
ors are driven by the municipal council’s agenda rather than their own (00:51:49-2).
Finally, there are a number of indications pointing towards the importance of user-
producer linkages and a supportive institutional framework. Specifically, close
contacts between those coordinating the mapping project and intended users are
perceived to have been key for defining a foresight product that answers to different
target audiences’ needs and requirements. In general, having involved the munic-
ipal level from the beginning, having the municipalities pay part of the costs,5
and approaching them both before and during each individual mapping process
is believed to have helped generate both interest in and acceptance of scenario
simulation results:
In Baden-Wu¨rttemberg waren die Kommunen von Anfang an mit am
Tisch, die kommunalen Spitzenverba¨nde. [...] Und damit... gibt es
5In this regard, it may be noted that it is not always that local-level risk mangers are aware of
the municipalities contributing financially to the hazard mapping project (e.g. I08RM, 00:16:50-
4).
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[. . . ] einen großen Wunsch, ich mo¨chte das Ergebnis auch haben. Ich
habe mitbezahlt, also kann ich auch sagen was ich haben will. Und es
gibt von vorneherein eine gro¨ßere Akzeptanz. Das heißt die Kommunen
fragen nach: “Wann kommt denn endlich unsere Karte?” Und mo¨chte
auch wissen, was ist auf der Karte dargestellt. Und plausibilisiert auch
mit auf den Karten. Guckt damit darauf und sagt: “Das gefa¨llt mir
jetzt nicht. [. . . ] Oder da ist die Bru¨cke, die ist jetzt neu gebaut. Das
mu¨ssen wir a¨ndern.” Also die Kommunen sind da sehr stark mit dabei.
[. . . ] Und das ist halt an anderen Stellen, anderen Bundesla¨ndern
einfach nicht der Fall. Und das ist halt einfach vorbildlich, dass da
halt so viel passiert ist. Und man sieht es ja auch an der Summe, die
umgesetzt wird. Also [. . . ] es wird richtig geklotzt und nicht gekleckert,
ja. (I12E, 00:21:07-5)
Additionally, flood partnerships, in spite of admittedly constituting something of
an emergency solution to the gap created by recent reforms having dissolved the
administrative body previously functioning as the municipalities’ point of contact
in water management issues, are thought to motivate local administrations to
pursue flood risk management and thereby support map usage. This is not only
noted by I16E in the quote below but also by I13E (00:27:08-3), who claims that
there would not have been a reasonable level of risk awareness in the region had
it not been for the flood partnerships.
Und das [Hochwasserpartnerschaften – Ed.] ist zum Beispiel ein ganz
tolles Werkzeug oder eine tolle Methodik, das Thema Hochwasser-
schutz bei den Kommunen kontinuierlich aktuell zu halten. Dort gibt
es viele Veranstaltungen, Hochwasserpartnerschaften, wo sich die Kom-
munen gegenseitig austauschen, wo es viele Unterlagen gibt. [...] Wo
sich also die Kommunen auch gegenseitig helfen, unterstu¨tzen und,
sage ich mal, antreiben. (I16E, 00:17:12-8)
One a future note, furthermore, attention to flood risk is expected to grow as
flood risk management plans are developed in line with the EU Floods Directive,
providing a set structure for defining current weaknesses and concrete response
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measures. Besides, not having much choice about the introduction of hazard maps
and management plans also makes is somewhat futile to try to oppose them.
Comparing the hitherto reviewed findings with the theoretical analysis in chap-
ter 3, one sees that many of the factors pointed to in academic literature as af-
fecting research use can also be recognized in relation to flood hazard maps in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Primarily, many cases of use are characterized by predictive
information being perceived as relevant whereas several cases of non-use are ratio-
nalized by not sharing this view (at least not under the present circumstances).
At the same time, it is not always that these statements and comments refer only
to the content of flood scenario simulation. Often, what affects whether or not
there is a need for and interest in hazard information is related to some other
aspect (e.g. timing, risk size, response capacity, etc.). Moreover, several of the
factors pointed to in KU studies have been mentioned too, including aspects re-
lated to the format of findings, stakeholder involvement in the research process,
individual actors’ attitudes, organizational culture and political interests. What
has not been mentioned yet are aspects related to research quality, credibility per-
ception and the presence of simulation uncertainty. But is this because credibility
is unimportant or because the hazard maps are credible enough to be accepted?
And are they accepted in spite of being recognized as somewhat uncertainty or
because local-level risk managers are unaware of the presence and implication of
simulation uncertainty? These are the issues to be reviewed next.
7.2.1 Credibility and the presence of uncertainty
A first thing to note with regard to the issue of credibility is that there are indeed
indications of research quality being an important factor even if it is rarely stated
as an explicit reason for use. As the mayor in interview 01 explains,
es muss fundiert sein. Da hatte ich dann gesagt: “Gru¨ndlichkeit geht
vor Schnelligkeit.” Weil es hat keinen Sinn, wenn ich – egal bei was –
eine falsche Datengrundlage habe. Dann setzt sich ja das, was an Fehler
drin steckt, nachher fort. Auch selbst wenn das, was man entwickelt
hat, was man geplant hat, auf der Grundlage, auf der es basiert, richtig
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war, aber die Grundlage eben falsch ist, dann ist auch das, was man im
Nachgang macht, eben auch falsch. Oder jedenfalls nicht wirkungsvoll.
Nicht so wie man es sich wu¨nscht. (I01RM, 00:39:55-7)
Moreover, all interviewees make a positive assessment of available flood hazard
maps in this regard. In terms of spontaneous comments, I01RM notes them to
be “well made” (00:39:55-7), whereas I03RM thinks the displayed assertions are
“good” although he questions the sense of referring to statistical return periods
(i.e. technical terminology) when the audience consists of lay-people (00:42:44-9).
Mostly, though, quality appraisals are not offered spontaneously, but something
that must be inquired about. Faced with a direct question about the perceived
trustworthiness of flood hazard maps, I07RM says that they made a good im-
pression (00:34:59-6), whereas I08RM says that he thinks the depicted predictions
come close to reality in terms of what a real flood could look like (00:13:46-5). For
his part, I10RM has never contemplated whether or not to trust flood lines based
on gauge level simulation. Thinking about it, he says that, provided that they
are based on year-long experience and not just a single data point, they should
be trusted since it is important that the risk of flooding is considered before new
building projects are initiated.
What underlies these assessments differs. In around half of the interviews, one
component of how risk managers judge whether or not to sanction belief in dis-
played flood lines is to compare these with other sources of information, including
local experience and photos of past inundation episodes:
Wir haben ja vom Hochwasser damals auch Fotos aus ein Hubschrauber
machen lassen, und da sieht man eigentlich, die Karte, die Fla¨che, die
Blau auf der Hochwassergefahrenkarte dargestellt ist, das deckt sich
schon mit der Fla¨che, die man vom Hubschrauber aus auf dem Gela¨nde,
auf dem Boden dann tatsa¨chlich sieht. Also das passt schon sehr gut
[. . . ]. (I06RM, 00:43:25-2)
To a lesser extent, the credibility of hazard maps is judged through the proxy
of trust in the source or in the competence of the involved engineers. Not being
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engineers themselves or feeling literate when it comes to simulation issues, the
mayor in interview 01 (01:04:46-5) prefers to stay out of the technical discussion,
noting that this is what experts are for, while I07RM (00:38:52-4) says that he
‘relies’ on the specialists. In other cases, local administrations and municipal
councils embrace flood hazard maps because these are produced by the state and
what the state vouches for is accepted:
Und das Land ist ja eine u¨bergeordnete Beho¨rde zu den Kommunen.
Und was von oben kommt, wird eigentlich akzeptiert. Das ist ver-
waltungsspezifisch eigentlich immer so, dass man Ergebnisse, die von
einer u¨bergeordneten Beho¨rde kommen, dass man die eigentlich gar
nicht anzweifelt. (I08RM, 00:14:19-6)
Indicating that a lack of confidence in higher authorities can render acceptance of
hazard maps more difficult, furthermore, I14E notes that when the relationship
between the higher- and lower-level authorities is tarnished since previously there
will not always be any willingness to engage constructively with questions as to
the hazard maps’ plausibility.6 Instead, the smallest suspicion that something is
off will suffice for old trenchlines to reopen:
[E]s kommt immer natu¨rlich auf die Gemeinden darauf an, wie gut
die Leute da sind oder wie das Verha¨ltnis zur Landesregierung oder
zum Regierungspra¨sidium ist. Manchmal, wenn es nur einen Verdacht
gibt, dass etwas, was die Bu¨ros, die fu¨r das Regierungspra¨sidium ar-
beiten hier, kartiert haben, das an irgend einer Stelle nicht stimmt,
dann wird es sehr schnell explosionsartig in den Gemeindera¨ten dann
hochgekocht, geht an die Presse und so weiter. (I14E, 00:29:38-8)
Making a similar observation, I13E notes that local acceptance of hazard maps
will partially depend on the communication between the regional administrative
authority and the municipalities, and the animosities between the respective civil
servants (I13E, 00:51:49-2).
6In I14E’s view, such animosity can sometimes be traced back to experiences during the time
of the Third Empire leading to an erosion in some communities’ faith in higher authorities.
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The most commonly mentioned reason for assessing hazard maps as credible,
though, is neither correspondence with other information nor trust, but respect for
the quality of the research method and input data, respectively the ‘effort’ going
into flood scenario simulation. I06RM states that he trusts the displayed predic-
tions because the mapping process is solid and the maps professionally investigated
and produced (00:43:25-2); I04RM mentions precipitation-runoff modeling, laser
scanning and empirical surveying before concluding that he has “a good feeling”
about the effort that the state invests in the production of hazard maps (00:22:35-
2); I05RM says that he knows from other assessment processes how exact the
local terrain can be determined (00:42:57-7); and, offering somewhat more detail,
I01RM is convinced by the multitude of data sources relied upon:
Also ich denke die sind gut erarbeitet, diese Karten. Da hat man sich
methodisch auch nicht nur darauf gestu¨tzt, was jetzt so allein die Ver-
waltungen wissen. Die Verwaltungen ko¨nnen auch nicht alles wissen.
Sondern man hat wirklich draußen die Leute befragt und hat auch noch
mal alles quasi angeschafft. Ich glaube die Experten sprechen, also wie
hier beispielsweise, sprechen dann von einer Geschwemmsellinie oder
wie das Ding heißt. [. . . ] Und das wurde dann alles aufgenommen. Und
hat auch noch einmal die Leute gefragt wie es eben in ihren Ga¨rten
aussah oder was weiß ich, wo u¨berall. Also ich denke die Karten, die
sind sehr gut gemacht... (I01RM, 00:39:55-7)
In this regard, involvement in the mapping process and interaction with higher-
authority civil servants represent important ways in which to build trust in the
quality of hazard maps. Through these processes, the user community gets a
chance to learn about scenario mapping, to ask questions, give feedback, raise
doubts, etc. For example, I09RM says that direct talks of this kind helped
strengthen the administration’s confidence in the modeling output:
Wir haben dann auch mit diesem Kollegen vom Landratsamt, der da
direkt involviert war in die Erstellung der Karten, im Gespra¨ch sehr
direkt Dinge dann noch mal ru¨ckgekoppelt und gefragt: “Kann das
sein?” Oder “wie kommt ihr darauf, dass das hier so und so aussieht?”
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Und da konnte viel gekla¨rt werden. Insofern ist die Vertrauensbasis da
schon gesta¨rkt. (I09RM, 00:50:54-8)
Likewise, I04RM refers to the administration’s involvement in the plausibilization
process, commenting that he has no doubts as to the correctness of the local hazard
maps, as these have been re-worked to account for everything that the municipality
voiced concern about, meaning that they have basically “made sure [...] that they
are exact.” (00:18:44-2).7 In this sense, the state’s efforts to consciously involve the
target audience in the review process as a strategy to ensure acceptance appears
to have paned out:
Und wir haben das gesagt: [...] bevor die dann tatsa¨chlich durch das
Landratsamt ausgerichtet wird und fertig ist und auch als U¨bersch-
wemmungsgebiet gilt, muss die Kommune noch einmal eine Gelegen-
heit haben dazu Stellung zu nehmen, das noch einmal zu u¨berpru¨fen
und ihre Anregungen und Bedenken noch mal zu melden. Sonst kriegen
wir keine Akzeptanz in der Fla¨che. (I13E, 00:27:08-3)
That none of the interviewees question the maps’ quality or trustworthiness does
not mean that there is no recognition of uncertainty, however. On the contrary,
several of the risk managers can point to at least one source of uncertainty affecting
science’s ability to make exact predictions, including:
- the exactness, quality and actuality of input data, e.g. associated with laser
scanning and the Digital Terrain Model (DTM) but also with local flood
history;
- the variability of hydrological statistics, meteorological conditions and the
local landscape and terrain;
7Also for risk managers who were not directly involved in the plausibilization process, knowing
that the maps’ flood lines have been checked against local experience can help, giving them the
feeling that whatever mistakes or errors there might have been, the worst of these have surely
been caught (e.g. I06RM, 00:44:38-9). On the other hand, it also happens that one person checks
the preliminary results and that the rest of the administration is thought to be unaware of this
work having been carried out (i.e. I05RM, 00:57:18-4).
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- the fact that computer models cannot “know” everything and that the
model’s predictive capacity is limited for highly complex forms of problems;
- the possibility that, during the next flood, something unpredictable happens
that changes how the water flows.
While less complete and exact than the technical experts’ knowledge, this still
indicates a basic understanding of the difficulties associated with prediction in
open systems. More specifically, one might say that the simulation uncertainty
is one of the forms of uncertainty that risk managers are aware of. Rather than
undermining their confidence in flood hazard maps, though, this is appears to be
something that they accept:
Natu¨rlich ko¨nnen da kleine Fehler drin sein, aber das ist ja nicht auss-
chlaggebend. Nur das Ergebnis, das große Ergebnis unterm Strich
za¨hlt. Und das stimmt auch, denke ich. (I04RM, 00:22:35-2)
Natu¨rlich kann man u¨ber 10 Meter mehr oder weniger vielleicht mal
diskutieren, aber ich vertraue den Hochwasserkarten schon sehr. (I06RM,
00:43:25-2),
Though I09RM doubts the accuracy of the predictions made in relation to one
part of the city, suspecting these to be exaggerated, this does not cause him to
dismiss the hazard maps as unreliable or doubt their methodological quality. He
simply notes that it remains to be seen when the next large flood episode comes
weather this is really what the consequences will look like (00:50:54-8). Likewise,
having experienced parts of the city to become inundated although they had been
predicted to stay dry in the hazard maps (including a building of relevancy for the
emergency response operation) has not caused the mayor in interview 03 to reject
scenario simulation as unreliable. On the contrary, seeing that the predictions
mostly paned out and having been explained that some imprecision is unavoidable,
his confidence in the maps’ predictive capacity has increased (00:43:47-0).
All in all, three things help us understand why the presence of simulation un-
certainty is not being taken to constitute an obstacle towards use. First, as can
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already be told from the reference above to the presence of ‘genuine’ uncertainty,
e.g. due to the risk of random events, there is no real expectation of complete
certainty as something that will even be possible – at least not to an affordable
price. As I09RM puts it, one cannot expect everything to be calculated down to
the very last detail since that would be much too cumbersome. To remain afford-
able, a reasonable level of precision must be picked (00:56:25-8). Likewise, I05RM
comments that the cost-benefit balance must be kept in mind in research projects
like this:
Es muss auch immer in einem vertretbaren, oder der Kosten-Nutzen
muss in einem Verha¨ltnis stehen. Also ich kann nicht 100.000 ver-
schiedene Rechnungen durchfu¨hren. [. . . ] Datensicherheit oder Forsch-
ungssicherheit nur damit man sagen kann: “Ich weiß es 100 Prozent
genau” [. . . ] Sehe ich eigentlich nicht als notwendig. (I05RM, 00:46:27-
4)
Hence, there is no expectation of flood hazard maps offering perfect certainty;
neither I09RM nor I03RM think that it is the job of the hazard maps to be all-
telling or 100 percent reliable. What they should do is to draw attention to flood
hazard and sensitize people to this risk (I03RM, 00:43:47-0), and what they are
understood to provide is mainly “a point of orientation” (I08RM, 00:13:46-5).
Second, the presence of uncertainty does not constitute an obstacle to use because
it is not thought to be of great consequence for the types of tasks performed:
Ob das nachher auf 5 oder 10 oder 20 Meter genau stimmt im Gela¨nde,
kommt es bei uns eigentlich gar nicht so exakt darauf an. Weil wie
gesagt das meiste ja sowieso draußen in der freien Landschaft ist und
da spielen die paar Meter kein... (I05RM, 00:39:16-0)
Would it be perceived to constitute a problem, moreover, a manual floodplain
survey can always be undertaken to gain more clarity (I01RM, I09RM).
Finally, imperfect or not, predictions based on flood scenario simulation are often
thought to be better than whatever estimate or information which was previously
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available. Ultimately, risk management is a question of preparing for the prospect
of something undesirable happening; it is per definition about making decisions
under uncertainty. Under these circumstances, an improvement in the local knowl-
edge situation is welcome even if it does not deliver perfect information:
Also ich bin mir bewusst, dass das nie 100 Prozentig genau ist, aber es
wird in jedem Fall genauer sein, als die U¨berschwemmungsgebiete [...]
[S]o ‘en gros’, im Ganzen, wird das mit Sicherheit verla¨sslicher sein.
(I05RM, 00:39:16-0).
So was hat man bisher ja in der Form noch gar nicht gehabt. Das
waren ho¨chstens irgendwelche Erfahrungswerte, die aber auch nie so
richtig festgehalten worden sind. [. . . ]. Aber diese Abgrenzungen,
diese ganz genaue Abgrenzung, die auch sehr, sehr genau ist – so wie
ich jetzt auch aus meinen Erfahrungen heraus habe es sehen ko¨nnen
und vergleichen ko¨nnen – das ist einfach mal etwas ga¨nzlich Neues.
(I04RM, 00:16:39-4)
As long as there is no superior assessment method, the best local risk managers
can do is to heed what it generates and prepare as best they can.
In summery, it is not that credibility is unimportant that explains why this factor
is not found to constitute an obstacle towards hazard map use, but that none
of the interviewees doubt this product’s credibility. In spite of understanding
flood hazard as something which cannot be predicted with complete certainty or
accuracy, flood scenario simulation is confined in to deliver credible guidance. In
other words, there is no indication of non-use being related to low confidence in
simulation output or of risk managers’ commonly taking an over-critical approach
to predictive research. Though it happens that the credibility of the state’s hazard
maps is questioned, this is mainly due to political resistance in I13E’s experience:
[A]lso ich sage mal ganz u¨berspitzt, wenn man die U¨berflutungsfla¨che,
so wie sie dargestellt ist, nicht haben mo¨chte, aus politischen Gru¨nden...
Das ist meistens der Beweggrund, in dem dann das dann das Modell
angezweifelt wird. (I13E, 00:59:35-0)
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To conclude, this suggests low confidence to be what is used as an argument by
those opposing the introduction of hazard maps rather than constituting a genuine
concern.
Chapter 8
Benefits and problems
8.1 Flood hazard maps as input to risk manage-
ment
As stated in the introduction, this thesis is not only interested in whether, how and
why flood hazard maps are used but also in the potential benefits and problems as-
sociated with presenting non-experts with a graphical representation of simulation
results. In theory, access to foresight information should allow local risk managers
to adjust and improve the local protection, preparedness and vulnerability situ-
ation. But, in practice, we lack insight as to how risk management is perceived
to benefit from predictive information. Moreover, it is yet unknown whether the
problems identified with non-experts’ use of simulation products elsewhere are also
present for flood hazard maps or not.
8.2 Benefits
To explore, e.g. the benefits of flood hazard maps to risk management, the inter-
viewees were asked openly about their thoughts and feelings towards this new tool
before more direct questions as to specific experiences of pros and cons were posed.
This was followed by a form of indirect control question towards the end of the
interviews, in which the interviewees were asked whether they would recommend
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flood hazard maps as a management tool to someone else. What the outcome of
this inquiry showed was not only a predominately positive view of hazard maps
as management tools but also that one of the central reasons for this (next to
relevancy) was the experience or observation of some form of benefit.
In principle, two categories of benefits can be detected. First, there are expected
benefits linked to being provided with more and better information than what
was previously available and profiting from this in different ways. In principle,
one can refer to these as conceptual, instrumental and strategic forms of benefits,
corresponding to information and knowledge benefits, management and decision-
making benefits, and persuasion and awareness-raising benefits. In essence, they
concern that local-level risk managers (including both elected leaders and civil
servants) somehow profit from access to foresight information. Second, there are
benefits of a more unexpected nature, concerning the role of hazard information
(sometimes, but not always, in combination with formal regulations) in pressuring
local-level risk managers to give flood risk more weight respectively in restricting
their possibilities to ignore it.
8.2.1 Benefits of knowledge, guidance and persuasion
Beginning with what it brings to be presented with and draw on flood hazard maps,
both risk managers and experts emphasize the value of scenario simulation for
offering new and better overview and understanding of local flood risk than what
was previously available, making flood risk more real and less abstract; providing
for a novel kind of certainty. Before, flood hazard was not properly recorded, and
available assessments were based on old or incomplete data. In comparison, the
projection offered by flood hazard maps is both clearer and more palpable:
[E]s wird einem doch jetzt deutlich vor Augen gehalten, wo genau die
U¨berschwemmungsgrenzen sind bei welchem Hochwasserereignis. [. . . ]
Und das hat man eben vorher so nicht gehabt, wo das so deutlich oder
so offensichtlich war [wie es] in der Karte dargestellt [ist]. (I04RM,
00:16:39-4)
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Alternatively, electronic hazard maps make available evidence more easily acces-
sible, thereby facilitating use. In either case, what is emphasized is a conceptual
form of effect as local knowledge – or the ability to draw on this – improves; it is
information access that is emphasized, not what it is done with this or what effect
it has. Other forms of benefits can be read-out inbetween the lines in descriptions
of how hazard maps are perceived and used, including that they make the risk of
flooding less abstract, fill in previous knowledge gaps and help confirm what some
already knew tacitly.
In terms of more instrumental forms of effects, it is mentioned how access to hazard
maps is affecting local preparedness, management capacity and damage potential.
For example, I09RM mentions how information as to the expected depth of in-
undation allows the administration to require adjusted building designs, noting
that this is good for both property owners and their insurance conditions, and for
the municipality, too (I09RM, 00:41:42-1). Similarly, application to preparedness
planning has helped at least one municipality avoid embarking on an ineffective
emergency response operation by revealing holes in the strategy that the emer-
gency services would have gone for intuitively (I13E, 00:27:08-3). In the case of
the community in interview 02, furthermore, access to a formal hazard assessment
has resulted in an (at least partial) update and extension of preparedness planning
and allowed the administration to give more weight to flood risk in its handling
of local building permit applications (00:55:02-8). Moreover, it let the municipal
council do something about unmaintained and deficient flood defenses in foresight
rather than hindsight. Other examples include that they have allowed the mayor
in interview 01 to approach the problem of unsolicited building projects more ef-
fectively (00:58:49-1), and that at-risk residents have been offered information as
to the local hazard situation and options for self-protection (e.g. I13E, 00:35:07-7
and I03RM, 00:22:46-0).
Where the more strategic forms of benefits come in is when the graphical rep-
resentation of flood hazard is used to convince others of the existence of a flood
risk. As I04RM points out: now that flood hazard can be illustrated in black and
white, one can also convince people more effectively by showing them the maps
and pointing to the latency of flooding (00:31:30-8). Likewise, speaking specifically
about local citizens, I01RM notes that the new flood hazard maps constitutes a
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more persuasive argument than manually drawn lines of older date, as these are
often not accepted as significant anymore:
[D]ie neuen Karten konnte man nicht so einfach ignorieren. Und wenn
sie alte Karten, die 20, 30, 50 Jahre alt sind heranziehen, dann in-
teressiert das natu¨rlich insbesondere den Bu¨rger, der etwas vorhat zu
bauen oder zu vera¨ndern, nicht. Der wird sagen es ist keine aktuellen
Datengrundlagen. (I01RM, 00:52:19-5)
Though it is throughout theoretically possible that the persuasiveness of a graph-
ical hazard representation makes it easier to get municipal councils to prioritize
flood risk, the benefit focused on in the data material is instead how this helps
local administrations explain and legitimize public management measures and/or
positions to external audiences. For example, this is how I02RMa explains what
he experiences as a benefit of scenario simulation:
I02RMa: Wenn wir in der Vergangenheit am einem oder anderem Ort
Hochwasserschutzmaßnahmen geplant haben, ist uns vorgehalten wor-
den: “Es hat noch nie ein Hochwasser gegeben...” Und das ist eben
das Hauptproblem. Heute, auf Grund der technischen Mo¨glichkeiten
kann ich eben simulieren oder berechnen, wo ich eine Hochwasserge-
fahr habe. Auch wenn es die letzten 50 oder 100 Jahre kein Hochwasser
gegeben hat. Und davor, davor wollen wir die Menschen schu¨tzen, dass
das Ereignis mo¨glicherweise gar nie eintritt. 00:33:40-7
Likewise, they sometimes help I02RMb convince people not to exercise a building
right in an area at risk of flooding:
I02RMb: Also [...] was wirklich beeindruckend ist, [ist] wenn wir Fotos
zeigen von abgeflossenen Hochwasserereignissen. Dann kann keiner
mehr sagen: “Ich sehe das nicht. Ich will das nicht sehen.” Sondern
dann fa¨ngt es bei den Leuten auch an, dass sie nachdenken. Und
manche sagen dann trotzdem: “Ach das kommt nie wieder und das
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war nur einmalig.” Ich sagen dann oft: “Ja gut, aber wenn das jetzt
sie nicht mehr erleben, aber ihre Kinder irgendwann so einen Schaden
im Haus, das macht auch keinen Spaß.” Aber am eindrucksvollsten ist
es natu¨rlich, wenn man Fotos zeigt oder diese blauen Karten. Und das
hat man bis neulich – hat man diese Karten nicht gehabt. 00:57:40-4
As I03RM explains, flood hazard maps provide an instrument with which one can
relatively easy present the local hazard situation and point to it politically, as one
does not have to talk about it in abstract terms anymore, but can concertize it
(00:57:45-1).
In a nutshell, then, a couple of cases exist in which flood hazard maps have brought
a benefit along the lines of motivating activity in foresight rather than hindsight.
Additionally, they sometimes help local administrations act more effectively or do
better what they would have done anyway. Examples in this regard cannot only
be found in the review above but can sometimes also be derived from descriptions
of use of a more general character, as when I08RM says:
[U]nser Gemeinderat entscheidet zusammen mit der Verwaltung, ob
wir neue Baugebiete ausweisen oder neue Gewerbegebiete ausweisen.
Und bei uns ist es jetzt so, die Bereiche, die wir andenken, wo wir
mo¨glicherweise einmal etwas ausweisen, die liegen bei uns alle außer-
halb der Bereiche, die von Hochwasser gefa¨hrdet sein ko¨nnten. Also
diese Konsequenz hat es bei uns bereits. Wir schließen da von vorne-
herein jedes Risiko aus. (I08RM, 00:18:36-3)
Here, there has been no change in the municipality’s planning. They have simply
used the hazard maps to confirm that the plans as they stand are acceptable also
from the perspective of not wanting to increase local damage potential. In other
cases, hazard maps are described as useful input without any concrete effect or
advantage being identified, and in at least one case (interview 01) one does not get
a proper sense for whether or how they have been used at all. In many cases, the
benefits associated with hazard maps are of a different character than the official
vision of them giving local-level risk managers more clarity as to where there is a
risk and thereby facilitating informed risk management.
Chapter 8. Benefits and problems of flood hazard maps 177
8.2.2 Benefits of pressure and restriction
The second category of benefits concern that production and publication of hazard
information makes it more difficult for public and private actors to ignore or will-
fully close their eyes to the risk of flooding. In some instances, this is something
that risk managers themselves mention benefiting from as when I09RM says that
access to flood hazard maps help keep the space for non-risk related interests in
local politics in check:
[E]s ist definitiv eine Erleichterung. [...] Jetzt ist ganz klar, wir
brauchen im Gemeinderat nicht daru¨ber diskutieren. Wenn da einer
die Idee hat “ach da ist doch noch viel Platz, da ko¨nnte man doch
noch ein scho¨nes Gewerbegebiet machen und mein Bruder hat da ein
Grundstu¨ck” oder so irgendwie, da gibt es eine klare Entscheidungs-
grundlage. Das geht nicht! Und man braucht da u¨berhaupt keine Zeit,
Mu¨he und Nerven auf solche Diskussionen verwenden. Und das ist
bestimmt auch positiv zu sehen. (I09RM, 01:01:08-3)
Noting a similar effect, I01RM suggest that, when it comes to the topic of risk,
elected representatives of the municipal council are generally careful. Even if it
means forgoing a desired project, disclosed information will not be openly contra-
dicted (01:01:51-0). As I02RMb points out, a municipal council may still decide to
live with the risk of flooding instead of doing something about it. Thanks to the
arrival of flood hazard maps, though, such a decision has to be made explicit. By
making it easier to hold decision-makers accountable, information obligates once
it is on the table:
I02RMb: (. . . ) Aber es ist natu¨rlich auch so, wenn man so was mal hat
und der Gemeinderat hat davon Kenntnis, dann ist er natu¨rlich auch in
der Pflicht. Dann kann man nicht mehr so tun: “Ich weiß nichts u¨ber
Hochwasser. Ich weiß nichts u¨ber die Gefahren.” Sondern wenn so was
mal da ist und bekannt ist, dann muss man Entscheidungen treffen.
Akzeptiere ich das, nehme ich das billigend in Kauf oder versuchen
ich eben entsprechend des Schadenspotentials auch Schutzmaßnahmen
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herzustellen und dazu irgendwelche Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. 00:47:17-
3
In I04RM’s view, it is really only to be seen as an advantage that flood hazard
maps makes naivety more difficult by ensuring that flood damage cannot come
as a surprise anymore (00:29:20-2). Representing a more unique view, the benefit
that I05RM focuses on is not that local decision-makers are reigned in, but that
hazard maps makes it easier to dismiss residents’ and private actors’ arguments
against the official interpretation of flood hazard. While such processes have been
associated with massive protest and conflict in the past, the introduction of a solid
scientific method and automatic legal implications effectively put a stop to this by
making local opposition inconsequential:
Bei dieser [vorige – Ed.] Ausweisung [. . . ] gab es massiv Probleme.
Also die Landwirte oder auch Betroffene Anlieger am Bach haben
sich da vehement daran gesto¨rt. Auch diese Abgrenzungen, die an-
hand von Geschwemmsellinien oder von fru¨heren Hochwa¨ssern teil-
weise auch durch Querschnittsberechnungen vor Ort festgelegt worden
sind, in Zweifel gezogen. Weil es halt seit Menschengedenken dort kein
Hochwasser gab [. . . ]. Also das ist sehr stark in Zweifel gezogen wor-
den. [. . . ] Wenn jetzt aber das anhand von so einem topographischen
Gela¨ndemodell errechnet werden kann, weil man genau weiß so und so
viel Einzugsgebiet, so und so viel Niederschla¨ge fu¨hren nachher dazu,
dass sich das im Talraum so und so verbreitet, ist das eigentlich nicht
mehr so leicht anzweifelbar. Und es ist dann einfach de facto (...)
U¨berschwemmungsgebiet. Ob jetzt der Anlieger meint, es ist rechtlich
haltbar oder nicht beziehungsweise fachlich haltbar oder nicht tut da
nix zur Sache. (I05RM, 00:09:13-0)
In other words, it is not that members of the public should be convinced of the
presence of a flood risk as in the quotes above pertaining to strategic forms of
benefits. Instead, the benefit that I05RM perceives is that it no longer needs to
matter what the local population thinks.
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Mostly, though, it is amongst the experts that benefits of pressure and restriction
are emphasized. According to I12E, the mere availability of information means
that no mayor will be willing to designate a building zone in an area at risk of
flooding anymore and risk being held accountable in case something happens:
Wenn ein Bu¨rgermeister die Hochwassergefahr kennt und trotzdem ein
Baugebiet ausweist, dann macht er sich strafbar und haftbar dafu¨r.
Und es wird kein Bu¨rgermeister mehr irgendwo hingehen und sagen:
“Das mache ich jetzt zum Bauland”, wohl wissend, dass da Hochwasser
ist. Weil er selber versucht Geld damit zu machen. Dass... die Gefahr
wird er nicht eingehen. Dann kommt doch das Hochwasser, und die
Ha¨user stehen unter Wasser. Das kommt sehr schnell raus, wie das
zusammenha¨ngt. Und es ist also nicht so, dass es dann wie vor 20, 30
Jahren: “Oh, das habe ich nicht gewusst. Und ha¨tte ich das gewusst
ha¨tte ich ja nie das Grundstu¨ck verkauft.” Also das ist, mittlerweile
die Haftungsfrage ist relativ eindeutig gekla¨rt. (I12E, 00:24:35-2)
Likewise, I16E notes:
Das kann nicht in die Schublade gelegt werden, weil: das sind Fakten,
wenn die auf dem Tisch liegen. Und wenn dann etwas passiert, dann
weiß auch jeder Bu¨rgermeister oder jeder, jeder zusta¨ndige Hochwasser-
schutzbeauftragte, dass er dann Probleme kriegt. (I16E, 01:02:38-9)
Even more unmistakable are the effects of introducing a formal regulatory frame-
work giving some of the simulated flood lines legal status. As I18E explains, this
alleviates the need to rely on people to voluntarily prioritize risk reduction over
other interests:
Vorteil ist aber, [. . . ] dass es einen Zwang gibt wirklich Vera¨nderungen
durchzufu¨hren. [. . . ] [F]reiwillig ist es manchmal schwierig, weil Hoch-
wasser, wenn es um ein 100, 200 ja¨hrliches Ereignis geht, also sel-
tene Ereignisse sind fu¨r viele, die dann jetzt Geld in die Hand nehmen
mu¨ssen, um sich vor einem Schaden in 50 Jahren oder 100 Jahren
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vielleicht erst zu schu¨tzen. Natu¨rlich kann das auch morgen kommen.
Aber viele denken: “100 ja¨hrlich? Ach das trifft mich schon nicht. Das
ist unsicher.” (I18E, 00:56:12-1)
That merely making information available can be of limited effect is something
that I13E has experienced first hand; as the mapping attempts first began, there
were no legal implications and also not much effect:
Wir hatten ja urspru¨nglich vor, wir zeigen die Gefahr auf durch die
Karten. Und der Rest erledigt sich von selbst. Nach dem Motto:
Die Kommunen wissen dann, was zu tun ist. Die sehen die Gefahr und
dann... ist klar. Da steht ja eigentlich alles drin. Aber dem ist nicht so.
Also wir hatten 2005 die ersten Gefahrenkarten am Neckar ausliegen...
[. . . ] Und die Ansprechpartner (...) vom Landratsamt hat mir dann
mal, eine Weile spa¨ter habe ich gefragt: “Ja und? Wie war denn jetzt
so die Reaktion von den Gemeinden und so? Was ist denn passiert?”
“Ja, zwei Wochen nachher kam der na¨chste Bebauungsplan und das
na¨chste Einzelbauvorhaben mit der Bitte um Genehmigung genau in
den so und so dunkelblauen Fla¨chen.” Wie wenn nichts gewesen wa¨re...
(I13E, 01:14:40-2)
Judging from the rest of the interview material, a legal framework that automat-
ically attaches restrictions to areas predicted to be at risk of flooding has two
further benefits compared to when floodplains are designated by way of legal ordi-
nance in separate assessment processes. First, it circumcises the negotiation space
for the local administrations; reducing their chances of influencing the assessment
of which areas are at risk to make it reflect local interests as well as formal hazard
evidence. Whereas flood lines used to be open for discussion, the introduction of
a formal assessment method based on scientific principles has done away with this
possibility:
I14E: Die alten U¨berschwemmungsgebiete wurden meistens oder vor-
wiegend nach abgelaufenen Ereignissen kartiert. Also man hat ein
Hochwasserereignis gehabt, das wurde kartiert und dann wurden die
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U¨berschwemmungsgebiete gemacht. Und diese U¨berschwemmungsge-
biete wurden intensiv mit den Gemeinden diskutiert. Deshalb hat es
manchmal jahrelang gedauert [. . . ] Aber diese Hochwassergefahrenkarte
wird nicht mit den Gemeinden diskutiert. Also nicht abgestimmt, dass
man sagt, man la¨sst ein Gebiet weg, weil die Gemeinde da ein Bauge-
biet vorhat. 01:56:29-7
SK: War es so fru¨her? 01:56:31-3
I14E: Ja, war so fru¨her. Da ist gehandelt worden. Und jetzt ist es ja
so, dass diese Hochwassergefahrenkarte einfach nach diesem method-
ischen technischen Vorgehen gemacht wird [. . . ] Das ist der riesige
unterschied. Es hat keine Gemeinde, niemand hat die Chance sich
gegen diese Rechtsverbindlichkeit von dieser HQ100-Fla¨che zu wehren.
[...] 01:57:20-5
Reducing the municipalities’ chances at influencing the floodplain designation pro-
cess and manipulating the assessment of which areas are at risk, flood hazard maps
can also be said to ensure that these represent a truer picture of the sum of available
evidence than what was perhaps the case before. Moreover, the mapping process
introduces a kind of control function that makes it more difficult for clients to
influence calculations for other types of errands, too:
[S]ie kommen ja auch oft und sagen: “Ja ko¨nnt ihr uns da nicht irgend-
wie rechnerisch ein bisschen was machen” und so weiter. [. . . ] [D]as ist
der Zwiespalt, der Auftraggeber mo¨chte ein positives Ergebnis. Und
dann haben, dann ist diese Gefahrenkarte fu¨r uns auch noch mal ein
viel besseres Argument, um zu sagen: “Nein, machen wir grundsa¨tzlich
nicht und sowieso nicht, weil wir mu¨ssen immer damit rechnen, das
andere nachher quasi eine Art Kontrollrechnung machen...” (I14E,
01:30:38-6)
Hence, it is not only in risk management and local politics that simulation-based
hazard maps help limit the influence of non-risk related interests but also in the
hazard assessments produced to provide input to these.
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Second, in an equivalent to I05RM’s assessment that it is a benefit that the mu-
nicipality no longer needs to bother with local critics, the experts note that the
automatic floodplain designation facilitates the process of placing areas at risk
under formal protection considerably for the higher-level authorities. Not having
to undertake a separate assessment process and not having to discuss every pro-
posed flood line with each municipality mean that things move much faster, taking
up less resources, with the result that large areas have been placed under formal
protection much sooner than what would otherwise have been possible:
Weil bis 2004 hatten wir ja das ganz normale Verfahren u¨ber Rechtsver-
ordnungen. Und wir hatten u¨ber Jahre das Problem, dass die Lan-
dratsa¨mter dieser Rechtsverordnungen nicht angegangen sind, [. . . ]
[dass] diese Verfahren nicht voran kamen und nie zum Ende gefu¨hrt
wurden. Weil... es gab Einspru¨che, es wurde verzo¨gert, es wurde
wieder infrage gestellt, es wurde wieder, ja? [. . . ] Wir haben zwar
einige U¨berschwemmungsgebiete festgesetzt, aber so, so wie jetzt, wo
ich also jetzt an 12, also in Ku¨rze an 12.300 Kilometer Gewa¨sser
U¨berschwemmungsgebiete fix und fertig festgesetzt habe, die gelten.
Also das ha¨tte ich damit nicht erreicht. (I13E, 01:18:26-3)
In effect, then, one of the benefits of the simulation-based flood hazard maps in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is that they helped the state place large areas of land under
legal protection without this first having to be demanded at federal level. As I17E
sees it, this would hardly have been possible without the hazard maps:
Wenn ich mir vorstelle, was wir fu¨r die Ausweisung eines Wasser-
schutzgebietes [. . . ] was wir da an Aufwand brauchen, um eine ra¨umlich
begrenzte, so eine Verordnung in Kraft zu setzen, auszuarbeiten, mit
allen Beteiligten abzustimmen. Das ist, das bindet sehr viel Arbeit-
skraft und dauert sehr, sehr lange. Wenn ich mir vorstelle, dass wir
das entlang aller Gewa¨sser in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg machen mu¨ssten,
das wa¨re, das wa¨re nicht zu leisten. Personell nicht zu machen. (I17E,
00:39:21-3)
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Ultimately, then, the type of benefit that many of the experts emphasize (and
some risk managers note, too) concerns the ability of simulation results to ‘force’
people to consider and account for flood risk in their decisions and behavior, either
by making it more difficult to escape accountability or, more directly, by way of
formal restrictions. Furthermore, it is noted that, while floodplains could be placed
under official protection before too, the advantage of standardizing this process
and tying it to the results of a traceable assessment method is that the area shown
to be at risk become more difficult to question and manipulate. This improves
state’s ability to quickly place large areas under protection, thereby having a direct
effect on the growth in damage potential.
8.3 Problems: under-usage and risk of negative
implications
Regarding problems, two things cause concern in both interview groups. First,
there is the perception that, in spite of constituting a relevant tool, foresight
information is so far underused and insufficiently promoted. Second, there is the
experience or fear of some form of negative effect following the introduction of
flood hazard maps.
Beginning with the first point, this concerns that the chance of acting in foresight
is lost both at the municipal level and at the level of private citizens and businesses,
e.g. due to the local level’s disinterest and lack of know-how, respectively due to the
higher authorities’ passivity and lack of support. Essentially, local administrations
have access to a wonderful instrument for risk communication and non-structural
alleviation work, as I06RM sees it, and yet neither local leaders nor their direct
superiors realize what a blessing they have been provided with, whereas higher-
level authorities fail to recognize the presence of reservations:
Es mu¨sste hier noch einiges an U¨berzeugungsarbeit geleistet werden,
um das ganze Personal, das im Rathaus arbeitet zum Beispiel oder an
verschiedenen Stellen im Landratsamt, dass die auch davon u¨berzeugt
sind, dass die Hochwassergefahrenkarten einen Segen bringen fu¨r die
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Leute. Es schwingt immer so mit: “Ach, die bringen ja nur Problem,
die Hochwassergefahrenkarten.” [. . . ] Also wir sehen das natu¨rlich als
Segen und sagen: “Ja die Leute bekommen jetzt Informationen und
ko¨nnen Vorsorge betreiben.” Aber auf der anderen Seite sehen es auch
viele so: “Ja da entstehen ja uns jetzt Kosten fu¨r die Hochwasservor-
sorge und wir ko¨nnen auch in bestimmten Gebieten gar nicht mehr
hineinbauen, wo wir eigentlich bauen wollten.” Und man kann das
schon von zwei Seiten [aus] sehen. [. . . ] Aber das wird offiziell so
nicht gesehen. Diese Vorbehalte, die man gegen die Hochwasserge-
fahrenkarte hat. (I06RM, 00:27:39-3)
In his view, more could be done to provide guidance for how to read the flood
hazard maps and what to conclude from them (I06RM, 00:34:38-4). As it is now,
they are too little appreciated and in consequence too little used:
I06RM: [...] [A]uf die Hochwassergefahrenkarten greifen nur die zuru¨ck,
die sich konkret selbst von sich aus dafu¨r interessieren... Natu¨rlich
Raumplanung und Raumordnung, fu¨r die gro¨ßeren Beho¨rden, die wis-
sen dann schon mitunter damit umzugehen. Aber konkret auf den
einzelnen (...) einer Gemeinde, da findet wenig statt... 00:30:31-4
I06RM: Also ich bin ja ein Fachmann im Hochwasserschutz und ich
sage, die Karten selbst die sind super. Mit denen kann man ganz toll
erkla¨ren[. . . ]: “Hier ist die U¨berflutungstiefe so und so groß, dann in
dieser Fla¨che darf nicht gebaut werden. Und wenn man Vorsorge be-
treiben will muss man die Tu¨ren, Tore, Sandsa¨cke und was auch immer
so und so hoch schichten, um sich vor dem Hochwasser zu schu¨tzen.”
Also fu¨r jemand, der sich mit Hochwasser, mit der Hochwasserprob-
lematik auskennt ist das ein Segen, die Hochwassergefahrenkarte. Aber
es mu¨sste eben besser an die Bevo¨lkerung herangetragen werden. Und
ich finde sie ist sehr-. Es ist jetzt die Frage was man damit macht. Sie
steht im Moment so fu¨r sich im Internet und wartet darauf genutzt zu
werden. 00:32:51-9
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Pointing in a similar direction even if he does not explicitly state flood hazard
maps to be under-used, I13E appears to find it problematic that it is so difficult to
get municipalities to comprehend the hazard maps and the possibilities that they
offer. In his experience, the situation is often that only part of the message hits
home, meaning that only part of it can be responded to:
Weil wir oftmals schon die Erfahrung gemacht haben, dass einmal der
Informationsgehalt der Karte sehr hoch ist und die Schwierigkeiten
haben zuna¨chst einmal die ganzen Informationen ru¨berzubringen... bzw.
das ru¨berbringen an sich, da wir Fachleute sind und wissen, was da drin
ist, ist einfach. Aber beim Gegenu¨ber kommt nicht alles an... und nur
Teile davon. Und dann werden nur Teile davon umgesetzt. Oder auch
nicht. (I13E, 00:02:29-2)
In line with the assessments in interview 11 that reported management measures
are still mostly taken in hindsight, this shows that actors which regard flood hazard
maps as a vital tool for risk management and which are in a position to assess
their aggregate level effect are partially somewhat troubled by what they see.1
Turning to the second point, a small number of interviewees refer to a experienced
or observed negative effect of flood hazard maps or the mapping project. These
include that it has become more difficult to find colleagues prepared to help out
in case of a flood emergency since it became clear what responsibility this implies
(I02RMb), that the announcement of the hazard maps’ arrival has triggered an
increase in local damage potential, as people hurry up with building projects out
of fear of having these prohibited (I06RM), and that local administrations have
gotten an alibi for postponing emergency management planning, as they can claim
that it is not worth pursuing until the maps are ready (I11Ea).
Mostly, though, it is the risk of negative effects that is described, such as the risk
of land-use restrictions leading to a loss of local business life and a lower trade
1That others are more unconcerned in this respect does not per se contradict that hazard
maps should be under-used. Amongst several of the experts, there is still a strong belief in this
management tool as something that will lead to improvements even if this cannot yet be observed
or they themselves cannot offer any concrete examples of this. And amongst the risk managers,
the expectations expressed with regard to the role of flood hazard maps for risk management
are often more low-key than in the example of I06RM.
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income (I03RM) or the risk of people pressing legal charges that can delay or
undermine the whole mapping project (I18E). Most central, though, is the risk of
‘innocent’ citizens having to suffer an disproportional negative consequence as a
result of hazard mapping, e.g. as a result of higher insurance premiums, loss of
coverage, falling property value, etc. For instance, I14E states that. . .
...der einzige Konflikt mit diese Hochwassergefahrenkarten, ist eben
das Problem, man weiß, man hat jetzt fla¨chenhaft dargestellte Risiken
u¨ber die man sich manchmal vorher nicht bewusst war [. . . ]. Und das
Problem ist, dass der einzelne, also das Hauptproblem sehe ich, dass der
einzelne private oder die Firma oder die Gemeinde jetzt plo¨tzlich in so
einem Gebiet drin sitzt, eventuell ein Problem mit Versicherungen oder
Immobilien und so weiter hat. Also es kann Fa¨lle geben, wo einfach das
Vorhandensein eines neuen Wissens dazu fu¨hrt, dass ein einzelner... im
Prinzip, obwohl es gar nicht so beabsichtigt war, einen wirtschaftlichen
Schaden hat oder eine Versicherung ihn nicht mehr versichert... [. . . ]
wollen [ein Haus – Ed.] verkaufen und haben dann ein Riesenproblem,
dass sie einfach das nicht verkauft bekommen, weil dieses Wissen um
dieses Risiko jetzt vero¨ffentlicht ist [. . . ]. (I14E, 01:50:22-5)
Whereas several interviewees mention the plan to subject flood hazard maps to
regular updates as something positive and even as a precondition for their con-
tinued significance, I14E also notes an “unsolved problem” with the situation of
making a technical non-stationary assessment the basis of juridical regulation, as
it implies that who is defined as being at risk and subject to legal restraints can
suddenly change at a later stage (00:17:42-2).
In general, the introduction of legal restrictions is sometimes perceived to be harsh
on people owning land in risk areas. While I09RM thinks that it is the right
approach, in principle, to place all floodplains under protection even if it implies
reverting an existing building plan, it cannot be disregarded that this is something
that can affect private citizens disproportionately hard. To explain, he gives a
concrete example of a young man for which such an outcome would have meant
disinheritance:
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Und zwar kam da mal ein junger Mann [. . . ] Der hat angefragt bei un-
serer Bauordnung, er wu¨rde gerne ein Haus bauen, was er da beachten
muss. Und dann gingen natu¨rlich zuna¨chst die Alarmglocken hoch, das
ist kein 100 ja¨hrliches Hochwasser, ist ein 50 ja¨hrliches. [. . . ] Allerdings
gibt es eben a¨lterer Geba¨ude, die da vorhanden sind. Und insofern gibt
es ein Baurecht [. . . ] Und in dem Fall hat der Grundstu¨ckseigentu¨mer
uns da zahlreiche Argumente geliefert, wo wir sagen mussten, da ko¨nnen
wir uns nicht verschließen. [. . . ] Er hat gesagt: “Ich habe noch drei
Bru¨der. Jeder von uns hat vom Opa einen Bauplatz geerbt. Das ist
mein Erbe. Wenn ich da nicht drauf bauen darf oder das als Bau-
platz verkaufen kann, sondern das ist jetzt mehr oder weniger nur
noch ein Garten, dann bin ich enterbt. [...] Na¨chster Punkt: Ich zahle
fu¨r dieses Grundstu¨ck seit zig Jahren Grundsteuer B fu¨r bebaubares
Gela¨nde. Kriege ich das Geld dann wieder, wenn ich da nicht bauen
darf?” [. . . ] Und da kann man jetzt auch nicht sagen, das ist alles
Schnee von gestern und das Grundstu¨ck ist jetzt nur noch einen Euro
wert. (I09RM, 00:29:29-3)
Even if it would be the right thing to do from a risk management perspective to
recall the right to build in areas now known to be at risk of flooding, it is not
always that a municipal administration finds the consequences of such a measure
acceptable:
Das hat definitiv Effekte auf den Wert von Grundstu¨cken und kann-
. Also die Eigentu¨mer sprechen ja dann von kalter Enteignung und
solchen Dingen, und fu¨hlen sich ihrer Werte beraubt, was zum Teil,
denke ich, nicht von der Hand zu weisen ist. (I09RM, 00:32:38-7)
In I09RM’s view, there has been no guidance or support from higher levels re-
garding how to handle these forms of effects; they have not foreseen and do not
comprehend what kind of challenges this puts the local administrations before.
Hence, while economists and risk researchers tend to see information as a policy
tool for regulating market prices and thereby to curb the growth in damage po-
tential, the perspective taken here is a focus on the implications of such measures
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for those potentially affected. Though, in principle, a problem of private nature,
public dissatisfaction is not without political risk. In sum, this nevertheless means
that, apart from not always being perceived to live up to their full potential of
motivating more precaution in foresight, there is no widespread confirmed form of
problem associated with the introduction of flood hazard maps.
8.3.1 What about non-experts’ handling of uncertainty?
Judging from the descriptions of map use and reasons for non-use reviewed in
chapter 6 and 7 and from the above presented analysis of problems, there is no
indication so far of problems related to over- or under-critical approaches being
taken towards flood hazard maps. Yet it has also been recognized in previous
passages that an absence of observations of, for example, misuse does not mean
that this does not exists; often it is only if some kind of negative implication ma-
terializes that misuse is discovered. Hence, this section will take a look at whether
or not the interviewed experts recognize a theoretical risk of such problems.
Regarding the possibility of an over-critical approach resulting in a lack of confi-
dence that could lead to non-use, there is indeed some recognition of this in the
interview material. For example, I15E (00:38:41-5) notes that people are often
skeptical towards computer-generated images on the basis of not knowing whether
they are film tricks or reality. Often, he says, it will depend on the credibility of
those responsible whether simulation results are trusted or distrusted. In his view,
simulationists must be honest about there not being any 100 percent exact solu-
tion for complex natural processes and open about the parameters where they are
uncertain and/or have made assumptions. Otherwise, people will lose confidence
in modeling: “It is very important for the credibility, because otherwise there will
be some detail where model and some empirical observation do not quite fit and
then the whole trust goes down the drain.” (I15E, 00:46:02-8). In this regard, it
is a problem that not everyone adheres to the same standards:
Und daran kranken eben viele Modelle, die man im Ingenieurwesen
anwendet. Dass man sagt: “Schnell, schnell wir mu¨ssen jetzt mal
wissen, ja wir wissen ja wie die physikalischen Zusammenha¨nge sind
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und dann rechnen wir mal.” Und wenn ein Modell nicht ganz sauber
u¨ber Messdaten gepru¨ft und validiert worden ist, so lange muss man da
große Vorbehalte haben. So und daher kommt auch, [dass] viel Unfug
gemacht wird heutzutage mit Computermodellen. (I15E, 00:07:29-8)
Sharing this view, I12E notes that the problem with more and more data and
increasingly user-friendly simulation programs is that this increases the risk of
computer models being acquired and run without the necessary understanding or
competence. In his view, this is something that can lead to people losing confidence
in modeling and to good models being subject to bad use getting an undeserved
bad reputation in the policy sphere:
Dass was ich als negativ oder als problematisch ansehe ist, dass viele
versuchen und sagen: “Wir ko¨nnen das. Wir machen das. Wir kaufen
uns so ein Modell.” Aber schauen nicht nach den Randbedingungen,
die dazu zu erfu¨llen sind. [. . . ] Also dieses Simulieren ist das Eine...
[...] Aber das Vorbereiten der Daten fu¨r die Simulation ist vielleicht
genauso groß und genauso aufwendig. Und man kann nicht einfach
sagen ich habe heute hochauflo¨sende Daten, die kaufe ich mir einfach
alle zusammen und dann kann ich das machen. Und da sehe ich ein-
fach eine große Gefahr. Dass immer mehr versuchen, die Modelle wer-
den immer anwenderfreundlicher, dass immer mehr getan wird, immer
mehr gerechnet wird. Aber die Modelle... vielleicht sogar in Mis-
skredit kommen, weil sie falsch eingesetzt wurden. Und dann unter
Umsta¨nden Modelle mit falschen Attributen versehen werden, obwohl
sie eigentlich gut sind. Nur weil sie jemand falsch angewendet hat [...].
(I12E, 00:07:56-8)
When it comes to flood hazard maps specifically, moreover, I12E notes that a
failure to be open about various areas of uncertainty or limitations can quickly
lead them to be dismissed as lacking credibility (01:03:02-3). Likewise, I14E notes
that a failure to document what data one has used can quickly lead to problems as
technical administrators not recognizing the numbers will then become suspicious
and wonder what is going on (2h+00:12:27-3). In I13E’s impression, though, it
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is rarely that doubts as to the accuracy of flood scenario predictions result in a
lack of confidence in the hazard maps as such. In his experience, most doubts can
be constructively handled through dialog and discussion (i.e. personal contact),
and it is only when there are political reasons for not wanting hazard maps that
simulation modeling is dismissed as unreliable:
Also ich will mal sagen: Entweder wird die Darstellung komplett ver-
worfen, weil man es nicht haben mo¨chte. Oder es wird konstruktiv
an Details diskutiert. Nach dem Motto: Wir hatten da schon mal
ein Hochwasser, aber die Fla¨che war noch nie nass. Wie kommt das?
Wieso ist die bei euch nass und bei uns war die noch nie nass? Dann
wird sich aber konstruktiv mit dem, mit dem Modell auseinanderge-
setzt. Dann geht der Ingenieur natu¨rlich hin [. . . ] Also dann la¨uft
ein ganz normaler und auch guter Prozess ab, weil am Ende dieses
Prozesses steht die Einsicht der Kommune: “Jetzt stimmt sie, die
Karte.” Obwohl die auch Unscha¨rfe dann hat. Aber dieses jetzt... also
dass quasi aus der Argumentation heraus: “[. . . ] Und das ist ja so
unscharf und so ungenau. Damit kann ich ohnehin nichts anfangen.”
Also das kommt selten glaube ich... Es kommt eher wie gesagt diese
pauschale Ablehnung aus ganz anderen Gru¨nden, politischen Gru¨nden
sage ich mal. (I13E, 01:03:18-0)
In other words, low confidence is a real risk, but one that extensive measures have
been taken to handle (e.g. through several steps of involvement of the municipali-
ties, including one of letting them review and comment on map drafts before these
count as finished). Judging from the data, these measures are perceived to suffice
for keeping this risk at bay.
Moving on to the risk of an under-critical approach, e.g., resulting in unintentional
misuse, there is also a form of theoretical recognition of this as something that
simulation results in general (but also other forms of data) can be vulnerable to.
For example, I12E notes it to be extremely important to document and describe
assumptions to avoid giving free reign to speculation as to what is being displayed,
as well as for this information to be read and recognized (00:55:34-8). Providing
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a concrete example, I12E recounts how a figure contained in the 2001 Rhine-Atlas
(assumed to represent the value of rural land areas) was re-used for other types of
calculations without the user bothering to look up what it really represented. As a
result, later estimates of the risk of flooding often over-estimated the value of rural
land areas, something that I12E notes can lead decision-makers to consider flood
protection measures for locations where this would not be rationally motivated
(00:55:34-8). Noting that non-experts in local administrations have a tendency to
simply adopt what they are presented with without critical scrutiny, furthermore,
I16E sees it as important not to give out an exact figure, but to rather present
simulation results in the form of a span:
Das sind technische Instrumente, da stecken Randbedingungen dahin-
ter. Wenn ich sage 3,42 m, dann weiß der Modellierer, der es gemacht
hat, ganz genau: ich habe das Szenario angenommen, ich habe die
Kurve angenommen, ich habe die Rauheit angenommen im Gela¨nde.
Ich weiß genau, was da drin steckt. Also wie viele Unsicherheiten und
[wo] jede Stufe der Modellierungskette herkommen. Und der Sach-
bearbeiter klickt auf den Tisch, 3,42 m: “Ach 3,42 m, da mache ich bis
hierhin. Da mache ich bis 3,42 m einen Objektschutz und dann bin ich
auf der sicheren Seite.” Und da sieht man dann halt auch irgendwie, [...]
dass man vielleicht auch... ja die Ergebnisse dann auch entsprechend
einordnet in Klassen. Dass man eher sagt: “Ja das ko¨nnte bis zu
so-und-so viel Meter kommen, das Wasser. Das kann natu¨rlich auch
schlimmer werden.” (I16E, 00:23:34-1)
In regard to flood hazard maps, specifically, I16E perceives a risk of people focusing
too much on whether they are inside or outside the HQ100-line, not realizing or
remembering that a less frequent flood poses a risk, too (00:31:25-2). For similar
reasons, I18E sees it as suboptimal that it is not more clearly stated that it is only
the hazard associated with riverine flooding that is displayed in hazard maps.
Without a disclaimer about other forms of hydrological hazards also constituting
a threat, people may be lulled into a false sense of security by flood hazard maps:
I18E: Also das einzige Problem, das ich sehen ko¨nnte wa¨re das Thema,
dass die Karten immer nur Flusshochwasser sind. Und dadurch ablenken
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ko¨nnten davon, dass Hochwasser u¨berall stattfinden kann. [. . . ] Und
dass man dadurch, dass man immer nur an der Flusshochwasser denkt,
und da gibt es Gefahrenkarten, dass man vergisst, dass es ja auch
Sturzfluten, Flash Floods gibt vom direkten Niederschlag. Also deswe-
gen sage ich mal, das wa¨re vielleicht ein Punkt, den man tatsa¨chlich ein
bisschen verbessern mu¨sste, dass immer zumindest u¨ber jeder Karte
daru¨ber stehen mu¨sste: “Flash Floods u¨berall mo¨glich” sozusagen.
[. . . ] Und also wenn Sie jetzt so fragen, wa¨re das ein Punkt, wo ich
sage, das ko¨nnte ein Nachteil von so einer Karte sein. Dass man sich
in Sicherheit wiegt in Gebieten, wo es gar keine Sicherheit gibt. [. . . ]
Weil es die Wahrnehmung auf ein Gebiet konzentriert und von anderen
Gebieten ablenkt. 00:50:24-2
Moreover, it is suboptimal that there are no indications as to the elevation of
the land areas depicted as lying outside the likely inundation zones, as this limits
people’s possibility of assessing the likeliness of nevertheless being flooded.2
Some experts would like to display more uncertainty information in flood hazard
maps directly, only this is not thought to be politically desired or practically
possible. For instance, even if I18E would have preferred if the uncertainty of
scenario simulation could have been visualized in the form of a buffer zone around
the mapped flood lines, this is not something that he thinks the political scene
could handle. Instead, he must produce as precise of a hazard estimate as possible
in spite of knowing the limitations involved:
Und das ist natu¨rlich auch einer Herausforderung eine Karte mo¨glichst
genau zu machen, aber zu wissen, sie kann auch nicht 100 Prozent
genau sein. Auch jede Modellierung hat seine Unsicherheiten... Also
ich wa¨re sowieso immer dafu¨r gewesen, dass man nicht eine Karten-
linie zieht, sondern dass man, wo hier der Fluss ist und hier die Ha¨user,
2Where the terrain is steep, houses located close to the area depicted as being at risk of
inundation can mostly count on remaining dry. But, where the terrain is flat, it is more difficult
to tell where the water will halt, and even small deviations from the assumed status quo can
mean that an area indicated to stay dry is nevertheless inundated. Hence, elevation data for the
‘dry zone’ would facilitate for map users to assess the eventual seriousness and/or implications
of simulation uncertainty.
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dass es nicht eine Linie gibt, sondern dass es so eine Art Puffer gibt
zum Beispiel. Wo man noch hier sagt: “Okay, das ist Ungenauigkeits-
bereich.” Aber damit kann die Politik nicht umgehen. Als Modellierer,
ich bin ja Hydrauliker, wa¨re so was viel besser. Dann kann man noch
ein bisschen mit Statistik arbeiten, Wahrscheinlichkeiten, die Unsicher-
heiten irgendwo mitreinnehmen, wenn es so einen Puffer gibt um eine
Linie. Aber die Politik will genau den richtigen Wasserstand und genau
eine Linie. (I18E, 00:25:39-1)
Likewise, I12E (01:02:02-9) says that, although not just he but probably all engi-
neers would like to include more uncertainty information, this is not possible when
the displayed flood lines are used as a legal instrument to decide where what is
allowed respectively prohibited. That there are uncertainties involved in making
an exact prediction is nothing that anyone wants to hear:
Und da muss es eine klare Abgrenzung geben, eine klare Linie geben.
Und diese Linie, wenn ich dann sage: “Gut, also sie ko¨nnte da liegen,
sie ko¨nnte da liegen” und dazwischen mache ich so ein Vertrauensband
rein, dann entspricht das nicht mehr einer gesetzlichen Vorgabe. Ich
muss also klar abgrenzen, da liegt die Linie. Und das muss ich nach
meinem besten Wissen und Gewissen machen, obwohl ich eigentlich
weiß: “Naja, es ko¨nnte da, es ko¨nnte da sein.” [...] [E]s wird aber
erwartet, dass wir so eine Linie ganz klar abgrenzen. Und das machen
wir natu¨rlich auch. Aber halt wohl wissend, da ist noch irgendetwas
da. Aber das la¨sst sich sehr schwierig dokumentieren solche Sachen.
Das will keiner ho¨ren... [. . . ] 00:58:20-3
In principle, this suggests recognition for under-critical adoption of simulation
results as a real risk. And, yet, none of the interviewed experts appear to think
that it would constitute a great problem or pose a serious risk if local-level users
would fail to recognize and/or account for the presence of simulation uncertainty in
flood hazard maps. As I18E explains, the maps are really quite reliable, meaning
that, even if one can discuss the exact course of the flood lines, the scenario
overview as such is still a useful form of guidance:
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I18E: Ich glaube fu¨r einen gro¨ßten Teil hat das nicht so die Bedeu-
tung, weil wenn dann geht es ja nur um die Grenze. Also der Großteil
ist ja schon sehr belastbar, einer Karte. Also es ist nicht so, dass
(in) eine Ortslage ganz viel u¨berschwemmt ist und die Ortslage ist
u¨berhaupt nicht gefa¨hrdet. Also zumindest bei den Karten in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg wird es das nicht geben. Es wird immer nur darum
gehen, ist das Geba¨ude auch noch? Oder das Geba¨ude? Oder die
Trafostation? Der ganze Rest, also der Großteil der Karten ist ziem-
lich eindeutig. [...] Und dann beginnt ja die ganze Diskussion. Und
das ist ja das Wichtige. [...] 00:40:16-7
Furthermore, as both II18E and I12E point out, even an imperfect product can
generate awareness and discussion. Hence, it would be unreasonable to abstain
from mapping just because all flood sources cannot be accounted for or because
the resulting picture will be somewhat uncertain (e.g. I12E, 01:06:48-9). Besides,
there is not that much in the hazard maps that can be misunderstood as I16E
sees it. In his experience, what is vulnerable to misuse is rather when some form
of numerical digit is produced that people might misinterpret or re-use without
understanding where it comes from:
Aber jetzt das direkte missverstehen... Eigentlich nicht.. Deswegen,
ich denke Missversta¨ndnisse gibt es immer dann, wenn klassifizierte
Werte da sind. [. . . ] [W]enn ich jetzt sage irgendwie, ich habe einen...
Schadenswert von 0-200 Euro, von 200-4000 Euro und... von, weiß
ich nicht, u¨ber 5000 Euro, u¨ber 4000 Euro. [. . . ] Und da ist aber
dann, [...] je nachdem, was man halt wa¨hlt, auch eine Gefahr darin...
[. . . ] Ich nehme jetzt die umweltrelevante Anlage als sozusagen Vul-
nerabilita¨t hoch und stufe den ganzen Bereich auch als hoch ein. Also
so, solche Sachen ko¨nnen dann irgendwie passieren. Aber bei dem,
bei der Hochwassergefahrenkarte selber... ist vielleicht ho¨chstens das
Missversta¨ndnis da, was dem zu Grunde liegt. [. . . ] 00:48:26-0
Furthermore, apart from the hypothetical risk of people being lulled into a not
quite justified sense of security, there is no clear idea of why it would be problematic
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if people would fail to comprehend or account for the presence of uncertainty. At
least in I13E’s view, it is not too much but too little trust that poses a risk:
Nein, wu¨sste ich jetzt nicht, was, was daraus entstehen ko¨nnte... Also
eher das wenigere Vertrauen, das macht einem dann Probleme natu¨rlich...
(I13E, 01:08:59-9)
What concerns him, in other words, is not that scenario simulation results will be
misused but that they will not be used at all.
In many cases, it is thought to suffice if people understand that some uncertainty
is present respectively that what is displayed is a prognosis; a form of snapshot in
time, rather than certain prophecy (i.e. I11Eb, I12E and I17E). As I13E sees it, it
is only when local administrations question or make a fuss about the hazard maps
that it is important to explain the technical details to avoid a loss in confidence
(00:57:11-2). In a world of increasing specialization, I16E points out, it must be
legitimate to work also with outputs that one does not oneself have the expertise
to assess. As long as one understands the ‘dimensions’ of uncertainty involved,
one can still make good use of them:
Also dass man die Gro¨ßenordnungen, in denen es sinnvoll ist zu denken,
dass man sich die mal vor Augen fu¨hrt. Das ist, denke ich mir,
notwendig. Ansonsten, wenn man so etwas, solche Gedanken sozusagen
beru¨cksichtigt, ist es absolut legitim, denke ich, mit Modellergebnis-
sen zu arbeiten, auch wenn man sie nicht komplett... durchschaut
wissenschaftlich. Darauf ist man angewiesen auch, also... dass man
nicht immer jede Information auch sozusagen bis ins kleinste Detail
nachvollziehen kann irgendwie... (I16E, 00:51:30-8)
Indeed, the idea of getting end-users to account for simulation uncertainty is not
thought to be quite realistic. According to several experts, end-users lack both
interest and competence when it comes to engaging with uncertainty information.
In municipalities where the same person is responsible for building planning and
the local finances, I14E points out, the competence required for understanding
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the documentation provided together with the hazard maps is often not present
(2h+00:16:26-9). Similarly, I13E’s experience is that it is ‘futile’ to try to explain
the basis of flood hazard maps, e.g. because it is only in municipalities of a certain
size that the necessary know-how for a constructive discussion is present. While he
and his colleagues always underline that the displayed flood lines represent various
carefully calculated scenarios, anything beyond that is difficult:
Das ist aussichtslos. [. . . ] [W]ir versuchen klarzumachen, es ist ein
Szenario und es ist so gut, wie es irgendwie geht. Wir haben einen
Riesenaufwand in der Vermessung. Wir haben einen Riesenaufwand
in der Modellierung. Wir sind also wirklich ganz genau unterwegs.
[. . . ] Aber... Mehr, mehr ko¨nnen wir nicht kommunizieren. Weil mehr
ist einfach... fehlt der Hintergrund oder es ist dann, man merkt auch
deutlich, wenn man da ein bisschen ins Detail geht im Gespra¨ch, dann
kreist das Auge des Gegenu¨ber plo¨tzlich irgendwo durch die Gegend
und man ho¨rt angestrengt noch zu, aber es erreicht ihn nicht mehr.
(I13E, 00:55:16-7)
Hence, even if simulation results in general are complex and easy to misuse, there
is no perception of this as a risk that flood hazard maps are sensitive to: the un-
certainties are fairly limited; there are few concrete values to re-use in unsuitable
ways; and there is no clear idea of what a failure to consider uncertainty informa-
tion could lead to. Ultimately, then, there is not only a lack of observed examples
of misuse in the data material but also a lack of risk perception amongst technical
experts when it comes to this as something to worry about.
Is there anything speaking against this view in the rest of the data material?
Indeed, at least in a theoretical way, one could argue that there is. In the case of
the mayor in interview 03, the situation is namely one of simulation uncertainty
not having been accounted for when looking upon the predictions displayed in
flood hazard maps:
Wobei ich jetzt auch sagen muss, u¨ber die Messgenauigkeit hatte ich
mich jetzt vorher so intensiv nicht informiert. Das kann durchaus sein,
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dass es vorher auch schon mitkommuniziert wurde, ich es dann aber
einfach nicht als Information aufgenommen hatte. (I03RM, 00:47:19-7)
In I03RM’s view, no one takes the time to read the fine print of the complementary
documentation delivered together with the flood hazard maps. Only if something
happens that indicates that what is displayed might not be quite accurate or
reliable will an effort be made to learn of eventual uncertainties involved:
Das ist denke ich auch immer das Wichtigste, dass man dann nicht 300
Seiten Information bekommt, die nachher sowieso keiner lesen kann.
Sondern, dass man dann eher, wenn man eine konkrete Frage hat,
Auskunft bekommt bei der entsprechenden Stelle. (I03RM, 00:53:26-
0)
Though difficult to classify as an example of misuse since I03RM denies any use at
all having been made of hazard maps for planning purposes, what happened in this
case was that parts of the city (including a building of importance to the emergency
response operation) ended up standing knee-deep in flood water although they had
been predicted to stay dry according to the simulation results displayed in the flood
hazard maps. While it would be wrong to portray this outcome as a consequence
of not having accounted for simulation uncertainty in preparedness planning, then,
it does show the potential for real nagative consequences if predictive information
is treated as absolute ‘truth’ instead of being recognized as containing sources of
uncertainty.
Considering that there is one example in the interview material speaking against
it being completely free of risk to disregard simulation uncertainty, this gives raise
to the interesting question of how come experts in practice do not seem to agree
with experts in academia that it is vital for end-users to understand and account
for the presence of simulation uncertainty? Which of the above stated reasons
is the decisive one? And what does it depend on if a high level of uncertainty
awareness is important or not?
Chapter 9
Discussion
9.1 Discussion per research question
In light of academic literature showing the potential benefits of simulation to not
only depend on whether but also on how such evidence is used, three research ques-
tions were formulated to guide the study of simulation-based flood hazard maps as
tools for local-level risk management in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. These concern how
this type of information is used (including options of misuse and non-use); what
affects whether it is used or not; and what benefits and problems are experienced
or observed. In each of the sections below, it will be discussed what the findings
in chapters 6 to 8 suggest are the answers to these questions, before a concluding
remark is made in relation to the study’s overall research interest.
9.1.1 How flood hazard maps are used
In chapter 3, a distinction was made between ideal use, misuse in the form of
reliance on ‘bad’ research or illegitimate use of ‘good’ research, and more or less
illegitimate forms of non-use. At the same time, it was also argued that different
actors can have different views as to what is legitimate or illegitimate, respectively
that it can be situational when a form of application should count as the one or
the other. Hence, it was decided not to study the presence or absence of these
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categories in absolute terms, but to explore different actors’ perceptions of the use
or non-use made of flood hazard maps.
Beginning with the issue of use, it is worth reiterating that research use can mean
different things. One of the simpler models (and the one relied on by J. Bradley
Cousins for describing different forms of ideal use) is the ICS-framework differen-
tiating between instrumental, conceptual and strategic research use. In chapter 4,
it was shown that formal descriptions of how flood hazard maps should support
local-level risk management commonly emphasize knowledge-driven instrumental
research use, intending for foresight to inspire activities in relation to all four
management fields.
Judging from the results presented in chapter 6, flood hazard maps are indeed
used in line with what official sources prescribe (see chapter 4). Empirically, some
kind of direct application has been identified in relation to all four management
fields, including in the following forms:
- Technical protection: decisions to reinforce and extend existing structural
defenses;
- Emergency management: main input to preparedness planning and/or in-
clusion as appendix;
- Non-structural alleviation: restriction of land-use, withdrawal of building
rights from areas at risk, incorporation in GIS;
- Risk communication: presentation ceremonies and organization of public
meetings and information evenings.
Not all of the use described by the interviewed risk managers was driven by the
arrival of new knowledge about the local hazard situation, however. Apart from
the case of interview 02, where several forms of direct application followed upon
simulation results showing the municipality to be less well-protected and less well-
prepared than hitherto assumed, it has often been something else that has moti-
vated the decision to make use of hazard maps. For example, much use is linked to
legal requirements and official regulation. In other cases, usage has been pushed
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for from above or helped along by external policy processes calling attention to a
problem.
In effect, this suggests comprehensive management reform to be a rather peripheral
form of effect. Rather than challenging the status quo, flood hazard maps are often
associated with a new and/or better kind of overview of the local hazard situation
without this necessarily implying any real surprises. Likewise, it is relatively rare
for them to be linked to the initiation of new measures and activities or to a change
in focus or attention. More common is that they are applied within the scope of
already established activities. Often, this form of use is of a more long-term
consultation character than a one-off decision situation. Or there is a knowledge
effect without it being completely clear what consequences this will have in the
long run. Examples of more conceptual forms of uses within each management
field include:
- Technical protection: contributing to a reassessment of the sufficiency of
current defenses; starting an indeterminate thought-process;
- Emergency management: serving as one input amongst others to prepared-
ness planning which would have been carried out anyway;
- Non-structural alleviation: being consulted together with data on other rel-
evant aspects in relation to routine administrative errands – just like other
available hazard information before them; being consulted to help local ad-
ministrations exclude that flood risk constitutes an obstacle to local devel-
opment plans;
- Risk communication: facilitating information provision when local citizens
inquire about flood risk.
Thinking of risk management as an ongoing process of dealing with recurrent
errands, consulting relevant information, learning and optimization, it becomes
clear that scenario simulation results will often constitute one source of input
amongst others. Sometimes they will play a larger role, sometimes a smaller one
(such as when the risk is low or other arguments weigh heavier). Mostly, though,
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this form of use is about foresight information helping local-level risk managers do
better what they would be doing anyway.
Additionally, there is a number of instances in which flood hazard maps have
played a more strategic role (without this necessarily implying selective use of
the kind suggested by the original definition). Apart from the field of emergency
management, this form of use has been identified in relation to all management
fields:
- Technical protection: illustration of the seriousness of local flood risk to
legitimize pre-formulated plans for structural defenses and/or reduce local
opposition to the same, private validation of the soundness of made plans;
- Non-structural alleviation: illustration of the seriousness of local flood risk
to get private individuals to follow the administration’s preferred policy of
keeping high-risk areas free of construction;
- Risk communication: external presentation of research to build confidence
in public authorities, respectively forestall negative reactions and maintain
good public relations.
Though such forms of use are not what official documents emphasize, they are
nonetheless part of what risk managers appreciate about being provided with a
graphical representation of flood hazard. Here, focus is not placed on what is
learned from or decided on the basis of simulation results, but on their usefulness
for confirming respectively conveying specific ideas or pre-defined plans to others.
To summarize, this means that the ICS-framework has been useful for distinguish-
ing between different forms of use made of flood hazard maps. At the same time,
it has also shown some of its limits and weaknesses. For example, not all pol-
icy and administrative processes have the character of one-off events. Though
a phenomenon like recurring consultation can be included under the headline of
conceptual research use, as has been done here, this leads to new difficulties in
terms of keeping the meaning of the different categories stable and clear, as this
– strictly speaking – falls beyond the original description. In this sense, there is
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a conflict between the complexity of the field and the rigidity that it implies to
draw on pre-fabricated concept categories.
As pointed out in chapter 3, different forms of use will often interact and build on
each other, so that the way a person or organization has used research resembles
a fluid process of different forms of applications and effects rather than something
that falls squarely into a single category. In the case of the flood hazard maps,
direct application to decision-making was often the consequence of a conceptual
knowledge effect about the necessity of taking action. In other instances, the
objectively establishable application of integrating new findings into an existing
database was what enabled these to influence other actors’ understanding of the
local hazard situation and allowed for regular consultation. Furthermore, strategic
ulterior motives can accompany different forms of more direct application. In this
sense, it is indeed questionable to regard instrumental, conceptual and strategic
research use as distinct and separate categories. A better option could be to think
of them as ideal types and to openly discuss forms of use falling inbetween or
not fitting the picture. In this study, such an example concerns when research is
used for communication purposes without this necessarily or only corresponding
to a strategic form of application. In several cases, flood hazard maps have been
used to enlighten people about local flood hazard to allow them to make informed
choices without this corresponding to an attempt to advocate a clearly defined
political position. Though this, too, is a way in which research can be used, it
does not correspond to any of the existing categories of research use.
Another thing that this study has shown is that, as already noticed in KU-theory,
it is not always suitable to think of instrumental research uses as the ultimate goal.
At least when it comes to the field of risk management, there is often a difference
between knowledge utilization and research use in the sense that where knowledge
of the risk of flooding has already been accounted for there is not necessarily
much need for direct application of new findings. Put differently, the absence
of instrumental research use can be a positive signal if it reflects a high level of
preparedness and no particular weak spots. Moreover, there is a difference between
instrumental one-time application and lasting reform. In this sense, the aim of
research use is not direct application of individual findings but policy and practice
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that is sensitive to and accounts for the current state of knowledge while being
open to the idea of this being something that evolves and requires adjustment.
Regarding the option of misuse, this can pertain either to – willful or unintentional
– use of research of inferior quality, or to – willful or unintentional – misinterpreta-
tion and/or distortion of research of high quality. In this regard, the fact that the
hazard maps are generally thought to represent a case of ‘good’ research means
that the first of these categories is of little relevance. Moreover, though the second
category is, theoretically, something that could lead to concrete negative effects,
this is nothing that any of the interviewees have experienced, observed or heard
of. While recognizing that risk managers without technical skills will often accept
flood simulation results uncritically (i.e. in trust), there is no perception of this
as a significant problem and no concern about it leading to specific undesirable
consequences. In this sense, there is a difference between the way the risks of
simulation use by non-experts is framed in academic literature and how this is
regarded by technical experts active in the field. (The nature and implication of
this difference will be returned to in the discussion of the overall research interest.)
Turning to the issue of non-use, finally, chapter 3 distinguished between illegitimate
and legitimate non-use. Illegitimate non-use is described as the willful act of
sweeping evidence under the carpet for self-serving purposes, whereas legitimate
non-use concerns both non-use of ‘bad’ research and non-use of ‘good’ research if
this is, e.g., untimely or irrelevant (so called rational non-use) or if changes in the
decision context respectively presence of competing information makes it obsolete
(so called political non-use).
Looking at the results, we see that risk managers tend to frame their own acts of
non-use as rational and justified. Only in the case of interview 02 is it recognized as
‘unfortunate’ that some forms of use have not been continued or not yet initiated.
In the rest of the cases, aspects related to timing, knowledge saturation, lack of
relevancy, resource scarcity and political context are described to alleviate the
need for flood hazard maps or for there being anything to apply them to. Per
management field (apart from non-structural alleviation, for which there were no
instances of admitted non-use), this looks as follows:
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- Technical protection: non-use due to plans for structural protection already
having been made or currently being implemented (i.e. timing), or due
to political cost-sharing challenges obstructing management altogether (i.e.
decision context);
- Emergency management: non-use since current plans already cover what
simulation results show (i.e. information saturation), because current prac-
tices and local experience suffice (i.e knowledge saturation), because risk is
low or the means to preventing damage lacking (i.e. translating into low
relevancy for there not being any need), or as a result of hazard maps not
covering the risk of highest concern (i.e. low relevancy);
- Risk communication: non-use for large-scale communication efforts due to
lack of human resources (i.e. political context), low risk (i.e. translating into
low relevancy for there not being any need), or sufficient local awareness (i.e.
knowledge saturation).
In contrast, when risk managers or experts refer to non-use elsewhere or at a more
aggregate level, this is more commonly framed as problematic and undesirable. A
‘regrettable’ lack of application is referred to in relation to all management fields
apart from technical protection (in relation to which usage is either thought of as
less relevant or still expected to follow over the next few years):
- Emergency management: non-use due to lack of awareness of legal require-
ments, general failure to prioritize crisis preparedness, change in local lead-
ership leading to new priorities (i.e. political context), lack of skill;
- Non-structural alleviation: under-use due to political priorities of growth,
expansion, trade-taxes, etc.;
- Risk communication: non-use for large-scale communication efforts due to
unwillingness to draw attention to bad news or not wanting people to doubt
that everything is under control, because of lack of skill and/or external
support, for the reason of not believing anybody to be interested in listening.
In effect, this means that, even if there is use in the direction of what official doc-
uments expect and prescribe in relation to all four management fields, there are
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also those who think that the level of use is too low and the impacts disappointing.
Rather than being enthusiastic about being provided with foresight information
and the ability of taking proactive action, political decision-makers and administra-
tive risk managers are noted to sometimes regard simulation results as a nuisance
respectively fail to see their benefit. In the field of risk communication, moreover,
there is not only a gap between the desired and observed level of application but
also between the desired and observed form of application. Though in theory
regarded as a suitable tool for awareness-raising for the sake of motivating more
risk acceptance, less reliance on public authorities and more self-responsibility for
flood protection, the situation in the interview sample is one of many local admin-
istrations actively avoiding such use or drawing on flood hazard maps to advocate
for a structural solution rather than for adaptation. Rather than regarding the
risk of flood hazard as something that the public has a right to know about and
act upon, it is treated as a political risk factor; something that can raise doubts
as to whether or not the administration is doing a good job. This is noteworthy
as it suggests a discrepancy between the official wish for risk management to be
regarded as a shared concern rather than as the responsibility of the public au-
thorities and the attitude and activities on the ground in the municipalities in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (cf. Kjellgren, 2013).
9.1.2 Factors affecting whether flood hazard maps are used
The second research question concerns what factors affect whether or not simula-
tion results are used. In this regard, one thing that the results show is that it is not
possible to specify a single main factor leading to use or non-use of flood hazard
maps. Instead, different management fields are characterized by different mixes of
factors. Somewhat simplified, one might say that in the field of technical protec-
tion flood hazard maps were used where an unexpectedly high risk was or had just
been discovered, whereas non-use was the outcome when a plan for dealing with an
undesirable risk level was already in place. In relation to emergency management,
low risk perception or already having a plan or ‘enough’ knowledge and experience
discouraged use, whereas a high risk perception and openness towards optimizing
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the local preparedness plan supported use. In the field of non-structural allevi-
ation, complete non-use was not present, but negative attitudes towards hazard
maps were thought to be linked to local political interests and a preference for
growth and expansion, whereas positive attitudes were tied to such tasks already
being performed and hazard maps thought to facilitate this. Regarding risk com-
munication, finally, the idea of using hazard maps for large-scale awareness-raising
was resisted where risk managers could not see what advantages this would bring
or expected negative results, whereas it was welcomed where risk communication
was associated with an opportunity rather than with a risk. At the same time,
especially the experts were of the view that there were also background factors of
a more general nature influencing map usage.
On a theoretical note, chapter 3 presented two different strains of ‘factors affecting’-
literature. On the one hand, it was suggested that research use depends on the
audience’s perception of findings as salient, credible and legitimate, whereby the
relevancy of the legitimacy category was also suggested to be somewhat question-
able. On the other hand, findings from the field of KU studies emphasize factors
related to personal characteristics, research characteristics (including relevancy
and research quality), user-producer linkage, and contextual factors. Thinking of
the results presented in chapter 7, there is support for each of these categories in
some kind of way:
Credibility: Flood hazard maps are regarded to be of high quality or a
better guide to flood risk than previous assessments, and this is noted to be
important for risk managers to want to use them;
Saliency: Cases of use are often associated with a perception of flood hazard
maps as salient for the task at hand or for having questioned the status
quo, whereas cases of non-use are sometimes linked to a perception of flood
hazard maps not showing anything new or covering the right form of risk
(i.e. suggesting that the content of the maps is of low relevancy) or there
not being any need for them or any real sense in using them (i.e. suggesting
that the external circumstances reduces their relevancy);
Legitimacy: Whether there is a history of trust or distrust between a mu-
nicipality and higher administrative levels (though this is not noticed to
Chapter 9. Discussion 207
affect the perception of the research process as fair as much as whether or
not the end-product is accepted as credible);
Personal characteristics: Risk managers with low skills are less able
to scrutinize flood hazard maps and make an informed assessment about
whether or not to trust them and can also lack the know-how about how
best to apply them;
Research characteristics: Apart from aspects related to quality and rel-
evancy, the flood hazard maps’ format is appreciated for making them user-
friendly;
User-producer linkage: Stakeholder involvement in the development and
design phase is noted to have helped create ownership and a product that
answers towards the intended users’ needs, while continuous contact through-
out the research process and a chance to review the draft maps before these
are finalized is something that facilitates acceptance of the end-product as
credible;
Context: What political interests dominate, the personal engagement of
local leaders, and whether or not local administrators champion flood simu-
lation results to be considered by the municipal council.
While supporting the relevancy of categories identified in previous literature, the
problem with such a list is that it fails to clarify the relationship between the
different components. Hence, a different way of organizing or making sense of the
empirical findings is required.
To this end, an inductive analysis was undertaken. The result of this is the propo-
sition of three overarching factors as important for whether or not flood hazard
maps will be used: (a) whether or not users perceive themselves to need hazard
information, (b) whether or not flood hazard maps are accepted as an appropriate
tool in this regard, and (c) whether or not contextual conditions and background
factors support or obstruct a perception of needing respectively accepting hazard
information. Hence, rather than being isolated from each other, these are aspects
which partially influence and depend on each other.
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a) Users’ perceived need for information
Throughout the interview material, there is a number of indications of it mattering
whether or not a risk manager perceives himself, or his community or management
field to need the kind of information provided by flood scenario simulation. In this
regard, not less than five different aspects were identified to play a role in the
interview material, reflecting that an outcome of use or non-use will rarely depend
on one factor but the consideration of many interlinked aspects.
First, risk perception mattered in the sense that risk managers who appraised the
threat of flooding as low (normally in terms of frequency and damage potential)
also perceived a low need for flood hazard maps in relation to a management
activity. In contrast, being or recently having been alerted to weaknesses in current
flood defenses (implying a change in risk perception from low to high) increased
an administration’s interest in hazard information. Hence, risk perception is not
a static category, but one that can suddenly change.
Second, risk managers’ attitude and/or openness towards a certain activity or
measure affected whether or not they perceived a need for hazard information.
A telling example of this is the effect of different attitudes towards large-scale
risk communication. In some municipalities, there was no expectation of such a
measure being effective or leading to anything positive, whereas, in other areas,
dialog was seen as a basis for good public relations; as something helpful. Another
example concerns the low interest in new evidence in areas where a management
plan was already in place or currently being implemented, reflecting a limited
openness to re-open already handled policy items. In this sense, attitude is both
about whether or not a management activity is expected to be effective and about
timing in the sense of whether or not it has already been crossed off the list.
Third, a risk manager’s assessment of viability of carrying out a certain activity
or of doing so successfully mattered. In the field of emergency management, for
example, interest in learning where flood damage is likely to occur was limited
by the fact that the fire brigade did not have the means to prevent it anyhow.
In other instances, lack of time and (e.g. human) resources meant that, even if
one would like to pursue a certain activity, it was not always regarded as possible.
Additionally, lack of know-how and external support were things which reduced
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the need for flood hazard maps if it meant that the audience did not know how to
use these in a good way and not end up making things worse.
Fourth, perceived sufficiency of already available information and knowledge played
a role in the sense of the need for hazard maps being lower where relatively up-
to-date hazard assessments were already available, respectively where experience
and established routines were thought to suffice. At the same time, this is not
necessarily a question of actual quantities; in some instances, much knowledge
and information was already present without this being regarded as sufficient or
as alleviating the relevancy of a new assessment.
Fifth and finally, awareness of legal requirements for a certain management activity
would sometimes produce a need for hazard information, whereas unawareness
of the same meant that both the target activity and the tool were regarded as
somewhat obsolete.
Apart from the last two points, the rest of this category bears certain likeness to
Protective Motivation Theory (e.g. Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). According
to this socio-psychological model, residents at risk will respond to a threat on the
basis of two major perceptual processes: ‘threat appraisal’ and ‘coping appraisal’.
The first of these consists of perceived probability and severity of exposure, to-
gether with a subcomponent of fear. The second consists of a person’s belief in
the effectiveness of protective actions, in their own ability to perform these, re-
spectively assumptions about what costs (money, time, effort) this would require.
b) Users’ acceptance and assessment of flood hazard maps as appropri-
ate information tools
Following the lead of previous literature, it does not suffice for there to be a need
for information, but the information that is available must also be perceived to
correspond to this need and to constitute a reliable source of information. In
regard to the flood hazard maps, the latter of these two criteria was not found to
constitute a problem to any of the interviewees whereas the former was something
of an issue in some instances.
All of the risk managers described the hazard maps to be of high quality and/or
to offer a credible representation of local flood hazard. In line with the description
Chapter 9. Discussion 210
in chapter 3, these actors’ arguments for sanctioning belief in the hazard maps’
credibility followed over different tracks, including efforts to assess the underlying
data, method and research effort, comparison with other sources of information,
and proxies of trusting the state or responsible engineers. For this reason, a
contaminated relationship with higher-level authorities was raised as something
that can obstruct acceptance.1
With regard to relevancy, a perception of flood hazard maps as a suitable tool
for a certain management activity was often – but not always – linked to use
whereas a perception of them being of limited relevancy for the same was linked
to non-use. Aspects that made the interviewed risk managers regard flood hazard
maps as suitable tools included: when simulation results reveal an unexpected
level or risk, thereby challenging the status quo; the provision of new or better
(as in more exact, reliable or up-to-date) information about local flood hazard
compared to previous assessments; and a format that makes the information easy
to access without requiring any extra work or departure from established routines.
In contrast, things that were perceived to reduce their relevancy included: that
they contain technical terminology about statistical return periods instead of gauge
level data that people are more familiar with; when they fail to cover sources of
flooding of local concern; and when their content fails to offer any new information
in comparison to what was already known.
c) Contextual conditions and background factors
Contextual conditions and background factors can affect risk managers’ perception
of needing hazard information respectively seeing flood hazard maps as a suitable
tool in both positive and negative ways. In this regard, the interview material
contained references to five different kinds of factors.
First, personal and agency interests are a form of contextual background factor
that affects local leaders’ priorities and interest in risk management. In some
areas, openness towards certain forms of management measures is limited because
these are perceived to stand in conflict with local political interests. Elsewhere,
1Though pre-existing mistrust is described by Mitchell et al. (2006a) as something that can
jeopardize the perception of research as legitimate, here it was found to be related to whether
or not hazard maps will be accepted as trustworthy rather than whether or not they should be
regarded as fair (i.e. reflecting on their credibility rather than on their legitimacy).
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risk management is part of the local agenda and political tradition, or part of
what the mayor defines as important (in which case the relationship between the
mayor and local council may also play a role in terms of affecting whose agenda
wins out). In this regard, there is a link between what the local interest definition
looks like and whether or not there is openness towards particular management
activities.
Second, flood experience is noted to affect both risk perception and the definition
of what lies in a community’s best interest. Frequently affected municipalities have
often learned to live with flood risk and, e.g., not be afraid of using hazard maps
for communication purposes. In contrast, municipalities lacking such experience
will not always regard it as necessary to invest time and effort into management
measures. Hence, the occurrence of a flood episode is something that can quickly
lead to a new kind of openness towards management reform.
Third, a community’s resources play a role in the sense of affecting whether par-
ticular management measures are (perceived to be) viable or not. In this regard,
a community’s size is sometimes of importance, as large administrations are often
able to employ more people with higher skill sets and as technical protection can
be too expensive for small townships.
Fourth, linkages and relations are important both for developing a product that
corresponds to the intended users’ needs and requirements and for increasing the
chances of it being accepted as methodologically sound. Considering that higher-
level authorities will sometimes serve as knowledge brokers between municipalities
and contracted engineering bureaus, furthermore, it matters whether the chances
of a constructive dialog are high or low in the sense of there being a good or a
strained relationship between different offices or levels. In the empirical material,
the following things related to user-producer linkage were specifically mentioned:
that the municipalities’ financial involvement created ownership; that the munic-
ipalities’ presence at the table from the start allowed them to express ideas and
needs in terms of content and design; that the municipalities’ involvement at sev-
eral different stages throughout the mapping process was productive; that the
Flood Partnerships offer institutional support in the form of information meetings
and a chance at best-practice exchange; and that the municipalities’ involvement
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in the plausibilization process reduces the risk of these containing errors while at
the same time allowing intended users to learn about and gain confidence in the
mapping method.
Fifth and finally, the legal framework can play an important role for research use in
the sense of making activities for which hazard maps constitute a relevant source of
input mandatory. In this sense, it has the capacity to overrule the necessity of users
being open towards a certain management activity or considering it worthwhile to
prioritize.
If the results of the empirical analysis are sorted in this way, it becomes clearer
what different kinds of deliberations and factors affect whether or not foresight
information is used while still recognizing the core importance of research being
perceived as credible and salient. In line with Protection Motivation Theory, the
implication of this is that instances of insufficient protection and preparedness
often cannot be alleviated through information provision alone. Though a mis-
takenly low risk perception is sometimes part of the picture, lack of action and
attention can also be related to local leaders not wanting to recognize risk as a
priority problem or to risk managers lacking the means or know-how for address-
ing the same. In the interview material, this is indirectly recognized and reflected
in statements emphasizing other measures and tools, too, as important for boost-
ing local management reform (e.g. the EU requirement for flood risk management
plans, the work pursued in the Flood Partnerships, and effects of different forms of
legal requirements and regulations). Moreover, the similarities between the com-
ponents of Protection Motivation Theory and the factors identified to affect risk
managers’ perception of needing information are interesting for indicating that not
only private actors but also public officers can suffer from low risk perception and
protective motivation.
9.1.3 Benefit and problems associated with flood hazard
maps
The final research question concerns the benefits and problems associated with
introducing flood hazard maps to be used by local-level risk managers. Even if
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there are no specific models or typologies of the positive effects of research use as
this is a somewhat under-studied topic (cf. James and Jorgensen, 2009), chapter
3 noted that research can, e.g., offer evidence, ideas and concepts; reduce areas
of uncertainty or lack of knowledge; confirm knowledge of tacit, local and indige-
nous character; identify issues requiring public policy or management attention;
guide and legitimize decision-making, etc. In addition, chapter 2 described graph-
ical formats to be associated with advantages in terms of being more immediate,
awakening more interest, being more convincing, etc. At the same time, there is
also the risk of non-use and of insensitive or misinformed use leading to negative
effects.
Looking at what the results chapters tell us about what the interviewees think of
the introduction of scenario simulation results as input to flood risk management,
we see that both the risk managers and experts offer predominantly positive as-
sessments of this. In the case of the risk managers, the reasoning in this regard
is relatively concrete, referring both to first-hand experiences and specific tasks
for which hazard maps are relevant. In contrast, the experts’ arguments are often
tied to hopes and expectations about what flood hazard maps will or should affect,
not only in regard to specific tasks and activities (i.e. instrumental use) but also
with regard to such conceptual and overarching effects as: higher risk awareness,
attitude change, higher priority for flood risk, shift in focus from flood control to
adaptation, more municipal cooperation, etc. This points to a difference between
the two groups in the sense of risk managers mostly appreciating simulation-based
flood hazard maps for supporting risk management as it currently works, whereas
the experts often focus on what access to graphical foresight information might
change about local-level flood risk management, framing it as a tool for imple-
menting a new management paradigm.
Regarding what benefits are observed and experienced, more concretely, many of
these do indeed correspond to the aspects noted in chapter 3. They concern flood
scenario simulation’s usefulness for providing some form of information advantage
compared to previously available evidence, offering guidance and relevant input to
decision-making and planning, and being helpful for legitimizing and promoting
favored management solutions internally and externally. In short, this category
can be referred to as benefits of knowledge, guidance and persuasion. An overview
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Figure 9.1: Overview of main benefits identified
of the main forms of benefit within each of these categories is included in Figure
9.1.
These benefits largely correspond to the functions that scientific knowledge is tra-
ditionally expected to fulfill. At the same time, they do not represent the full
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picture. In addition to the more expected benefits, there were also several advan-
tages mentioned which are best categorized as benefits of pressure and restriction.
Amongst the risk managers, these mostly consisted of flood hazard maps limiting
the capacity of local political actors to disregard the threat of flooding in favor
of other interests, respectively that reliance on a scientific method which it is dif-
ficult to question limits the chances of local land-owners and business interests
to argue against floodplain designation. Similarly, external observers emphasize
that the threat of being held accountable for not having taken action in spite of
knowing of the risk of flood hazard pressures local administrations to become more
active, and that basing hazard assessments on simulation technology removes the
floodplain designation process from the municipalities’ sphere of influence, lim-
iting their chances of manipulating it. Additionally, by alleviating the need to
negotiate the floodplains with the municipalities, the introduction of automatic
land-use restrictions for areas shown to be at risk from a certain flood scenario is
observed to have helped the state place larger areas under protection more quickly
than what would have otherwise been possible.
In effect, this means that one can differentiate between flood hazard maps’ overt
purpose of supporting local flood risk management and a more latent function of
pressuring local administrations to acknowledge flood hazard and restricting their
ability to ignore this and prioritize other interests.
In terms of the interviewees’ overall assessments of the hazard maps, reservations
and critical remarks commonly concerned that these are associated with high
costs and efforts, suggesting that cost-benefit balance might not always add up
(especially where flood risk is low or much information already available). Since
these aspects were mentioned in both interview groups, both risk managers and
experts can be said to find flood hazard maps good in principle, while at the same
time recognizing that there are also places and circumstance under which they
make less sense. For less aﬄuent states, this implies an implicit recommendation to
take the time to evaluate where hazard frequency, exposure and damage potential
justify hazard mapping rather than to map all waterways per default.
With regard to actual problems, two things were mentioned: first, that flood
hazard maps are under-used or not having as much impact as hoped for, and,
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second, that their arrival is also associated with a risk of unintended negative
effects. Concerning the latter point, actual experiences of negative effects were
rare. What dominated the interview material, instead, was concern about the
possibility of hazard information producing negative effects (primarily in terms of
private actors being disproportionately affected by impacts on real estate prices,
insurance conditions or building rights). With regard to the former point, this
shows that it is not how the hazard maps are used that is causing concern, but
the issue of whether they are applied to help improve local risk management in
the first place. For example, many local administrations are perceived to do little
beyond what is formally required, to continue to prioritize other interests, and to
still need to experience flooding first hand to become motivated to act.
To summarize, this means that, where they are used, the results of flood scenario
simulation are appreciated for supporting and improving local flood risk manage-
ment in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Contrary to how the idea of acting in foresight
rather than hindsight is sometimes framed in theory, though, the way they do
this is not necessarily by triggering comprehensive reform or a novel interest in
risk management where this was lacking. Instead, it is often by helping risk man-
agers and administrations for whom and which risk management was already on
the agenda to do better what they were basically interested in doing anyway that
flood hazard maps are perceived to make a difference.
9.2 Implications for the overall research interest
Regarding problems reported in academic papers about non-experts’ dealings with
simulation results, this means two things.
The risk of over-criticalness leading to non-use: Although flood hazard
maps are indeed found to be somewhat vulnerable to problems of under-usage,
there is nothing in the interview material that ties this to risk managers taking
an over-critical approach to scenario simulation or to a lack of confidence in flood
modeling. Though there is recognition in the expert group for lack of confidence
being something that could constitute a problem, e.g. if users are confronted with
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hazard assessments which do not correspond to local experience without this be-
ing explained, active efforts are perceived to keep this risk in check. For example,
official directives specifying detailed requirements for the scenario simulation and
mapping processes lower the risk of assessment results of questionable quality be-
ing issued. Moreover, the involvement of the municipalities in the plausibilization
process contributes to lower the risk of errors being overseen, at the same time as
it allows the target audience to learn of and confirm the quality of flood simulation
output. Hence, local credibility doubts can normally be resolved in a process of
constructive dialog, and it is only where the hazard maps are resisted for polit-
ical reasons that the presence of disagreement and scientific uncertainty become
ammunition in a battle against research use.
The risk of under-criticalness leading to misuse: Though there are a couple
of comments about negative effects, none of these can be tied to flood hazard maps
having been misused. Generally, there are no experiences or observations of flood
simulation results being used in questionable or problematic ways. Yet, this is
not the same as to say that there are no indications of under-critical acceptance.
Although local officials are generally thought to be aware of the presence of some
uncertainty, it is also noted that small communities rarely posses the competence
to engage in constructive dialog as to what underlies the displayed predictions
or how plausible these are. Among the risk managers, this was corroborated by
the fact that some interviewees had never contemplated the credibility of flood
hazard maps prior to being asked or actual flooding occurring. In theory, this
implies a risk of inferring safety where this may not be justified with regard to
the assumptions and uncertainties underlying the displayed flood lines, and a risk
of black-box use in the sense of hazard maps being drawn on for planning and
decision-making without consideration for simulation imprecision. Rather than
regarding this as a potential problem, however, uncritical acceptance was largely
‘sanctioned’ by the expert group. Not only was it regarded as unrealistic to expect
local-level actors to comprehend the details of scenario simulation but it was also
portrayed as a lesser evil to over-trust simulation results than to under-trust and
reject them. This, in turn, was rationalized both with reference to flood simulation
results in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg being generally reliable and with reference to it not
being clear what negative effects could come out of black-box use.
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In effect, this means that there is a discrepancy between what academic literature
frames as problematic in relation to non-experts’ use of simulation output, gener-
ally, and the views of experts in science, engineering and policy when it comes to
risk managers’ use of simulation-based flood hazard maps, specifically. Particu-
larly, the latter group rejects the idea of misuse due to insufficient understanding
of simulation uncertainty as a central form of risk. What they would possibly
regard as problematic is the fact that the growing availability and increasing user-
friendliness of simulation software means that anyone can produce output data –
including people without the necessary training and knowledge or the right kind
of understanding and respect for what it takes to produce a good simulation.
This gives rise to a new puzzle, namely: how can it be that what is pointed out as
a problem in theory is regarded as a non-issue in practice? Is it only in the case
of flood hazard maps that under-critical acceptance is unproblematic? Or only in
the case of local-level flood risk management?
Chapter 10
Excursion: Alpine hazard
simulation in Austria
10.1 Motivation, method and material
According to (Esaiasson et al., 2005, pp. 147), the value and interest of exploratory
research can be raised if the author does not satisfy with presenting inductively
generated ideas and hypotheses but makes an additional effort to check whether
there is any kind of support for these in other material. This can, e.g., be done
by having a look at what available data at the aggregate level suggests or by
collecting a small amount of new data from another context. Inspired by this
recommendation, a way of collecting more data on the use of computer simulation
of natural hazards was sought. Following a telephone call resulting in an invitation
to learn about alpine hazard simulation in Austria, the chance was taken to do
a small excursion into scenario prediction of avalanches, debris flow and torrents.
In the end, seven face-to-face interviews were conducted, covering both technical
details in respect to computer modeling and the use of output data for public and
private risk management.1
Most of the Austrian interviewees worked in research, developing and running
computer models to answer basic or commissioned research questions, or doing
1An eight interview was made but never analyzed. The reason for this was that it concerned
decision input based purely on statistical data, which is not what this dissertation focuses on.
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hazard simulations for expert opinions (‘Gutachten’ in German) or hazard zone
maps. Additionally, one actor working at a regional office of the Austrian Ser-
vice for Avalanche and Torrent Control (‘Wildbach- und Lawinenverbauung’ in
German) responsible for public risk management, including hazard zoning and
technical protection, was interviewed. Through his work, he was familiar with
simulation programs and simulation output, but also with other methods of haz-
ard assessment. A conscious decision was taken not to interview any local-level
users or private clients commissioning hazard simulations, but to focus on tech-
nical experts and the questions of whether and when there is a risk of misuse or
confidence-related non-use and who must know what about simulation uncertainty
to ensure ‘good’ use of hazard simulation?
Since the opportunity to collect data in Austria turned up before the analysis of
the material from Baden-Wu¨rttemberg was done, it was not possible to formulate
interview questions to ‘test’ the findings made in Germany. Instead, all interviews
were conducted in a relatively open manner, where the interview partners were
asked about what they do, what experiences they have made of the simulation-
management nexus, and what they can tell about the role of simulation uncer-
tainty. As long as the informants stayed somewhat on topic, the interview guide
was sparsely used. In this way, data was collected on a wide range of issues,
allowing for a broad reflection on the topic of interest.2
When it comes to the analysis, this followed more than a year later, after the
coding of the German data was done. It was relatively targeted in character in the
sense of consciously looking for descriptions confirming, contradicting or helping
us understand the findings made in relation to flood hazard maps. All relevant
passages were summarized, first once and then again, allowing for a step-wise
reduction of the data material until the core messages emerged. These would
not always reflect the original language anymore but be freely formulated. To
allow for traceability, an excel sheet was used where the original text was placed
in the left-most column and each step of summary shown in its own column to
2All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed by a native speaker. The only
exception concerns a half-hour or so talk held with one of the researchers upon the day of arrival
– i.e. prior to the ‘real’ interview held the next day. This conversation was not recorded. Instead,
the hand-written notes from this talk were proofread later the same day and written out on a
computer after the journey’s conclusion. When a reference is made to this material below, it
will be marked ‘notes from pre-interview talk’.
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the right. Eventually, the core messages from the different interviews were placed
in a separate sheet to allow for more direct comparison and overview. Before it
is revealed what this overview showed, though, it should be explained in which
ways the Austrian context diverges from the case of flood hazard maps in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg and how this matters for the exploration.
10.1.1 Contrasts between alpine and riverine hazard sim-
ulation
A first thing to note about alpine hazard simulation is that it represents a greater
scientific challenge compared to the simulation of riverine flooding. When it comes
to avalanches and debris flow, for example, it still remains somewhat unknown how
snow and debris behave physically. Hence, a model has to calculate what goes on
in a cloud of snow or debris rushing down a slope without us completely under-
standing what the internal process actually looks like. Indeed, when it comes to
avalanches, the science community is not even completely sure about what causes
them. That the three-day-sum of snowfall in meters is a main input is mainly
a result of practice, and the likely point of departure must still be manually as-
sumed. Moreover, different countries focus on different output data. In Austria,
run-out length is defined over pressure, but elsewhere a combination of pressure
and deposition height is used. For debris flow, on the other hand, the variability in
terms of the size of stones and amount of clay involved means that the same model
may not be suitable for all scenarios. In contrast to avalanche simulation, more-
over, there are no calibrated standard parameters to rely on. Torrents, finally, are
difficult to simulate because the catchment areas are mostly very small (implying
higher levels of uncertainty) and because data is scarce. According to one of the
interviewees, there are gauging stations for less than one percent of Austria’s over
10.000 mountain streams. Consequently, it is difficult to use measurement data
to determine what value a statistically defined design event corresponds to, espe-
cially since there are only around 30 years of observations (compared to around
100 years for some of the waterways in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg).
Lack of data is a problem, generally. Small events in uninhabited areas are rarely
registered unless some form of damage emerges. That not all events are recorded
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makes it difficult to define a design event and also implies a limited number of
well-documented hazard episodes to use for model calibration. For avalanches,
hence, model parameters are often calibrated on the basis of particular types of
events, although they will then be used to simulate all kinds of avalanches. When
a simulation is run, furthermore, there will not always be much empirical data to
use for comparison to get a sense of how well the model output fits with reality.
In comparison with riverine flooding, then, alpine hazard simulation is generally
associated with larger model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty and data uncer-
tainty. Ultimately, it can difficult to assess even within which dimensions they lie.
For the study at hand, this means that data is collected on the use of less certain
simulation results, allowing us to reflect on whether or not the size of uncertainty
matters for whether hazard simulation is thought to be vulnerability to problems
of misuse and/or lack of user-confidence.
More differences compared to the material collected in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg con-
cern the output and information products generated and the different users of
these. For one thing, only one scenario is simulated, namely that of an event with
a statistical return period of once in 150 years. For another thing, we can dis-
tinguish between direct users of simulation output and users of simulation-based
information products such as expert opinions and hazard zone maps.
To explain this, we can begin with a look at the hazard maps produced. These
are published by the Austrian Service for Avalanche and Torrent Control and
are normally based on a combination of simulation results and the professional
knowledge of actors with long practical experience of hazard estimation. In the
maps, red and yellow zones are defined, representing high and mid-level hazard,
for which different types of binding land-use restrictions apply. Apart from plans
in paper and electronic format, a mapping tool is by now available online, showing
the hazard zones for all of Austria.3 During a period of public display, anyone
is free to study the map proposal and put in a formal objection if something
is thought to be wrong. All complaints are reviewed by a commission and, if
an objection is found to be scientifically valid, the maps must be worked over
and the public review process repeated. Apart from introducing binding land-use
3For floods see http://www.naturgefahren.at/karten/hochwasser/karte.html, and for
avalanches see http://www.naturgefahren.at/karten/lawine/karte.html.
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restrictions, hazard maps are also supplied to local administrations for the purpose
of supporting their risk management efforts. Hence, we can differentiate between
two types of users. First, there are the practitioners (or civil servant risk managers)
in the regional offices of the Service for Avalanche and Torrent Control, who use
the direct output of a simulation inquiry as input to hazard zoning but also as a
basis for decision-making about where to build and how to dimension structural
defense installations. Indeed, such actors will sometimes themselves have access
to simple software programs and be able to run their own simulations. Second,
there are land-user planners responsible for regional development issues, local-
level decision-makers and risk managers, and residents and business-owners, all of
which constitute end-users or potential end-users of the information contained in
simulation-based hazard zone maps.
Turning to expert opinions, these are often commissioned by private actors and
publicly-owned service providers working in ways similar to that of private busi-
nesses. Expert opinions are used as input to building and construction decisions
(e.g. for planning roads, railroads, power lines, structural protection measures,
or deciding where to place a new ski lift system), and are sometimes even legally
required for obtaining a building permit. Both research institutes and private
engineering bureaus can produce expert opinions. Apart from some form of rep-
resentation of the simulation results, expert opinions will also include a formal
interpretation of the results. Consequently, what is eventually used will not only
or necessarily be simulation results in a graphical format but can also be numerical
output or the written account of what the simulation is interpreted to show.
For the study at hand, this implies a chance to explore whether different products,
formats or user groups are particularly vulnerable to problems related to over-or
under-critical approaches to simulation output and simulation-based information
products.
10.2 Simulation as input to risk-management
Before reviewing the interviewees’ experiences in regard to different actors’ use of
simulation-based hazard assessments, their views of alpine hazard simulation in
Chapter 10. Excursion: Alpine hazard simulation in Austria 224
general shall be explored. In this regard, it would appear that many interviewees
perceive a form of dilemma in respect to modeling and simulation. On the one
hand, predictive research is associated with clear and concrete benefits. On the
other hand, simulation output is difficult to interpret and non-experts are often
challenged in this regard, running the risk of sanctioning belief in findings of low
quality just because these look convincing.
10.2.1 Benefits...
Unquestionably, computer models constitute a valuable complement to other meth-
ods of hazard assessment such as historical documentation, expert-based estimates
or the results of non-numerical mathematical equations. Even if a simulation can
be wrong and much interpretation of the results is necessary, the possibility of
using simulation technology still represents a quantum leap in the eyes of the
regional-level risk manager in interview A22:
[E]s ist so, dass diese, diese Lawinenmodelle eben diese, diese Gela¨nde-
abha¨ngigkeit sehr stark zeigen. [. . . ] [Und] was da dann links oder
rechts außen passiert, das hat man nie gewusst. Also das war immer
nur ein La¨ngenschnitt. Und mit diesem 2D zum Teil 3D Modellen
bekommt man jetzt also ein, ein fla¨chig-ra¨umliches Bild. Und da muss
ich schon sagen, also das hat enorm viel gebracht, also da kriegt man
eine gewisse Sicherheit. Wobei es auch nicht immer stimmen muss,
also es ist immer die Interpretation notwendig. Aber das hat schon
viel gebracht. [...] Es war, es war wirklich ein, ein Quantensprung in,
in, in der, in der, in der Berechnung von diesen Pha¨nomenen. (IA22E,
00:24:16-7)
As IA23E points out, a simulation run can help a simulationist or producer of
hazard maps or expert opinions see things that he or she might otherwise have
missed and remained unaware of:
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Wofu¨r es gut geeignet ist, meiner Meinung nach, ist halt als Entschei-
dungsunterstu¨tzung fu¨r [...] Expertengutachten. Wenn man halt vielle-
icht in der Simulation Sachen sieht, die man halt eben im Gela¨nde
draußen aus, aus verschiedenen Gru¨nden halt nicht unbedingt gesehen
hat. (IA23E, 00:09:19-6)
Representing a way of drawing general conclusions on the basis of all available
historical and empirical evidence, a simulation run will not only indicate the run-
out length of, e.g., an assumed avalanche scenario but also the predicted width
of the affected area. Furthermore, regional-level risk managers are helped by the
way simulations shows how sensitive avalanches are to local terrain conditions.
As IA22E puts it, simulation technology is something that allows practitioners
to look with two pairs of eyes instead of one; that of experience and professional
knowledge and that of a numerical calculation. Moreover, where no or very little
documentation or local experience is present, such as in a previously uninhabited
area for example, simulation technology offers a possibility to nevertheless get
an idea of the hazard situation and whether or not development there might be
tolerable:
Und was auch, es ist natu¨rlich, dass jetzt ha¨ufig in Gebieten gebaut
wird oder etwas erschlossen wird, wo fru¨her keine Lawinen, wo also
keiner gesiedelt hat oder nichts gebaut wurde. Und das Gebiet ist dann
sehr unbekannt. Also hat man auch keine historische Dokumentation,
wo man belegen kann, hier ist eine Lawine herunter gegangen. Man
weiß es einfach nicht. Und da spielen dann glaube ich die Simulation,
werden in Zukunft auch eine gro¨ßere Rolle spielen. Weil das dann
schon irgendwie, man vielleicht das eventuell dann besser abscha¨tzen
kann... (IA21E, 00:29:18-0)
Where much experience and documentation are present, on the other hand, run-
ning a simulation will not necessarily reveal anything that an expert could not
tell as well. (Possibly, it is associated with the advantage of model errors be-
ing systematic and therefore quantifiable, whereas an expert will not make the
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same misjudgment twice, but sometimes overestimate and sometimes underesti-
mate (IA20E, 00:12:53-8).) Consequently, some regional-level risk managers are
skeptical of using computer models and simulation results, arguing that they are
easy to manipulate, associated with large uncertainties, and not bringing any
added value anyway. And yet the popularity and use of simulation programs are
growing. Not because the use of a computer model will necessarily result in a
better hazard assessment, as IA24E explains it, but because of the traceability
that they offer. Whereas what underlies a professional estimate based on long
practical experience is difficult to make explicit and substantiate, everything that
went into and came out of a simulation model can be documented:
[A]lso der Unterschied zwischen Modellierung und den Erfahrungswerten
der Wildbachverbauer, der Praktiker, ist nicht exorbitant groß. [. . . ]
[V]iele alte Wildbachverbauer sagen: ‘Dazu ha¨tten wir jetzt kein Mod-
ell gebraucht. Das ha¨tten wir so auch gewusst.’ Nur das Wissen alleine
hat, reicht heute nicht aus. Weil dieses Wissen kann man behaupten,
dass man es hat, aber sehr schwer nachweisen... (IA24E, 01:16:40-9)
According to IA24E, it is no longer sufficient to ‘know’ and to draw a line in a
map based on knowledge that others cannot scrutinize. After all, expert knowledge
is uncertain and vulnerable to the influence of external pressure, too, as IA20E
points out (00:12:53-8). Thus, what drives the societal demand for simulation
results is the growing need for public authorities to be able to substantiate and
document assessments and decisions for the sake of accountability if something
goes wrong; public officials must safeguard themselves much more today than just
a few decades ago:
[I]ch glaube, dass ein ganz maßgeblicher Faktor auch die rechtliche Ab-
sicherung des Praktikers ist. Wenn, fru¨her [...] eine staatliche Beho¨rde,
die das dann entscheidet, die wurden ja nicht hinterfragt. [...] Aber
mittlerweile, in allen Bereichen des Lebens, von Amerika kommend
schlagen die Rechtssysteme immer mehr... zuru¨ck und sagen: ‘Ja,
Entschuldigung. Da hat doch jemand etwas entschieden und wie ist
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denn der der u¨berhaupt auf das gekommen.’ Und wenn jemand betrof-
fen ist und einen Schaden hat und nachweisen kann rechtlich, dass die
Beho¨rde da nicht nach Stand der Wissenschaft entschieden hat, dann
wird es fu¨r die Beho¨rde schon enger. [...] [D]ie Praktiker wissen schon,
man muss sich besser absichern. [...] Und dafu¨r sind die Modelle als
Instrumentarium. (IA24E, 00:42:50-8)
Supporting that a growing pressure for accountability is one of the drivers of
simulation demand, IA21E says:
Also es ist sicher so, dass also das ha¨ufiger, auch wenn es zu einem
Unfall kommt oder so, das danach gefragt wird: “Ihre Entscheidung,
worauf basiert sie? Ha¨tte man, wenn man jetzt eine Simulation oder ein
Prognosemodell gehabt ha¨tte, was wa¨re dabei herauskommen?” Also
das stimmt. Also das ist sicher so, dass es abgesichert werden muss
heutzutage. Bei den Lawinensimulationsmodellen ist es aber auch,
die werden glaube ich schon auch dazu verwendet, um seine eigene
Entscheidung also noch einmal zu u¨berdenken. [...] [W]enn jetzt bei
einer Simulation, man sieht, dass jetzt bei der Lawine einen Lawinen-
arm auf einmal irgendwo in eine andere Richtung schwenkt, schaut man
sich den Bereich dann vor Ort noch einmal genauer an und u¨berlegt:
Kann das sein? (IA21E, 00:27:47-0)
In summary, this means that the benefit of alpine hazard simulation lies partially
in improving experts’ capacity to estimate hazard, providing them with an extra
pair of eyes and facilitating appraisal where data is scarce. The other part of it
lies in helping those responsible for producing hazard assessments to document the
basis of these and thereby making them more likely to hold up against eventual
questioning. Ultimately, this supports the view that what fuels societal demand
for computer modeling is not only their predictive capacity but also the need for
a rational basis for decision-making.
Regarding the specific possibility of using hazard simulation for introducing legal
land-use restrictions, furthermore, this is associated with the benefit of reducing
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the space for non-experts to influence the assessment of where construction should
be permissible or not:
In O¨sterreich ist zum Beispiel, die oberste Baubeho¨rde ist der Bu¨rger-
meister. [. . . ] Und der Bu¨rgermeister, wir haben sehr viele kleine
Gemeinden, der ist sehr ha¨ufig befangen. Wir sprechen immer vom
Bock und Ga¨rtner Problem. Wenn man den Bock zum Ga¨rtner macht,
braucht man sich nicht wundern, wenn der Salat fehlt. Wenn der
Bu¨rgermeister seinem Sohn eine Baubewilligung erteilt... in einem
Bereich, wo er es nicht ha¨tte sollen... Wen wundert es? Bei der
Gefahrenzonenplanung, die ist bewusst sehr weit weg angesiedelt. Und
das ist sehr gut so... Weil eben diese perso¨nlichen Befangenheit meist
nicht greifen ko¨nnen. (IA24E, 01:11:44-6)
Even if this kind of benefit is not limited to hazard zone maps based on scenario
simulation, it does show that it is partially the need to reduce local influence over
hazard assessment that underlies the need to base this on a traceable scientific
method – just like in regard to floodplains in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. The fact that
zoning decisions will often have large effects on real estate values4 means that civil
servants must try to make these as incontestable as possible and make sure that
they hold up to public scrutiny. As I22E points out, “it [the hazard zoning – Ed.]
is quite, quite laboriously produced precisely for the reason that it is known that it
is a huge intervention in private property.” (00:34:04-7). The better an authority
can under-build its zoning assessment with computer models, the better it can
rebut eventual objections, IA24E points out, and “accordingly, the planner must
also invest very much work to document and substantiate it as well as possible.”
(01:32:49-8).
Ultimately, then, simulation both supports higher-level practitioners’ hazard as-
sessments and helps them document and defend these outwardly, making risk
4Though loss of insurance coverage or higher premiums are a less commonly mentioned side-
effect compared to the case in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (inter alia because people living in certain
areas are already excluded from insurance), falling property values are nevertheless thought to
be problematic, e.g. due to the prospect of not have enough banking collateral anymore to cover
one’s loans. Hence, private people often attempt to question the draft hazard zone maps during
the public display period as a final attempt to prevent or at least delay their arrival.
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managers less vulnerable to accountability claims and the zoning less vulnerable
to manipulation.
10.2.2 ...and problems?
There are several reasons why computer models are perceived to be complex tools
to handle with care. First of all, the quality of the output is completely dependent
on the quality of the input: garbage in – garbage out. Furthermore, most models
have a number of different wheels to turn, each of which will affect the end-result.
In this regard, not only mischievous manipulation is a risk but also that this will
happen accidentally or undeliberately. To this comes that, as soon as a model is
somewhat complex, a non-expert running a simulation program will not always be
able to fully comprehend or follow how a certain result was obtained. In IA24E’s
view, this means that some models should require a ‘weapons license’ to run since
one cannot trust the output without knowing the process:
Eigentlich braucht man fu¨r viele Modelle einen Waffenschein... weil
es bei vielen Modellen von den Parametern, alleine schon von der
Parametrisierung und dem ganzen Modellablauf dahinter fu¨r viele An-
wender nicht mehr mo¨glich ist zu sehen, was tut denn dieses Modell
u¨berhaupt. (IA24E, 00:16:38-7)
Ein Modell ist ha¨ufig nur so gut, wie sein Anwender. Und das Gut ist
jetzt meistens viel auf Erfahrung bezogen. Ein Modellanwender, der
nicht weiß, was das Modell eigentlich tut und irgendwas herein schu¨ttet
und irgendetwas heraus kriegt, wenn der ein Vertrauen in das Ergebnis
hat, dann wu¨rde ich sagen, hat er das Thema verfehlt. Dann ist er fehl
am Platz. (IA24E, 01:26:50-0)
Even if the visual format of simulation results means that they appear easy to
interpret, IA19E says that one cannot really know what a picture is supposed to
tell unless one also understands what input data and model was used to produce
it. Only when one comprehends the limitations and uncertainties of the building
parts will one be able to also understand the end-product:
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[W]ie man zu diesem Bild gekommen ist, ist meiner Meinung nach
einer der wichtigsten Punkte, um dieses Bild u¨berhaupt interpretieren
zu ko¨nnen. [...] Und da geht es dann wieder um das Modell, aber
auch sogar um die Numerik. Da geht es eigentlich um alles. [...] Weil
wenn ich nicht weiß, [...] wo die Grenzen davon sind oder wie das
ganze u¨berhaupt funktioniert, finde ich perso¨nlich es schwierig, so et-
was richtig interpretieren zu ko¨nnen. (IA19E, 01:13:16-2)
The problem is that through the visualization of simulation results in a graphical
user interface, the output becomes so convincing that people risk believing what
they see even without any confirmation as to its quality or credibility. The more
convincing the format and the less experienced the user, the higher the risk of un-
critical acceptance without the necessary scrutiny or control. A colorful visualiza-
tion will thus make it difficult for non-experts to differentiate between simulation
output of low quality, for which there may not actually be much support, and sim-
ulation output of high quality resulting from a careful research process. In IA20E’s
view, this makes computer simulation somewhat deceptive, as simulation results
without empirical significance may still be adopted as confirmed ‘knowledge’:
Also wir haben sehr oft das Thema, dass halt bunte, scho¨ne Bilder [. . . ]
wo die Drucke oder irgendetwas dargestellt ist, vermitteln irgendwie
dem Betrachter: Ja, das ist die Wirklichkeit. Oder das ist die Lawine,
die geht (...). Das ist so. Wenn ich das selber einfach hinschreiben
wu¨rde und wu¨rde sagen: ‘An Punkt X ist Druck mit 15 Kilopascal und
so weiter’, das darf man halt in Frage stellen. [...] Aber halt, wenn
du ein scho¨nes, buntes Bild hast, gerade bei so Entscheidungstra¨gern
oder so, die, das ko¨nnen sie herzeigen oder das kann er sagen seinem
Bu¨rger, wenn er kommt. Da sagt er: ‘Da schau her, die Lawinen, das
ist simuliert worden. Das schaut so aus.’ Und das ist halt tru¨gerisch,
weil sozusagen ein buntes Bild teilweise halt nicht viel aussagen muss.
Aber die Akzeptanz halt sehr, sehr hoch ist dann davon. (IA20E,
00:42:55-1)
Especially amongst lay-people, who lack expertise both when it comes to modeling
and alpine hazards, this form of uncritical acceptance is thought to be common:
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Je laienhafter jemand ist, umso mehr glaubt er diesen Bildern. Vor
allen Dingen, wenn sie sich bewegen. [. . . ] Das u¨berzeugt natu¨rlich.
Und je mehr man weiß, umso, und je intensiver man sich mit dem
Pha¨nomen bescha¨ftigt, umso kritischer wird man natu¨rlich. Und sieht
nicht nur die scho¨nen Farben und die tollen, eindrucksvollen Filme,
sondern weiß natu¨rlich, dass das Ganze sehr grob ist [...] [I]m Grunde
ist, sind die Experten schon wesentlich kritischer. (IA22E, 01:45:21-4)
While on the one hand constituting a useful complement to other assessment
methods, then, simulation is on the other hand also associated with a risk in the
sense of its output seeming more convincing than the model and data warrant and
this not being recognized by under-critical audiences. So far, the Austrian experts
largely mirror the analysis presented in chapter 2. The question is whether this
relationship between convincing output and a risk of misuse is also observed to give
rise to problems in practice, or whether it is most of all a problem of theoretical
nature.
10.3 Different audiences’ responses to simulated
hazard assessments
In the following three sections, it will reviewed how different target audiences are
thought to respond to hazard assessments based on computer simulation, and how
important it is thought to be for them to consider the uncertain nature of hazard
simulation in their use of such information.
10.3.1 Regional development planners and local leaders
Because the product the most similar to riverine flood hazard maps in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg are alpine hazard zone maps, this section will begin with a review
of how these are received, though one or two comments will also touch upon
simulation-results of a less binding character. Beginning with regional develop-
ment planners, these are not thought to concern themselves with the issue of what
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underlies the derived hazard zones but to accept these in trust of the source, i.e.
the Austrian Service for Avalanche and Torrent Control:
[F]u¨r die Raumordnung sind die, die Simulationsergebnisse eigentlich
uninteressant. [...] [W]ie wir zu unseren roten und gelben Zonen kom-
men, das ist relativ uninteressant. Die, die trauen uns da u¨bern Weg
und, und u¨bernehmen dann die Zonenpla¨ne eigentlich, naja, ich will
nicht sagen in blindem Vertrauen, aber doch im Vertrauen. (IA22E,
01:27:57-6)
Rather than making some kind of concession to the uncertain nature of simulation-
based hazard assessment such as adding some kind of buffer when designating
development zones, construction is normally allowed right up to the yellow line
(IA20E, 00:28:32-0). Hence, even if they know and are told about the presence of
uncertainty, they are not observed to do anything particularly to account for this:
SK: Ist es den Raumplanern bewusst, dass es eigentlich, dass es eigentlich
schwierig ist, eine Linie zu ziehen? 01:31:35-5
IA22E: Ich glaube schon, ja. Also wir kommunizieren das auch immer
wieder. Also so diese Dinge, also ja, große Unsicherheiten (...). Also
das wird kommuniziert. Das wissen sie schon, die mit uns zu tun
haben. 01:31:53-7
SK: Wird das auch beru¨cksichtigt? 01:31:58-4
IA22E: Wird nicht beru¨cksichtigt. Nein, das wird, kann man nicht
beru¨cksichtigen. Das ist eben diese, diese Linie ist einfach notwendig,
dass man sagt, o.k. mit sehr hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit bleibt sie dort
dann auch wirklich stehen. [...] 01:33:24-6
Moving on to public decision-makers at the local level, the presence of simulation
uncertainty is not observed to give rise to much discussion here either. Most of
the time, mayors are not thought to comprehend where the depicted hazard lines
come from but to simply accept these as given, in trust of the higher authorities’
competence:
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Wenn es der Bu¨rgermeister als Baubeho¨rde ist, der weiß wahrscheinlich
nicht, was jetzt genau hinter dieser Linie steckt. Was wurde da mod-
elliert? Mit welchem Modell? Mit welcher Scha¨rfe? Mit welchem In-
put? Der muss sich darauf verlassen, dass die vorgeschaltete Beho¨rde,
die, die das erarbeitet hat, dementsprechend nach besten Wissen und
Gewissen das produziert hat. Ich glaube mittlerweile, dass das, die
meisten auch so annehmen... (IA24E, 01:29:02-8)
According to IA22E, mayors are mostly glad about receiving a document that
gives them information and arguments. A hazard zone map is something solid
that a mayor can point to in order to resist pressure from actors wanting to build
in hazard zones. Moreover, it can be used to support crisis management planning
by showing where evacuated people may be brought to. But, of course, there are
also those who resist them for how they devalue the real estate prices the red zone:
Ja, die Bu¨rgermeister sind meistens sehr froh, weil sie eine gewisse
Sicherheit haben und Argumente. Der Bu¨rgermeister ist ja fu¨r die
Sicherheit in der Gemeinde zusta¨ndig und das ist ein Hilfsmittel fu¨r
ihn. Er kann sagen, schaut, das ist der Zonenplan. Also, da braucht
ihr nicht fragen wegen einer Umwidmung. [...] Und tut sich auch
leichter im Fall von irgendwelchen Krisen. [...]. Es gibt natu¨rlich auch
Leute, die das absolut nicht wollen, weil natu¨rlich da die rote Zone
einen Baugrund enorm entwertet. (IA22E, 00:34:04-7)
Giving an example of a less positive form of response, IA21E (notes from pre-
interview talk) describes how a mayor in a neighboring country was not grateful
for the warning that a newly designated building area would end up in the red zone
according to the hazard simulations. Instead of looking for an alternative location,
things were hurried up so that, by the time the hazard zone maps were finished,
the area was already built-up. Likewise, simulation results that there is no legal
obligation to account for are rarely welcomed by local leaders and politicians, as
these tend to prefer a focus on local business interests due to close ties with the
private sector:
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Sehr ha¨ufig oder ich wu¨rde sagen meistens sind die Lokalpolitiker,
also Gemeindechefs, Gemeindeorgane, so stark von anderen Interessen
u¨berpra¨gt in unserem Bereich, dass sie da lieber die Augen zumachen
und von den Modellen und dem Modellergebnissen gar nichts sehen
und ho¨ren wollen. [...] [W]eil wir touristisch ganze Talschaften mit
Skigebieten erschlossen haben, Pisten erzeugt haben. [...] Also das hat
sich dann auch in der Landnutzung eine Riesenverschiebung gegeben.
Und es will dann kein Lokalpolitiker ho¨ren, dass da einiges schlechter
geworden ist meteorologisch... [...] Aber die Lokalpolitik ist natu¨rlich
dort mit den Hauptwirtschaftsfaktoren so eng verknu¨pft, dass sie sehr
große Scheuklappen haben Sachen anzugehen [...] [E]s gibt andere
Skigebiete und andere Regionen, wo das wunderbar funktioniert. [. . . ]
Da arbeiten die Skipistenbetreiber und die Lokalpolitik ohne diese
Scheuklappen [. . . ] die nehmen solche Modellerkenntnisse gerne an und
schauen sich das an und u¨berlegen sich, was kann man da in Zukunft
tun? (IA24E, 00:48:48-6)
While IA24E recognizes the presence of exceptions in this regard, then, i.e. in the
form of municipal and private actors who welcome modeling results as a tool for
achieving sustainable business expansion and safe building planning, he cannot
tell what sets these communities apart. In his view, it must have something to
do with the respective people in charge and personal animosities and interests
(00:49:44-0).
As in the case of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, then, local-level decision-makers are gen-
erally thought to accept hazard information and to react to it in accordance with
their interests. As neither regional planners nor local politicians are noted to fully
comprehend or account for the presence of uncertainty, furthermore, the next
question is whether this is perceived to be acceptable or framed as problematic.
The answer, it would seem, is that local actors are not expected to inquire about
the origin of or uncertainty associated with simulation-based hazard assessments
(i.e. IA24E, 01:30:46-4). Likewise, even if it would sometimes be desirable for
regional development planners to understand a bit more, it is generally acceptable
for them, too, to adopt hazard zones without questioning:
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Also ich wu¨rde, ich wu¨rde sagen ja. Wenn Sie Bedenken ha¨tten, wa¨re
es gescheiter, sie, sie ha¨tten eine Ahnung. [...] Aber im Grunde haben
wir da eigentlich nie Diskussionen oder u¨ber Simulationen. Ich glaube
auch, dass die Leute sich da nicht wesentlich auskennen, bei diesen
Dingen. (IA22E, 01:29:06-4)
As IA23E explains, it is not realistic to expect local decision-makers and regional
planners to know enough to be able to appraise the quality of hazard assessments.
What they need is a line to use for planning purposes. Consequently, it falls on
the experts producing hazard zone maps to ensure that these are good enough to
be uncritically accepted:
Fu¨r Entscheidungstra¨ger politisch jetzt zum Beispiel, oder auch fu¨r die
Raumplanung, [. . . ] die brauchen eigentlich eine fixe Linie, mit der sie
planen ko¨nnen. [. . . ] Wenn man alle Informationen immer hin gibt,
dann wu¨rde man quasi von jedem (in der Kette weiter verlangen), dass
der sich einfach damit bescha¨ftigt und auch gut auskennt, d.h. dieses...
dieser Abstraktionsgrad (bei mir mal eben), das soll quasi der Experte
regeln. [. . . ] [So dass] sich halt auch andere Leute darauf verlassen
ko¨nnen. (IA23E, 00:26:05-5)
Even if the consequence of more or less blind trust is that regional planners allow
for development right up to the fringe of the yellow hazard zone, this is – all things
considered – not the worst imaginable outcome. The opposite scenario, that they
would lack confidence in simulation-based guidelines and disregard these would be
much worse: “Yes, well, too little confidence would probably be even worse. If one
says: ‘O.k., I build behind this, in this yellow zone.’” (IA20E, 00:38:35-8).
Even though several of the interviewees would prefer if hazard zone maps could
show shaded areas or gray zones rather than sharp lines to make the presence
of uncertainty explicit and unmistakable, they also show understanding for why
this is not possible. Not only would it require too much effort and skill on behalf
of the recipients to interpret something like that and generally lead to chaos if
all regulatory authorities would constantly try to provide the full picture (IA21E,
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00:10:57-2) but it is also thought to be incompatible with the wish to introduce
legal restrictions:
[D]ieser graue Bereich wa¨re mir lieber, aber mit dem kann natu¨rlich
das ganze Rechtswesen nichts anfangen, wenn ich sage ja, ja, das ist
alles da wahrscheinlich, da wahrscheinlich. Die wollen genau wissen,
was ist jetzt bei dem Haus. Und ist da etwas oder ist da nichts. Aus,
Ende. Ich kann nicht sagen, ja wahrscheinlich. Mit dem kann niemand
etwas anfangen. Also (braucht es) eine konkrete Aussage. (IA22E,
01:31:27-2)
In effect, this means that it is not only in regard to riverine flood simulation
associated with fairly low levels of uncertainty that it is thought to be accept-
able for local leaders and land-use planners to ignore the presence of uncertainty.
Even though the uncertainties associated with alpine hazard simulation are much
greater, it is still thought to be tolerable for end-users to adopt simulation-based
hazard information without questioning respectively not to account for its un-
certain nature in development planning. After all, they are not thought to have
the right competence for understanding the details and it would be worse if they
would lack confidence and not abide by this information. Essentially, then, there
is indeed a perception of lack of confidence as something that could constitute a
problem in the sense of leading to non-use, but no reference, so far, to a risk for
sub-optimal decision-making as a result of uninformed use.
10.3.2 Private actors and publicly owned enterprises
Turning to private actors’ responses to simulation-based hazard assessments, this
is noted to – at least partially – depend on the client’s agenda and knowledge
resources. Someone who lacks technical know-how and who wants to build some-
thing, and needs an assessment for the building permit process, will often adopt
this without questioning (IA21E, 00:25:19-7). In comparison, larger businesses
wanting to realize new projects will often possess enough resources to hire scien-
tific competence in the form of private engineers. These will have the technical
Chapter 10. Excursion: Alpine hazard simulation in Austria 237
skill to spot weaknesses in simulation results and their interpretation, and will
sometimes apply this to question official hazard assessments:
Ja, es ist so, beim Hausbau (wollen sie) Zahlen, dann sagt man, ja zehn
Kilo Pascal, fertig. Zivilingenieure, die Projekte machen, die kommen
dann meistens schon und diskutieren. [...] Wird oft recht kontrovers,
also das muss man sagen. Das ist nicht immer nur freundschaftlich
dann, also das. (IA22E, 00:57:16-0)
Indeed, it even happens that industry actors commission their own counter-zone
assessments to question the public authorities’ appraisal and be able to present
a solid argument for their own position – something that IA22E admits can be
useful, too, even if it is generally unwelcome at first (00:59:30-2).
There can also be a difference between accepting and following the results of a
simulation run, however. Though IA21E claims that Austrian public enterprises
commissioning expert opinions generally trust there to be a risk if this is what the
simulation says (often you can even see signs of it in the landscape), it is not always
that such information has an impact on what is then decided. In one instance, for
example, a project was continued along the original plan in spite of an avalanche
simulation indicating a risk of technical damage. Since the predicted hot spot was
located in an accessible area, it was decided that it would be preferable to fix the
problem if and when it arose rather than to look for an alternative location. When
there is no official regulation to follow, IA21E explains, a cost-benefit analysis will
often decide whether an indicated risk is acceptable or not:
Sie haben keine Vorschriften, wie es im Siedlungsraum halt ist. Und
die machen das dann eher nach einer Kosten-Nutzen U¨berlegungen.
Also auch wenn sie wissen, es steht im gefa¨hrdeten Bereich, aber wir
halt sagen: “Gut, es ist halt relativ unsicher. Also es kommt sicherlich
nicht jedes Jahr oder alle zwei Jahre, sondern eher alle 30 Jahre.” Dann
entscheiden sie rein nach Kosten Nutzen. Und da ihr Planungshorizont
ich glaube 30 oder 40 Jahre sind, wenn wir halt sagen: “Ja, 150 ja¨hrlich.
Ja, ko¨nnte passieren.” Dann sagen sie, o.k., das Risiko tragen sie. Also
das... das ist dann egal. (IA21E, 00:12:42-4)
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Regarding whether or not uncertainty constitutes a problem, low confidence in
simulation output is indeed described as a risk that needs to be managed to avoid
rejection and non-use. In contrast to the analysis in chapter 2, though, this is
not connected to unrealistic expectations of being able to get certitude (so that
uncertainty becomes an obstacle towards use) or to a lack of confidence in modeling
as such, but simply to the risk of a client not finding a specific assessment result
credible. As IA21E explains, it is not only important for researchers to confirm
the plausibility of simulation-based hazard assessments but also for clients to be
given this opportunity. Involving the intended users from the start and keeping an
open dialog about what goes into a computer model are the best ways of ensuring
acceptance and thereby also use:
Also die [Ergebnisse – Ed.] mu¨ssen halt immer verifiziert werden. Und
das muss man auch mit den Endanwendern zusammen machen und
auch die Ergebnisse durchsprechen und die Plausibilita¨t halt u¨berpru¨fen.
[...] [S]ie sind auch viel aktiver in dem Projekt dabei und liefern
vielmehr Informationen, wenn man sie also von Anfang an mitein-
bindet. Wenn das nicht passiert, sind viele von den Ergebnissen, liegen
dann in der Schublade und dann werden sie auch gar nicht mehr...
weiter wirklich verwendet. Oder auch nicht akzeptiert. Und wenn sie,
man mit ihnen nicht spricht und ihnen auch sagt, was in diese Sim-
ulation nun eingeht, also als Eingangsparameter, dann... [...] wird es
einfach nicht wirklich akzeptiert. (00:17:59-4, emphasis added)
At the same time, though, this is not the same as giving clients full insight into
the uncertainty associated with the disclosed results. When more than one model
is used to run the same simulation, for example, and the results diverge, this will
not be communicated in the expert opinion. This will only contain one value, as
that is what the experts were hired for and what clients are competent to deal
with:
Denen, denen sagen wir das gar nicht. Die mo¨chten hinterher einen
Wert haben. [...] [W]enn wir zwei Modelle angewendet haben, also
eins la¨uft, weiß ich nicht, 20 m la¨nger aus, als das andere, mu¨ssen wir
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halt mit Expertenmeinungen dann interpretieren, wo glauben wir, ist
es am realistischsten. Und wir mu¨ssen einen Wert liefern. Weil wenn,
die Leute mo¨chten nur einen Wert haben. Also wir... sie ko¨nnen mit
mehreren Sachen nicht umgehen. (IA21E, 00:08:03-0)
Though it is important to always communicate that some uncertainty is present,
IA21E does not think this is anything that clients pay much attention to: “if
you somehow say: ‘Yes, we have an uncertainty here (...).’ People cannot make
anything of that.” (IA21E, 00:20:05-4).5 To some actors, a simulation is a way of
transferring responsibility from the private decision-maker to the expert commu-
nity, meaning that clients will not necessarily have an interest in learning of the
fine print, as that would defeat the purpose of asking for an expert assessment:
Ja, ich glaube, ja wenn sie wirklich gar keine Ahnung haben, dann
werden sie es entweder einfach so nehmen. Und sie mo¨chten ja dann
wahrscheinlich etwas bauen und werden einfach sagen: “Gut, wir haben
das in Auftrag gegeben. Die sagen, das ist so, das u¨bernehmen wir.”
Weil damit haben sie ja im Prinzip nicht die Verantwortung dafu¨r. Son-
dern dann sagen: “Ja, die haben ja die Verantwortung. Das nehmen
wir. Das ist schon o.k.” (IA21E, 00:25:19-7)
In this sense, there is not much recognition for the viewpoint of output uncertainty
as something that end-users of simulation-based hazard information should have
a detailed understanding of to ensure ‘sensitive’ use. Though clients should be
allowed to ask and learn about anything they want in order to develop confidence
in the quality of a hazard assessment, it is the job of the researcher to interpret
what available evidence suggest is likely and not the job of the client. Hence, it
is the researcher that needs to understand the meaning of the various sources of
uncertainty built into simulation results and no one else.
5What modelers and simulationists can do, it is often commented, is possibly to try to com-
municate these things in a way that end-users may understand. Though this is something that
is heard in several of the interviews, it is never quite explained what this would look like in
practice.
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10.3.3 Regional-level risk managers
Turning to practitioners responsible for hazard zoning and technical protection
at the regional level, the image of how critically or uncritically simulation results
are approached varies between the interviewees. According to IA21E, it is gen-
erally understood that simulation results (and in extension also simulation-based
expert opinions) do not represent certain knowledge but are associated with uncer-
tainty, only technical protection planning has to proceed anyway. Independently
of whether or not a value is uncertain, a decision still has to be made:
Und ich habe auch bei einigen Gutachten, bin ich dann auch heraus
gegangen, habe die Ergebnisse interpretiert und habe dann halt gesagt:
“Naja, aber vielleicht ist die Anbruchho¨he ein bisschen ho¨her, weil
wenn der Stau das...” Dann sagen sie: “Nein, wir mu¨ssen das jetzt
planen. Wir haben hier unten das Objekt, das mo¨chten wir schu¨tzen.”
Und sie mo¨chten von mir wissen wie. [...] Und ja, da gibt es keinen,
wenig Spielraum. [...] Es wird auch immer beschrieben bei uns. [...]
Dass man das nicht hundertprozentig sagen kann, das liegt halt an den
Limitationen von den Modellen. Aber... das ist dann ein akzeptiertes
Risiko [...]. (IA21E, 00:10:57-2)
In IA21E’s view, this is also somewhat acceptable. First of all, it would be to
ask too much to require regional-level risk managers to understand how particu-
lar simulation results were arrived at and what different uncertainty sources this
involves. Supporting this view, IA23E says that it is one thing for a modeler to
point out that a simulation is associated with large uncertainties, and quite an-
other for a practitioner instructed to produce a hazard zone map to interpret what
that means for the task at hand (00:21:50-0).6 Second, the whole reason behind
commissioning an expert assessment is to not have to possess this competence
in-house. In IA21E’s view, then, it normally suffices that the researcher includes
6In his view, practitioners do not only need to be told about the strengths and weaknesses of
computer models but also be given concrete suggestions in terms of how to handle this (00:21:50-
0).
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information as to where uncertainty is possible and that the client has an oppor-
tunity to ask; only when something is to be built can it be necessary with a more
exact uncertainty estimate:
[F]ru¨her habe ich gedacht, sie mu¨ssten viel mehr daru¨ber wissen. Mit-
tlerweile glaube ich, ja, sie sollten sich bewusst sein. Also man sollte
das schon kommunizieren. Also man sollte es nicht verheimlichen und
ihnen nur Ergebnisse geben, sondern man sollte halt schreiben, die
Ergebnisse sind unsicher, weil ja. [...] [Wenn] die Anwender jemand
ist, der wirklich etwas baut, sollte man ihn... auch die Unsicherheiten
quantifizieren, was halt relativ schwierig ist. [...] Aber sie [...] brauchen
nicht komplett dieses, das nachvollziehen zu ko¨nnen, wie man zu dem
Wert kommt. Weil ich denke, dafu¨r beauftragen sie die Experten. [...]
Also das, wenn sie, sie sollen die Mo¨glichkeit haben nachfragen zu
ko¨nnen. Es sollte auch im Bericht ein bisschen beschrieben werden, wo
Unsicherheiten auftreten ko¨nnen. (IA21E, 00:15:37-5 )
In contrast, IA19E’s assessment is that, at least in relation to technical protection
planning, simulation results are often too uncritically accepted – perhaps as a
result of a lack of experience:
Meine Erfahrung oder meiner Einscha¨tzung ist, dass die viel zu sehr
akzeptiert werden. Wenn, [. . . ] jetzt muss man hier ein, ein Bauwerk
dimensionieren, einen Damm oder irgendetwas. Und ich sage, diese
Ergebnisse aus der Simulation sind aus den und den Gru¨nden eventuell
mit Vorsicht zu genießen und haben einen Spielraum in dem und dem
Bereich. Das interessiert niemanden. Was die Leute ho¨ren wollen, ist:
die Lawine ist an diesem Punkt 5 m hoch... [...] Ja, ich glaube, umso
weniger Erfahrung oder ich weiß es nicht, womit es zusammenha¨ngt,
werden diese Ergebnisse viel zu sehr akzeptiert. (IA19E, 01:36:41-2)
Often, he says, regional-level risk managers lack the detailed knowledge to be able
to estimate how large the errors are that different sources of uncertainty give raise
to. Indeed, this is something that even researchers themselves can find difficult
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(IA19E, 01:51:40-7). Hence, people will rely on things that they do not fully
understand because it is ‘easy’ (01:25:30-0). As he sees it, it would be better
if practitioners at this level would understand more about the simulation-based
assessments with which they work. Even if he realizes that this might be practically
unrealistic, it is in principle what is called for:
Entweder muss das Ergebnis oder die, die Prozedur so standardisiert
sein, dass derjenige keinen Fehler machen kann. Was aber auch im
Grunde genommen am besten nicht so sein sollte. Ja, im Grunde
genommen sollten die Leute schon mehr daru¨ber wissen, aber ich glaube
fast, dass das zu viel ist. Ich glaube es ist kaum mo¨glich, alles oder
richtig viel u¨ber so ein Modell zu wissen, wenn man eigentlich nur die
Ergebnisse interpretieren soll. Teilweise ist es aber sehr notwendig [...].
(IA19E, 01:25:30-0)
Working with regional-level risk management himself, the practitioner in interview
A22 admits that he does not quite comprehend what a computer model does.
Knowing that simulation is an uncertain method and having access to experience
and other sources of information, though, he can assess whether the input and
output with which he is confronted are realistic or not. But for more he depends
on external expertise:
Wir in der praktischen Anwendung haben von diesen ganzen the-
oretischen Hintergrund wenig Ahnung, relativ wenig Ahnung. Wir
beurteilen das Ergebnis, was da herauskommt. Wir, wir schauen, ob
die Eingangsparameter halbwegs stimmen oder mit unserer Erfahrung
u¨bereinstimmen. Aber der Prozess innerhalb des Modells ist uns rel-
ativ verschlossen. [...] Also fu¨r uns ist es wie eine Blackbox beinahe.
Mit einem Ergebnis und dieses Ergebnis stellen wir mit unserer Er-
fahrung, mit unserer, unseren anderen Methoden in, in, in Einklang.
Aber das andere, also das Prozessuale im Modell, das mu¨sste man mit
den, den Spezialisten behandeln zusammen. (IA22E, 00:50:32-4)
In his view, though, this is not a problem. In a world of ever-growing complexity
and specialization, everyone cannot know everything. What is important is that
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one recognizes one’s own limitations and makes sure to ask for external support
when this is needed:
Man kann nicht alles wissen. [...] [I]ch ha¨tte auch die Zeit nicht fu¨r
das. Dazu gibt es die Leute, die sich besser auskennen, [...]. Und
da mu¨sste man, wenn, wenn man darauf kommt, das ist ja vollkom-
men unplausibel, dann muss man in die Diskussion gehen. (IA22E,
00:53:03-5)
In his view, then, a user of simulation results must not necessarily be able to trace
the whole process of how these have been arrived at and what model uncertain-
ties this involves. He should, however, be able to assess the plausibility of the
parameters used and of the resulting findings, and know who to ask if something
strikes him as strange or unlikely. Representing a similar view, IA24E notes that
“[t]he practitioner, he musts inevitably incorporate this modeling and develop and
have confidence in this modeling. Otherwise he cannot justify this map with good
conscience.” (01:29:02-8). While there are partially different views as to what
regional-level risk managers should know about simulation results and simulation-
based hazard information, then, both IA22E’s and IA24E’s assessments are that
practitioners working directly with simulation output should not accept this un-
critically. In contrast to local-level and private actor users, furthermore, it is not
enough for the output to be scrutinized and found plausible but the inputs, too,
(at least those that the practitioner is competent to assess) should be subjected
to review.
Hinting towards why it is problematic if simulation results are uncritically accepted
without quality control, one may note that what is really perceived to constitute a
problem is when practitioners or other actors are too self-confident about their own
simulation skills respectively too trusting of software programs and output data
that they themselves use and produce. For example, compared to their more senior
colleagues, young practitioners in regional management offices without much field
experience or practice in other assessment methods are thought to be more at risk
of accepting output data of questionable quality:
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[D]ass also viele... es sehr viele Lawinenexperten gibt, die relativ neu
sind und wenig Gela¨ndeerfahrung haben. Und wenn das so ist, [...] ich
glaube, es ist halt schon einfach so ein Risiko, dass die Simulationspro-
gramme sehr einfach bedient werden ko¨nnen und [...] die Ergebnisse
halt einfach nicht genug verifiziert werden. [...] [D]ie Anwender oder
die Leute, die simulieren, haben oft zu wenig Prozesswissen... [. . . ]
Und sie haben, glaube ich, zu großes Vertrauen in die Ergebnisse. Also
von sich selber. Und da ist es, wa¨re es halt auch gut, wenn die Leute
sich mehr bewusst sind u¨ber die Unsicherheiten, wenn sie die dann in
ein Ergebnis im Endeffekt halt verpacken. (IA21E, 00:20:05-4)
If an actor running a simulation does not undertake a manual survey of the local
terrain, for example, particularities in the local landscape may be overseen, in
which case the output will give an incorrect representation of the likely outcome
of a hazard scenario. If this is the case and if the output is given out without
any effort to confirm it, there is a risk of erroneous predictions being uncritically
accepted and made the basis of planning and decision-making. Alternatively, end-
users may react on the simulation results not being realistic and lose faith in
simulation modeling as a practice altogether:
[D]ie Gefahr ist halt, dass die Ergebnisse einfach nicht richtig sein
ko¨nnen, weil die lokalen Bedingungen einfach stark abweichen. Wenn
man sich dessen nicht ganz bewusst ist und die, das Gela¨nde einfach
nicht miteinbezieht, dann liefern diese Simulationsergebnisse einfach
falsche Werte. [...] Die Karten werden herausgegeben und Leute, die
sich nicht damit bescha¨ftigen, sehen die Karte und sagen: “Ja, ja, ja,
das stimmt so.” Und es wird herangezogen fu¨r weitere Planungsmaß-
nahmen. Und da ist halt die Gefahr, dass diese, dass heutzutage ein-
fach mo¨glich [ist,] so eine Simulation irgendwie laufen zu lassen, man
hat scho¨ne Bilder, vero¨ffentlicht die und nur weil es scho¨n aussieht wird
das Ergebnis einfach auch von Leuten, die es nicht... genauer hinter-
fragen, einfach akzeptiert. Und das ist glaube ich halt schon, schon
relativ eine Gefahr. Gerade bei Lawinen und alles, wo es wirklich sehr
lokal auch unterschiedlich sein kann. Also die Bedingungen. [. . . ] Und
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wenn die lokalen oder die Entscheidungstra¨ger das so nicht beobachtet
haben [. . . ], dann werden sie das Ergebnis auch gar nicht ernst nehmen.
Also dann werden sie es nicht heranziehen... (IA21E, 00:23:06-4)
In other words, it is a problem if actors running simulation programs take an
under-critical approach to the generated results, as this implies a risk of sub-
standard output being given out. Moreover, the reason why this is problematic is
both that it can lead to a general lack of confidence if audiences are provided with
simulation results that they can see are not right, and that it can lead to planning
and decision-making being based on ‘bad’ research (i.e. a form of misuse) if the
audience is not competent to assess the output quality.
Giving a concrete example, some interviewees are critical of the hazard zoning
pursued in a neighboring country. Whereas simulation results are used as a com-
plement to expert-based estimates for the hazard zoning in Austria, the zoning in
this other region is more directly based on simulation output on account of the
bidding system favoring the cheapest assessment method:
Also da hat jeder einreichen ko¨nnen und sagen: “Ich bin ein Inge-
nieurbu¨ro oder wir sind ein Forschungsinstitut. Wir ko¨nnen das und
wu¨rden dieses Gebiet fu¨r diesen und den Preis abscha¨tzen.” Und das
ist teilweise dann auch, gerade bei so etwas, in die falsche Richtung
gegangen, dass es eben extremes Dumping gegeben hat. Dann hat
jeder gesagt: “Ich kann es noch billiger und noch billiger.” Und die bil-
ligste Methode ist einfach die Simulation herunter rechnen zu lassen,
die Linie nachziehen und sagen: “Das ist es.” (IA20E, 00:31:59-5)
Since the cheapest bidder may not necessarily be competent or take the time to
review the local terrain, this system is not perceived to be a good guarantor for
producing as ‘good’ hazard assessments as possible:
Und diese, diese Naturgefahren, also Gefahrenzonenplanung wird jetzt
halt ha¨ufig u¨bernommen von Ingenieursfirmen. [...] [D]ie Gemeinde,
die schreibt das aus. Es bewirbt sich [das ganze Land] darauf, also
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kann es auch sein, [...] dass jetzt aus [der Su¨den] eine Ingenieursfirma
die Gefahrenzonenplanung in den Alpen macht. Und die basieren das
dann natu¨rlich auf den Simulationen, weil sie selber die Region ja gar
nicht wirklich halt einscha¨tzen ko¨nnen. [...] [I]ch glaube, sie merken
das auch, dass es halt nicht so gut funktioniert. (IA21E, 00:34:21-1)
Sometimes, IA21E (notes from pre-interview talk) says, they can see just by look-
ing at the local terrain that the simulation results are exaggerated and that larger
areas than strictly necessary (as defined by official regulation) are being placed
under legal protection. Generally, it is regarded as somewhat critical when pri-
vate engineering firms’ use alpine hazard simulation programs since they often
have even less time than public authorities and research institutes (e.g. IA19E,
01:57:03-9).
In effect, this means that even if some still see it as somewhat acceptable for
regional-level practitioners provided with a simulation-based hazard assessment in
the form of an expert opinion to rely on the experts’ interpretation of available
evidence without closer understanding of the uncertainty involved in this, there
is also the viewpoint that it is not acceptable for risk managers at this level to
simply accept simulation output without scrutiny or reflection as to its quality
and credibility. Though there is no explicit reasons stated for why this would be
bad, it is clear that risk management decisions are expected to rely on the best
available research results possible and that the risk of unintentionally relying on
‘bad’ findings would therefor be serious. Hinting towards the risk of misinter-
pretation being present at this level too, finally, is the assessment that there are
also circumstances under which the uncertainty should not only be qualitatively
described but also quantified (as far as that is possible). Here, for the first time,
then, it does not appear to be acceptable for simulation results to be uncritically
accepted without questioning.
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10.4 Reflection on the original case study find-
ings
In terms of implications, the result of the above analysis is that the findings made
for the case of flood hazard maps in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg are both corroborated
and nuanced.
Beginning with the risk of non-use, there is no indication of widespread non-
use related to credibility doubts. As in the case of flood simulation in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, though, it is recognized that errors and/or insecurity about what
underlies output results can lead to non-use. Hence, here too, active efforts are
undertaken to involve target audiences in the research and quality review process
to ensure acceptance. A further similarity is that, when results are attacked or
not used, this is observed to be tied to political or financial interests rather than
related to the simulation quality.
Continuing with the risk of misuse, similar to the results in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
there are instances in which the Austrian experts regard it as more or less unavoid-
able that simulation-based hazard assessments are used without closer attention
being payed to the presence of uncertainty. Particularly, this applies to alpine haz-
ard maps at the municipal level respectively when private actors with low skills
commission an expert opinion of the hazard at a particular location, e.g. for the
sake of a building permit process. In principle, the position taken by the Austrian
interviewees is that, not having the right background themselves, some actors need
to be able to hire and rely on professional experts. In consequence, it is unsur-
prising that they have neither time to nor interest in questioning what they are
told. Not having the competence to make an informed judgment themselves, this
is what they hired the experts for.
At the same time, black-box use is not sanctioned for everyone. Most notably,
higher-level public servants should not simply accept what they see, but carefully
scrutinize the quality of input and output data to ensure that what is eventu-
ally decided correspond to what is really truly known about a particular hazard
situation. This is particularly emphasized in respect to actors responsible for us-
ing simulation results to draw up legally binding hazard zones, but also for those
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responsible for planning structural protection works. In practice, uncritical ac-
ceptance has been observed to lead to hazard zoning based on simulation results
of suboptimal quality with the result that larger areas than necessary (in terms
of what is stated in formal guidelines) have been designated at hazardous (i.e. a
form of negative consequence from officials taking an under-critical approach to
modeling output, in line with what was described in chapter 2.2.1.2).
Chapter 11
Conclusion
The backdrop of this study is the growing popularity of simulation technology and
predictive data as input to societal decision making at the same time as academic
research points to a problem in respect to decision-makers’ and civil servants’ han-
dling of such input. Specifically, it is pointed out as a risk factor if models are
treated as ‘answer machines’ or ‘truth generators’ (cf. Wagner et al., 2010). The
reason why this is seen as problematic is twofold. First, misconceptions about
science’s ability to deliver certain answers can lead decision-makers to regard the
presence of uncertainty in simulation results as an obstacle towards use, in which
case they may prefer to wait for more evidence although action in the present
would actually be preferable. Second, misconceptions about science’s ability to
deliver certain answers can lead public officials to use simulation results as if these
represent the truth, without proper consideration of assumptions and uncertain-
ties, in which case the resulting decisions will be based on an incomplete or even
misguided understanding of the present state of knowledge.
Recently, a new type of simulation product has become popular, namely the visu-
alization of the predicted outcome of various hazard scenarios on a map or digital
terrain representation to support risk management of natural hazards. What mo-
tivated this study was the perceived knowledge gap as to what risk managers’
dealings with such simulation-based information products look like. Are hazard
simulation results at risk of going unheeded due to skepticism about their relia-
bility? Or are they at risk of being misused by non-experts lacking the time and
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interest in considering the fine print of model output? Do scenario simulation
results help risk managers act in foresight or are the potential benefits of being
provided with predictive information canceled out by difficulties?
To explore this topic, the use of simulation-based flood hazard maps in the German
state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg was studied by interviewing both representatives of
the intended user group (i.e. risk managers) and representatives of modelers,
engineers and actors in higher-level public offices responsible for implementing the
state’s mapping project (i.e. external experts). The findings pertinent to the three
research questions of how, why and with what kind of benefits and problems flood
hazard maps are used have already been discussed in chapter 9. In a subsequent
step, a small excursion into the field of alpine hazard simulation was made to check
whether there was any support for the findings made in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in a
different context and to seek to understand the origins of the discrepancy identified
between how the external experts reasoned around non-experts’ use of simulation
output and what has been written about this in academia.
Below, the insights gathered from these two case contexts will be brought together
to address the study’s practical and theoretical purpose and draw lessons for future
research.
Revisiting the study’s practical purpose
The practical purpose of this study was to develop concrete recommendations
for how to encourage the use of available foresight information for local-level risk
management. In this regard, a first point to note is that such encouragement is
not always necessary. Where risk management has already been prioritized and
subjected to comprehensive reform, there can be little need for flood hazard maps
without this constituting a cause of concern. Put differently, there is a difference
between knowledge utilization and research use. Where knowledge of the existence
of a flood risk has already been responded to, there will not necessarily be much
need for marginally different research findings. Where, on the other hand, the risk
of flooding has long been under-prioritized, the hope would be for new research
results to lead to a change in attitude and contribute to concrete management
reform. In this sense, the interesting question is how to encourage that available
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foresight information is responded to where risk management is not already a local
priority. In this regard, three lessons can be outlined.
First, since non-use of flood hazard maps was sometimes connected to audiences
not seeing the point of pursuing relevant risk management measures, doubting that
these would be effective or their own capacity to implement them in a successful
way, efforts to encourage use could do well by focusing on what underlies these
perceptions and how they can be changed. Apart from working on conveying the
sense of particular strategies and measures (and what is at stake in case of inac-
tion), this could involve, e.g.: busting myths and unfounded fears in terms of what
it would mean to engage in particular activities; providing best-practice examples
for guidance and encouragement; offering trainings to address incapacity prob-
lems and lack of know-how; and developing templates to lower the costs of getting
started. Particularly in the field of risk communication, local administrations need
to be convinced that telling people about the risk of natural hazards represents
an opportunity rather than a threat, and be provided with practical guidance in
terms of what a communication strategy may look like. Naturally, this also re-
quires some form of organizational structure to be present that can take charge of
such tasks and which can work as a point of contact to municipalities in need of
support.
Second, usage can be supported by efforts to ensure acceptance of a particular
form of research and its results. In this sense, the study confirms the impor-
tance of involving the target audience in the research process, both for the sake
of ensuring content which matches the intended users’ needs and interests and for
spreading knowledge about the research method and build confidence in the results
(cf. Mitchell et al., 2006a; Cash et al., 2003; Nutley et al., 2007). Even if the target
audience lacks the technical skill to make an informed assessment of the different
steps and components of the research process, there are still ways of assessing new
findings’ credibility. In addition to personal contact and involvement of intended
users in the plausibilization process, confidence in hazard simulation results could
be encouraged if it would be easier to compare these with other sources of infor-
mation. Online, this could be done by embedding photos and different forms of
written and numerical documentation of past hazard events. In printed material,
a minimum requirement would be to offer a translation of technical terminology
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into language that lay-people can relate to (e.g. what gauge level a particular
statistical return period corresponds to). With regard to acceptance of simulation
uncertainty, this can be facilitated by allowing for dialog and questions, and by
making it intuitively understandable why ‘certitude’ is beyond reach by drawing on
examples that the users can easily relate to. In respect to the flood hazard maps,
arguments that the interviewed risk managers appeared to accept for deviations
from flood simulation results included the possibility of unexpected events (e.g. a
fallen tree clogging up a bridge or an underpass), changes to the local landscape
and terrain (e.g. through local development or mobile objects), imprecision asso-
ciated with laser scanning, and that a higher level of precision would be financially
costly. In principle, these are arguments that resonate with what risk managers
already know intuitively, making them sound logic, rather than arguments which
require complex thinking or the formation of new knowledge.
Finally, it is not always that there is any interest in reconsidering the status quo.
When this is the case, publication of new research findings will not necessarily be
able to change this. This confirms lack of interest in risk management as such
as a major obstacle towards research use. If efforts to convince people fail in
this regard, knowledge utilization may ultimately require regulation. Rather than
hoping that the publication of research findings will lead to a change in behavior,
the cases of hazard maps in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and hazard simulations in Austria
show that it can be more effective to use research results to define where which
type of restrictions and formal requirements should apply. This does not only
concern the need to regulate land-use and development planning but also efforts
to make preparedness planning and transparent publication of hazard information
mandatory elements of local management policy.
Revisiting the study’s theoretical purpose
The theoretical purpose of this study was to analyze whether problems noted in
academic literature related to non-experts’ use of simulation are present for risk
managers’ use of simulation-based hazard maps as well, and thereby to contribute
to the development of empirically anchored theory as to the circumstances under
which simulation usage by non-experts is problematic or unproblematic. First,
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though, for the sake of balance, a brief note on the benefits of simulation technology
is called for.
As noted in Chapter 2, computer simulation is commonly associated with advan-
tages in terms of enabling research where access to real target systems and data is
limited, and in terms of allowing for cheaper respectively more complex analyses.
What this study shows is that it is not only in relation to basic science and knowl-
edge advancement that these benefits apply but also when simulation is used in
practice to support public management and regulation. In this regard, a number
of further advantages are also noted. Compared to prior assessment methods, a
first point is that simulation technology allows for more transparency in terms
of how a particular conclusion was arrived at, thereby facilitating for responsible
authorities to substantiate and account for the basis of their work and for others
to scrutinize the same. Related to this, some note a defined assessment method to
leave less space for manipulation or undue influence by stakeholders and affected
parties. Moreover, simulation technology can constitute a useful complement to
practice knowledge by allowing for better error-quantification and in the sense of
giving experienced personnel a chance to compare their assessments with model
output as a form of ‘digital second opinion’. In general, the study shows that the
overt function of science in the policy sphere of offering support and guidance can
be complemented with a more latent function of putting audiences under pressure
and restricting their maneuvering space.
Turning to the problems, the short story is that there is little support for over- or
under-critical approaches to simulation modeling catering for widespread problems
of non-use or misuse in relation to (flood) hazard scenario simulation in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg and Austria. Though undesirable forms of non-use were observed,
these were not related to target audiences having such high expectations in haz-
ard simulation’s ability to provide accurate decision guidance that the presence
of uncertainty became a barrier to use. In principle, lack of confidence in the
credibility of output data is something that could pose a threat to acceptance and
application. But, hitherto, this risk has been successfully managed by involving
clients and intended users in the research process and in the review and quality
control steps. In this way, local and professional knowledge is used to corroborate
simulation results to minimize the risk of biased results due to error or imprecision,
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and, at the same time, the participatory element of the assessment process creates
ownership of the judgment as to the findings’ credibility.
In this sense, confidence-related non-use is more of a latent risk associated with the
overall danger of hazard simulation becoming the target of a credibility crisis in
line with what was experienced for environmental simulations in the Netherlands
in 1999 (see section 2.2.1). Indeed, it is largely for the sake of avoiding such an
outcome that it is regarded as vital for simulationists to document exactly what
goes into a model and what this means for the findings that come out of it. As
long as the quality of a simulation is high and the documentation is solid, potential
doubts can mostly be settled through constructive dialog. In instances of vocal
protest and questioning of results, this is not necessarily tied to the presence of
simulation uncertainty, but can just as well reflect local unwillingness to accept
a certain conclusion for political or financial reasons. Hence, credibility doubts
do not have to be the origin of rejection, but can be what people resort to as a
‘legitimate’ form of argument when simulation results are unwelcome (i.e. a form
of ‘uncertainty as ammunition’ against specific research findings). In any case, one
is left with the impression that it is not primarily for the sake of avoiding misuse
that uncertainties should be communicated, but for the sake of keeping science
unimpeachable.
With regard to misuse, there was little concern amongst the interviewed experts
about it being associated with negative consequences if local-level users accept
hazard simulation results uncritically. Judging from the empirical material, this
lack of concern is related to two things. First, it is linked to the hazard simulation
results in question being perceived to be of high quality, and therefore to provide
relatively reliable guidance. Second, it is related to the perception of a low potential
for negative consequences if hazard maps and expert opinions are adopted without
question. This, in turn, is related to the circumstance that these are primarily
thought of as ‘avoidance-tools’ in the sense of enabling land-use restrictions which
limit the municipalities’ expansion in hazard zones. As long as the issue at stake is
about where not to build, even if simulation results are associated with imprecision
or fail to reflect the possibility of an unexpected turn of events, abiding by them
will still, on average, help reduce a community’s vulnerability level. From this
perspective, it is not regarded as particularly problematic if simulation results
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are treated as more certain than they really are; the main thing is that they are
accepted. Likewise, lack of technical training is not regarded as much of a risk
factor, other than if it appears to stand in the way of acceptance.
With regard to the flood hazard maps, this implies an implicit focus on simulation
results as an instrument for land-use regulation. In other areas of application, it is
namely not as risk-free to ignore the presence of uncertainty. This was i.e. shown
for preparedness planning when the emergency operation in one community was
‘surprised’ by water flowing into a building of importance that a literal reading
of the hazard maps (i.e. ignoring the uncertain nature of flood simulation) would
not have indicated to be in need of protection.
In comparison, audiences at higher levels often possess more technical education
and/or practice experience and tend to be in charge of issues of a different nature.
When they consult simulation results, what is deliberated is not simply whether or
not to practice avoidance in a particular zone, but which areas are to be marked out
as hazardous, where to invest in structural defenses, and to what level of protection.
In short, they handle issues of real consequence in terms of who will be protected or
not, respectively which exposure or damage to regard as acceptable. Consequently,
the potential for negative consequences in case of a mistake is higher. Under these
circumstances, it is not regarded as tolerable for findings to be uncritically accepted
without scrutiny. This is, first of all, because of the risk of inferior or mistaken
simulation output being made the basis of decision-making – a scenario that could
both lead to misguided risk management and lay the ground for a credibility crisis.
Second, it is because not wanting to hear of or account for simulation uncertainty
implicitly places the responsibility for the content of management decisions on the
shoulders of the simulation community. Some experts understand that actors in
structural protection find it comfortable to adopt science’s ‘best guess’ when a
value has to be picked. In principle, though, what level of risk to accept is not for
science to determine, but for the responsible public authorities to decide. Hence,
it is estimated that risk managers at this level should be capable of assessing the
credibility of input and output data, respectively be competent to understand and
handle the presence of uncertainty (or have guidelines to rely on for doing this).
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In short, this means that it is when there is a mismatch between the potential con-
sequences of ignoring uncertainty and a user’s intrinsic capacity of understanding
and/or accounting for the distinct epistemology of simulation research that uncriti-
cal acceptance may turn into a risk factor. This can, for example, be the case when
predictions are provided to local-level decision-makers for other purposes than for
the sake of ensuring avoidance, such as in the case of the Red River forecasts in
1997 (see Introduction). It is also a possibility in relation to national-level policy
makers, who lack expertise in the field of modeling but who are still expected to
consider the implication of simulation results in regard to the content and direc-
tion of various policy proposals. And it is the case when risk management experts
responsible for protection and regulation lack the capacity, skill and/or experi-
ence to interpret simulation output in a way that is sensitive to the character of
the model and input data, and which accounts for what local terrain and hazard
history suggest to be realistic.
In this sense, it is not that the problems described in chapter 2 are not recognized
when it comes to simulation results in the field of risk management of natural
hazards. It is still regarded as a risk that users will unknowingly rely on bad data
or misuse or fail to use good data. In the case of alpine hazard simulations, there is
even a concrete example in the form of a region in a neighboring country to Austria
having designated larger hazard zones than necessary as a consequence of relying
on simulation work of questionable quality. However, there is a difference in focus
when it comes to the origin of these risks. In previous writing on the simulation-
policy/practice interface, recipients’ too high trust in science’s ability to deliver
‘certain’ knowledge (or at least trustworthy guidance) is often emphasized. It
is as a consequence of audiences’ misconception about simulation as a research
method in the tradition of the hypothetico-deductive science model that there
can be negative implications for the science community (i.e. credibility crisis)
respectively decision-making (i.e. non-use or misuse).
In contrast, experts in the daily practice of hazard simulation and risk management
are relatively forgiving of users’ trusting attitude towards simulation research. In
their view, there are many actors for which it is simply vital that they can turn
to experts for a reliable assessment, and it would be too much to ask of them
to critically reflect on the origins of this. The risk that they perceive as central
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is instead that those producing simulation results will not be critical enough of
these or sufficiently aware of the limitations and epistemological particularities of
the models that they are running. Considering that even highly skilled and ex-
perienced modelers are at risk of over-trusting their own output data, this is all
the more of a risk in relation to engineering consultants and public experts with-
out sufficient education or field experience. If these groups (i.e. as producers of
simulation data) are under-critical, it increases the risk of output being produced
which does not meet the necessary scientific standards and which has not been
subject to sufficient quality control. If such results are passed on to a community of
end-users unable to spot their flaws, it (a) undermines the conditions under which
non-experts’ trusting reading of simulation findings can be regarded as relatively
risk-free. Moreover, it (b) increases the likeliness of a credibility crisis and the risk
of misguided policy and practice decisions. This is the background of the experts’
worry about the increasing availability of user-friendly simulation programs, in-
transparent models and data of mixed or unknown quality. Likewise, this is the
reason why lack of time and growing competition are regarded as risk factors even
for serious actors, as this may aggravate the risk of (accidental) negligence.
The only time that unrealistic expectations in science’s capacity to deliver reliable
knowledge are regarded as a problem is when interviewed modelers are faced with
‘senseless’ research contracts in the sense of having to explore phenomena for which
data and basic knowledge are largely lacking. When it is uncertain whether the
policy community understands the ‘guesswork’ character of such inquiries respec-
tively how these will be used, it is sometimes unwelcome to have to develop and
run such models. Otherwise, it is not unrealistic expectations, but other aspects,
which are focused on in terms of creating difficulties. For example, scarce resources
and a tendering system that rewards the cheapest bidder are perceived to create
circumstances under which public authorities may find themselves being provided
with simulation assessments of lower quality than desirable. In this respect, lack
of experience with simulation and modeling on behalf of the authorities commis-
sioning hazard assessments is pointed to as a risk factor for making it difficult
for them to know what requirements to stipulate to ensure high-quality products.
Hence, the problem, as the experts see it, is not unrealistic expectations as much
as difficulties with respect to the task of having ‘realistic’ expectations fulfilled.
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What does this mean for the question of how to avoid problems associated with
non-experts use of simulation products? In principle, the perspective that it can be
permissible for non-experts to treat simulation results as more certain and reliable
than they really are – as long as the research quality is high and the potential
for negative consequences is low – places much of the responsibility for avoiding
problems on the shoulders of the simulationists; to avoid a credibility crisis or
reliance on inferior findings, they must ensure that the information they give out
is as good as possible.1 At the same time, this cannot free actors in the policy
sphere from all responsibility in terms of what research is commissioned or how
results are understood and used; there cannot be a carte blanche for first ignoring
uncertainty and then blaming science if things go bad.
To avoid such an outcome, the presence of uncertainty must be made unmistak-
ably clear. Considering that accompanying documents are not always read, this
could be done directly in the visual representations of simulation results or in the
legend explaining these. When it comes to hazard maps, this could, e.g., take
the shape of an indicative uncertainty area around the calculated hazard lines. If
this is unpractical, a minimum requirement would be the inclusion of a written
disclaimer directly in the map indicating what it covers respectively does not cover
and making an explicit reference to the presence of uncertainty (e.g. in the form
of a quantitative assessment).2 Even if this would not eliminate the possibility of
uncertainty going unaccounted for, making the presence of uncertainty unmistak-
ably clear would at least (a) lower the risk of non-experts overseeing it by accident
or ignoring it by mistake, and (b) prevent end-users not caring to reflect on the
meaning of imprecision from blaming science in case things turn out bad. Put
differently, it would, ideally, force people to make conscious decisions about how
to respond to and handle the presence of uncertainty.
At the same time, it is a valid point that not all user-groups are competent to
deal with all kinds of uncertainty information. Consequently, there is also a need
1Of course this is the conclusion of the experts’ reasoning in relation to this specific case. It
should not be confused with a factual statement or with implying that this also applies to other
situations falling under the realm of the simulation-policy nexus.
2For flood hazard maps, for example, it could be specified that these cover the risk of inunda-
tion from riverine flooding and not from slope water, over-flowing canals, etc. To facilitate the
assessment of where the presence of imprecision might be worth taking into account, further-
more, flood hazard maps could do well by indicating the elevation of the land areas predicted to
stay dry.
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to actively contemplate who needs to know what to ensure ‘good enough’ use
(i.e. implying a low risk for negative consequences) and to adjust the way uncer-
tainty information is communicated accordingly. For some actors and situations,
it might be important with a detailed understanding of the uncertainty associated
with simulation results. In other cases, it might be better to focus on ways of
conveying a limited set of cues to help the intended users draw a minimum of
inferences with regard to the epistemological nature of modeling without much
active cognitive effort (as in the suggestions just mentioned above). In principle,
these are questions which should be explicitly dealt with for all simulation prod-
ucts entering the policy sphere. From this perspective, challenges in terms of how
to avoid problems concern both how to identify cases where there is a mismatch
between an audience’s competence level and what is at stake, and the question of
how this gap can be bridged.
In chapter 2, it was noted that common recommendations for ensuring use that is
sensitive to the presence of uncertainty concern (a) more and better uncertainty
information, (b) more user-producer interaction to provide for better mutual un-
derstanding, competence and trust, (c) strategies for making simulation output less
vulnerable to misuse (e.g. by providing value ranges rather than exact figures),
and (d) not forgetting alternatives to prediction such as precautionary hedging
options and decisions for increased resilience. This study does not question the
validity of either of these strategies. Indeed, there is no need to choose since all
of them can be pursued jointly in parallel. It does draw attention, though, to the
lack of clarity as to when more uncertainty information is needed and when this
simply needs to be communicated differently, respectively to what ‘better’ uncer-
tainty information would look like in practice. Additionally, one point that this
study indicates is the role of intermediaries such as the public authorities commis-
sioning virtual engineering. These play a role both for regulating and scrutinizing
the quality of simulation assessments, and for what acceptance these will enjoy
at lower levels. Specifically, it does not only matter how authorities manage the
contacts with and involvement of intended users but also what kind of research
requirements are specified in terms of documentation, on-site visitations, which
model to use, whether to use more than one simulation program, how to include
uncertainty information, etc. Depending on the circumstances, such institutions
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can be part of the solution (or of the problem) as well, and should therefore also
be considered.
In order to move forward with the issue of how to ensure ‘good’ use, research
needs to become more precise and develop common distinctions as to the dif-
ferent categories of actors, products and application contexts referred to, since
both problems and solutions are likely to depend on these details. This could, for
example, involve spelling out the risks at the different stations of the simulation-
policy/practice nexus, ranging from ‘modelers’ developing simulation programs (in
academic, private or public positions), ‘simulationists’ using simulation programs
(e.g. modelers themselves, virtual engineers, risk managers, regulators) and dif-
ferent forms of ‘users’ of simulation results (ranging, e.g., from those producing
their own output, over those commissioning such work, to end-users of processed
information products).
Based on the findings of this study, the highest requirements when it comes to
who needs to know what certainly apply to producers of simulation results (i.e.
including actors in public offices running models that they have not themselves
developed), who must know very well what they are doing to avoid the risk low-
quality output being released for use. Next to them, actors in public office com-
missioning simulations should be well enough informed to be able to assess the
quality of the results that they are provided with, in order to spot and inquire
about questionable output data. Where appropriate, they should also be in a
position to specify simulation requirements for contractors to adhered to, in order
to guarantee high-quality results in the first place. In a third category, one could
place users receiving simulation-based risk assessments to use as input to decisions
about whether or not to invest in public protection measures (where, to what ex-
tent, etc.) or where to draw the line for a risk zone. These actors should be (or
made) aware of the presence of uncertainty to ensure that the resulting decisions
are made by risk managers, whose job it is to accept this kind of responsibility,
and not pushed onto simulationists or the science sphere as such. Finally, there
are those who are more or less ‘affected parties’ when it comes to simulation re-
sults, in the sense of being supplied with assessments together with instructions or
regulations regarding what is allowed where. For these individuals (e.g. in local
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administrations or private households), it is primarily important that the assess-
ment results are accepted and adhered to, since this will (provided that the results
are not mistaken) help reduce further increases in risk. Awareness of underlying
uncertainties is not a priority for this group in the same way as it is for the other
categories mentioned.3
Though this can only be said to represent a first suggestion for how to theoreti-
cally differentiate between different users of simulation models, it could serve as a
starting point for further work in this direction, including for research about how
different audiences respond to and deal with the presence of uncertainty and how
uncertainty should best be communicated, e.g. to ensure that research recipients
of different backgrounds are able to tell its meaning for their particular field of
work.
3It may be noted that one explanation for the interviewed experts’ lax view on the need for
local-level risk managers to be aware of simulation uncertainties could be that they unconsciously
place these in the fourth category described above. As shown by some of the situations found
in the data material, this may however be a mistaken view, and these individuals should at
least sometimes be placed in the third category (e.g. emergency managers in charge of defining
an emergency response plan or administrators in charge of planning local technical protection
measures). All in all, it is not to be avoided that the responsibilities of a single individual can
fall into more than one category.
Appendix A
Translations of German quotes
A.1 Quotes in chapters 2-5
Chapter 2
A model can mean two different things, on the one hand the display of a state of
affairs in the form of a representation [. . . ], on the other hand a statement about
the relationship and interdependencies among several objects (which makes it
related to theories). [. . . ] Abstract models are the basis for assumptions on which
a simulation rests. Hence, a simulation represents the concrete implementation of
such a model. (Spath, 2009, pp. 50)
In simulation-related deficit analyses, mainly aspects of the models themselves are
being used as factors for explaining low and/or false effects. These studies concern
themselves with uncertainty and limits of models and the resulting insufficient
reliability of the results. As a further explanatory factor raised is the complexity
and opaqueness of models, so that decision makers do not understand the how
the results were arrived at and accordingly misinterpret them. In deficit analyses
that refer to context, on the other hand, models are viewed in their socio-political
setting. The focus is less on the limitations of the simulation instruments and
more the actors and institutions producing (or commissioning), communicating or
using them. (Scheer, 2013, pp. 86)
Chapter 4
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The smaller the catchment area, the more difficult the provision of the hydrological
data. In isolated cases it can be necessary to regenerate the hydrology for small
catchment areas. At the same time, there are generally no records of past flood
events for small catchment areas, so that the hydrological data situation – due
to the lack of calibration data – cannot be significantly improved by producing a
precipitation-runoff model (P-R-Model). (Moser et al., 2011, pp. 23)
Chapter 5
[T]he experts [represent] a complementary acting-unit to the target group, and
the interviews aim to gather information about the contextual conditions of the
actions of the target group. [. . . ] The interviews with experts are a source of
data among others, for example interviews with members of the target group,
participatory observation, document and file analysis. (Meuser and Nagel, 1991,
pp. 445-446)
A.2 Quotes in chapter 6
Section 6.1.1
In the past one did not know. One did not have the opportunity to create such
hydrodynamic, numerical models. Someone just said: “Yes before, there was water
here once, or there.” It was not recorded properly. And now one simply knows.
Through the flood hazard maps, one sees it and then one also knows that one
must build technical flood protection, if what is there is not enough. (I02RMb,
00:32:59-3)
After we knew from the flood hazard maps where the water can or where it spreads
out or... where the protected areas are, we have now examined the existing flood
protection facilities and did an analysis of the stability of the flood defenses. And
it has been found that not all facilities are stable but that they must be improved
or perhaps even renewed. And in some areas it has been found that the facilities
are not high enough. And that was the second step then. First, look where the
danger is and, then, what is there: is that enough? Is it stable? And additionally
of course: where is there something missing. (I02RMb, 01:31:07-4)
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As I said, on the one hand, the municipal council was informed and then the
decision was made that the administration, that’s us, was commissioned..., on the
basis of this report, to develop an action plan and a financing concept. (I02RMa,
00:42:23-9)
I02RMa: [. . . ] That was another issue then. Previously, we had a safety level that
was different depending on the facility. There was no uniform protection objective.
And, through a municipal council decision, the city resolved to create a technical
defense against a larger flood along the main river. So not for a 100 year flood, like
along the small waterways, but – due to the much higher damage potential... You
see, these areas, which are so nicely blue here, that’s all, those are the industrial
zone. If that stands under water... it causes huge damage. And because of that
they decided to implement a higher level of protection. 00:28:55-4
I02RMb: And then we could of course also present it well in the municipal council
because such a simulation is much more impressive than when one just tells some-
one: “Everything here will be blue” and they say... -It’s just difficult. But I think
through this visualization... the acceptance is just of a different kind. 00:36:25-9
On the administrative side, we must ourselves, of course, still do some homework
that this questionnaire drew attention to. For example, because of the new in-
sights, which one has from the flood hazard maps, to revise our technical protection
concept. [. . . ] To analyze the weaknesses exactly and which measures, technical
measures can be implemented. (I04RM, 00:07:35-3)
SK: Do I understand it correctly that the maps have perhaps not played a signif-
icant role for your work? 00:39:59-1
I03RM: Yes, you understand that right. Because, at the time that the maps
were published, the Water Association had already developed its concept. [. . . ]
00:40:32-9
So it has not triggered that we’ve said: “Oh look, we need to do something here.”
Because it was already clear from before that we have to do something here. [...]
Elsewhere, it is perhaps, then [the] flood hazard map is the trigger for this thought
process to even start. That was not the case for us. (I03RM, 00:55:09-9)
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So before the flood hazard map, we had already had all these calculations made.
Where flood protection systems must be built and how large they should be, that
was already clear. And that also has not changed through the calculations for the
flood hazard map. (I06RM, 00:17:53-2)
I03RM: [. . . ] If you’re suddenly standing in someone’s garden, who is only in
the HQ100-line, who has never been flooded [...] if you then come and say you
want to build a flood defense and because of that he might need to dismantle his
greenhouse, [...] he will have no understanding at first. But if you show him, last
time was HQ50. Now we assume that at some point HQ100 will come and then
the water will stand 20 cm high here. And then we go inside, what is affected
by those 20 cm. Then he will suddenly be very open towards flood protection
measures. [. . . ] 00:34:36-6
SK: And did you have such cases where you brought the maps along and (. . . )?
00:34:42-8
I03RM: We rather had the discussion here. And had, could then visualize it with
the PC, to display the inundation depth. We had two cases, yes, which till today,
I think, are not 100
Section 6.1.2
If you look at this kind of map, you see: Which areas in my municipality are
inundated? Where must I potentially evacuate? How should I evacuate? And
then there are various hazard points: hospitals, sewage treatment plants, whatever.
Points where I must consider in advance where I have to act, how I have to act,
and then fixate the respective alarm stations. That’s just easily possible with the
flood hazard maps. Like escape routes, for example. And roads: Which roads are
inundated, which areas can no longer be reached. Such things one can simply read
very well with the help of the maps. (I11Ea, 00:23:04-6)
I16E: They are useful in those areas where no information has been present previ-
ously. [...] [S]o that the municipalities contemplate: What must I do? Or: I have
to do something. [...] [But] in a hazard map in the sense of a HQ100, whether
there will be many new insights there – I find doubtful. Because, in principle,
most will perhaps already have experience of that. [...] So I mean, if I have a
river here and I have 25-year flood, the fire department will say: “That you’ve
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calculated nicely. We know that too.” [...] So flood risk maps, well hazard maps,
are already a bit obsolete by now, so to say. Nowadays, one only speaks of flood
risk maps. [. . . ] And... that is, in my opinion, the nuts and bolts, that one knows
which objects are somehow present in the area. (I16E, 01:00:10-8)
Here, we can judge by rule of thumb, but with such a computer simulation, in
which I have these aids with the elevation points that I can use, there I actually
get an exact value in the end. So I don’t think that’s bad! As I said, for us locally
too large. Too far. (00:38:52-4)
I02RMb: Right. We have intensified our preparedness planning activities some-
what. Realized that many areas had not been considered before. [. . . ] that has
become much more intense. It has been properly worked out now, for example,
where along a street of houses along the brook is inundation to be expected?
Where must be closed off? That has been looked at in detail and compared with
the maps. And now it’s also really worked out. And, previously, it was a bit crude.
Or it wasn’t at all. 01:04:03-3
I02RMa: [. . . ] If either a failure or a flood larger than the design flood occurs [. . . ]
we have developed an exemplary emergency response plan for one district. What
is to do if it fails. Because people live with the understanding: we are protected.
And now that protection is questioned. [...] There is still a lot to do. Also for the
main river. It requires time and... well human resources. [...] Someone has to sit
down and make a plan. And there we’re still at the very beginning. As I said, for
this district, we made a plan for a conference. [...] And... But for downtown, we
don’t have any yet... because we are not yet in a position staff-wise... to. . . finish
it. 01:23:25-8
[D]uring the time that I’ve been here now, it came about that the law demands
that you, as a municipality, create a [plan – Ed.]. There was a legal specification.
But, for us, it then still took a while, simply because the time is not there. In such
a small administration, we are responsible for so many things [...] And I took it
now, because I said: “We must do something now.” And then I took a week off
from everything else and made the plan. (I08RM, 00:32:29-0)
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One needs the maps to produce this plan because one had to say, one must know,
when a water level of, for example, 5 meters is reached, what is affected? [...]
And then one must be able to tell, when that area is affected, which protection
measures are to be implemented in order to have further areas or other areas be
protected. For this, such a map is very important. That is clear. Together with
our building department, with our on-call service department, we specify which
measures we require on the basis of these maps and these water levels. [...] You
have a parking lot right down at the river and there are 150 vehicles. You know
very well that, when the river comes to 4.50 m, the vehicles must be gone. You
only see that, however, when you have produced such a hazard map beforehand,
to see, at 4.50 m, which areas are affected. (00:33:43-4)
The plan was originally produced by my predecessor. Without flood hazard maps.
[. . . ] They made a plan after they had participated in several flood episodes. [. . . ]
And on the basis of these insights, it was defined which measures to take. It is,
of course, a process of continuous updating, nowadays as well. If you open up a
new building zone today, for example, this will naturally have ramifications for the
next flood. [. . . ] We often hear from people, who call and tell us: “We have water
in the basement, suddenly.” [...] And that is then recorded by us and when the
next flood comes we can say: “Stop! 20 cm before we have to call these people.
Take action, something is coming.” (I10RM, 00:35:30-1)
I07RM: [. . . ] They are, however, five years ago, they said that we’ll get something
like that too, but I think that, for starters, these maps, for the adjoins of the
Neckar, the Rhine valley, that they will, for starters, prioritize the larger rivers
and do those first, that we will perhaps get them too then. As I said, we need
them, if we have a centennial flood, we will normally need them every 100 years
(laughs). [...] 00:28:35-8
I05RM: Well we know, we already had a couple of big floods here. In particular in
the region where the streams meet up. [...] That’s the area where [...] there can be
damage, really. And that is known. [...] In the past, the terrain there was raised
so that [...] the danger of flooding would no longer be so great. So these areas are
known. One knows, when there is flooding, this is the area where there will be
problems. But the problems are not such that one would make alarm plans. There
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is no fuel oil storage or something like that, regarding which one would have to
warn the fire department or which would make oil-barriers necessary or something
along those lines... 00:28:08-7
SK: So for the emergency management, the map will not play that great of a role,
you think? Because of- 00:28:17-9
I05RM: Well, I can’t imagine it. 00:28:21-1
I made a round here in the house as these flood hazard maps became binding for
one of the brooks, to everyone where I thought they could have something to do
with flooding. So starting with the on-call service department, which must go out
in case of floods and close off areas, fill up sandbags, and who knows what, to
our office of public order, which has the organizational leadership in these kind of
emergency situations. [...] And their first reaction was: “Hm? What do we need
these maps for? We know exactly what happens when a flood comes.” We have
a warning system. There is a gauging station. And [...] a corresponding response
plan [. . . ]. (I09RM, 00:12:47-6)
This was triggered by the hazard map. The town had seen that their new devel-
opment zone from 20 years back would be inundated already at HQ10. [...] Then
he [the mayor – Ed.] initiated for an emergency management plan to be made.
[...] Then, on the basis of the hazard maps and the sequencing, and with external
support, [...] they looked up what actually happens in town when the water arrives
and starts to rise. (I13E, 00:27:08-3)
But then it got stuck somewhere, too, because it is a lot of effort and the munici-
pality short on cash, little staff. And then it was pushed. Often, it is also the case
that the mayor that triggered it is perhaps pushed out of office. And when there
is a new one... And then nothing further happens... (I13E, 00:27:08-3)
Section 6.1.3
I05RM: In the area of real estate, agriculture, when we lease our parcels of land.
In construction law, whether one may build or store this and that at this location.
Surely also in water maintenance, how do I care for the brook (...). [...] 00:25:51-5
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I05RM: [...] If I receive a landfill permit application from a farmer and I see that
that is floodplain area, then [...] I will say in my response to this application: “No,
wait a moment, this is an area that is regularly flooded. So we don’t do it.” If I
lease a plot of land, which belongs to the city, then I will [...] tell the property
department: “Listen here. This is now farm land, but try to lease it as meadows,
because: if it is leased as farm land I will have the dirt in the brook afterwards.”
In our brook there are rare types of fish, such as souffia and bullheads. If there is
a flood and the dirt is flushed into it, the habitats or cavities where the fish lay
their eggs are lost. [...] 00:22:15-7
I09RM: Well, for us it is certainly very helpful, definitely, to have this overview.
[...] And we have information on flood depths. That’s very important now when,
as is possible here, there are building projects intended [...] then we can tell the
architects: “The depth of a 100-year flood would now at this place of your land
be 50 cm, over there 70 cm. Plan accordingly so that the potential for damage is
minimized.” [...] So it is very, very helpful for us. [...] 00:41:42-1
[T]hat when people apply for a building permit, that we write into it: “Caution
flooding! Flood-aligned building required.” Or ”not permissible here.” Things like
that. They weren’t followed up on very strictly in the past because one just didn’t
have these maps and didn’t know how far the blue areas extended. Today with the
maps we can look closely and say: “Ok, here is blue.” [...] (I02RMb, 00:55:02-8)
And [...] we had to modify the development plans in some areas, had to revise
them, what then often for the affected landowners, who according to the old
planning law had a building lot and now only have a flooded piece of land, in
terms of planning law, this is a problem for local politics. (I02RMa, 00:56:56-8)
In everyday life, it’s a huge help. I mean this geographical information system
in general. [...] I always say, I have a telephone in one hand, in the other hand
the mouse to the PC and, if someone asks me something regarding any of the
relevant issues that we administer here, I can provide information directly. I can
retrieve this flood information. I see where pipes are. I see which building law
applies, what the zoning says, where protected areas are and so on. And, in this
respect, this information is simply a very important building block, too... (I09RM,
00:41:42-1)
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Say, in the case of the field that is to be leased [...]. Rather than the city having
to maintain it as meadow, it will be leased as farm land. As I said, it’s not as if
what it says in there is written in stone. But it’s the information that the local
decision process must consider. What finally comes out of it is a different story.
(I05RM, 00:24:29-5)
You see that other communities have erected buildings, public buildings, in the
HQ100-area in the recent past. [...] Ultimately, politics does not always decide
rationally, but interests are pursued. And there you must weigh flood protection
against other interests. (I08RM, 00:20:37-3)
I06RM: Yes, I find them very good. Flood hazard maps provide insight about the
theoretical inundation area. But you already see that communities nevertheless try
in these areas, especially in the HQ-extreme area, that they still try to designate
building zones. And there should still be a means to prevent that. [...] 00:13:47-3
There are acceptance problems insofar as that, naturally, many municipalities do
not want these maps. Because then they are provided with stipulations. For
example, an industrial zone that they wanted to designate, they are not allowed
to designate. Or a development zone. They want to expand, every municipality
wants to expand [...] And the hazard maps stop that in the river valleys. (I18E,
00:34:16-3).
[T]he municipalities are in these... how’s that called? In these municipal asso-
ciations, they are involved in the financing. And they play along, enforcedly.
Because it’s an EU directive, which is then implemented via state laws. But the
municipalities are not enthusiastic about it because maps come out of it showing
certain areas as flooded. Where then, possibly, originally planned development
areas cannot be realized any more, or only with much more difficulty, because, if
one builds the development area there, one has to do landfilling, which consumes
volume, a reduction volume, that one must then win back somewhere else. That’s
the municipalities’ daily struggle, not only against flooding but also against the...
these flood hazard maps. (I14E, 00:29:38-8)
Section 6.1.4
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And the state has or is in the process of creating flood hazard maps and then you
see it in blue and white: That’s what it looks like. And then it’s real. Then one
knows: Ok, that will come at some point. (I02RMb, 00:32:59-3)
So, simulation and animation are ways through which this flood hazard can be
made real and with which to sensitize people. (I18E, 00:25:39-1)
[T]o affect that some form of precaution is taken in these [protected – Ed.] ar-
eas. That people do something, that they say: “Whoops! We may actually be
affected.” And, for that, these maps are important. That one can record: there is
something! [. . . ] That is exactly the point where we can do something today in
terms of precaution. Where we have the possibility to accomplish that citizens do
something themselves. Which is often important. I mean, we cannot always only
say: “Build flood defenses!” The public can take a lot of precaution itself. So that
there is less damage, and, through that, it is perhaps more worth than us building
the hundredth retention basin somewhere along a waterway. It can very well be
wiser to use the maps to generate precaution.
That the citizens themselves start taking precaution, very important point. That
they do not say, as just mentioned, “the state must take care of it” or “the mu-
nicipality must do something”. Instead, everyone can do something themselves
simply by saying: “Well, how do I use my basement? [...] What can I do if I build
anew? [...]” (I12E, 00:28:45-5)
Then one can then say or show the population: “Up to this point it is dangerous.
Above that, you can think of yourself as being on the safe side.” Or, if he’s within
the HQ100-flood, say: “Build accordingly.” Or, what do I know, if the heater
is to be rebuilt or whatever, that one can arrange oneself accordingly. (I05RM,
00:29:56-6)
I10RM: They are of course very important when it’s about building things. That
is, when it’s about development plans or preparing development plans. Or if it’s
about, people who want to rent an apartment in a certain area often come to us
and ask: “From when on will we have inundation there?” For that, the maps are
of course very important, that one must really say clearly. Or it is very helpful
that they exist. [...] 00:25:16-2
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I think it [the hazard map – Ed.] is an important tool for the residents for clar-
ifying, and for showing: “Careful, even if you were never flooded or only very
rarely, you live in a flood-prone area.” That is very important for the presentation
of measures that we were just talking about. Because if you come to someone
and tell them: “We’re building a wall through your garden”, even if that wall is
just 50 cm high, they’re not going to be thrilled. But if you say you’re doing it
because you want to protect them, and if you can also support that with a flood
hazard map, then they’re suddenly open towards such measures. Because they’ll
say: “Yes, I’d rather have a wall than water in my basement.” (I03RM, 00:29:01-1)
It’s like this, those who want to build there and have a building site – given to
them, inherited or whatever – are very unreasonable. They’ll say “there has never
been flooding here” because they really want to build at this spot. And then we
often convince them with photos, when we have photos. Or with these blue maps.
[...] And it is often difficult to convince them. (I02RMb, 00:55:58-5)
When citizens come and ask. . . . [T]hey want to rent a flat somewhere or buy
a house or so. Maybe there’s a plot of land somewhere, where they would like to
build. Of those, there is certainly the one or the other who inquires: “Is it a flood
plain? When can we expect flooding there? As of what water level?” Every now
and then there’s a request, and then we refer to the map. (I10RM, 00:40:53-5)
I mean the individual builder or architect who comes to us and says: “How is it
there?” And I can tell him relatively quickly: “In the case of a 100-year event,
which is when the buildings insurance will take care of it and when there are also
certain consequences in terms of construction law, the flood depth is that and that
for this piece of land.” Then they are of course very grateful when they can quickly
obtain reliable information. (I09RM, 01:02:12-4)
I02RMa: That’s right, when, by real estate transactions nowadays, they inquire.
01:40:18-8
I02RMb: Right. [. . . ] [S]ince the Oder and Elbe were gracing through the TV [...]
And then, of course, flood events in states that never used to have flood problems.
[...] [P]eople living near the creek or who want to buy a house [are] already more
sensitized. They also come and ask: what does it look like? [...] That was not the
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case in the past. Before, no one was interested. Because it just wasn’t on their
minds, flooding... 01:41:23-0
I03RM: We have also arranged information events and again explained how the
flood hazard maps work, which information I can draw from them. And, especially
after the flood, there was of course again and again the request: “Yes, how is it at
my place? [...] Am I actually in the hazard zone, or am I already outside?” [...] If
the water comes, is it only my coal cellar that is wet or my living room too. [...]
00:34:36-6
And the information, well, it was also publicly presented. It was a fairly brief
affair. It was somewhat politically motivated. They wanted to show, outwardly,
that they are here now, the maps. There was some explaining involved, too.
(I01RM, 00:43:59-5)
I04RM: Yes, has just been discussed. The top of the administration definitely
wants to organize an information evening. Here at city hall with a large audience,
with invitation by the Regional Administrative Authority, through which the maps
are produced, and by the Administrative District Office, of course. And we, as
involved party that is, want to organize an information evening during the public
display period. Because then the topic is new and that is when people have the
most questions. [...] 00:06:14-1
The city [Name] did that. They invited the whole population of this development
area to an information event. Said: “This is what it looks, people. Errors were
made, alright. Now, the case is that, if we are flooded, the water will stand at 1
meter. Check that you have enough material to protect yourselves. We can also
give it to you.” They showed how to do it, how to water-proof a basement window,
like all these site protection measures. (I13E, 00:35:07-7)
So, the maps were printed in color in the daily newspapers. And there was no
outcry. “Oh, that’s what it will look like if we’re flooded.” It also wasn’t used
somehow politically to say: “So, you’ve now seen it in the maps, in the Rhine-
Atlas. Now we must do something! [...]” (I12E, 00:34:59-3)
Section 6.2
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Well... there is certainly preoccupation with it. And, I would say, in 90
We have two different kinds of reactions from out there. [...] And we have regions,
for example, here... They’re already finished, the dark green ones. That was
no problem. The municipalities, yes, there was discussion and alright. Here, in
this area down there, they are only just being finished. There, there was massive
resistance: “The map is not correct. It cannot be that we have spent millions
on retention basins and our settlements, future settlement area is still flooded.”
[...] “It cannot be. The maps are wrong. The Regional Administrative Authority
has miscalculated.” And tried to mobilize politically to prevent that the map is
produced. That there is as well . . . [...] [T]here is the whole bandwidth. [...]
I’ve already heard people say: you bring the flood to us with your maps. (I13E,
00:14:47-0)
A.3 Quotes in chapter 7
Section 7.1.1
Our river basin investigation was already done at this time. So much of what
is shown as risk-zone in the flood hazard map was already known since before.
Because it was known what the catchment area looks like and what this means for
the water surface profile in the affected communities. (I03RM, 00:29:01-1)
I06RM: Well, we don’t use them for our daily work. They’re more something for
the municipalities themselves to use when some building areas are being discussion
and new ones are being devised for future development or the like. Because our
mission is the implementation of predefined flood protection facilities at specified
locations. [. . . ] 00:16:58-2
It is nevertheless, in spite of everything, always easier to take action and get
support just after the occurrence of flood damage than on the basis of flood hazard
maps, for example (...). No municipality is willing to open up its wallet unless it’s
in great distress. (I06RM, 01:01:58-2)
Because [...] it has changed over the decades how flooding happens. Today floods
turn out differently than 20, 30 years ago. [...] And if you compare the flood hazard
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maps now with old maps, earlier maps, then that alone shows how necessary it
was to redo them to have a basis for planning in the water sector and in the area
of flood protection. (I01RM, 00:39:55-7)
Section 7.1.2
Then you can see exactly at what time which area, which block is flooded. And,
well, that really helps. Because then, since we also knows through the forecasts
what water level we will be getting, we can already take protective measures there
in advance. (I10RM, 00:25:16-2)
Well (...) it’s not the most urgent thing for us. Because we know in this type of
town, we already know. We know, by this and that event, it will be this and that
area. We also have simple aids down here at the bridge. We have, after every
major flood, we add a new mark in color and note the year and then we know
exactly, when the creek runs over the embankment to this and that level, then we
know, down here, in this and that area the basements will be flooded. This is the
advantage of a smaller city, that we still know these things. (I07RM, 00:30:24-1)
I07RM: They don’t bring us much, that is-. Because maybe we can put up a
flexible flood barrier at some road, but we already know that by ourselves. [...]
When there is heavy rain, I simply drive out to the first bridge out there and look
how high the water is standing. And then I know in two hours I’ll have this and
that water level in town. These are just experiences that we have [...] where we
then need to or can take action. Whether to issue a warning [...]. 00:34:24-8
But the biggest problem are small rivers, small streams, which are only this wide,
normally, and perhaps this deep [shows with his hands]. And when you have a
geographically concentrated flood episode, then it can be that it is river three
meters wide or, yes, and deep. Those are the main problem. But that cannot be
handled even with such maps. Because you would have to calculate every little
river that comes out from somewhere in the woods. Which overflows perhaps every
200 years. [. . . ] In 15 years it is over there and in 20 years it’s moving in that
direction. The effort is much too great. You won’t even find the plans anymore
by then (laughs). (I07RM, 00:32:46-7)
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I13E: Well, where we still encounter trouble is when it comes to the local under-
standing of it being necessary. To do this or that. For example, for the municipality
to set up an emergency plan. That this is necessary even if there are technical
protection measures in place in the form of a dike or retention basins. That it
is necessary anyway because there can be an event which is greater than what
these reservoirs or this dike were dimensioned for. The municipality must never-
theless be prepared. And that continues to be very difficult to get across to the
municipalities. [...] 00:14:47-0
Section 7.1.3
It [GIS – Ed.] is basically like an onion that has different layers which I can then
look through. Then I see that at this point, [. . . ] it’s a natural monument, it’s
floodplain, it’s this or that. [. . . ] When I have this flood hazard map as well and
know that at this point, I see it in the aerial view, it extends this far, I can check:
is the project that I’m planning affected too? Or is it not affected? Then I can
make decide much better than what was possible before when one only had this
in the form of cartographical material. (I05RM, 00:15:36-1)
...you can very quickly find out everything electronically now, what the situation
is like. Previously we had to either, as I mentioned, rummage through our files or
we had no data at all. [...] And it’s really important to us to have this information
accessible. (I09RM, 00:43:46-1)
Locally, there are land-use plans which cover all districts. And in a recent update,
at least here locally, it of course had to be taken into account. [...] At some
locations, you cannot designate any land-use anymore. Whether it’s for housing
or commerce or something else. So, that was a very concrete opportunity for use,
or it was mandatory, ultimately, to consider it. (I01RM, 00:49:58-9)
[O]ften, the case is that precisely commercial zones are located in these areas. And
if those are no longer useable and no longer open for modifications, then that poses
a problem to the local business community and, hence, also to the municipality.
Because if a company cannot grow, it won’t [...] necessarily satisfy with being
offered a different location in the area, but will eventually call the whole site [into]
question and possibly relocate. And that’s very dangerous for a community and
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also expensive. Because, to a great extent, a municipality is financed by trade tax.
[...] If we have good protective works, which function reliably, this must also have
an [...] effect. Currently it is handled very strictly, that these protected areas may
not be built-up. (I03RM, 00:39:11-4)
Basically there is fear of contact or resistance. One doesn’t really want to know.
Because a municipality, if it has businesses in flood-prone areas, it prefers to have
them work and pay taxes and so on and not to strain them and somehow-. It’s
regarded as if it would be to hassle people to say: “You however live in the flood-
prone area.” Many municipalities want to continue building in such areas. (I06RM,
00:27:39-3)
I14E: Yes, there’s always the question, if a municipality has a problem and wants
to be informed and wants to have an idea of how it can protect itself, what it
can do, then it’s a big advantage. But if in the municipality there’s, so to say, a
very dedicated mayor, who mainly regards it as his task to attract more business,
to designate development areas, and to develop the community, and then has the
problem that he is located in a narrow valley and only has development opportu-
nities along the stream, for them it’s a problem and they don’t always appreciate
it. [...] 01:35:16-3
You have to count with, that the municipalities, which of course – these are in-
teresting plots of land along the waterways as long as there’s no flood – that the
municipality of course has a great interest in securing such land parcels and use
them for building, for urban development. And this will, there is much conflict
potential in this [...] (I17E, 00:23:22-4)
Section 7.1.4
Well, you cannot say: “We alone know best and this is how we’ll do it. And,
citizen, you should simply accept it.” Instead one should involve the citizens at a
very early stage [...]. (I03RM, 00:15:50-8)
[W]hen the flood hazard maps will be published in the near future, then the
reaction from the population, from those directly affected. Because that is still a
large question mark. Will there be a storm of protest coming our way? Because
many people see: “Oh, I’m in the flood area”, which they might previously not
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have been aware of. And whether some of that will come crashing down over us.
My boss currently fears so, for example. (I04RM, 00:02:47-9)
But, as I said, right now, what is rather perceived is the danger that something
will be unleashed, which we don’t know where it will end or what will come out of
it, and that the municipalities will be faced with a lot of questions. (That) we’ll
be covered in inquires and we, as a municipality, weren’t even who came up with
this thing. So, it’s a bit ambiguous. (I04RM, 00:17:55-2)
I08RM: Yes, it’s like this, when we’ve expanded our basins, I assume that we’ll,
of course, promote that. Because, naturally, positive things you can market well.
But, currently, we lack the funds to, concretely at this moment, extend or build
something new. And, naturally, you don’t market something negative. . . That
could give people the idea that they might not be perfectly protected. Therefore,
in this area – that has political reasons – we only communicate positive news in
this area at our small level. (Pause) 00:11:41-6
For us, it’s currently more important to establish the structural defense than to
invest the time and to prepare material to inform the public, only to have to
say: “We must still do this and that.” It’s perhaps more meaningful to make
a start first, saying: “We’re building. We’re doing it.” And then inform parallel.
Because otherwise it kind of has the effect of making citizens afraid and an extreme
pressure building up. And, this way, we can simultaneously say: “We don’t only
know about it but we’re also working on it.” (I02RMb, 01:42:32-1)
I05RM: Well, I don’t really see the necessity for that. Especially since the affect-
edness is limited to a few residential houses and a couple, or probably only a single
store. They know the fact of the matter, because they’ve already experienced it.
[. . . ] [I]t’s not a huge area that is inundated, here. Insofar, there’s also no reason
to raise panic. Those who are directly affected by flooding [...], they know it... [...]
00:34:51-1
SK: And the people who already own a house close to the river? 01:02:55-3
I09RM: Nothing changes for them... 01:02:59-1
SK: Is there no interest in coming here, see the maps and see how high the-
01:03:04-1
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I09RM: The depth. They know exactly how high the water stood in the basement
at this and that time. At the most they would start discussing, saying: “That’s
not correct.”
Well, one needs special knowledge about flood protection to make it palatable for
the citizens. What the positive purpose, the purpose and the sense of the flood
hazard map is. And that is not being communicated by the municipality, the
community. And the staff is not there and the expertise doesn’t exist. And it’s a
shame that one produces such a good instrument as the flood hazard map, only to
then not communicate the positive sides of it to the population in several steps...
(I06RM, 00:30:31-4)
The state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg has issued the flood hazard map, but then, really,
a group of people would have to say: “Now we introduce it in every community and
offer consultations and also have discussions with individual companies threatened
by flooding.” There is no structure in place to communicate it in a positive way
to people... It’s left to depend on itself. (I06RM, 00:28:22-8)
Because, as a mayor, one has to take care of services of general interest to the
citizens and one doesn’t want to worry them with these hazard maps and these
issues. And will then, owing to the circumstances, also say: “Well, it’s not a non-
issue here, flooding. Hence, we don’t care about it any further. We have it here
[the maps – Ed.] and whoever wants can have a look, but we don’t do anything
actively. We still have that construction site over there and the kindergarten that
is still to be built and this and that.” And then the resources are simply differently
used. [...] 00:40:57-1
I18E: [. . . ] [T]here are municipalities which approach it very responsibly, in my
view, and never talk about the risk of flooding in diminishing way, but always say:
“There is this danger.” Which don’t have a problem with us depicting flooded areas
located in industrial zones [...] They deal with this issue very proactively. And
there are other cities, which say: “Oh, what? Flood hazard? No, we cannot tell
anyone about that.” Because they’re afraid that the industry will move somewhere
else and they pay a lot of taxes. And they’re afraid that people will panic and
move away from the area. [...] So, as you can see, there are many who prefer not
to mention the risk of flooding and who hope that nothing will happen during
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their tenure as, for example, mayor. And, if it does, then it was an evil natural
phenomenon. [...] 00:19:08-3
SK: What does it depend on, in your view, that some handle this well whereas
others don’t? 00:19:15-7
I18E: Well I guess that’s really a purely individual question, which people are
there. [...] Really it must be that. Because the two cities that I’m thinking of
[...] are economically very stable, both have large industries in their diked areas,
both are exposed to a similar risk of flooding, both with huge loss potential. [...]
But they respond to it completely differently. [...] [T]hey’ll only face damage from
HQ100 or HQ200 events. That’s very rare. The one says : “Yes, still important. It
can happen, I have to inform people.” And the other says: “HQ200. Once in 200
years. Whether that will ever affect me? Better to do good politics now, collect
lots of trade taxes.” [. . . ] 00:22:36-0
Section 7.2
It’s always a problem when there are consequences. And when there’s suddenly an
ordinance [...] Then I say: “Hm, maybe it’s not right. [...]” Then there are always
acceptance problems. When people see disadvantages from it. (I18E, 00:38:02-0)
When we’re around in the flood partnerships, there’s often reports of the many
measures that have been carried out. But these measures are usually taken because
of negative experiences. I.e. because flood events have happened. And very little
happens in advance. I must admit I don’t have very high hopes that we’ll get
many municipalities to bother about these things in advance. (I11Ea, 00:30:36-3)
In Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, the municipalities were present at the table from the start,
the municipal associations. [. . . ] And, hence... there is [...] a great desire, I also
want to have the results. I have shared the costs, so I can also say what I want.
And there’s a greater acceptance from the outset. That means the municipalities
ask: “When will we finally get our map?” And they also want to know what the
map shows. And partake in the plausibilization of it. Look at them and say: “I
do not like that there. [...] Or there’s the bridge which has been newly built. We
have to change that.” So, the municipalities are strongly involved. [...] And that’s
simply not the case elsewhere, in other states. And that’s just exemplary, that so
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much has happened. And you see it in the sum that is spent. Like [...] they’re
really spending big and not saving on it. (I12E, 00:21:07-5)
And the [flood partnerships – Ed.], for example, are a really great tool or a great
method for keeping the issue of flood risk management continuously present in the
municipalities. There are many events, flood partnerships, where the local author-
ities can exchange information with each other, where there’s a lot of material.
[...] Where the municipalities help each other, support and, I would say, motivate
each other. (I16E, 00:17:12-8)
Section 7.2.1
it must be well-founded. There I’d say: “thoroughness before speed.” Because
there’s no sense in – no matter in what context – relying on a faulty data basis.
Then, what is there in errors, will diffuse down the line. Even if what one was
developing, what one was planning, was correct with regard to the input used, if
this input is wrong, then what is done will also be wrong. Or at least not effective.
Not like you’d want it to be. (I01RM, 00:39:55-7)
We also had photos of the flooding taken from a helicopter back then and, as you
can see, in fact, the map, the area, that is shown in blue on the flood hazard map,
corresponds to the area that you see on the ground from a helicopter. It actually
fits very well [...]. (I06RM, 00:43:25-2)
And the state is the higher authority to the municipalities. And what comes from
above is usually accepted. It’s almost always the case in administration that one
doesn’t doubt the results that a higher authority provides you with. (I08RM,
00:14:19-6)
[O]f course, it always depends on the municipality, how good people there are
or how the relationship with the state government or the Regional Administra-
tive Authority is. Sometimes, if there’s as much as the slightest suspicion that
something that the engineering bureaus working for the Regional Administrative
Authority have mapped is wrong, it will very quickly be explosively stirred up in
the municipal councils, sent out to the press, etc. (I14E, 00:29:38-8)
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Well, I think they’re well compiled, these maps. Methodologically, they’ve not only
based them on what is known by the administrations alone. The administrations
cannot know everything. Instead, they’ve asked the people out there and have
acquired everything anew. Like, here, for example, I think the experts talk about
debris lines, or whatever the things are called. [...] And all of that was recorded.
And they also asked the people what it was like in their gardens or I don’t know
where. So I think the maps are very well produced... (I01RM, 00:39:55-7)
We then also talked to this colleague from the Administrative District Office, which
was directly involved in the creation of the maps, discussed things very directly
and asked: “Can this really be the case?” Or “how do you come to the conclusion
that it looks like that there?” And, like that, a lot was clarified. In that way, the
basis of trust was certainly strengthened. (I09RM, 00:50:54-8)
And we said: [. . . ] before they can be issued by the Administrative District Offices
and are done and determine what counts as floodplain, the municipalities must
be given a chance to respond to them, to review them and voice their suggestions
and concerns. Otherwise, they won’t get accepted. (I13E, 00:27:08-3)
Of course, small errors can be present, but that’s not decisive. Only the result,
the bottom line, counts. And that’s correct, I think. (I04RM, 00:22:35-2)
Of course you can discuss about 10 meters more or less, maybe, but I still trust
the flood maps very much. (I06RM, 00:43:25-2)
It must always be proportional, or the cost-benefit must stand in proportion. I
cannot perform 100,000 different calculations. [...] Data or research certainty just
to be able to say: “I know it 100 percent accurately.” [...] I don’t really see that
as necessary. (I05RM, 00:46:27-4)
Whether it’s correct down to 5 or 10 or 20 meters in the terrain, it actually doesn’t
matter that much to us. Because, as I said, most of it is anyhow out in the open
countryside and, there, a few meters doesn’t play any role... (I05RM, 00:39:16-0)
Well I am aware that it’s never 100 percent accurate, but, in any case, it will be
more accurate than the previous floodplain assessment [...] [L]ike, at large, it will
surely be more reliable. (I05RM, 00:39:16-0)
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We haven’t had something like this in this form before. At most, there were some
experience values, which, however, were never properly recorded. [...]. But these
delineations, these very precise delineations, which are very exact – from what
I have been able to tell and compare based on my experience – that is simply
something entirely new. (I04RM, 00:16:39-4)
Well, somewhat exaggerated, I would say that if one doesn’t want the inundation
area the way it’s being shown for political reasons... That’s usually the motive for
raising doubts about the model. (I13E, 00:59:35-0)
A.4 Quotes in chapter 8
Section 8.2.1
[I]t is certainly clarified where exactly the flood frontiers are by which type of
inundation event. [...] And, previously, one simply didn’t have anything like
that, where it’s so clear or so palpable [as it is] illustrated in the map. (I04RM,
00:16:39-4)
[T]he new maps can’t be as easily ignored. And when you refer to old maps, which
are 20, 30, 50 years old, of course those don’t interest the citizens, in particularly
not the one intending to build or to change something. He will say: that’s not an
up-to-date data basis. (I01RM, 00:52:19-5)
I02RMa: In the past, when we planned flood protection measures at some place or
another, we were toled: “There has never been flooding...” And that is the main
problem. Today, due to the technical possibilities, I can simulate or calculate
where I have a flood hazard. Even if there hasn’t been a flood in 50 or 100 years.
And that’s what we want to protect people from, so that such an event will perhaps
never materialize. 00:33:40-7
I02RMb : Well, [...] what’s really impressive [is] when we show photos of past
flood events. Then no one can say: “I don’t see it. I don’t want to see it.” Instead
people start to think. And some will still say: “Oh, it will never happen again and
that was only once.” Then I often say: “Yes, alright, but even if you don’t have
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to experience it again your children will, such damage to the house at some point
of time won’t be fun.” But, of course, the most impressive is if you show photos
or these blue maps. And we didn’t – until recently we didn’t have these maps.
00:57:40-4
Together with the administration, our municipal council decides whether we’ll
designate any new development areas or commercial zones. And, in our case, the
areas that we are thinking about, which we may at some point designate, are all
outside of the areas that could be at risk of flooding. So, this consequence it
has already had for us. There we eliminate all risks from the outset. (I08RM,
00:18:36-3)
Section 8.2.2
It’s definitely a relief. [...] Now it’s quite clear, we don’t need to discuss it in
the municipal council. If someone has the idea “well there’s still a lot of space,
one could still make a nice commercial zone there and my brother owns a plot of
land right there” or something along those lines, there is a clear decision basis.
It’s not possible! And we don’t need to waste any time, effort and nerves on such
discussions. And that’s definitely positive. (I09RM, 01:01:08-3)
I02RMb: (. . . ) But, naturally, if you have something like that and the municipal
council knows about it, then there’s also an obligation. Then you can no longer
pretend: “I don’t know anything about flooding. I don’t know anything about
the hazards.” But, instead, when something like that is there and known about,
you have to decide. Do I accept this, do I take it into account, or do I try to
build protection measures according to the damage potential and take some form
of action. 00:47:17-3
During this [previous – Ed.] designation process [...] there were massive problems.
Farmers and affected residents near the brook were vehemently disturbed by it.
Demarcations based on debris lines or from previous floods established partly
through local cross section analyses were also called into question. Because there
hadn’t been any flooding there as far back as people could remember [...]. So it
was very strongly questioned. [...] Now, though, that it can be calculated on the
basis of a topographical terrain model, because one knows exactly this and that
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much catchment area, this and that much rainfall will lead it to spread out like this
and that in the valley area, it’s not as easy to question anymore. And it’s simply
de facto (...) floodplain. Whether the residents think it’s legally or professionally
tenable or not doesn’t really play a role anymore. (I05RM, 00:09:13-0)
If a mayor knows the flood hazard and nevertheless designates a development
area, then he’s making himself liable to prosecution. And there’s not any mayor
anymore that will say: “I’ll turn that into a construction area” knowing very well
that it’s flood-prone. Wanting to make money off it. He won’t take the risk. Then
flooding occurs and the houses are under water and it gets out quickly, how those
things are related. So, it’s no longer the way it was 20, 30 years ago: “Oh, I didn’t
know that. If only I’d known, I’d never have sold that land parcel.” It’s, by now,
the liability question has been unambiguously clarified. (I12E, 00:24:35-2)
It cannot be hidden in the desk drawer because: once out in the open, these are
facts. And, if something happens, every mayor or every responsible flood risk
manager knows he’ll be in trouble. (I16E, 01:02:38-9)
The advantage is that it’s there’s an obligation to implement changes. This is
sometimes difficult to achieve on a voluntary basis because flooding, if it’s an
event every 100, 200 years, rare events in other words, for many that have to
spend money to protect themselves from damage in 50 or 100 years maybe. Of
course, it can happen tomorrow, too. But many think: “Every 100 years? Well
that won’t happen to me. It’s uncertain.” (I18E, 00:56:12-1)
Initially, our plan was to show the hazard through these maps. And the rest would
sort itself out. According to the motto: Then the municipalities will know what to
do. They see the danger and the rest... is obvious. Everything is in there. But that
was not the case. In 2005, we had the first hazard map of the Neckar on display...
[. . . ] And a little later I asked the contact from the Administrative District Office:
“Well? What was the reaction by the municipalities? What happened?” “Well,
two weeks later, the request for permission for the next development plan and the
next building project plan located in those dark-blue areas came in.” As if nothing
had happened... (I13E, 01:14:40-2)
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I14E: The old flood areas were mostly mapped following actual events. So one had
a flood event, that was mapped and then flood plains were declared. And these
flood plains were discussed intensively with the municipalities. That is why it
took years sometimes [. . . ] But the flood hazard maps are not discussed with the
municipalities. One doesn’t agree to leave out an area just because a municipality
plans to designate a development area there. 01:56:29-7
SK: Was that the case in the past? 01:56:31-3
I14E: Yes, that was the case. It was haggled about. And, now, flood hazard
maps are created using these methodical, technical procedures [. . . ] It’s a huge
difference. No municipality, no one has the chance to fight off the legal obligation
of these HQ100-areas. [. . . ] 01:57:20-5
[T]hey often come and say: “Well couldn’t you change a little something in your
calculations” and so forth. [. . . ] There’s a conflict, the client wants a positive
result. And then we have, then this hazard map provides a much better argument
for saying: “No, we don’t do that on principle and especially not since we al-
ways have to count on someone else doing a form of control calculations...” (I14E,
01:30:38-6)
Because up until 2004 we had the usual procedure via ordinances. And for years
we had the problem that the Administrative District Offices didn’t get going on
these ordinances, [. . . ] [that] the assessments didn’t proceed and weren’t brought
to an end. Because... there were appeals, there were delays, questions were raised
[. . . ] We set out some floodplains but not like now when I’ll soon have set out 12,
designated 12.300 kilometers of floodplains, finished and done, which are binding.
I couldn’t have done that with the old procedures. (I13E, 01:18:26-3)
When I think about what it requires to determine a water conservation area [. . . ],
to issue an ordinance for a specially limited area, to work it out, clear it with all
parties involved. It takes a lot of work and a long, long time. If I imagine that
we would have had to do that along all the water bodies in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
it wouldn’t have been possible, not from a human resource perspective. (I17E,
00:39:21-3)
Section 8.3
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Quite some persuasion work is still needed, to make sure that the personnel work-
ing in City Hall, for example, or in various places at the Administrative District
Office, that they are also convinced that the maps bring a blessing for people. It
always resonates like: “Oh, those flood hazard maps, they just cause trouble.”
[. . . ] We see them as a blessing and say: “Yes, now people can get information
and prepare in advance.” On the other hand many see it like this: “Yes, there
will be costs for flood protection and we won’t be able to build in certain areas
anymore, as we wanted to.” One can see it from two sides. [. . . ] But, officially,
they’re not recognized, these reservations that some have against the flood hazard
maps. (I06RM, 00:27:39-3)
I06RM: [...] [T]he only ones who resort to the flood hazard maps are those who
have a direct interest in them... Regional planning and land-use planning, of
course, for the larger public authorities, who know how to use them. But at the
individual (. . . ) of a municipality, there’s not much use... 00:30:31-4
I06RM: I’m an expert when it comes to flood protection and I say: the maps
themselves are great. With them you can explain wonderfully. If you use them as
a basis and you have people affected by flooding, you can say: “Here, the flood
depth is this and that high, and in this area, building is not permissible. And
when you want to prevent flooding, or protect yourself against flooding, you have
to stack the doors this and that high with sandbags, or whatever.” So, for someone
who’s familiar with the flood problematic, it’s a blessing, the flood hazard maps.
But they must be better conveyed to the population. [. . . ] It’s really a question
of what you do with them. At the moment they’re just standing there on the
Internet, waiting to be used. 00:32:51-9
Because we have often made the experience that, on the one hand, the information
content of the map is very high and that it’s difficult to convey all that informa-
tion... respectively to convey it is easy since we’re experts and know what is in
there. But, across from us, not everything hits home... and only parts of it. And
then only parts of it are implemented. Or not. (I13E, 00:02:29-2)
...the only conflict with these flood hazard maps is the problem that one knows,
now we have areas displayed as being at risk about which this was not always
previously known [...]. And the problem is that individuals, well I see the main
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problem as being that the private individual or the firm or the municipality finds
itself to be located in such an area, possibly having difficulties with insurances
or the real estate and so on. So there can be cases in which the existence of
new knowledge can lead to an individual... even if this wasn’t intended, suffers
a financial loss or that an insurance company refuses to insure him... [...] want
to sell [a house – Ed.] and has the huge problem that they cannot get it to sell
because knowledge about this risk has been published [...]. (I14E, 01:50:22-5)
And there came a young man [...] He would like to build a house and enquired
about the building regulations, what he would have to consider. And then the
alarm bell went off, that’s not a 100-year flood area but a 50-year one. [...] At the
same time, there are older buildings around. And, consequently, there’s a building
right [...] And, in this case, the land owner delivered numerous arguments which
we couldn’t ignore. [. . . ] He said: “I have three brothers. Each of us inherited a
building lot from our grandfather. That’s my inheritance. If I can’t build there
or sell it as a building lot, I’ve been disinherited. [. . . ] Next point: I pay a high
property tax for that land parcel for years because of it being registered as a
building lot. Do I get my money back if I can’t build there?” [. . . ] And one can’t
say that that’s water under the bridge and now the property is only worth a euro.
(I09RM, 00:29:29-3)
It definitely affects the real estate value and can-. Well the owners talk about cold-
hearted expropriation and stuff like that and feel robbed of their values, which is,
in part, I think, cannot be denied. (I09RM, 00:32:38-7)
Section 8.3.1
And many models used in engineering suffer from this. That one says: “Quickly,
quickly we have to know now, and we know the physical relations so let’s calcu-
late.” And as long as a model hasn’t been checked and validated with the help of
measurement data, one must have big reservations. And this is also the reason
why much mischief is being done with computer models. (I15E, 00:07:29-8)
What I view as negative or problematic is that many try and say: “We can do that.
We’ll do that. We buy such a model.” But do not look at the boundary conditions
that have to be met. [. . . ] So doing these simulations is one thing... [. . . ] But to
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prepare the data for a simulation is an equally large and as elaborate task. And
one can’t simply say: there’s high-resolution data available today, I’ll just buy
that and then I’ll be able to simulate. And that’s where I see the danger. That
more and more people try, the models are becoming increasingly user-friendly,
that more and more is being done, more and more is calculated. But the models...
are maybe even discredited because they’re being used the wrong way. And then
models might be attributed with the wrong characteristics although they may
actually be good. Only because someone used them in the wrong way [...]. (I12E,
00:07:56-8)
Well I want to say: either the representation is completely scrapped because one
doesn’t want it. Or there’s constructive discussion about the details. In the sense
of: We had a flooding event there but that area was never inundated. Why
is that? How come it’s flooded in your calculations? Then it’s constructively
discussed around the model. The engineer goes there, of course [. . . ] And then
there’s a normal and good process, at the end of which the municipality agrees:
“Now it is correct, the map.” Although there’s imprecision. But that... that it’s
argued: “[...] And it’s all so imprecise and uncertain. I can anyhow not use that
for anything.” That is rare, I think... Rather there’s the general rejection because
of other reasons, political reasons, I’d say. (I13E, 01:03:18-0)
These are technical instruments, there are boundary conditions. If I say 3,42 m,
the modeler who made it knows exactly: I assumed that scenario, I assumed that
curve, I assumed this roughness of terrain. I know exactly what has gone into it.
How many uncertainties and [where] every stage of modeling came from. And the
civil servant clicks on the table, 3,42 m: “Well, then 3,42 m is what I’ll use. I’ll
implement property protection up to 3,42 m and I’ll be safe.” And that somehow
shows [. . . ] that one should maybe categorize the results in classes. That one
should rather say: “Yes, it could come up to this and that many meters, the
water. It could of course also be worse.” (I16E, 00:23:34-1)
I18E: Well the only problem that I see is the issue of the maps only showing riverine
flooding. And can distract from the fact that inundation is possible anywhere. [. . . ]
And that, because one only thinks of riverine flooding, which these maps are there
for, that one forgets that there are also flash floods caused by direct precipitation.
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That’s why I would say that that’s a thing that should actually be improved, that
every map should have it written on top: “Flash floods possible everywhere”, so
to say. [. . . ] And, when you ask like that, that would be a thing that I’d consider
to constitute a downside of such a map. That one feels safe in areas where there
isn’t really any safety. [. . . ] Because it focuses our attention to a specific area and
distracts from other areas. 00:50:24-2
And that’s of course a challenge, to make a map as precise as possible while
knowing that it cannot be 100
And there has to be a clear distinction, a clear delineation. And this delineation,
if I say: “Alright it could be here or it could be there” and in-between I have
an area of uncertainty, that doesn’t amount to a legal guideline. I have to define
clearly, that is the frontier. And I have to do that according to my best knowledge
and my best conscious even though I know: “Well, it could be here, it could be
there.” [. . . ] [W]hat is expected of us is that we define a definite line. And that’s
what we do, of course. But we do it at the same time as we are well-aware of there
being something else. But such things are difficult to document. Nobody wants
to hear it... [. . . ] 00:58:20-3
I18E: I don’t think it’s of great importance, generally, because, when, then it only
concerns the boundary. The most of such a map is very robust. It’s not like
that (in) one area lots is inundated and the location isn’t at risk. At least with
the maps in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, that will not happen. It will always be about
whether this building is affected as well? Or that building? Or this transformer
station? All the rest, the main part of the map, is pretty definitive. [. . . ] And
then it triggers discussion. And that’s the most important part. [. . . ] 00:40:16-7
But to misunderstand directly... not really. Because I think misunderstandings
always arise when there are classified values. [. . . ] When I say I have damages
ranging from 0-200 Euros, from 200-4000 Euros and... I don’t know, above 5000
Euros, above 4000 Euros. [. . . ] And that is, [. . . ] depending on what one chooses,
also a source of danger... [. . . ] I assume an environmentally relevant facility to
have a high vulnerability and assume that for the whole area. Things like that
can somehow happen. But regarding the flood hazard map itself... maybe at most
there could be a misunderstanding concerning what it’s based on. [. . . ] 00:48:26-0
Appendix A. Translations of German quotes 291
No, I don’t know what could come of that... Rather lack of trust, that causes us
problems, of course... (I13E, 01:08:59-9)
Well that one considers the scale in which it’s sensible to think. That is, I think,
necessary. If one takes such thoughts into account it is totally legitimate, I think,
to work with results of models even if one doesn’t completely comprehend them
scientifically. One has to do that... one cannot follow the tiniest detail of every
piece of information... (I16E, 00:51:30-8)
It’s futile. [. . . ] We try to make it clear that it’s a scenario and that it’s as good
as possible. We’re making a tremendous effort in the surveying. We’re making a
tremendous effort in the modeling. We’re really very precise. [. . . ] But... more
than that we cannot communicate. Because more is simply... the background is
missing or it’s, one notices it when one goes into detail in a discussion, that the
eyes of the counterpart start wandering off and they’re only listening with effort
and it’s not reaching them anymore. (I13E, 00:55:16-7)
Though, I have to say, I hadn’t informed myself very intensively regarding the
measurement inaccuracy in advance. It is possible that this was communicated
along with the rest, but that I didn’t register it as information. (I03RM, 00:47:19-
7)
I think that’s always the most important thing, not that one is provided with
300 pages of information that nobody will read. But that, if one has a specific
question, one is given information by the relevant office. (I03RM, 00:53:26-0)
A.5 Quotes in chapter 10
Section 10.2.1
[I]t is the case that these models for avalanches show the dependency on terrain
very strongly. [. . . ] [And] what happens outside of that to the left or right, one
didn’t know about that. Well it was always a longitudinal profile. And with these
2D sometimes 3D models one gets an extensive spatial image. And I have to
say, that has really done a lot, that one gets a kind of certitude. Not that it’s
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always correct, interpretation is always necessary. But it did do a lot. [. . . ] It
was, it really was a quantum leap in, in, in the, in the, in the calculation of these
phenomena. (IA22E, 00:24:16-7)
What it can be well used for, in my opinion, is as decision-support in [. . . ] expert
opinions. When one sees things in the simulation that one, for different reasons,
didn’t necessarily see out there in the terrain. (IA23E, 00:09:19-6)
And what also, it’s natural that there’s building or development in areas now,
where in the past no avalanches, where nobody settled before or nothing was built.
And the area is unknown then. So one doesn’t have historical documentation
by which one could show: there’s been an avalanche here. One simply doesn’t
know. And that’s where, I believe, simulations will play a larger role in the future.
Because then that somehow, one can then possibly estimate that better... (IA21E,
00:29:18-0)
Well the difference between modeling and the experience of the torrent managers,
the practitioners, isn’t that staggeringly high. [. . . ] Many old torrent managers
say: “We wouldn’t have needed a model for this. We would have known that
anyway.” But knowledge alone isn’t enough today. Because it can be claimed that
one possesses this knowledge, but it’s difficult to prove... (IA24E, 01:16:40-9)
I think that a quite decisive factor is the legal safeguarding of the practitioner.
In the past, when [. . . ] the public authority that decided that, they weren’t
questioned. [. . . ] But now, in all walks of life, coming from America, the legal
systems are increasingly striking back and saying: “Well excuse me. Somebody
decided something here and how did that person get to that decision?” And if
somebody is affected and there’s been damage and that person can show, legally,
that the public authority didn’t decide according to the state-of-the-art of science,
the public authority can find itself in a tight spot. [. . . ] [T]he practitioners know,
one has to protect oneself. [. . . ] And the models can be used as instruments for
this. (IA24E, 00:42:50-8)
Well it is certainly the case that it’s more common, if there’s an accident or
something like that, that people ask: “Your decision, what is it based on? Would
one, if one would have had a simulation or a prognostic model, what would the
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results have been?” That’s correct. It’s certainly the case today that it has to be
hedged. Regarding the avalanche models it’s also the case, they are also being
used, I think, to rethink one’s own decisions once more. [. . . ] [I]f, in a simulation,
one sees that an avalanche-branch suddenly heads into a different direction, one
will take another detailed look at that area on-site and consider: Is that possible?
(IA21E, 00:27:47-0)
In Austria, the highest building authority is for example the mayor. [. . . ] And
the mayor, we have a lot of small municipalities, is often biased. We always talk
about the ram and gardener problem in this instance. If one chooses the ram to
be the gardener one shouldn’t be surprised when the salad is missing. If the mayor
issues a building permit to his son... in an area where he shouldn’t have... Whom
does it surprise? When it comes to hazard zone planning, it’s consciously located
far away. And that’s good... Because these personal biases can’t take hold most
of the time. (IA24E, 01:11:44-6)
Section 10.2.2
Really, many models need a weapons permit... because in many models the param-
eters, just the parametrization and the whole model sequence in the background
make it impossible for many users to see what the model does in the first place.
(IA24E, 00:16:38-7)
A model is often only as good as its user. And good relates to experience in most
cases. A model user who doesn’t know what the model actually does and pours
something in and gets some result, if he trusts this result, I’d say he has missed
the mark. Then he’s in the wrong place. (IA24E, 01:26:50-0)
[H]ow one arrived at this image is in my opinion one of the most important points
for being able to interpret it at all. [. . . ] And then it’s about the model again but
also about the numerics. It’s about everything, really. [. . . ] Because if I don’t
know [. . . ] where its limits are or how all of it works, I, personally, find it difficult
to interpret something like that right. (IA19E, 01:13:16-2)
Well it’s often a topic that colorful, beautiful images [. . . ] in which pressure or
something is depicted somehow convey to the viewer: Yes, that’s the reality. Or
that’s the avalanche, it goes (. . . ). It’s like that. If I was to simply write that
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down myself and was to say: “At point X there’s pressure of 15 kilopascal and
so on”, that one may question. [. . . ] But, well, if you have a beautiful, colorful
image, especially with decision-makers or so, that they can show or that they
can tell when a citizen comes. Then he says: “Look here, the avalanches, it has
been simulated. It looks like this.” And that is deceptive because a colorful image
partially doesn’t have to tell you much. But the acceptance of them is, like, very,
very high. (IA20E, 00:42:55-1)
The more of a lay person someone is, the more likely he is to believe these images.
Especially if they move. [. . . ] That’s convincing, of course. And the more one
knows, the more intensively one deals with these phenomena, the more critical
one becomes, naturally. And doesn’t only see the pretty colors and the great
impressive films but knows, of course, that all of that is very rough [. . . ] [A]t core,
the experts are much more critical. (IA22E, 01:45:21-4)
Section 10.3.1
[F]or regional planning offices, the simulation results aren’t really of interest. [. . . ]
How we arrive at our red and yellow zones is relatively uninteresting. They trust
us in this and accept the zoning plans, well, I don’t want to say in blind trust, but
in trust. (IA22E, 01:27:57-6)
SK: Are the development officers aware of it actually being difficult to draw a line?
01:31:35-5
IA22E: I think so, yes. We communicate that again and again. Those things, well,
yes, great uncertainties (. . . ). Well that is being communicated. The people that
deal with us know that. 01:31:53-7
SK: Is it also taken into account? 01:31:58-4
IA22E: It’s not being taken into account. No, it’s, cannot be taken into account.
It’s that this, this line is simply necessary, that one says alright, with a very high
likeliness, that’s where it will come to a halt. [. . . ] 01:33:24-6
When it’s the mayor as the building authority, he probably doesn’t know what’s
involved in this line. What has been modeled here? With what model? With
which specificity? With what input? He has to rely on the prior authorities
having produced this, has to rely on them having produced it according to their
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best knowledge and conscience. Meanwhile, I think that most of them also accept
it... (IA24E, 01:29:02-8)
Yes the mayors are very happy most of the time because they have a degree of
certainty and arguments. The mayor is responsible for safety in the municipality
and that is helpful for him. He can say: look here, that’s the zoning plan. So you
needn’t ask for a reclassification. [. . . ] And also has it easier in the case of a crisis.
[. . . ] Of course, there are people who really don’t want it because, naturally, a red
zone will devalue a building site immensely. (IA22E, 00:34:04-7)
Very often or I would say in most cases the local politicians, heads of municipalities,
of municipal offices, are so strongly influenced by other interests in our area that
they rather close their eyes and don’t want to know or hear about models and
results of modeling. [. . . ] [B]ecause we developed skiing resorts in whole valleys,
have created pists. [. . . ] So there has been a huge shift in the use of land. And no
local politician wants to then hear that things have worsened meteorologically...
[. . . ] But local politics is of course so intimately linked to the main economic
factors there that they are very reluctant to address these issues [. . . ] [T]here are
other skiing resorts and regions where this works very well. [. . . ] There, ski-resort
operators and local politicians work without this reluctance [. . . ] they are happy
to get modeling results and look at these and contemplate: what can one do there
in the future? (IA24E, 00:48:48-6)
Well, I would, I would say yes. If they would have concerns, it would be better
if they would have a clue. [. . . ] But basically we don’t ever have discussions or
about simulations. I also think people don’t know much about this, about these
things. (IA22E, 01:29:06-4)
For political decision-makers, for example, or for development planners, [. . . ] they
need a fixed line to plan with. [. . . ] If one would always pass along all information,
one would (demand from each in the chain) that they preoccupy themselves with
this and know about it, so this... this degree of abstraction (as in my case) should
be dealt with by the experts. [. . . ] [So that] other people can rely on it. (IA23E,
00:26:05-5)
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[T]his gray area would be preferable, but the whole legal establishment couldn’t
deal with it, if I say alright, yes, all of it is likely there, likely there. They want
to know exactly what is with this house. And is there something there or not.
That’s it. I can’t say: yes, probably. Nobody knows how to respond to that. So
a specific statement (is required). (IA22E, 01:31:27-2)
Section 10.3.2
Well, it’s like this: when it comes to construction of houses, (they want) numbers,
then one says: yes, ten kilopascal, that’s it. Civil engineers carrying out projects,
they mostly come to discuss. [. . . ] Often becomes quite controversial, admittedly.
It’s not always just friendly, then, that. (IA22E, 00:57:16-0)
They don’t have any provisions the way that settlement areas have. And then
they rather do it according to cost-benefit-analyses. Even if they know that this
is in a hazardous area but we say: “Alright, it’s quite uncertain. It doesn’t come
every year or every other year but rather every 30 years.” Then they decide on the
basis of cost-benefit alone. And since they plan for 30 or 40 years into the future,
if we say: “yes every 150 years. Yes, could happen.” Then they say alright, we’ll
accept that risk. So it... it’s then inconsequential. (IA21E, 00:12:42-4)
Well they [the results – Ed.] always have to be verified. And that has to be done
together with the end-users and the results have to be discussed and the plausibility
has to be checked. [. . . ] They are also more actively involved in the project and
provide much more information if they are included from the beginning. If that
doesn’t happen, many of the results are, end up in a drawer and will then not be..
utilized any more really. Or accepted. And if they, one does not talk to them and
also tells them what goes into this simulation, I mean as input parameters, then...
[. . . ] it won’t really be accepted. (00:17:59-4, emphasis added)
We don’t tell them that. They want to have one value in the end. [. . . ] If we have
used two models and one runs, I don’t know, 20 m further than the other, we have
to interpret this as experts: what do we believe is more realistic. And we have to
deliver a value. Because people only want a single value. So we... they can’t deal
with more things. (IA21E, 00:08:03-0)
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Yes, I believe, yes, if they really have no idea, they will either simply accept it.
And then they probably want to build something and will simply say: “Alright,
we commissioned it. They say, it’s like that, we accept it.” Because, then, they’re
in principle no longer responsible. But say: “Yes, they are responsible. We take
it. It’s okay.” (IA21E, 00:25:19-7)
Section 10.3.3
And, in some expert opinions, I’ve gone out, have interpreted the results and have
said: “Well, maybe the starting altitude is a bit higher, because if the congestion...”
Then they say: “No, we have to plan this now. We have this structure down here,
we want to protect it.” And they want me to tell them how. [. . . ] And yes, there’s
no, little leeway. [. . . ] It will always be pointed out by us. [. . . ] That this can’t be
said with a hundred percent certainty, it’s due to the models’ limitations. But...
that’s an accepted risk then [. . . ]. (IA21E, 00:10:57-2)
[B]efore, I thought that they must know much more about it. Meanwhile, I think,
yes, they should be aware. One should communicate it. One shouldn’t keep it a
secret and only give them results, instead one should write that the results are
uncertain, because yes. [. . . ] [If] the user is someone that really builds something,
one should... also quantify the uncertainties, which is relatively difficult. [. . . ]
But they [. . . ] don’t need to completely comprehend this, how one arrives at this
value. Because I think that’s what they’re commissioning experts for. [. . . ] So, if
they, they should have the option to ask questions. In the report, it should also
be described where uncertainties can arise. (IA21E, 00:15:37-5)
My experience or my assessment is that they are accepted way too much. If [. . . ]
one has to plan a building here now, a dam or something. And I say: these results
from the simulation have to be taken with a pinch of salt for this and that reason
and there’s some latitude in this and that area. Nobody cares. What the people
want to hear is: at this point, the avalanche is 5 m high... [. . . ] Yes, I think the
less experience or I don’t know what it depends on, these results are much too
accepted. (IA19E, 01:36:41-2)
Either the result or the, the procedure has to be standardized to such a degree
that mistakes cannot be made. Though, actually, it shouldn’t be that way either
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in the best case. Yes, fundamentally, people should know more about it, but I
tend to believe that that’s too much. I believe it isn’t possible to know everything
or a whole lot about such a model if one is only supposed to interpret results.
Partially, though, it’s very necessary [. . . ]. (IA19E, 01:25:30-0)
We, working in the practical application, know little, relatively little about the
whole theoretical background. We judge the result, what comes out. We, we
look at the input parameters if they are somewhat right or correspond with our
experience. But the process within the model is relatively unknown to us. [. . . ]
To us, it’s like a black box almost. With a result and this result we compare with
our experience and our, our other methods. But the other, the procedural within
the model, that one would have to deal with together with a specialist. (IA22E,
00:50:32-4)
One cannot know everything. [. . . ] I also wouldn’t have the time for that. For that,
there are more well-versed people. [. . . ] And there one must, if, if one realizes
that it’s completely implausible, then one must enter into discussion. (IA22E,
00:53:03-5)
[T]hat many... that there are many avalanche experts who are relatively new and
have little field experience. And when that’s the case, [. . . ] I just think it’s a risk
that the simulation programs are so easy to run and [. . . ] the results just won’t be
verified enough. [. . . ] [T]he users or the people who do simulations often possess
too little process knowledge... [. . . ] And they have, I think, too much trust in the
results. I mean, in themselves. And there it’s, it would be good if people would
be more aware of the uncertainties, when they then pack these into the results,
ultimately. (IA21E, 00:20:05-4)
The danger is that the results can be simply not correct because the local condi-
tions just deviate strongly. If one isn’t aware of this and doesn’t take the terrain
into account, the simulations will simply give false values. [. . . ] The maps are
published and people who deal with these things see the maps and say: “Yes, yes,
yes, that’s right.” And it’s consulted for further planning measures. And that’s
the danger, that these, that [it’s] possible today to somehow run such a simulation,
one has beautiful images, publishes these and – only because it looks good – the
result is accepted by people who don’t... question it in detail, simply accept. And
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that, I think, is certainly a relative risk. Especially with avalanches and every-
thing, where it can really be very different, locally. I mean, the conditions. [. . . ]
And if the locals or the decision-makers haven’t observed things this way [. . . ],
they won’t take the results seriously. So then they won’t use them... (IA21E,
00:23:06-4)
Well, everyone was able to hand in and say: “I’m an engineering office or we’re
a research institute. We can do this and would analyze this area for that price.”
And that has partially, especially with something like this, taken a turn for the
worse, that there’s been extreme price dumping. Everyone then said: “I can do it
even cheaper and even cheaper.” And the cheapest method is simply to run the
simulation, trace the line and say: “That’s it.” (IA20E, 00:31:59-5)
And these, these natural hazards, well hazard zone planning is now often being
done by engineering companies. [. . . ] [T]he municipality puts out a tender. [All of
the country] applies for it, so it’s possible [. . . ] that an engineering company from
[the south] does the hazard zone planning in the Alps. And then they of course
base it on simulations because, themselves, they cannot really assess this region.
[. . . ] I think they’re noticing, too, that this isn’t working all that well. (IA21E,
00:34:21-1)
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